<![CDATA[Team IT Security - 📰 Alle Kategorien]]> de-DE Tue, 28 Jul 2026 20:30:15 +0200 Tue, 28 Jul 2026 20:30:15 +0200 15 2026 Team IT Security lakandor@tsecurity.de (Horus Sirius) lakandor@tsecurity.de (Horus Sirius) IT Security Cybersecurity Nachrichten Team IT Security RSS Generator v2.0 https://tsecurity.de/favicon.ico <![CDATA[Team IT Security - 📰 Alle Kategorien]]> <![CDATA[Crime blotter: A second arrest in the 2025 FedEx robbery]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3695530/ios-mac-os/crime-blotter-a-second-arrest-in-the-2025-fedex-robbery/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3695530/ios-mac-os/crime-blotter-a-second-arrest-in-the-2025-fedex-robbery/ Sun, 26 Jul 2026 13:08:48 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de AirPods, a shooting followed an argument about an Apple Watch, and another FedEx robbery in Memphis, all in this week's Apple Crime Blotter.

White wireless earbuds resting in an open charging case on a soft gray fabric surface, with the case lid tilted back and earbuds partially seated in their slots
AirPods 4

The latest in an occasional AppleInsider feature, looking at the world of Apple-related crime.


Continue Reading on AppleInsider | Discuss on our Forums]]> <![CDATA[John Robertson's The Dark Room (emf2026)]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3695464/it-security-video/john-robertsons-the-dark-room-emf2026/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3695464/it-security-video/john-robertsons-the-dark-room-emf2026/ Sun, 26 Jul 2026 12:05:29 +0200 🎥 IT Security Video tsecurity.de <![CDATA[US reportedly favors selective bans over blanket restrictions on Chinese open weight models citing security concerns]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3695340/ai-nachrichten/us-reportedly-favors-selective-bans-over-blanket-restrictions-on-chinese-open-weight-models-citing-security-concerns/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3695340/ai-nachrichten/us-reportedly-favors-selective-bans-over-blanket-restrictions-on-chinese-open-weight-models-citing-security-concerns/ Sun, 26 Jul 2026 10:13:08 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

The Trump administration is planning targeted bans on Chinese AI models rather than a blanket ban. After public pressure, OpenAI and Google DeepMind signed an open letter opposing regulation of open-weight models, yet OpenAI and Anthropic continue to lobby privately for those same restrictions amid security concerns and powerful business interests.

The article US reportedly favors selective bans over blanket restrictions on Chinese open weight models citing security concerns appeared first on The Decoder.

]]> <![CDATA[Did Virginia Regulators Downplay Data Center Health Concerns?]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694993/it-security-nachrichten/did-virginia-regulators-downplay-data-center-health-concerns/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694993/it-security-nachrichten/did-virginia-regulators-downplay-data-center-health-concerns/ Sun, 26 Jul 2026 06:31:16 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

]]> <![CDATA[China is Creating a Herd of 100 Elite Yak Clones]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694805/it-security-nachrichten/china-is-creating-a-herd-of-100-elite-yak-clones/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694805/it-security-nachrichten/china-is-creating-a-herd-of-100-elite-yak-clones/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 20:01:07 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

]]> <![CDATA[The EU’s AI transparency deadline is weeks away. Is your enterprise ready?]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694779/ai-nachrichten/the-eus-ai-transparency-deadline-is-weeks-away-is-your-enterprise-ready/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694779/ai-nachrichten/the-eus-ai-transparency-deadline-is-weeks-away-is-your-enterprise-ready/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:50:13 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Providers and deployers of AI systems: You only have a couple of weeks left until you must explicitly inform users when they are interacting with AI content.

To assist in the effort, the European Commission (Commission) has published guidelines to help AI deployers get in line with the AI Act’s transparency obligations, which will begin to go into effect on August 2.

After that, companies providing AI systems must alert users when they are interacting with AI. They must also tell users when they have been exposed to deepfakes, “emotion recognition,” or biometric categorization systems, or when they are given AI-manipulated content in matters of “public interests without human review or editorial control.”

Henna Virkkunen, the Commission’s executive VP for tech sovereignty, security and democracy, said in a statement, “with today’s guidelines, the Commission supports the smooth and effective application of the AI Act to make AI systems interacting with people such as chatbots and AI agents and AI content more transparent and trustworthy. These guidelines support providers and deployers in meeting their obligations under the AI Act, while helping citizens know when they are interacting with AI.”

Systems must include machine-readable markers to reveal such content, to reduce “the risk of deception and manipulation” and build public trust in AI.

“Generative systems have collapsed the cost of producing convincing content while the cost of judging it stands where it always stood,” said Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research. This requirement is “an attempt to restore friction to that imbalance.”

A company’s non-compliance could result in fines anywhere from €750K (about $856K) to €15M (about $17 million), or even up to 3% of its total worldwide annual revenue.

Transparency requirements

The EU AI Act’s transparency requirements apply to “natural or legal persons,” public authorities, agencies, or other bodies that develop AI systems, or have them developed, and place them on the EU market or into use under their name or trademark. This means all companies, regardless of whether or not they are EU-based.

“Systems placed on the European market, put into service there, or producing outputs used there are inside the field, wherever the developer sits,” Gogia noted.

Applicable systems must be intended to interact directly with “natural persons”; these systems include AI-enabled chatbots or conversational agents, AI companions, or coding agents. However, AI-enabled tools like recommender systems, spam filters, authentication, search and retrieval, transcription, text and code auto-completion, or predictive maintenance do not fall under the rule.

Specific outputs such as AI-generated text, images, video, and audio must contain a machine-readable mark. Deepfakes and public interest-related text created by AI without human review or control must be clearly labeled, however, deepfake content that is “artistic, creative, satirical, or fictional” is largely exempt.

AI content must be marked with one of three labels: “AI,” “Fully AI-generated,” or “Partially AI-modified.” For instance, “Fully AI-generated” applies when news summaries, music, art, or videos have been created without any human oversight (apart from prompting), while “partially AI-modified” could mean a person’s face is swapped into an authentic photograph to create a deepfake.

The three icons are publicly available for free use; enterprises can download zip files in PNG and SVG formats.

Most of the Act’s transparency rules begin to go into effect on August 2. But AI systems placed on the market before then will have some leeway; they must be in compliance by December 2.

However, a four-month allowance “on one obligation, for one population of systems, contingent on one procedural step, is not a strategy,” Gogia emphasized. Enterprises should plan to comply by August 2 and “treat any relief that arrives as margin.”

A consistent code of practice

Along with the transparency guidelines, the Commission has introduced a code of practice that essentially serves as a gesture of good faith. When signed, it can provide “legal certainty” and a “simple and practical” way to demonstrate compliance with the AI Act, according to the Commission. Signatories can also collaborate through the ‘Signatory Taskforce,’ which will share practices and advance technologies around marking and labeling practices.

Providers that choose not to sign must comply through other methods and demonstrate that those methods are “adequate” through assessment by surveillance authorities, according to the Commission.

Non-signatories “keep their flexibility, and will face more case-by-case scrutiny for it,” said Gogia.

Criteria for compliance

Shashi Bellamkonda, principal research director at Info-Tech Research Group, pointed out that the transparency requirements apply to content only when three criteria are met: It has been published, is informative to the public, or is on matters of public interest.

B2B business content or blogs may not need an AI disclosure if they do not meet these criteria, he noted. Also, published text that has undergone human review or is under editorial control does not need to be labeled. Editorial control means that a person must hold the ultimate legal responsibility for the publication of the content.

Many companies like Google, Adobe, and LinkedIn have already established ways to identify images marked as AI-generated. Meta has made it a requirement, but the creator has to add the AI-generated label, Bellamkonda said.

“This is a good move for guardrails around public information, and companies with good compliance and ethical oversight may not have to worry about this,” he noted. But as a general practice, companies should disclose AI-generated content and state whether it has been human reviewed.

Creating a transparency pipeline

Establishing full transparency means identifying who carries the responsibility for the content, whether the marking survives real use, not just testing, and what evidence will defend the decision, Gogia said.

Concerns cluster around responsibility, durability and evidence. Several organizations usually touch one piece of content, and none controls the whole chain, which is why contracts become the “pressure point,” he said. Most current agreements were written to deliver software and say “almost nothing” about provenance persistence, verification access, or evidence retention.

The durability concern is the most difficult, Gogia noted, because marking performs well in controlled settings but “badly in ordinary life.” Meta, for one, said its invisible watermark was designed to survive cropping; a published test, however, found the company’s preview detector missed 55% of cropped images.

“CIOs should ask which platform can actually provide evidence before believing its dashboard,” said Gogia.

Disclosure of AI use must be “clear, distinguishable and accessible,” he emphasized. “A notice buried in lengthy terms, or reachable only through determined clicking, satisfies nobody, least of all a market surveillance authority.”

Sustained compliance is a “living control” requiring a central record of systems, duties and evidence; testing taking place where the user meets the control rather than where the developer built it; and continuous supplier assurance. Enforcement will vary by country, so keep one common baseline with local overlays, Gogia said.

His advice: Inventory every system that talks to people, generates content, or gauges sentiment; classify provider and deployer roles; place disclosures at first interaction; define substantive human review; keep the evidence.

Marks and provenance signals should be tested after content undergoes cropping, compression, translation, transcription, and other editing, Gogia said. A useful audit starts from a real output and follows its “pulse” through generation, editing and publication, identifying at “each beat” the responsible party, the surviving mark, and evidence for exceptions. Missed labels should also be traced for root cause and recurrence.

To ensure compliance, before August 2, enterprises need a prioritized inventory, live disclosures on the highest-risk use cases, and a “named owner for every control,” he noted. In the first 30 days, they should stabilize and test; in the first 90 days, push requirements into procurement processes as a standing discipline. Procurement must secure commitments on marking methods, known failure modes, and evidence access, with explicit notice if/when any of them change.

“The sensible architecture is a common transparency baseline carrying traceability, responsibility, and evidence, with jurisdictional overlays for language, sector rules, and local practice,” Gogia said.

This article originally appeared on CIO.com.

]]> <![CDATA[US AI testing institute chief steps down within three months]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694777/ai-nachrichten/us-ai-testing-institute-chief-steps-down-within-three-months/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694777/ai-nachrichten/us-ai-testing-institute-chief-steps-down-within-three-months/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:50:12 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

The head of the US government’s AI testing institute, Chris Fall, has resigned about three months after taking charge of the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), the federal organization responsible for evaluating advanced artificial intelligence models for safety and security.

Current National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Director Arvind Raman will serve as acting CAISI Director following Fall’s departure while continuing to oversee the Commerce Department office responsible for the institute, the Daily Signal reported, citing two people familiar with the matter.

A Commerce Department spokesperson who spoke to the publication did not disclose a reason for the resignation.

Fall assumed leadership of CAISI in April after the Trump administration reorganized the former US AI Safety Institute under NIST. The institute develops methodologies for evaluating frontier AI models and works with AI developers on voluntary technical assessments covering areas such as cybersecurity, model misuse, reliability and other risks associated with increasingly capable AI systems.

The leadership change comes as governments and AI companies continue developing technical approaches for evaluating frontier AI models while enterprises expand deployments of generative AI and agentic AI across business operations.

In recent months, the Commerce Department has taken a more active role in AI policy involving advanced models, placing greater attention on how the federal government evaluates technologies with potential national security implications.

Continuity matters more than personalities

CAISI works with AI developers such as Anthropic, Google’s DeepMind and OpenAI on voluntary evaluations of frontier AI models and develops methodologies for testing model capabilities and risks. The institute does not regulate AI developers or certify commercial AI systems.

For enterprises, those evaluations are one source of technical information alongside vendors’ own testing, third-party security assessments and internal AI governance programs.

Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research, said enterprises should focus less on the individual leading the institute and more on whether its technical work continues with the same level of consistency and transparency.

“Leadership churn at CAISI weakens the signal long before it weakens the science,” Gogia said. “The testing has not stopped. Its authority simply does not travel as cleanly once the leadership does not.”

According to Gogia, the more important question for enterprises is not whether the institute’s evaluation work will continue but whether the processes supporting those evaluations remain stable.

“The instinct is to ask whether the pipeline is breaking,” he said. “The more useful question is where the pipeline now sits.”

Enterprises still carry the burden of AI governance

Gogia said organizations should continue treating government-led AI evaluations as one input into their governance processes rather than as evidence that a model is inherently safe for enterprise deployment.

“A government evaluation was always a signal, never a certificate,” he said. “A signal loses value the moment its issuer becomes unpredictable.”

He said enterprises should instead monitor whether CAISI maintains consistent evaluation methodologies, continues publishing technical findings and preserves continuity within its research teams under interim leadership.

“The name on the door is not the signal. The behaviour underneath it is,” Gogia said.

Gogia also cautioned against linking Fall’s resignation to recent Commerce Department actions involving AI policy or export controls, noting that there is no public evidence connecting the two.

“CAISI evaluates; it does not enforce export controls, because it holds no such power,” he said. “This is not a testing body reaching for enforcement. It is enforcement reaching past the testing body.”

With Raman assuming the role on an interim basis, the next significant milestone for enterprises will be the appointment of a permanent director, and whether the institute’s evaluation programs continue without disruption, the analyst said.

Gogia said the successor’s mandate may prove more important than the individual selected.

“A CAISI result is not a safe harbour,” he said. “It informs an obligation; it does not discharge one.” NIST did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

]]> <![CDATA[OECD: Physical labor isn’t immune from AI disruptions]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694778/ai-nachrichten/oecd-physical-labor-isnt-immune-from-ai-disruptions/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694778/ai-nachrichten/oecd-physical-labor-isnt-immune-from-ai-disruptions/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:50:12 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Jobs involving physical labor are at high risk of disruption from automation, with new technologies such as AI robots becoming more prevalent, according to a recent study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). That means workers in construction and extraction, farming, fishing, forestry, production and material transportation could be affected by fast-moving technology changes.

“Routine and low-skilled jobs are at higher risk,” the Paris-based public policy group said, adding that “overall, jobs requiring non-routine cognitive, social and creative skills are less susceptible to automation.”

The kinds of creative and cognitive jobs still thought to be less exposed to automation include social work and community service roles. 

OECD also said management jobs — which often require workers to devise creative answers to solve problems — fall within the creative and cognitive category. “While AI has made some high-skill job requirements more susceptible to automation, many critical skills in these roles remain difficult to automate,” OECD said.

The same still holds true for some physical and manual labor jobs – including cleaners, agricultural workers, food-prep assistants, and laborers — which are less exposed to the affects of AI, OECD said.  

But people who work in programming, translating and interpretation positions could find their work affected by the quick rise of AI tools and services. According to the organization, global AI uptake rose from 7% in 2021 to 20% in 2025.

“In these occupations, GenAI could perform a significant share of tasks at least twice as fast today or in the near future,” OECD said.

The effects of the AI boom are not always uniform across industries or regions. In a separate 2026 Employment Outlook study released by the group, exposure to disruption from generative AI (genAI) ranges from about 16% in some areas to more than 70% elsewhere, depending on industries and occupations. 

Numerous research firms have said in recent years that AI is driving short-term job losses, though tech industry experts and analysts have argued AI will also create new careers and jobs as agentic AI takes over low-skilled work. 

AI technology has become so ubiquitous that it’s been compared to electricity — virtually all companies will need it or at least know how to use it. But it’s adoption has been hindered at times as companies struggle to find ROI from its use, and by regulatory and ethical hurdles.

In the US, AI blamed for June job losses

According to a Challenger, Gray & Christmas study released earlier this month, AI was cited as the top reason for job cuts in June. The outplacement firm said employers cut 45,849 job cuts in June, of which 14,029 were attributed to AI, with the tech industry leading the cuts.

“Tech remains the epicenter of this year’s cuts,” Challenger said. “AI is the dominant force as companies are restructuring around it, automating roles, and reallocating budgets toward new capabilities. The sector is being reshaped in real time.”

Overall, AI has been responsible for 173,568 job cuts since 2021, the company said.

AI is hurting jobs in customer service, internal reporting, telecommunications, and hosting automation, said Victor Janulaitis, a staffing consultant who was formerly CEO at Janco Associates Inc.

“C-level executives continue to be focused on eliminating ‘non-essential’ managers, staff, and services,” he said. “Coders and developers have limited opportunities with legacy applications.”

While jobs in the IT sector overall are declining, current hiring tends to skew in the direction of people with AI skills. A report this month by CompTIA put job listings with AI skills at around 500,000, which is close to double the number in January.

“Employers in other industries are accelerating digital transformation initiatives and moving from AI experimentation to implementation,” said Seth Robinson, CompTIA’s vice president for industry research.

That view dovetails with what ManpowerGroup, the recruitment firm, is seeing; demand for AI-related skills has nearly doubled over the past year, said Ger Doyle, regional president of North America at ManpowerGroup.

That growth extends well beyond traditional technology roles as companies move from experimenting to AI deployments at scale, Doyle said. “We’re seeing it influence hiring across occupations ranging from data science and engineering to project management and operational roles,” he said.

]]> <![CDATA[AMD raises the AI stakes with Helios, Venice and robotics]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694768/ai-nachrichten/amd-raises-the-ai-stakes-with-helios-venice-and-robotics/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694768/ai-nachrichten/amd-raises-the-ai-stakes-with-helios-venice-and-robotics/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:50:07 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

AMD executives took to the stage at its Advancing AI 2026 event in San Francisco today to detail the company’s next generation of AI infrastructure solutions, from Instinct MI455X AI accelerator GPUs and 6th Gen EPYC “Venice” CPUs, to Pensando networking, ROCm.AI software and its Helios rack-scale platform that ties it all together.

AMD has been working towards rack-scale AI system solutions for years. Its ZT Systems acquisition last year added valuable engineering talent and intellectual property that is now finally bearing the real fruits. Its Helios AI platform is a major platform evolution for AMD, with shipments scheduled to begin in the second half of this year (which is here and now).

The announcements at Advancing AI show how the company has engineered its AI platform solutions for large reasoning models, sustained inference and agentic workflows. These workloads pressure memory capacity, data movement, networking and CPU orchestration. AMD’s approach is to keep as much data close to the compute engines as possible and move it more efficiently throughout the system, but there’s deeper nuance here that’s obvious versus AMD’s chief rival, NVIDIA.  

AMD’s MI455X targets the AI memory wall

The Instinct MI455X GPU is the compute engine that fuels the Helios rack, and the first GPU based on AMD’s new CDNA 5 architecture. Built with a modular mix of 2nm and 3nm chiplets, it carries 432GB of HBM4 and 23.3TB/s of peak memory bandwidth.

Compared to AMD’s current MI355X, the MI455X offers 1.5 times the memory capacity, up to 2.9 times the peak memory bandwidth and up to four times the peak matrix performance with MXFP4 and MXFP8 data types, which are lower-precision numerical formats designed to accelerate AI processing while reducing memory demands. With MXFP6 (6-bit floating point), performance is rated at up to twice that of MI355X.

AMD also shared some actual, measured internal results using production silicon. The company claims MI455X delivers 3.8 times higher FP8 decode performance, 3.5 times more measured FP4 compute performance and between 2.5 and 3.5 times more networking bandwidth than MI355X, depending on the transfer path tested. Those figures provide more context than just numerical specifications, though they remain AMD-provided comparisons that will need independent validation.

AMD Instinct chart showing generational leap in performance

AMD

The architectural choices behind the numbers are important. Reasoning models and long context windows require sizeable KV caches for maintaining AI attention states, while mixture-of-experts models frequently move large amounts of data across accelerators. MI455X should let more model data, activation states and cache remain local. New dedicated IP in hardware can transfer data while the GPU continues processing, and expanded cache and multicast capabilities are designed to reduce redundant data movement to further improve efficiency.

The aforementioned lower-precision formats can also raise throughput and reduce memory use, but model developers still have to determine where they can be applied without unacceptable accuracy loss.

AMD’s Helios rack takes aim at Vera Rubin

AMD Helios rack

Dave Altavilla

Helios is AMD’s primary rack-scale competitor to NVIDIA’s Vera Rubin platform. Each liquid-cooled rack combines 72 MI455X GPUs, 18 single-socket Venice host CPUs and Pensando networking technologies.

In its most complete, premium configuration, AMD rates Helios for 2.9 exaflops of low-precision AI compute, with 31TB of aggregate HBM4 capacity, 1.7PB/s of memory bandwidth, 260TB/s of bidirectional scale-up bandwidth and 43TB/s of scale-out bandwidth.

These are formidable figures, but they are technical specifications rather than actual application benchmarks. The more consequential development is AMD’s move from collections of eight-GPU servers to a 72-GPU shared-memory domain. Models too large for one node can operate across the rack without treating every exchange as a scale-out networking transaction, which benefits large-model inference as well as training.

AMD uses UALink over Ethernet, or UALoE, for an open standard scale-up fabric. Each MI455X provides 3.6TB/s of bidirectional scale-up bandwidth, while the complete rack delivers all-to-all connectivity through a single switch layer. AMD also claims six times more scale-out bandwidth per GPU than MI355X when MI455X is configured with three Pensando Vulcano 800 AI NICs.

While open standards give cloud providers more control over suppliers and system design, AMD and its partners now have to prove those components can deliver the predictable performance, reliability and deployment experience customers expect from a tightly controlled, more vertically integrated platform.

Finally, AMD designed Helios with automatic rerouting around failed links, virtual rack partitions, tray-level serviceability and rack-wide power, cooling and health monitoring. Major hyperscalers and potentially large-scale enterprise customers will likely key in on these capabilities, which can affect the availability, total cost and consistency of the AI services they consume.

Kind of like cowbell, AMD Venice gives agentic AI more CPU

Chart showing AMD EPYC CPU performance

AMD

AMD’s agentic CPU messaging regarding its upcoming Venice-based EPYC processors is mostly marketing speak, but the underlying requirement is very real. An AI agent can invoke retrieval, databases, security checks, code execution and other tools before a GPU generates a response. Running many agents concurrently increases the amount of conventional compute requirements surrounding the accelerators.

Venice scales to 256 Zen 6 cores with support for 512 threads, 16 memory channels, up to 1GB of L3 cache per socket, along with PCIe 6.0 and CXL 3.1 connectivity. AMD is also offering several Venice configurations for other applications, including general-purpose servers, high-frequency workloads, GPU hosts and high-density CPU sandbox systems used to execute agent tools.

Treating the CPU solely as a GPU host understates its role. Gateways, tokenization, vector search, databases and short-lived code execution stress different mixes of per-core performance, thread count, memory bandwidth and I/O. Specifically, AMD’s internal testing shows Venice significantly outperforming its current EPYC 9965 Turin CPU across five parts of the agentic AI pipeline, including gateway processing, context assembly, vector search, enterprise applications and short-lived tool execution. Individual gains vary by workload, but AMD details the overall generational improvement at up to a 1.7 times lift. As with the MI455X figures though, these comparisons come from AMD and will require independent validation.

Pensando networking and ROCm software advance

Keeping GPUs fed with data and coordinating traffic across racks directly affects utilization and operating costs. In fact, GPU utilization is a pretty sad state of affairs currently for some of the major frontier model providers.

As such, Pensando networking has become central to AMD’s roadmap. Helios can connect each MI455X to as many as three 800Gbps Vulcano AI NICs, while Salina DPUs handle front-end networking and infrastructure services.

On the software side, which is an equally critical component, AMD also introduced ROCm.AI, an AI-assisted development layer due to arrive in August. It includes reusable skills for coding agents, simplified management and Hyperloom, which can profile workloads, tune serving configurations, modify kernels and validate results.

These tools address two persistent AMD challenges: developer efficiency and ease of use, and software tuning. Automated optimization still has to produce repeatable gains without creating hard-to-maintain code, however. And while ROCm has progressed significantly over the last few years, NVIDIA’s CUDA retains an advantage in maturity, tooling and developer familiarity.

Customer commitments underscore rack-scale confidence

AMD now has commitments that give its MI450 generation and Helios considerably more weight. Meta and OpenAI have announced multi-generation agreements composed of up to 6GW of AMD compute capacity, with initial 1GW deployments planned for the second half of 2026.

Oracle plans a 50,000-GPU public cloud cluster beginning in the third quarter, while Microsoft will deploy Helios for Azure AI inference. Finally, just before the AMD event, Anthropic announced a strategic partnership for up to 2 Gigawatts of AMD-fueled AI compute, with its first gigawatt expected online in the first half of 2027.

Commitments of this scale reflect confidence in more than just MI455X performance. These customers are evaluating the complete architecture, including Venice CPUs, Pensando networking, ROCm software, rack integration, serviceability and AMD’s ability to deliver and execute across multiple product generations.

There is some financial alignment behind the agreements as well. AMD issued OpenAI performance-based warrants and committed to investing up to $5 billion in Anthropic. That context matters when evaluating these deals as market validation, but these planned deployments are substantial nonetheless and put Helios on a much stronger foundation as it begins shipping.

AMD expands its robotics and embedded foundation

AMD also expanded its physical AI portfolio, building on credible traction from its Xilinx-derived Kria adaptive system-on-modules and embedded technologies that are already powering robotics, machine vision and industrial automation applications.

The new Ryzen AI Embedded X100 combines up to 16 Zen 5 CPU cores, integrated Radeon graphics, a second-generation NPU and as much as 128GB of unified LPDDR5X memory shared across its compute engines. To me this looks a lot like a repackaging and optimization of the company’s Strix Halo platform, but with specific optimizations for the embedded space. Regardless, AMD is pairing X100 with the Kria AI Robotics Developer Platform, which includes a System Module or SOM, and a new Robotics Partner Network spanning hardware, software and platform providers.

Samples began shipping in June, with full production expected in the fourth quarter. This broader objective is to give developers a path across AMD x86 CPUs, GPUs, NPUs and FPGAs for real-time autonomous systems, rather than requiring them to assemble those hardware engines and software components independently.

Execution for AMD is now the test

AMD has assembled a credible platform for the burgeoning agentic AI market that’s blowing up currently with no signs of stopping. MI455X addresses memory and data movement, Venice handles dense agentic CPU workloads, Pensando networking connects global system resources, and ROCm.AI addresses software complexity. Finally, Helios assembles these components into a true competitive threat for NVIDIA’s latest Vera Rubin platform.

AMD’s open architecture may appeal to customers seeking supplier choice, but openness must also translate into reliable deployments, competitive total cost and software that does not require a significant rip-up. NVIDIA enters this cycle with a stronger ecosystem and far more rack-scale deployment experience. The true test will be how easily and reliably customers can integrate, operate and maintain these AMD solutions at scale.

As it stands, AMD now has major customers and a clearly defined architecture with systems engineering expertise behind it. Delivering Helios on schedule and showing that its performance claims translate into a real production workload throughput advantage and total cost of ownership gains will determine how much the competitive gap narrows. And of course, this is in a market that is clamoring for ever-more compute resources with a seemingly insatiable demand for AI services and capacity. That’s an environment for big iron success. Now AMD just has to deliver optimized, turnkey AI platforms. This is far easier said than done, but time will soon tell as deployments take shape this year.

This article is published as part of the Foundry Expert Contributor Network.
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]]> <![CDATA[Google’s anti-search-scraping lawsuit dismissed]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694764/ai-nachrichten/googles-anti-search-scraping-lawsuit-dismissed/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694764/ai-nachrichten/googles-anti-search-scraping-lawsuit-dismissed/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:50:05 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

A court has dismissed Google’s case against SerpApi over that company’s scraping of search results to train AI models.

The US District Court for the Northern District of California found that there was no indication that any copyright had been breached.

Google announced in December that it was suing SerpApI for its alleged web scraping, claiming that it was protecting copyright holders. In February, SerpApI fought back and asked the court to dismiss Google’s case. And this week, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers agreed with SerpApi that Google’s case has no merit.

Google’s argument was that SerpApi’s actions breached the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA). It made two claims: first, that no person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title, and second that no person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, or component protected by the Act.

SerpApi claimed that the URLs and other links that were being served by Google did not in themselves entail copyright and the judge agreed. In her judgment, she said that there was no indication that the copyright holders had authorized Google to take action against SerpApi.

The case is not completely over as the judge has given Google 21 days to amend its complaint to demonstrate that it was acting on behalf of the copyright owners. It remains to be seen whether its war against the web scrapers is finally over.

]]> <![CDATA[Blockbuster I.P.O.s Are Creating New Millionaires. Philanthropies Want a Cut.]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694745/ai-nachrichten/blockbuster-ipos-are-creating-new-millionaires-philanthropies-want-a-cut/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694745/ai-nachrichten/blockbuster-ipos-are-creating-new-millionaires-philanthropies-want-a-cut/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:49:53 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Build in public, fail in public: what it’s like to be a founder under 20 right now ]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694735/ai-nachrichten/build-in-public-fail-in-public-whatitslike-to-be-a-founder-under-20right-now/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694735/ai-nachrichten/build-in-public-fail-in-public-whatitslike-to-be-a-founder-under-20right-now/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:49:48 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Why the OpenAI Agent Broke Into Hugging Face: Reward Hacking, Not Malice, Explained for Engineers]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694703/ai-nachrichten/why-the-openai-agent-broke-into-hugging-face-reward-hacking-not-malice-explained-for-engineers/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694703/ai-nachrichten/why-the-openai-agent-broke-into-hugging-face-reward-hacking-not-malice-explained-for-engineers/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:49:20 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de OpenAI disclosed that its own models breached Hugging Face's production infrastructure while taking a public security benchmark. The models were not attacking a target — they were optimizing a score. Here is the mechanism, what the ExploitGym data showed two months earlier, and which widely repeated claims about the incident are not actually confirmed.

The post Why the OpenAI Agent Broke Into Hugging Face: Reward Hacking, Not Malice, Explained for Engineers appeared first on MarkTechPost.

]]> <![CDATA[The May 2026 Security Update Review]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694568/hacking/the-may-2026-security-update-review/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694568/hacking/the-may-2026-security-update-review/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:02:56 +0200 🕵️ Hacking tsecurity.de I’m currently in Berlin helping set up for Pwn2Own Berlin, but that doesn’t stop Patch Tuesday from coming, and it’s another big one. At least nothing is listed as being in the wild – for now. Take a break from your regularly scheduled activities and let’s take a look at the latest security patches from Adobe and Microsoft. Due to technical difficulties, there will not be a video companion for this month.

Adobe Patches for May 2026

For May, Adobe released 10 bulletins addressing 52 unique CVEs in Adobe Commerce, After Effects, Adobe Connect, Illustrator, Media Encoder, Premiere Pro, Substance 3D Painter, Substance 3D Sampler, Content Authenticity SDK, and the Adobe Substance 3D Designer. Here’s this month’s overview table:

Bulletin ID Product CVE Count Highest Severity Highest CVSS Exploited Deployment Priority
APSB26-49 Adobe Commerce 15 Critical 8.7 No 2
APSB26-48 Adobe After Effects 4 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-50 Adobe Connect 2 Critical 9.6 No 3
APSB26-51 Adobe Illustrator 4 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-47 Adobe Media Encoder 2 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-46 Adobe Premiere Pro 3 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-55 Adobe Substance 3D Painter 2 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-54 Adobe Substance 3D Sampler 1 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-53 Content Authenticity SDK 14 Critical 7.5 No 3
APSB26-52 Adobe Substance 3D Designer 5 Important 6.3 No 3
TOTAL 10 bulletins 52

The obvious priority this month is the patch for Commerce, with its 15 bugs and deployment priority of 2. The Connect fix should also rank up there since both of its CVEs are CVSS 9s. Beyond those, it’s a pretty typical month for Adobe, with most of the bugs either being cross-site scripting (XSS) or open-and-own code executions.

Microsoft Patches for May 2026

This month, Microsoft released a whopping 138 new CVEs in Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Azure, .NET and Visual Studio, Copilot Chat, Github Copilot, M365 Copilot, SQL Server, TCP/IP, and the Telnet Client – yes, the Telnet client. Two of these bugs were reported through the TrendAI ZDI program. 30 of these bugs are rated Critical, three are rated as Moderate, one is rated Low, and the rest are rated Important in severity.

This large volume of fixes follows the largest monthly release in Microsoft’s history and reflects the trend across the industry of a high number of submissions. While not all of these bugs were found by AI, it’s likely they had an AI-related component – even if it was just AI writing the submission. I should also point out the Pwn2Own Berlin occurs in just a few days, and it’s typical for vendors to patch as much as they can before the event.

None of the bugs patched by Microsoft this month are listed as publicly known or under active attack at the time of release, so we’ve got that going for us. Let’s take a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with a nasty-looking bug in DNS:

-    CVE-2026-41096 - Windows DNS Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This patch fixes a heap-based buffer overflow in the DNS Client triggered by a malicious DNS response. No authentication or user interaction needed, and since the DNS Client runs on virtually every Windows machine, the attack surface is enormous. An attacker with a position to influence DNS responses (MitM, rogue server) could achieve unauthenticated RCE across your enterprise.

-    CVE-2026-41089 - Windows Netlogon Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This update covers another CVSS 9.8 bug, which is a stack-based buffer overflow that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker execute code on a domain controller by sending a specially crafted network request — no credentials, no user interaction required. Yup – that makes it wormable. This is the highest-impact bug that requires immediate patching: a compromised domain controller is a compromised domain.

-    CVE-2026-42898 - Microsoft Dynamics 365 On-Premises Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This bug rates a CVSS 9.9(!) and represents a code injection in Dynamics 365. It allows any authenticated user to execute code with a scope change, meaning exploitation can break out and affect resources beyond the vulnerable component itself. Scope changes are pretty rare, so if you’re running Dynamics 365 On-Prem, definitely test and deploy this patch quickly.

-    CVE-2026-40415 - Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This bug in the TCP/IP stack results from a use-after-free (UAF) and could allow a remote, unauthenticated threat actor to execute code without user interaction. That makes this another wormable bug. However, this one is much less likely to be exploited. The target needs to be under sustained low-memory (memory pressure) conditions, which is pretty rare. Still, no need to tempt fate here. Test and deploy this one quickly.

Here’s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for May 2026:

<![if supportMisalignedColumns]> <![endif]>
CVE Title Severity CVSS Public Exploited Type
CVE-2026-35435 Azure AI Foundry Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 8.6 No No EoP
CVE-2026-35428 Azure Cloud Shell Spoofing Vulnerability Critical 9.6 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-42826 Azure DevOps Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 10 No No Info
CVE-2026-32207 Azure Machine Learning Notebook Spoofing Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-33109 Azure Managed Instance for Apache Cassandra Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.9 No No RCE
CVE-2026-33844 Azure Managed Instance for Apache Cassandra Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9 No No RCE
CVE-2026-41105 Azure Monitor Action Group Notification System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 8.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33111 Copilot Chat (Microsoft Edge) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-26129 M365 Copilot Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-26164 M365 Copilot Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-33821 Microsoft Dynamics 365 Customer Insights Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 7.7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-42898 Microsoft Dynamics 365 On-Premises Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.9 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40379 Microsoft Enterprise Security Token Service (ESTS) Spoofing Vulnerability Critical 9.3 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-40363 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40358 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-34327 Microsoft Partner Center Spoofing Vulnerability Critical 8.2 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-40365 Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-41103 Microsoft SSO Plugin for Jira & Confluence Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 9.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33823 Microsoft Team Events Portal Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 9.6 No No Info
CVE-2026-40364 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40366 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40361 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40367 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-42831 Office for Android Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-41096 Windows DNS Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-35421 Windows GDI Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40403 Windows Graphics Component Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40402 Windows Hyper-V Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 9.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32161 Windows Native WiFi Miniport Driver Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-41089 Windows Netlogon Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32175 .NET Core Tampering Vulnerability Important 4.3 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-32177 .NET Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-35433 .NET Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No EoP
CVE-2025-54518 * AMD: CVE-2025-54518 CPU OP Cache Corruption Important No No RCE
CVE-2026-42899 ASP.NET Core Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-40381 Azure Connected Machine Agent Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-42823 † Azure Logic Apps Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 9.9 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33833 Azure Machine Learning Notebook Spoofing Vulnerability Important 8.2 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-32204 Azure Monitor Agent Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-42830 Azure Monitor Agent Metrics Extension Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33117 Azure SDK for Java Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 9.1 No No SFB
CVE-2026-41109 GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No SFB
CVE-2026-35424 Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-41614 M365 Copilot for Desktop Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-41100 Microsoft 365 Copilot for Android Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.4 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-40377 Microsoft Cryptographic Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-41094 Microsoft Data Formulator Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40417 Microsoft Dynamics 365 Business Central Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-42833 Microsoft Dynamics 365 On-Premises Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 9.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-42838 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40360 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No Info
CVE-2026-40359 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40362 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-42832 Microsoft Excel Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.7 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-34329 Microsoft Message Queuing (MSMQ) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40419 Microsoft Office Click-To-Run Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40418 Microsoft Office Click-To-Run Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-35436 Microsoft Office Click-To-Run Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40420 Microsoft Office Click-To-Run Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-42893 Microsoft Outlook for iOS Tampering Vulnerability Important 7.4 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-40374 Microsoft Power Automate Desktop Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-41102 Microsoft PowerPoint for Android Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-35439 Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40368 Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-33110 Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-33112 Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40357 Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32185 Microsoft Teams Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-41101 Microsoft Word for Android Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-35440 Microsoft Word Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-40421 Microsoft Word Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 4.3 No No Info
CVE-2026-41097 Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.7 No No SFB
CVE-2026-40370 † SQL Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-41613 Visual Studio Code Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-41612 Visual Studio Code Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-41611 Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-41610 Visual Studio Code Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.3 No No SFB
CVE-2026-33839 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33840 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34330 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34331 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-35423 Windows 11 Telnet Client Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No Info
CVE-2026-35438 Windows Admin Center Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-41086 Windows Admin Center in Azure Portal Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34344 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34345 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-35416 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-41088 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34343 Windows Application Identity (AppID) Subsystem Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-35418 Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33835 Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34337 Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40407 Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40397 Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-42896 Windows DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-35419 Windows DWM Core Library Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-34336 Windows DWM Core Library Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No Info
CVE-2026-33834 Windows Event Logging Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32209 Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 4.4 No No SFB
CVE-2026-33841 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-35420 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40369 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34332 Windows Kernel-Mode Driver Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-34339 Windows Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-34341 Windows Link-Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33838 Windows Message Queuing (MSMQ) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34342 Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-41095 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34340 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40398 Windows Remote Desktop Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21530 Windows Rich Text Edit Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32170 Windows Rich Text Edit Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40410 Windows SMB Client Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-35415 Windows Storage Spaces Controller Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34350 Windows Storport Miniport Driver Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-40405 Windows TCP/IP Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-40414 Windows TCP/IP Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.4 No No DoS
CVE-2026-40401 Windows TCP/IP Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No DoS
CVE-2026-40413 Windows TCP/IP Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.4 No No DoS
CVE-2026-35422 Windows TCP/IP Driver Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-34351 Windows TCP/IP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40399 Windows TCP/IP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34334 Windows TCP/IP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40406 Windows TCP/IP Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-33837 Windows TCP/IP Local Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40415 Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-42825 Windows Telephony Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34338 Windows Telephony Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40382 Windows Telephony Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-40380 Windows Volume Manager Extension Driver Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No RCE
CVE-2026-40408 Windows WAN ARP Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34333 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34347 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-35417 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-42891 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) for Android Spoofing Vulnerability Moderate 6.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-35429 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) for Android Spoofing Vulnerability Moderate 4.3 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-41107 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Moderate 7.4 No No Info
CVE-2026-40416 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) for Android Spoofing Vulnerability Low 4.3 No No Spoofing

* Indicates this CVE had been released by a third party and is now being included in Microsoft releases.

† Indicates further administrative actions are required to fully address the vulnerability.

 

Looking at the other Critical-rated bugs in this month’s release, there are quite a few scary-looking bugs (including a CVSS 10!), but there’s no action for the end user as Microsoft has already mitigated these bugs and is just now documenting them. There’s also this month’s crop of Office bugs where the Preview Pane is an attack vector. However, the bug in Office for Android does not have the Preview Pane vector; it’s simple open and own. The bug in the WiFi driver needs a network adjacent attacker. The SharePoint bug requires authentication, but anyone with site privileges has the authentication needed. The bug in SSO Plugin for Jira & Confluence should really be called an authentication bypass, since it allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain access to a system.

Looking at the other code execution bugs, most are of the open and own variety as expected. The bug in Dynamic 365 (On Prem) requires high privileges. The Message Queueing bug requires an adjacent attacker. The bug in SQL Server requires authentication, but as usual, patching won’t be straightforward. Finally, there’s a bug in the kernel that leads to code execution. Most kernel bugs are privilege escalations, but this one could allow code execution if an attacker sends specially crafted NVMe over Fabrics (NVMe‑oF) response messages during the connection handshake process that contains an invalid header length value. Neat.

As usual, the vast majority of the Microsoft release fixes Elevation of Privilege (EoP) bugs. Also as usual, most simply lead to local attackers executing their code at SYSTEM-level privileges or administrative privileges, so there’s not much to add without further technical details about the bugs themselves. There are also a few bugs that just state the attacker could “gain ELEVATED privileges.” How obtuse. The bugs in Azure allow an attacker to access data otherwise hidden from them. The Edge bug allows threat actors to elevate to the privileges of the running application. The bug in Visual Studio allows attackers to get permissions associated with the MCP Server’s managed identity. Finally, there are a couple of sandbox escapes, too, which are always useful.

This month's update includes six Security Feature Bypass vulnerabilities. The most severe is in the Azure SDK for Java (CVSS 9.1). An attacker over the network can bypass the integrity protection provided by authentication tags on encrypted data, effectively manipulating encrypted input in a way that slips past integrity checks during decryption. Close behind is the bypass affecting the GitHub Copilot integration in Visual Studio Code (CWE-74). This one requires a user interaction, but it allows an attacker to circumvent the path validation safeguards that normally control which files Copilot is permitted to modify. The other Visual Studio Code bypass involves cross-site scripting, improper link resolution, and information exposure triggered when a user opens or views a maliciously crafted notebook. On the Windows networking side there are two bypasses. The first hits the Windows TCP/IP driver via an authentication bypass using an alternate channel. The other impacts the Windows Filtering Platform through improper access control, allowing a local, low-privileged attacker to bypass FQDN-based network security rules. Finally, there’s a Secure Boot bypass that, you guessed it, bypasses secure boot features.

Moving on to the Information Disclosure bugs fixed this month, we have 15 different CVEs. As usual, the majority of these simply result in info leaks consisting of unspecified memory contents or memory addresses. The bug in Power Automate could expose data marked “Sensitive” within Power Automate Desktop flows. One of the Word bugs could disclose NLTM hashes. The bug in Edge could disclose your cookies, which seems rude. The bug in Visual Studio could expose file path information. Finally, there’s a bug in Telnet for Windows 11 that leaks information being used by Telnet at the time. I didn’t even realize Windows 11 still had a telnet client.

The May release contains 10 spoofing bugs (plus the ones already addressed by Microsoft). The bug in Azure Machine Learning Notebooks vulnerability requires user interaction, but it could expose info through the Azure ML web interface to the attacker. There’s a cluster of fixes for Microsoft's mobile Office suite on Android. Excel, Word, and PowerPoint for Android all carry spoofing flaws rooted in improper access control. Two Copilot products are also affected by spoofing vulns. The M365 Copilot for Desktop has no details provided. The M365 Copilot for Android variant requires low privileges and producing only limited impact on confidentiality and integrity. Microsoft Teams for Android rounds out the mobile app spoofing bugs. Three Edge bugs close things out, all involving misrepresentation of information in the browser UI.

There are two Tampering bugs in this month’s release. The one in .NET Core allows threat actors to write files to an affected system. The other is in Outlook for iOS and manifests as a command injection bug.

There are eight DoS bugs in the May release, but as always, Microsoft provides little to no actionable information about the vulnerabilities. The most interesting from a practical standpoint are two TCP/IP bugs that allow a low-privilege Hyper-V guest to crash the host. Both are triggered from the adjacent network. On the broader network-exposure side, the ASP.NET Core bug is a straightforward infinite loop condition — an unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted request over the network and the server stops responding.

No new advisories are being released this month.

Looking Ahead

Assuming I survive Pwn2Own Berlin (which is looking iffy at the moment), I’ll return on June 9th on what will hopefully be a smaller release than this one. Until then, stay safe, happy patching, and may all your reboots be smooth and clean!

]]> <![CDATA[The June 2026 Security Update Review]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694563/hacking/the-june-2026-security-update-review/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694563/hacking/the-june-2026-security-update-review/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:02:53 +0200 🕵️ Hacking tsecurity.de I’ve made it through Pwn2Own Berlin, had a little vacation, and now I’m back for Patch Tuesday. Microsoft and Adobe didn’t disappoint. In fact, they have heralded my return with the largest Patch Tuesday release ever. Thanks? Take a break from your regularly scheduled activities and let’s take a look at the latest security patches from Adobe and Microsoft. If you’d rather watch the full video recap covering the entire release, you can check it out here:

Adobe Patches for June 2026

For June, Adobe released 11 bulletins addressing 123 unique CVEs in Adobe Acrobat Reader, ColdFusion, Experience Manager, Experience Manager Forms, InDesign, InCopy, Substance 3D Sampler, Content Credentials SDK, Dreamweaver, Format Plugins, and Adobe Campaign Classic. A total of 11 of these CVEs were reported through the ZDI program.

Here’s this month’s overview table:

Bulletin ID Product CVE Count Highest Severity Highest CVSS Exploited Deployment Priority
APSB26-66 Adobe Campaign Classic 2 Critical 10.0 No 1
APSB26-64 Adobe ColdFusion 7 Critical 9.6 No 1
APSB26-63 Adobe Acrobat Reader 20 Critical 7.8 No 2
APSB26-57 Adobe Experience Manager Forms 3 Critical 9.3 No 2
APSB26-62 Adobe Dreamweaver 5 Critical 8.6 No 3
APSB26-65 Adobe Format Plugins 2 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-59 Adobe InCopy 3 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-58 Adobe InDesign 12 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-60 Adobe Substance 3D Sampler 4 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-61 Content Credentials SDK 8 Critical 7.5 No 3
APSB26-56 Adobe Experience Manager 57 Important 5.4 No 3
TOTAL 11 bulletins 123

Obviously, the update for Campaign Classic should be on the top of your deployment list if you’re a user. A CVSS 10 is rare; two in the same bulletin is pretty much a unicorn. Adobe says there are no active attacks, but I would expect heavy research into creating one. The update for Coldfusion is also a Priority 1, but again, no known attacks is the wild. I suspect the Reader patch will also receive a lot of attention as malicious PDFs are common in ransomware attacks. The update for Experience Manager may be large, but it’s mostly just cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs.

Microsoft Patches for June 2026

This month, Microsoft released a new record 208 CVEs Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Azure, .NET and Visual Studio, Github Copilot, Defender, Exchange Server, Hyper-V, Secure Boot, and BitLocker. At least, that’s my count. Microsoft’s tools seem to be having some issues, as they initially included a CVE from 2020 in this release. Regardless, the count is over 200, and I counted several times.

One of these bugs came through the ZDI program, but bugs submitted during Pwn2Own Berlin remain unpatched. If you include the Chromium and other third-party bugs, the total CVE count for June comes to a staggering 571 CVEs. 38 of these cases are rated Critical while the rest are rated Important in severity.

I’ve been counting CVEs on Patch Tuesday since 2017, and this is by far the largest monthly release in that time. The previous record was 177 set last year. It is extraordinary that Microsoft can produce so many patches in a single month, but it does raise concerns. How many of these cases were found using AI tools? How many patches were generated using AI to assist in coding or testing? What quality issues may exist in these patches? And likely most importantly, is this the new normal? The last two months were also large releases. Should sysadmins adjust their processes for prioritization and patch deployment based on this new volume of updates? Unfortunately, Microsoft is not providing those answers right now. Hopefully that changes in the future. BTW – just a note – the current number of CVEs shipped by Microsoft this year exceeds the total number of CVEs shipped in all of 2018.

One of the bugs patched by Microsoft this month is listed as under active exploitation and three others are listed as publicly known at the time of release. Let’s take a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with the bug being exploited in the wild.

-   CVE-2026-41091 - Microsoft Defender Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Since Microsoft doesn’t provide info on how widespread exploitation is, we must read some tea leaves. For this patch, several different people were acknowledged, which indicates multiple parties say this is in the wild, meaning exploitation is likely significant. The good news is that most people won’t need to take action as Defender updates itself. However, if you don’t have this configured or are in an isolated environment, you’ll need to update to the latest version.

-    CVE-2026-45657 - Windows Kernel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This CVSS 9.8 bug allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute code at SYSTEM level without user interaction. Yup – this is wormable. The problem lies in the way the kernel handles TCP/IP. This was listed as “Exploitation Less Likely” by Microsoft, but rest assured that every researcher and bug shop on the planet is reversing this patch right now trying to create an exploit. Test and deploy this patch quickly.

-    CVE-2026-47291 - HTTP.sys Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Our second CVSS 9.8 bug of the month, this also allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute code on affected systems without user interaction. However, there is a caveat. Systems using the default MaxRequestBytes registry value used by the Windows HTTP stack are not affected by this bug. You can edit your registry settings if you need protection while you test and deploy the patch. The bulletin includes instructions and even a PowerShell script for doing this action. Microsoft lists this as “Exploitation more likely”, so I would definitely check your registry settings.

-    CVE-2026-44815 - DHCP Client Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Here’s another CVSS 9.8 that has an odd incongruity. Although the CVSS says no permissions are required for exploitation, the write-up states it must be an “authenticated” user. I would err on the side of caution here and believe the CVSS. If that’s correct, then we have another bug where a remote, unauthenticated attacker could execute code on affected systems without user interaction. And since the DHCP client is on every OS, it’s a juicy target. This is another one to test and deploy with haste.

-    CVE-2026-45585/CVE-2026-50507 - Windows BitLocker Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
If you’ve followed the ongoing saga of Nightmare Eclipse vs. MSRC, the bugs should look familiar. One is definitely a fix for “YellowKey”, while the other appears to be a fix for “GreenPlasma”. The researcher has promised a “bone shattering” drop on June 14, so let’s hope Microsoft is able to reach some understanding with the researcher before more 0-days are released. Also, there is a script provided by Microsoft as a mitigation, but the better strategy is to test and deploy the updates.

 Here’s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for June 2026:

<![if supportMisalignedColumns]> <![endif]>
CVE Title Severity CVSS Public Exploited XI Type
CVE-2026-41091 Microsoft Defender Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 Yes Yes 0 EoP
CVE-2026-49160 HTTP.sys Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 Yes No 1 DoS
CVE-2026-50507 Windows BitLocker Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.8 Yes No 1 SFB
CVE-2026-45586 Windows Collaborative Translation Framework (CTFMON) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 Yes No 1 EoP
CVE-2025-10263 * ARM: CVE-2025-10263 Completion of affected memory accesses might not be guaranteed by completion of a TLBI [kernel] Critical 9.3 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-48567 Azure HorizonDB Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 10 No No N/A EoP
CVE-2026-32193 Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No 3 RCE
CVE-2026-47644 Copilot Chat (Microsoft Edge) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 6.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-44815 DHCP Client Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-47291 HTTP.sys Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No 1 RCE
CVE-2026-42824 M365 Copilot Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 6.5 No No N/A Info
CVE-2026-45476 Microsoft Azure Network Adapter Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 8.2 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-44810 Microsoft Cryptographic Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-48579 Microsoft Exchange Online Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 9.1 No No N/A Info
CVE-2026-47655 Microsoft Graph Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 6.5 No No N/A Info
CVE-2026-45497 Microsoft M365 Copilot Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.7 No No N/A RCE
CVE-2026-45460 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 4.7 No No 3 Info
CVE-2026-45472 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45474 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45461 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45463 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45456 Microsoft Outlook and Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45458 Microsoft Outlook and Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-47635 Microsoft Outlook and Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-26142 Nuance PowerScribe Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-47289 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-47654 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No 3 RCE
CVE-2026-48563 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-42992 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-44799 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-44801 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-42985 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No 1 RCE
CVE-2026-45648 Windows Active Directory Domain Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No 3 RCE
CVE-2026-42987 Windows Deployment Services (WDS) Remote Code Execution Critical 8.1 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-33828 Windows Device Health Attestation (DHA) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-44803 Windows Graphics Component Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No 1 RCE
CVE-2026-44812 Windows Graphics Component Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No 1 RCE
CVE-2026-45607 Windows Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45641 Windows Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-47652 Windows Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.2 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-47288 Windows Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) Remote Code Execution Critical 7.1 No No 3 RCE
CVE-2026-45657 Windows Kernel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-48574 Windows Media Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45490 .NET SDK Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45491 .NET Tampering Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No 3 Tampering
CVE-2026-45591 ASP.NET Core Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No 2 DoS
CVE-2026-47643 Azure Stack Edge Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 9.8 No No 3 RCE
CVE-2026-41098 Azure Stack Edge Spoofing Vulnerability Important 8.4 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45642 Microsoft Azure Attestation service and Device Health Attestation Service Spoofing Vulnerability Important 3.9 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45650 Microsoft Bing Search Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.3 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45637 Microsoft DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45647 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint for Mac Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-40371 Microsoft Dynamics 365 (on-premises) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-44822 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 8.2 No No 3 Info
CVE-2026-45455 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 3.3 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-45469 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-44817 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 3 RCE
CVE-2026-44818 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-44820 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-44823 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45459 Microsoft Excel Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 3.3 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-45504 Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-45502 Microsoft Exchange Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5 No No 3 Info
CVE-2026-45503 Microsoft Exchange Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No 3 Info
CVE-2026-45583 Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45500 Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45501 Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-47631 Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-42986 Microsoft Graphics Component Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 1 EoP
CVE-2026-41092 Microsoft Kinect Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45644 Microsoft Live Share Canvas SDK Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-47293 Microsoft Office Click-To-Run Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45485 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 3.3 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-44821 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-45483 Microsoft Office Project Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45475 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-44819 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-44824 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45645 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-49161 Microsoft PC Manager Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 3 SFB
CVE-2026-42902 Microsoft PowerToys Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45484 Microsoft SharePoint Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45454 Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-47298 Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45467 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45468 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45479 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45453 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-47636 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-47637 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-47638 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-47639 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No 3 Spoofing
CVE-2026-47641 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-33113 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45462 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45464 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45465 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-47634 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No 1 Spoofing
CVE-2026-47640 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No 3 Spoofing
CVE-2026-45481 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No 1 Spoofing
CVE-2026-48560 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-48562 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No 2 Spoofing
CVE-2026-42835 Microsoft Teams for Android Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-45606 Microsoft UxTheme Library (uxtheme.dll) Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 DoS
CVE-2026-45482 Microsoft Visual Studio Code CoPilot Chat Extension Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.4 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-45466 Microsoft Word Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 3.3 No No 3 Info
CVE-2026-45471 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45486 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45643 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45457 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-42980 NT OS Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 1 EoP
CVE-2026-42916 NT OS Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45649 Office for Android Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No 3 Spoofing
CVE-2026-47653 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No 3 RCE
CVE-2026-42909 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No 3 RCE
CVE-2026-42913 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No 3 RCE
CVE-2026-42993 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45588 Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.9 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-48568 Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.9 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-48570 Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.9 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-48573 Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.9 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-48575 Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.9 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-48576 Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.9 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-48578 Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.9 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-45654 Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.9 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-45656 UEFI Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-8863 UEFI Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-40376 Visual Studio Code Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-47281 Visual Studio Code Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 9.6 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-47284 Visual Studio Code Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-47292 Visual Studio Code MSSQL Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-48569 Visual Studio Code Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-47287 Visual Studio Code Tampering Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No 2 Tampering
CVE-2026-42829 Windows Administrator Protection Secure Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-34335 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-45601 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45598 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45596 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45638 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45603 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-42911 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45594 Windows Application Identity (AppID) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-45655 Windows BitLocker Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 5.3 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-45658 Windows BitLocker Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 1 SFB
CVE-2026-45640 Windows Bluetooth Port Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45605 Windows Bluetooth Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-47656 Windows Boot Manager Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.9 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-44809 Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-45634 Windows DHCP Client Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 3 Info
CVE-2026-45608 Windows DHCP Client Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.8 No No 3 Info
CVE-2026-41108 Windows DNS Client Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-42905 Windows DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 1 EoP
CVE-2026-44811 Windows DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-44808 Windows DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-44807 Windows DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-42983 Windows DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-44802 Windows DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-44813 Windows DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-44804 Windows DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-48566 Windows DWM Core Library Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-44814 Windows DWM Core Library Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-45602 Windows Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Tampering Vulnerability Important 9.1 No No 2 Tampering
CVE-2026-42836 Windows Function Discovery Service (fdwsd.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-42910 Windows Hotpatch Monitoring Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-42972 Windows Hyper-V Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-45592 Windows Internet (wininet.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-42903 Windows Kerberos Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No 3 DoS
CVE-2026-42914 Windows Kerberos Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.3 No No 2 DoS
CVE-2026-48583 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45653 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-42984 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-45600 Windows Kernel-Mode Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-45604 Windows Managed Installer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-45595 Windows Mark of the Web Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No 2 SFB
CVE-2026-45636 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-50508 Windows NTLM Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No 1 Spoofing
CVE-2026-48565 Windows Narrator Braille Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-44805 Windows Network Controller (NC) Host Agent Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 3 DoS
CVE-2026-42981 Windows Performance Monitor Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-42974 Windows Performance Monitor Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45487 Windows Program Compatibility Assistant Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-42828 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-42837 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-42969 Windows Push Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 3 Info
CVE-2026-42971 Windows Push Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-42970 Windows Push Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-42973 Windows Push Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-42978 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-42977 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-42979 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-42991 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-45639 Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-42908 Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-45593 Windows SDK Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-42906 Windows Shell Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-42907 Windows Shell Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-47648 Windows Storage Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-42915 Windows TCP/IP Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.7 No No 2 DoS
CVE-2026-42904 Windows TCP/IP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 9.6 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-42968 Windows Telephony Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No 2 Info
CVE-2026-42912 Windows Telephony Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-45597 Windows UI Automation Manager (uiamanager.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No 3 EoP
CVE-2026-45599 Windows UPnP Device Host Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-45635 Windows UPnP Device Host Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No 2 RCE
CVE-2026-40409 Windows Universal Disk Format File System Driver (UDFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-40404 Windows Universal Disk Format File System Driver (UDFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 2 EoP
CVE-2026-42989 Winlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No 1 EoP

* Indicates this CVE had been released by a third party and is now being included in Microsoft releases.

† Indicates further administrative actions are required to fully address the vulnerability.

 

Looking at the other Critical-rated bugs in this release, the scariest-looking one is actually nothing to concern yourself with at all. The CVSS 10 bug in Azure HorizonDB has already been addressed by Microsoft and is just being documented now. That’s also the case for five others. Of course, there wouldn’t be a release without Office bugs that have the Preview Pane as an attack vector. There are multiple in June. There’s a handful of bugs in the Remote Desktop Client, but these rely on connecting to a malicious RDP server. There are three patches for Hyper-V that allow for guest-to-host code execution. The bug in Active Directory requires authentication, but any authenticated user can hit it. For the Windows Directory Service vulnerability, it needs to be listening for TFTP. You have blocked that everywhere, right? The bug in Azure Network Adapter is somewhat unique as you need to update your Linux kernel to be protected. The bug in Azure Kubernetes allows an attacker to break out of a container and gain control of the AKS worker node. Finally, the bug in the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) seems unlikely, but if exploited, it could allow authenticated attackers to get code execution on affected systems.

Moving on to the other code execution bugs, there are the ubiquitous open-an-own bugs in Office components like Excel and Word. The code injection bug in Exchange Server looks troubling, but it requires a machine-in-the-middle (MiTM), so exploitation is unlikely. The bugs in SharePoint require authentication, but you should note that the patch applies to both SharePoint Server 2016 and SharePoint Enterprise Server 2016. The two bugs in UPnP are interesting. Both can lead to code execution by causing an error during the handling of specially crafted data, which could lead to a Use After Free (UAF) bug. The bugs in RDP Client all require connecting to a malicious RDP server, but it’s not clear why some are rated Critical and some are rated Important. The NTFS vulnerability requires a user to mount a virtual hard drive on an affected system. The last RCE bug this month is in Azure Stack Edge and requires the attacker to send a specially crafted file upload request that includes a manipulated file name or path, leading to code execution.

There are more than 60 Elevation of Privilege (EoP) bugs in this month’s release, and as usual, most simply lead to local attackers executing their code at SYSTEM-level privileges or administrative privileges, so there’s not much to add without further technical details about the bugs themselves. A notable exception is in Exchange Server, where a user on Outlook Web Access (OWA) could gain access to other mailboxes. The bug in Visual Studio Code could allow attackers to gain permissions associated with the MCP Server’s managed identity. The bugs in Windows SDK and Windows UI Automation Manager could let attacker go from low integrity up to medium integrity code execution. The bug in Bluetooth just allows “elevated” privileges without really describing what elevated might be.

Moving on to the more than 20 security feature bypass (SFB) bugs in the June release, there are a total of 10 that impact Secure Boot. All carry scope change (S:C) in the CVSS, meaning successful exploitation affects security boundaries beyond the vulnerable component itself — specifically the ability to load untrusted code at boot, bypass Virtual Secure Mode, and undermine boot integrity guarantees. CVE-2026-45654 explicitly calls out VSM exposure. The bulk of these are credited to Alon Leviev (STORM), which is notable given his prior BootKitty/BlackLotus-adjacent research. The bugs in the Windows Boot Manager have a similar impact as the Secure Boot bugs. The UEFI Secure Boot vulnerabilities go a layer deeper. They require either local admin or physical access but could allow for the running of untrusted code even before the OS loads. Rootkits anyone? The four bugs in BitLocker all require physical access but could yield encrypted data if exploited. The bug in Windows Administration Protection allows attackers to bypass the feature that prevents standard-user apps from performing admin-level actions. The bug in Visual Studio Copilot Chat could be the most interesting non-boot bug here as it allows authentication impersonation. Mark of the Web (MotW) and Excel vulns could bypass user warnings. Lastly, the bug in PC Manager bypasses expected user controls.

Turning our attention to the mass of spoofing bugs in the release, we instantly see 18 impacting SharePoint Server. Fortunately, these are simply cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs. It’s the Exchange bugs we should really watch for. One is an XSS that an attacker can exploit by convincing an Exchange administrator to open a malicious link or message, which then runs code in the admin's web session. That's a meaningful privilege escalation path. Another is listed as an SSRF-based attack, but no other details are available. The last is a lower-impact XSS with limited confidentiality/integrity loss. The bug in Bing Search (remember Bing?) is a classic search result spoofing. The bug in Azure Stack Edge is interesting as it could allow access to resources outside the vulnerable component's security boundary. The bug in Office for Android requires user interaction. The Office Project Server bug is an authenticated XSS with low impact. The final spoofing bug is in Azure Attestation but has already been addressed. You should still verify you are protected by following the instructions in the write-up from Microsoft.

There are 30 different information disclosure bugs in this release, and fortunately, the vast majority of these simply result in info leaks consisting of unspecified memory contents or memory addresses. The two bugs in Visual Studio require user interaction and could “disclose information over a network.” How obtuse. The bug in GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code could disclose discloses a sign-in access token for a user's work account. That's a meaningful credential exposure, not just random memory. That leaves the two bugs in Exchange Server. One could allow an authenticated user to gain information about which network services that the Exchange server can reach. The other sounds much like the spoofing bug in OWA as it allows attackers to see information in mailboxes they should not have access to.

I’ve never been a fan of the “tampering” category, as it could mean so many different things. For example, the bug in .NET simply says it could allow an unauthorized attacker to perform tampering locally. Similarly, the bug in Visual Studio says the same, expect here the tampering occurs over a network. Microsoft doesn’t even bother with a CWE for the tampering bug in the DHCP Server, so your guess is as good as mine.

There are seven DoS bugs in the June release, and as usual, Microsoft provides little to no actionable information about the vulnerabilities. The most interesting is the bug in HTTP.sys, which is listed as publicly known. This is an uncontrolled resource consumption, rated "Exploitation More Likely," and publicly disclosed. Since, HTTP.sys sits at the core of IIS and Windows web services, a network-accessible DoS here can take down any Windows server running HTTP-based services. Based on the Acknowledgement, it looks like this bug may have been found using AI. There are no real details for the other bugs, but based simply on the impact, I would focus on the Kerberos and TCP/IP bugs if you had to prioritize.

No new advisories are being released this month.

Looking Ahead

The next Patch Tuesday will be on July 14 and will be the last one before Black Hat/DEFCON. It’s usually a big release, so strap in and hang on. I’ll be back then to give you my full thoughts. Until then, stay safe, happy patching, and may all your reboots be smooth and clean!

 

]]> <![CDATA[The July 2026 Security Update Review]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694560/hacking/the-july-2026-security-update-review/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694560/hacking/the-july-2026-security-update-review/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:02:51 +0200 🕵️ Hacking tsecurity.de Well folks. Here we are. The bug apocalypse has fully descended upon us. I’ll do my best to sort this out in some way meaningful, but this month’s release shows us the nay-sayers were right, and I’ve got to hand it to the nay-sayers here. Excellent call. Take an extended break from your regularly scheduled activities as we let’s take a look at the latest security patches from Adobe and Microsoft. If you’d rather watch the full video recap covering the entire release, you can check it out here:

Adobe Patches for July 2026

Adobe has now moved to a bimonthly release schedule, which means they will be releasing patches on the second and fourth Tuesdays of the month. I’ll continue to cover the second Tuesday release here and update this blog should the fourth Tuesday release contain anything significant. I think this is a smart way to break up a monster release into something a bit more manageable. Apple has said they are taking a similar approach. We’ll see if other vendors follow their lead.

For the first part of the July release, Adobe released 12 bulletins addressing 88 unique CVEs in Adobe ColdFusion, Commerce, After Effects, Animate, Audition, Bridge, Creative Cloud Desktop Application, Experience Manager, Illustrator, Media Encoder, Premiere Pro, and the Content Credentials SDK.

Here’s this month’s overview table:

Bulletin ID Product CVE Count Highest Severity Highest CVSS Exploited Deployment Priority
APSB26-82 Adobe ColdFusion 13 Critical 9.9 No 1
APSB26-73 Adobe Commerce 13 Critical 9.6 No 2
APSB26-78 Adobe After Effects 3 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-83 Adobe Animate 6 Critical 8.6 No 3
APSB26-71 Adobe Audition 6 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-81 Adobe Bridge 6 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-77 Adobe Creative Cloud Desktop Application 2 Critical 8.1 No 3
APSB26-74 Adobe Experience Manager 13 Critical 9.6 No 3
APSB26-79 Adobe Illustrator 5 Critical 9.3 No 3
APSB26-72 Adobe Media Encoder 5 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-76 Adobe Premiere Pro 4 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-80 Content Credentials SDK 12 Critical 8.2 No 3
TOTAL 12 bulletins 88

While nothing is under active exploit, I would prioritize the Cold Fusion and Commerce patches first. The patch for Cold Fusion even clocks in with a CVSS 9.9 bug. Beyond that, most of these updates are pretty straightforward. If you’re using these products, patch them. However, you can use you regular patch cadence here.

Microsoft Patches for July 2026

Here it is. The Mother of All Releases. To call this record-breaking is an understatement. How to count this mess is anyone’s guess, but I see new Microsoft 621 CVEs for the month of July. Some of these are in online services where no user action is required. They also list about 480 bugs in Chromium and Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) that I won’t cover here. Here’s how I put this in context. I looked at the last 20 years of Microsoft releases. The CVE count year-to-date exceeds all other years’ totals.

The products covered this month are also astonishing. There are patches for Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Azure, .NET and Visual Studio, Github Copilot, Defender, Exchange Server, Hyper-V, Ages of Empire II, and Minecraft Server (really!). That phrase “Windows components” does some pretty heavy lifting here, too, as just about everything you’ve ever heard of is getting patched. All told, there are 63 rated Critical, six rated Moderate, one rated Low, with the rest rated Important in severity. Eight of these bugs were submitted through the ZDI program (more on that later). Two CVEs are listed as under active exploit while one other is listed as publicly known.

So how do we eat this elephant? One byte at a time (pun intended). Let’s start by looking a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with the bugs being exploited in the wild.

-    CVE-2026-56155 - Active Directory Federation Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This is one of several AD FS being patched this month, but it’s the only one being actively exploited. It stems from insufficient access-control granularity and does require local access and low privileges to start, but AD FS is exactly the kind of identity infrastructure attackers love to pivot through once they're in. It can also be paired with an RCE as we often see in ransomware. Test and deploy this patch quickly.

-    CVE-2026-56164 - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
The other bug being exploited in the wild this month is a modest CVSS 5.3 – but it shows why Moderate severity bugs still matter. It's a missing-authentication flaw, meaning an unauthenticated attacker can hit it over the network with no user interaction required. When something this reachable is being actively abused, patch it now and worry about the score later.

-    CVE-2026-57092 - Microsoft Windows VMSwitch Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This patch rates the highest CVSS score for the month: a solid 9.9. It’s a use-after-free that lets a low-privileged attacker escalate to full host compromise across a VM boundary. We saw something like this demonstrated at Pwn2Own Berlin on ESXi, but it clearly isn’t alone. If you’re using VMSwitch in your Hyper-V deployments (and you likely are), test and deploy this one quickly.

-    CVE-2026-50522/58644 - Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This matching pair of CVSS 9.8 bugs results from the deserialization-of-untrusted-data and are reachable without authentication or user interaction. CVE-2026-50522 was demonstrated during Pwn2Own Berlin, so it’s odd to see Microsoft list it as “Exploit Maturity Unknown” since we literally handed them a working exploit. Just another reason to do your own risk assessment and not rely 100% on the vendor. If you have any Internet accessible SharePoint servers, test and deploy this patch quickly.

-    CVE-2026-56190 - Remote Desktop Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This patch covers an unauthenticated, network-reachable, no user interaction required bug. The root cause is a classic one: use of uninitialized resource (CWE-908), meaning specially crafted RDP traffic can interact with memory that was never properly initialized, letting an attacker corrupt memory and potentially steer code execution. RDP Servers are a common target, so audit your systems to see which are internet accessible and start from there.

-    CVE-2026-55008 - Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability
Ignore the title here and treat this like the XSS bug it is. The vulnerability is listed as a CVSS 9.6 since it’s a stored cross-site scripting flaw in Outlook Web Access, with a scope-changed impact that lets it break out of the web app context entirely. An attacker sends a specially crafted email, and if the victim simply opens it in OWA, arbitrary JavaScript executes in their browser session — no attachment needed, no macro warning, just viewing the message does it. If you’re using OWA, test and deploy this one quickly.

-    CVE-2026-50518 - Windows DHCP Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are a couple of these DHCP RCE patches in this release, but the other has caveats while this one does not. Both are heap-based buffer overflows scoring CVSS 9.8, both unauthenticated and network-reachable. If you're running DHCP Server role on anything Internet-adjacent (you're not, right?), these move to the top of the list.

-    CVE-2026-56188 - Windows Server Network driver Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Another Critical-rated bug, this one is caused by a race condition. It’s always fun to see a TOCTOU bug rated this high, since race conditions are notoriously finicky to exploit reliably. While it may prove tricky to exploit, this bug could allow an attacker to execute privileged code over the network without user interaction. Don’t let the race condition lull you to sleep on a wormable bug.

-    CVE-2026-55010 - Minecraft Bedrock Dedicated Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
File this in the “why not” category. This bug is a heap-based buffer overflow in Minecraft Bedrock Dedicated Server, also CVSS 9.8 and also unauthenticated RCE. Yes, your kid’s Minecraft server (it is your kid’s server, right?) is exposed to the same class of bug as your DHCP infrastructure. Patch it anyway.

Here’s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for July 2026:

<![if supportMisalignedColumns]> <![endif]>
CVE Title Severity CVSS Public Exploited Type
CVE-2026-56155 Active Directory Federation Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No Yes EoP
CVE-2026-56164 Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Moderate 5.3 No Yes EoP
CVE-2026-50661 Windows BitLocker Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.1 Yes No SFB
CVE-2026-54121 Active Directory Certificate Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-45499 ** Azure OpenAI Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 9.9 No No EoP
CVE-2026-48564 DHCP Server Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50370 DHCP Server Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-56159 DHCP Server Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50382 DirectX Graphics Kernel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-41106 ** Microsoft 365 Copilot Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 9.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26145 ** Microsoft Azure Synapse Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 4.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-48561 Microsoft Copilot Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.6 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55011 Microsoft Defender Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55012 Microsoft Defender Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55944 Microsoft Dynamics NAV and Microsoft Dynamics 365 Business Central (On Premises) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57100 ** Microsoft Entra Provisioning Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 9.9 No No EoP
CVE-2026-55041 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-54998 ** Microsoft Exchange Online Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-55008 Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability Critical 9.6 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-54992 Microsoft Message Queuing Queue Manager Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50314 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50467 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55018 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55022 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55045 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55049 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55129 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55056 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55140 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55043 Microsoft PowerPoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55123 Microsoft PowerPoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55120 Microsoft PowerPoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50522 Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58644 Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55040 Microsoft SharePoint Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Critical 9.1 No No SFB
CVE-2026-54117 Microsoft SQL Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-54118 Microsoft SQL Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50655 Microsoft Windows Media Foundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-56189 Microsoft Windows Media Foundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57090 Microsoft Windows Media Foundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57094 Microsoft Windows Media Foundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57087 Microsoft Windows Media Foundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57092 Microsoft Windows VMSwitch Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 9.9 No No EoP
CVE-2026-55033 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55127 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55132 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55010 Minecraft Bedrock Dedicated Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50474 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49164 Windows Active Directory Domain Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-54128 Windows DHCP Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50518 Windows DHCP Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49796 Windows GDI+ Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50380 Windows GDI+ Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.6 No No RCE
CVE-2026-54127 Windows Hyper-V Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 7.4 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50680 Windows Hyper-V Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 8.2 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50327 Windows Media Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58542 Windows Media Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58608 Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-54982 Windows Reliable Multicast Transport Driver (RMCAST) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-54995 Windows Reliable Multicast Transport Driver (RMCAST) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-42982 Windows Secure Kernel Mode Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50392 Windows Secure Kernel Mode Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50694 Windows Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-56188 Windows Server Network driver Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50444 Windows Server Update Service (WSUS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54999 Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-47302 .NET Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50525 .NET Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50651 .NET Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-57108 .NET Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50524 .NET Framework Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50527 .NET Framework Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50648 .NET Framework Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50650 .NET Framework Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50646 .NET Framework Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50649 .NET Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-47304 .NET Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No SFB
CVE-2026-50528 .NET Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.2 No No SFB
CVE-2026-50659 .NET Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-50526 .NET Tampering Vulnerability Important 7 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-50682 Active Directory Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No DoS
CVE-2026-55001 Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50647 Active Directory Federation Server Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50684 Active Directory Federation Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.8 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-56170 ASP.NET Core Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-47300 ASP.NET Core Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-47303 ASP.NET Core Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50652 Azure Active Directory Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50653 Azure Active Directory Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-57969 Azure CycleCloud Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58279 Azure CycleCloud Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-47632 Azure Monitor Agent Metrics Extension Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50338 Azure Spring Apps Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.2 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50488 Clipboard User Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50491 Code Integrity DLL (ci.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50381 Composite Image File System driver (cimfs.sys) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50427 Content Delivery Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50692 Desktop Window Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58633 Desktop Window Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58634 Desktop Window Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50296 DirectX Graphics Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50375 DirectX Graphics Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50353 DirectX Graphics Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50493 DirectX Graphics Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56643 DirectX Graphics Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56644 DirectX Graphics Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58629 DirectX Graphics Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49174 DNS Client Tampering Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-50495 DNS Client Tampering Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-57088 Extensible Storage Engine (ESENT) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50663 Game: Age of Empires II: Definitive Edition Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-47282 GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-41109 GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No SFB
CVE-2026-50510 GitHub Copilot Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49787 HTTP.sys Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50420 HTTP.sys Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No Info
CVE-2026-49788 HTTP/2 Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50696 Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-58617 M365 Copilot for iOS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58595 Microsoft Bing App for IOS Spoofing Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-49162 Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50305 Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50361 Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50466 Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50458 Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50658 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint for Mac Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56178 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint for Mac Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50657 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint for Mac Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 4.7 No No Info
CVE-2026-50329 Microsoft DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58541 Microsoft DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58596 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-57991 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.4 No No Info
CVE-2026-58291 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-57981 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57984 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57985 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.6 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57986 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57988 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57992 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58276 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-56645 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57974 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57975 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58281 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58284 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58285 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58287 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58288 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58289 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 9 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58290 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58292 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58293 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58294 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57983 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.7 No No SFB
CVE-2026-58295 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.3 No No SFB
CVE-2026-58525 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.2 No No SFB
CVE-2026-57987 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-58278 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-56646 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-57977 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-57993 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.4 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-58282 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-58283 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-58286 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-58298 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.2 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-58524 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-58296 Microsoft Edge for Android Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-58297 Microsoft Edge for Android Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-58300 Microsoft Edge for Android Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No Info
CVE-2026-58522 Microsoft Edge for Android Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.8 No No Info
CVE-2026-58299 Microsoft Edge for Android Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58523 Microsoft Edge for Android Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-50678 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.6 No No Info
CVE-2026-54988 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-48580 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50408 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55046 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55138 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55054 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55122 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-55898 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-50675 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55899 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55948 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58618 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-47642 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55024 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55025 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55031 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55048 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55029 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55039 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55136 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55141 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55036 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55044 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55037 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55058 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55137 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55053 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55131 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-54131 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55947 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55949 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-56156 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55006 Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-55009 Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-55005 Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-56642 Microsoft Fabric Data Warehouse Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50343 Microsoft Install Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50439 Microsoft Message Queuing Queue Manager Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58537 Microsoft NAT Helper Components (ipnathlp.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56193 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-55023 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55026 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No Info
CVE-2026-55027 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55028 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55047 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55035 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55057 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55121 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55042 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55139 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50665 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No Info
CVE-2026-56192 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-56195 Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-47290 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50301 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55017 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55125 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55133 Microsoft OneNote Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58636 Microsoft PC Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50438 Microsoft PC Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58647 Microsoft PowerBI Report Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 8 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-55052 Microsoft SharePoint Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58277 Microsoft SharePoint Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-55051 Microsoft SharePoint Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-54108 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-55016 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-55019 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-55020 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-55021 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-55030 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-55034 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-55126 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-55135 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-56157 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.4 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-47296 Microsoft SQL Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-55002 Microsoft SQL Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-47295 Microsoft SQL Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50468 Microsoft SQL Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-54116 Microsoft SQL Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-42900 Microsoft Windows App Store Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49784 Microsoft Windows App Store Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50356 Microsoft Windows App Store Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49165 Microsoft Windows App Store Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-54993 Microsoft Windows Media Foundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58610 Microsoft Windows Media Foundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55050 Microsoft Word Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55124 Microsoft Word Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55142 Microsoft Word Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55032 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55055 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55038 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55134 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55128 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55130 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50359 Microsoft XML Core Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-57097 Microsoft XML Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.4 No No SFB
CVE-2026-50346 Netlogon RPC Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50402 NTFS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50506 OData for ASP.NET and ASP.NET Core Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-45646 OData for ASP.NET and ASP.NET Core Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-54989 Quality Windows Audio/Video Experience (QWAVE) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50365 Remote Access Management service/API (RPC server) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54990 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58594 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-56190 Remote Desktop Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49783 Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No SFB
CVE-2026-42990 SQL Server ODBC driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 9.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49168 Storage Spaces Direct Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No EoP
CVE-2026-48581 Surface Broker SDMA Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49180 Universal Plug and Play (upnp.dll) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50455 Universal Plug and Play (upnp.dll) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-54111 Universal Print Management Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58543 Universal Print Management Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58601 Virtual Hard Disk (VHD) Miniport Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulernability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50520 Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-45496 Visual Studio Code Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-57101 Visual Studio Code Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No SFB
CVE-2026-57102 Visual Studio Code Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No SFB
CVE-2026-47305 Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49805 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50297 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50325 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50489 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-57095 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50416 Win32k Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 3.3 No No Info
CVE-2026-56184 Win32k Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50432 Window Virtual Filtering Platform (VFP) Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.3 No No DoS
CVE-2026-54119 Windows Active Directory Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-57976 Windows Active Directory Domain Services Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50366 Windows Active Directory Domain Services Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-49178 Windows Active Directory Domain Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58529 Windows Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-54983 Windows Active Directory Federation Services Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50695 Windows Active Directory Federation Services Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50304 Windows Active Directory Federation Services Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50368 Windows Active Directory Federation Services Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50324 Windows Active Directory Federation Services Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.9 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50355 Windows Active Directory Federation Services Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50411 Windows Active Directory Federation Services Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-58631 Windows Admin Center (WAC) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-56196 Windows Admin Center (WAC) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-56197 Windows Admin Center (WAC) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-56169 Windows Admin Center Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-57107 Windows Admin Center Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56185 Windows Admin Center Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50312 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 4.7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50462 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-57093 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34346 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-48572 Windows App Package Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-48571 Windows App Package Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50400 Windows App Package Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50331 Windows Application Model Core API Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49803 Windows AppX Deployment Extensions Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50351 Windows Audio Compression Manager (ACM) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50440 Windows Audio Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34328 Windows Audio Service Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50406 Windows Backup Engine Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50364 Windows Backup Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-42975 Windows Bluetooth Port Driver Remote Code Execution Important 8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58538 Windows Bluetooth Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58638 Windows Boot Loader Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6 No No SFB
CVE-2026-58637 Windows Client-Side Caching Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50384 Windows Clip Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49183 Windows Clipboard Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50689 Windows Clipboard Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50374 Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58536 Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58613 Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50401 Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50697 Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50667 Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50421 Windows Connected User Experiences and Telemetry Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50428 Windows Container Isolation FS Filter Driver (unionfs.sys) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-50352 Windows Cryptographic Services Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50302 Windows Cryptographic Services Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 4.2 No No SFB
CVE-2026-55144 Windows Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG) Tampering Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-50347 Windows Data.dll Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49181 Windows DHCP Client Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50683 Windows DHCP Client Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58627 Windows DHCP Server Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50685 Windows DHCP Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49807 Windows DirectX Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No Info
CVE-2026-49175 Windows DNS Client Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50487 Windows DNS Client Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50465 Windows DNS Client Tampering Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-49169 Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50426 Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 6.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50424 Windows Domain Controller Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50300 Windows DWM Core Library Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50437 Windows DWM Core Library Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-34348 Windows Event Logging Service Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50502 Windows Event Logging Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-33842 Windows File Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-40422 Windows File Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-41087 Windows File Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50473 Windows File Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50442 Windows File Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50389 Windows File Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50456 Windows File Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-57084 Windows File Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-57091 Windows File History Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50405 Windows Filtering Platform Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49172 Windows FTP Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50387 Windows GDI Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54122 Windows GDI+ Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50483 Windows Graphics Component Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-58609 Windows Graphics Component Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50391 Windows Group Policy Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50310 Windows Human Interface Device Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 4.7 No No Info
CVE-2026-50485 Windows Hyper-V Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 4.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-54129 Windows Hyper-V Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50315 Windows Image Acquisition Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58534 Windows Input Method Editor (IME) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50490 Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58540 Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50425 Windows Internal System User Profile Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50293 Windows Internal Task Bar Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49167 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 4.7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49173 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54132 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49795 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49798 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 9.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49808 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50354 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50332 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50377 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50390 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50423 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50397 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50436 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50399 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50459 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50477 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50478 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50484 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50673 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58532 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50294 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No Info
CVE-2026-50316 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50419 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 3.3 No No Info
CVE-2026-50463 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50475 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50429 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 8.2 No No Info
CVE-2026-58614 Windows Kernel Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-58545 Windows Kernel Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-58602 Windows Kernel-Mode Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50393 Windows Kernel-Mode Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50396 Windows Kernel-Mode Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50378 Windows Key Guard Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50303 Windows Key Guard Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-40378 Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-49799 Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50371 Windows LUA File Virtualization Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58544 Windows Management Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50404 Windows Media Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50358 Windows Media Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50336 Windows Media Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50398 Windows Media Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50414 Windows Media Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50379 Windows Media Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50433 Windows Media Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50676 Windows Media Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50677 Windows Media Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-34349 Windows Media Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50394 Windows Media Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50415 Windows Media Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.3 No No Info
CVE-2026-57083 Windows Media Photo Codec Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-54115 Windows Message Queuing (MSMQ) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50447 Windows Message Queuing Service (MSMQ) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50505 Windows Message Queuing Service (MSMQ) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50342 Windows MIDI Service Module Elevation of Privileges Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56183 Windows MIDI Service Module Elevation of Privileges Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56187 Windows MIDI Service Module Elevation of Privileges Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58635 Windows Narrator Braille Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50500 Windows Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50476 Windows Network Connections Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50450 Windows Network Connections Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56650 Windows Network File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56649 Windows Network File System Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 5.9 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50470 Windows Network Policy Server SNMP Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50496 Windows Network Policy Server SNMP Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-56194 Windows NFS Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56648 Windows NFS Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50337 Windows Notification Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49789 Windows NTFS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50412 Windows NTFS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50422 Windows NTFS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50672 Windows NTFS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56175 Windows NTFS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56182 Windows NTFS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50341 Windows NTFS Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-58640 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49184 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49797 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50308 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50386 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50309 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50313 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50388 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50448 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50471 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50461 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50417 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50482 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50494 Windows NTFS Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50344 Windows OLE Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50686 Windows OLE Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50335 Windows Operating Systems Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50317 Windows Operating Systems Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54987 Windows Overlay Filter Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50435 Windows Overlay Filter Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50409 Windows Overlay Filter Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-40400 Windows PowerShell Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49166 Windows Print Configuration Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-55004 Windows Print Configuration Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50499 Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50383 Windows Print Spooler Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-57085 Windows Print Spooler Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50469 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50434 Windows Push Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50339 Windows Push Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50430 Windows Push Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50334 Windows Push Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-44800 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50363 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50431 Windows Quality of Service (QoS) Packet Scheduler Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50372 Windows Redirected Drive Buffering System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50666 Windows Remote Access Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56647 Windows Remote Access Service Infrastructure Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50330 Windows Remote Desktop Client Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50376 Windows Remote Desktop Client Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50504 Windows Remote Desktop Client Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-58533 Windows Remote Desktop Client Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-58535 Windows Remote Desktop Client Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-58546 Windows Remote Desktop Client Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-58539 Windows Remote Desktop Client Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-55003 Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-57979 Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50445 Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50497 Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-54126 Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-57982 Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50369 Windows Remote Desktop Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58626 Windows Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-55014 Windows Remote Help Defense Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50318 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50407 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50357 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50441 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50668 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54109 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49792 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49793 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50362 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50492 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 6.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50501 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-58530 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-49791 Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50451 Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-57096 Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50323 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50452 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50348 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50345 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50322 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50340 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50410 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50449 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50460 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50403 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50385 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50413 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50457 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50486 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50503 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54125 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58527 Windows Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50373 Windows Search Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50679 Windows Search Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-44806 Windows Secure Channel Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.3 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50681 Windows Secure Channel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-56186 Windows Secure Channel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-50367 Windows Sensor Data Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58619 Windows Sensor Data Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50311 Windows Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50328 Windows Server Update Service (WSUS) Tampering Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-58531 Windows SMB Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54997 Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-49801 Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50690 Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-56168 Windows SMB Server Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-50360 Windows SMB Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-57089 Windows SMB Server Network Transport Driver (srvnet.sys) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50333 Windows Spaceport.sys Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50298 Windows Spaceport.sys Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49171 Windows Speech Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49170 Windows StateRepository API Server file Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58526 Windows Storage Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50299 Windows Storage Spaces Direct Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 6.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-57968 Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL2) Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-57973 Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL2) Kernel Tampering Vulnerability Important 6.3 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-50418 Windows System Secure Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 5.1 No No SFB
CVE-2026-50306 Windows TCP/IP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50307 Windows TCP/IP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49177 Windows TCP/IP Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50669 Windows Telephony Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54124 Windows Terminal Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-50350 Windows Trusted Runtime Interface Driver Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-50326 Windows Unified Consent System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49790 Windows Universal Disk Format File System Driver (UDFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50498 Windows Universal Disk Format File System Driver (UDFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58547 Windows Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) Device Host Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49794 Windows USB Audio Class Driver Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No Info
CVE-2026-50453 Windows USB Audio Class Driver Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-58528 Windows USB Audio Class Driver Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.8 No No Info
CVE-2026-50321 Windows USB Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50479 Windows USB Hub Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-55000 Windows USB Print Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.4 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54991 Windows USB Print Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54996 Windows USB Print Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49802 Windows USB Print Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49806 Windows USB Print Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50674 Windows USB Print Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49804 Windows USB Video Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.6 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50454 Windows User Interface Core Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49176 Windows WalletService Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-49800 Windows Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol (WPAD) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50480 Windows Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol (WPAD) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56173 Windows WebView Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58632 Windows Win32 Kernel Subsystem Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54107 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54986 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54112 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-54114 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50670 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50688 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50687 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-56176 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-58628 Windows Wireless Network Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-50295 Windows Zero Trust DNS Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-50509 Wireless Wide Area Network Service (WwanSvc) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-55945 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Moderate 4.2 No No Info
CVE-2026-45488 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Moderate 5.4 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-45489 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Moderate 6.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-55145 Outlook Copilot Tampering Vulnerability Moderate 6.3 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-56181 Windows Network Address Translation (NAT) Spoofing Vulnerability Moderate 8.3 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-58597 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Low 4.3 No No Spoofing

** Indicates this CVEs has already been resolved by Microsoft, and no further action is needed by the end user.

 

 

I’ll do my best to summarize everything else in this release, but no promises. I’m only human after all.

 

Looking at the remaining Critical-rated patches, Office is its own weather system: fourteen Word/Excel/PowerPoint/Office RCEs clustered at CVSS 7.8, plus five Windows Media Foundation RCEs. Outside of the Preview Pane attack vector, they are individually unremarkable; collectively, patch Office and reboot. Always reboot. We’ve already mentioned DHCP some, but DHCP Server can't catch a break. Beyond the one already covered, add CVE-2026-56159, CVE-2026-48564, CVE-2026-50370, and DHCP Client cousin CVE-2026-54128. Five DHCP RCEs in one release. Rounding things out, Print Spooler (CVE-2026-58608), Windows TCP/IP (CVE-2026-54999), and a SQL Server RCE pair (CVE-2026-54117/54118) all receive patches, and all are rated a CVSS 8.8. VE-2026-55944 (Dynamics NAV/Business Central On-Prem RCE, 9.8) is the same deserialization flavor as the SharePoint pair; it’s unauthenticated, network-reachable, and easy to overlook since it's not SharePoint. CVE-2026-48561 (Microsoft Copilot RCE, 9.6) and CVE-2026-50380 (Windows GDI+ RCE, 9.6) round out the near-top tier. Don't forget CVE-2026-55040, a SharePoint Security Feature Bypass (9.1) — patch it in the same pass as the SharePoint RCE pair since it's the same product family. Identity and infrastructure get hit too: CVE-2026-54121 (AD Certificate Services EoP, 8.8) and CVE-2026-50444 (WSUS EoP, 8.8). The obscure Reliable Multicast Transport Driver (RMCAST) takes two RCEs (CVE-2026-54982, CVE-2026-54995), and CVE-2026-50474 gives Remote Desktop Client its own RCE, separate from the RDP one already covered. The rest is a long tail: Defender RCE x2, GDI+ again, Windows Media x2, Secure Kernel Mode EoP x2, and a second Hyper-V EoP. You can consider these “normal” as far as patch cadence goes.

That leaves us with 95 RCE to discuss. I would explain, but there is too much, so let me sum up. CVE-2026-55944 (Dynamics NAV/Business Central On-Prem, 9.8) is the same deserialization flavor as the SharePoint pair: unauthenticated, easy to miss since it's not SharePoint. CVE-2026-54990 (Remote Desktop Client), CVE-2026-49172 (Windows FTP Service), and CVE-2026-50447 (MSMQ) all hit 9.8 too, proof severity labels lag CVSS sometimes. CVE-2026-48561 (Copilot) and CVE-2026-50380 (GDI+) sit at 9.6.

The pattern worth watching: 14 Windows NTFS and 7 ReFS RCEs/ That makes 21 filesystem-driver bugs, an unusually large cluster suggesting a shared root cause. Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) contributes 21 more that are genuinely Microsoft's to patch, not Chromium re-listing noise. Remote Desktop Client racks up a second and third RCE (CVE-2026-50474, CVE-2026-58594), and Windows Admin Center picks up two (CVE-2026-56196/56197) — WAC exposure keeps creeping into these releases. Exchange Server (CVE-2026-55005) and AD Domain Services (CVE-2026-49178) both land at 8.8.

And because this release wouldn't be complete without it: CVE-2026-50663, an RCE in Age of Empires II: Definitive Edition. Yes, really. Patch your civilization anyway.

There are close to 260 EoP bugs in this month’s release. Microsoft could have just published the EoPs and still had a record-setting month. As usual, most simply lead to local attackers executing their code at SYSTEM-level privileges or administrative privileges, so there’s not much to add without further technical details about the bugs themselves. What’s really frustrating is that 94 have no explicit privilege statement at all. Microsoft just says “elevate privileges” with no detail. By my count, that leaves around 25 bugs to consider. Some don’t elevate at all. The FAQ literally says the attacker just gets “the rights of the user running the affected application.” That covers Win32k, Clip Service, Search Service, MSMQ, and SharePoint. A few get a Low-to-Medium integrity bump. There are also a couple that lead to downgraded service accounts or arbitrary file deletion, but nothing else I’ve seen really stands out too much.

There are 20 Security Feature Bypass (SFB) bugs this month, and it's a genuinely mixed bag. CVE-2026-55040 leads at Critical, CVSS 9.1 as it’s weak authentication in SharePoint Server. Patch it in the same pass as the SharePoint RCE pair since it's the same product. The AI-coding-tool trend continues: GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code and Visual Studio all land SFB bugs, mostly injection or path-traversal flavored. BitLocker is this month's lone publicly disclosed bug. It’s not exploited yet, but public disclosure is a countdown clock, not a free pass. It requires physical access, as does the bug in Microsoft XML. The firmware/boot cluster is worth a second look: Secure Boot, Boot Loader, and Key Guard all touch the trust chain below the OS. Meaning, despite a low CVSS score, “if this fails, nothing above it can be trusted” stakes. Rounding out the SFB patches, there are two .NET SFBs, two Windows Kernel SFBs, and a DNS/Cryptographic Services bringing up the rear.

The July release includes 31Spoofing bugs this month, and we’ve already covered the most important (Exchange). SharePoint Server accounts for another ten with almost all the same root cause: stored XSS letting an authenticated attacker spoof content in the browser. Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) contributes fifteen more spanning access-control failures, SSRF, type confusion, and UI misrepresentation. All genuinely Microsoft's to patch, not re-listed Chromium noise. The remaining six round out the usual suspects: a Windows NAT spoofing bug reachable from an adjacent network, a Bing app flaw on iOS, a PowerBI Report Server XSS issue, a .NET output-encoding bug, and an AD FS spoofing flaw. None publicly disclosed, none exploited, but with SharePoint's history this year, don't let "just Spoofing" lull you into deprioritizing the patch cycle.

Of 111 Information Disclosure bugs, the overwhelming majority of these simply result in info leaks consisting of unspecified memory contents or memory addresses. GitHub Copilot is the standout. Here, the bug insufficiently protected credentials, meaning actual secrets leak, not memory scraps. The Windows Admin Center flaw discloses data via improper authentication. A management console leaking to an unauthorized party is a bigger deal than it sounds. SharePoint uses SSRF to pull data server-side, and the Event Logging Service is a protection-mechanism failure, not a memory bug at all. Edge picks up three genuinely file-system-flavored disclosures — improper authorization, files/directories accessible to external parties, and link-following — plus Edge for Android exposing “private personal information” twice and two path-traversal bugs. The remaining 40+ are mostly one-line “exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor” entries scattered across File Explorer, Push Notifications, Cryptographic Services, and Win32k.

Only 8 Tampering bugs this month, the smallest bucket, but a couple stand out. The top of the list is a WSUS bug, caused by an uncaught exception that lets an unauthenticated attacker tamper with the update service over the network. That’s your patch-management infrastructure itself being the target, which always deserves extra attention. Windows CNG (the crypto API) picks up a missing-cryptographic-step flaw, and Windows DNS Client shows up three separate times across the list, twice for improper access control and once for missing authentication on a critical function. DNS resolution having this many tampering paths in one release is worth flagging as a pattern rather than three unrelated bugs. The one genuinely different entry is Outlook Copilot, described simply as vulnerable to “malicious uses” enabling tampering over the network. That’s a fantastically vague phrasing for an AI-assistant feature, continuing this year's running theme of Copilot-branded features showing up somewhere in every release. Finally, a .NET link-following bug and a WSL2 kernel race condition receive patches. Both require local/authorized access to trigger.

Still with me? Good, because we have 35 DoS bugs to cover, and this is really an identity-infrastructure story more than a grab-bag. Active Directory Federation Services alone accounts for seven of them, all sitting at CVSS 7.5, all stack-based buffer overflows or infinite loops that let an unauthenticated attacker knock the service over the network. The .NET ecosystem is the other big cluster: .NET, .NET Framework, and ASP.NET Core/OData contribute nine bugs combined, almost all “allocation of resources without limits or throttling”.  HTTP.sys and HTTP/2 pick up the same flavor. LSASS shows up twice, which is always worth a second look given what that process actually holds. Rounding out the list are patches for Windows DHCP Server, SMB Server, Secure Channel, Hyper-V, and IKE Protocol each take a single hit, mostly requiring authorized or adjacent-network access rather than being wide open to the internet.

No new advisories are being released this month.

Looking Ahead

The next Patch Tuesday will be on August 11, just after Hacker Summer Camp in sunny Las Vegas. Should I survive the heat, I’ll be back then to give you my full thoughts on the release – no matter how large it may be. Until then, stay safe, happy patching, and may all your reboots be smooth and clean!

]]> <![CDATA[Announcing winapp, the Windows App Development CLI]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694515/it-security-nachrichten/announcing-winapp-the-windows-app-development-cli/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694515/it-security-nachrichten/announcing-winapp-the-windows-app-development-cli/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:01:37 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de We are excited to announce the public preview of the Windows App Development CLI (winapp), a new open-source c

The post Announcing winapp, the Windows App Development CLI appeared first on Windows Developer Blog.

]]> <![CDATA[Eric Evans receives Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694491/it-security-nachrichten/eric-evans-receives-department-of-defense-medal-for-distinguished-public-service/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694491/it-security-nachrichten/eric-evans-receives-department-of-defense-medal-for-distinguished-public-service/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:01:05 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[CVE-2026-20841: Arbitrary Code Execution in the Windows Notepad]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694473/it-security-nachrichten/cve-2026-20841-arbitrary-code-execution-in-the-windows-notepad/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694473/it-security-nachrichten/cve-2026-20841-arbitrary-code-execution-in-the-windows-notepad/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:00:44 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de In this excerpt of a TrendAI Research Services vulnerability report, Nikolai Skliarenko and Yazhi Wang of the TrendAI Research team detail a recently patched command injection vulnerability in the Windows Notepad application. This bug was originally discovered by Cristian Papa and Alasdair Gorniak of Delta Obscura. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in the execution of arbitrary commands in the security context of the victim's account. The following is a portion of their write-up covering CVE-2026-20841, with a few minimal modifications.

A remote code execution vulnerability has been reported in Microsoft Windows Notepad. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of links in Markdown files.

A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by enticing the victim to download and interact with a malicious file. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in the execution of arbitrary commands in the security context of the victim's account.

The Vulnerability

Microsoft Windows comes with a default text-editing application called Windows Notepad. Historically, this application offered only minimal editing features. However, modern versions of Windows include an improved and extended Notepad by default. This new version supports multiple file formats, Markdown rendering, and Copilot-enhanced features.

Markdown is a lightweight markup language that allows users to create formatted text using a simple syntax. It is widely used for writing documents, blog posts, and README files. It supports a wide range of formatting options, including (but not limited to) headers, styled text, numbered and bulleted lists, and links. Markdown supports two main link formats: standard and inline. The standard link format is:

          [link-name](link/path)

When rendered, only the link text ("link-name") is shown to the user.

The inline links use the following format:

          <link/path>

When rendered, they are transformed into the equivalent standard link:

          [link/path](link/path)

A remote code execution vulnerability has been reported in Microsoft Windows Notepad. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of links when handling Markdown files.

When Notepad opens a file, if the application detects that the file requires special rendering (in this case, Markdown), the input file is tokenized. Tokenization in this context means splitting the raw file text into a sequence of small, recognizable pieces ("tokens") that the renderer can process one by one. Detection is performed based on the file extension. Only the ".md" extension was found to trigger Markdown rendering, as the application uses a fixed string comparison to determine whether Markdown should be rendered by calling sub_1400ED5D0(). Markdown files are rendered token by token.

Function sub_140170F60() handles clicking on links in Markdown files. It filters the link value, and passes it to ShellExecuteExW() call.

The filtering performed on the link is found to be insufficient, as it allows using malicious crafted protocol URIs, such as "file://" and "ms-appinstaller://", to execute arbitrary files in the security context of victim. ShellExecuteExW() uses the configured protocol handlers and may expose additional exploitable protocols depending on the system configuration.

A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by enticing the victim to download a malicious crafted Markdown file, open it, and click on a malicious link. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in the execution of arbitrary commands in the security context of the victim's account.

Notes
• Files using the ".md" file extension are not registered to be opened by Notepad by default. However, when opened manually in Notepad, they are rendered as Markdown, which allows the vulnerability to be triggered.
• Any "\\" sequences are converted to "\" in the attacker-controlled link path prior to passing it to the ShellExecuteExW() call.

Source Code Walkthrough

The following code snippet was taken from Notepad.exe version 11.2508. Comments added by TrendAI researchers have been highlighted.

In sub_140170F60():

Detection Guidance

To detect an attack exploiting this vulnerability, the detection device must monitor and parse traffic on the following application protocols that can be used to deliver an attack to exploit this vulnerability:
• FTP, over ports 21/TCP, 20/TCP
• HTTP, over port 80/TCP
• HTTPS, over port 443/TCP
• IMAP, over port 143/TCP
• NFS, over ports 2049/TCP, 2049/UDP, 111/TCP, 111/UDP
• POP3, over port 110/TCP
• SMTP, over ports 25/TCP, 587/TCP
• SMB/CIFS, over ports 139/TCP, 445/TCP

The detection device must inspect traffic transferring a Markdown file with the file extension ".md". If such a file transfer is found, the detection device must search the file content for links.

The detection device must check whether the link paths contain the strings "file:" or "ms-appinstaller:".

If "file:" was found, the detection device must search the Markdown file contents using the following case-insensitive regular expression:

(\x3C|\[[^\x5d]+\]\()file:(\x2f|\x5c\x5c){4}

If "ms-appinstaller:" was found, the detection device must search the Markdown file contents using the following case-insensitive regular expression:

(\x3C|\[[^\x5d]+\]\()ms-appinstaller:(\x2f|\x5c\x5c){2}

If any of the regular expressions matches, the link contains a path to a remote resource. The traffic must be considered malicious; an attack exploiting this vulnerability is likely underway. This guidance should also detect the public PoC that was recently posted on GitHub.

Notes

•  The string matches are case-insensitive.
•  The detection guidance is based on the vendor-provided patch. However, the patch restricts the links to local-only files and HTTP(S) URIs, which may result in a huge number of false positives. Because of that, the detection guidance focuses on formats that may access and execute remote files. Due to that, it may result in false negatives.
•  The vulnerable function uses the configured protocol handlers and may expose additional exploitable protocols depending on the system configuration.

Conclusion

This vulnerability was patched by Microsoft in the February 2026 release cycle. They note no workarounds but do list user interaction as a prerequisite to exploitation. To fully remediate the vulnerability, the proper action is to test and deploy the provided vendor patch.

Special thanks to Nikolai Skliarenko and Yazhi Wang of the TrendAI Research team for providing such a thorough analysis of this vulnerability. For an overview of TrendAI Research services please visit https://go.trendmicro.com/tis/vulnerabilities.html.

The threat research team will be back with other great vulnerability analysis reports in the future. Until then, follow the team on Twitter, Mastodon, LinkedIn, or Bluesky for the latest in exploit techniques and security patches.

]]> <![CDATA[The February 2026 Security Update Review]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694474/it-security-nachrichten/the-february-2026-security-update-review/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694474/it-security-nachrichten/the-february-2026-security-update-review/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:00:44 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de I have survived the biggest Pwn2Own ever, but I’m back in Tokyo for the second Patch Tuesday of 2026. My location never stops Patch Tuesday from coming, so let’s take a look at the latest security patches from Adobe and Microsoft. If you’d rather watch the full video recap covering the entire release, you can check it out here:

Adobe Patches for February 2026

For February, Adobe released nine bulletins addressing 44 unique CVEs in Adobe Audition, After Effects, InDesign, Substance 3D Designer, Substance 3D Stager, Adobe Bridge, Substance 3D Modeler, Lightroom Classic, and the Adobe DNG Software Development Kit (SDK). The largest update here is for After Effects, which fixes 13 Critical and two Important rated bugs. The patch for Substance 3D Designer is on the larger side with seven fixes, but only two of those are Critical. On the other hand, the fix for Substance 3D Stager corrects five Critical-rated bugs that could lead to code execution. The Audition patch fixes six bugs, but only one is Critical.

The other patches are smaller in size. The fix for the Adobe DNG Software Development Kit (SDK) corrects two Critical and two Important-rated bugs. The InDesign patch fixes three bugs, but only one is Critical. The update for Adobe Bridge fixes two Critical bug that could lead to code execution. The patch for Lightroom Classic addresses a single Critical bug, and the release is wrapped up with a patch for Substance 3D Modeler that fixes a single, Important-rated memory link.

None of the bugs fixed by Adobe this month are listed as publicly known or under active attack at the time of release, and all of the updates released by Adobe this month are listed as deployment priority 3.

Microsoft Patches for February 2026

This month, Microsoft drops 58 new CVEs in Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Azure, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), .NET and Visual Studio, GitHub Copilot, Mailslot FS, Exchange Server, Internet Explorer (!), Power BI, Hyper-V Server, and the Windows Subsystem for Linux. Counting the third-party and Chromium updates listed in the release, it brings the total number of CVEs to 62. One of the bugs in the Windows Graphics component was submitted through the ZDI program. Five of these bugs are rated Critical, two are rated Moderate, and the rest are rated Important in severity.

It’s typical to see this number of CVEs released in February, but the number of bugs under active attack is extraordinarily high. Microsoft lists six bugs being exploited at the time of release, with three of these listed as publicly known. Last month only had a single bug being exploited, although there were twice as many CVEs patched. We’ll see if we’re on our way to another “hot exploit summer” as we saw a few years ago or if this is just an aberration.

Let’s take a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with the bugs under active attack:

-    CVE-2026-21510 - Windows Shell Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
This bug is listed as a security feature bypass, but it could also be classified as code execution. An attacker can bypass Windows SmartScreen and Windows Shell security prompts to execute code on a target system. This bug is also listed as publicly known, but Microsoft doesn’t say where. There is user interaction here, as the client needs to click a link or a shortcut file. Still, a one-click bug to gain code execution is a rarity. Definitely test and deploy this fix quickly.

-    CVE-2026-21514 - Microsoft Word Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
This bug also requires user interaction in the form of opening a Word document, but that’s all that’s required to bypass protections to dangerous COM/OLE controls. Thankfully, the Preview Pane is not an attack vector here. However, users are well known to open lots of documents they receive in e-mail. This bypass could also result in code execution if the right COM/OLE control is hit. This is also listed as publicly known, so add this to the list to test and deploy quickly.

-    CVE-2026-21519 - Desktop Window Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This is the second month in a row that a DWM was listed as being exploited in the wild. That leads me to believe the first patch didn’t completely resolve the vulnerability. Same as last month, this bug allows attackers to run code with SYSTEM privileges. Bugs of this type are typically paired with a code execution bug to take over a system. As always, Microsoft offers no indication of how widespread these exploits may be.

-    CVE-2026-21533 - Windows Remote Desktop Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Don’t let the word “Remote” in the title fool you – this is a local bug that allows attackers to run code with SYSTEM privileges. It’s interesting that Microsoft lists “Improper privilege management” as the root cause for this issue. If the system is running Remote Desktop Services, it’s probably a juicy target for attackers to move laterally after an initial breach. Add this one to the list of patches to test and deploy immediately.

-    CVE-2026-21513 - Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
Although long gone by many measurements, IE does still exist on Windows systems, and calling it always results in a vulnerability somehow. This bug manifests similarly to the Shell bug above, as it requires user interaction but could result in code execution. The bypass here is simply the ability to reach IE, which shouldn’t be possible. Again, test and deploy this fix quickly.

-    CVE-2026-21525 - Windows Remote Access Connection Manager Denial of Service Vulnerability
It’s unusual to see DoS bugs being used in active attacks, but that’s what we have here. A null pointer deref in the Windows Remote Access Connection Manager allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service locally. Most null pointer derefs cause the application or service to crash, but it’s not clear if it will automatically restart. I would exercise caution and patch quickly either way.

Here’s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for February 2026:

<![if supportMisalignedColumns]> <![endif]>
CVE Title Severity CVSS Public Exploited TYPE
CVE-2026-21514 Microsoft Word Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.8 Yes Yes SFB
CVE-2026-21510 Windows Shell Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.8 Yes Yes SFB
CVE-2026-21513 Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.8 Yes Yes SFB
CVE-2026-21519 Desktop Window Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No Yes EoP
CVE-2026-21533 Windows Remote Desktop Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No Yes EoP
CVE-2026-21525 Windows Remote Access Connection Manager Denial of Service Vulnerability Moderate 6.2 No Yes DoS
CVE-2026-21511 Microsoft Outlook Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2023-2804 * Red Hat, Inc. CVE-2023-2804: Heap Based Overflow libjpeg-turbo Important 6.5 Yes No RCE
CVE-2026-24302 Azure Arc Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 8.6 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24300 Azure Front Door Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21532 Azure Function Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 8.2 No No Info
CVE-2026-21522 Microsoft ACI Confidential Containers Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 6.7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23655 Microsoft ACI Confidential Containers Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-21218 .NET and Visual Studio Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-21512 Azure DevOps Server Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No XSS
CVE-2026-21529 † Azure HDInsight Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.7 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-21528 Azure IoT Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-21228 Azure Local Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21531 Azure SDK for Python Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21251 Cluster Client Failover (CCF) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-20846 GDI+ Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-21523 GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21518 GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-21257 GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21256 GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21516 GitHub Copilot for Jetbrains Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21253 Mailslot File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21537 † Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Linux Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21259 Microsoft Excel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21258 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-21261 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-21527 Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-21260 Microsoft Outlook Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-21229 Power BI Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21236 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21238 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21241 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21517 Windows App for Mac Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21234 Windows Connected Devices Platform Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21235 Windows Graphics Component Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21246 Windows Graphics Component Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21232 Windows HTTP.sys Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21240 Windows HTTP.sys Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21250 Windows HTTP.sys Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21244 Windows Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21247 Windows Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21248 Windows Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21255 Windows Hyper-V Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No SFB
CVE-2026-21231 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21239 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21245 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21222 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-21243 Windows Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-20841 Windows Notepad App Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-21249 Windows NTLM Spoofing Vulnerability Important 3.3 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-21508 Windows Storage Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21237 Windows Subsystem for Linux Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21242 Windows Subsystem for Linux Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-1861 * Chromium: CVE-2026-1861 Heap buffer overflow in libvpx High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-1862 * Chromium: CVE-2026-1862 Type Confusion in V8 High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-0391 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) for Android Spoofing Vulnerability Moderate 6.5 No No Spoofing

* Indicates this CVE had been released by a third party and is now being included in Microsoft releases.

† Indicates further administrative actions are required to fully address the vulnerability.

 

Moving on to the Critical-rated bugs, the patch for Azure Front Door sounds frightening, but Microsoft has already fixed the bug and is just now documenting it. That’s also true for the bugs in Azure Arc and Azure Function. There are two Critical-rated bugs in the ACI Confidential Containers. The first allows a container escape while the second discloses secret tokens and keys. Either way, you’ll want to handle those quickly.

Taking a look at the other code execution vulnerabilities in this month’s release, we start with a frightening looking bug in Azure SDK for Python that has the highest CVSS this month of 9.8. A remote, unauthenticated attacker code gain code execution on an affected system via a maliciously crafted continuation token. It’s not clear why this isn’t rated Critical, but I would treat it as such. The three bugs in Hyper-V are actually local open-and-own bugs that require a user to open a malicious file on an affected system. That’s also true for the bug in Notepad. The bug in Power BI is confusing, because Microsoft says it requires authentication and could lead to an attacker running code as an authenticated user. There’s the poorly named “Azure Local Remote Code Execution Vulnerability”, but it requires a machine-in-the-middle (MitM) to exploit. The bug in Defender for Endpoint Linux is restricted to local subnets, but you’ll need to enable auto provisioning to get the patch. The final code execution bugs addressed this month are in GitHub Copilot. Two are command injections and the other is a Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition, but both could end up in code execution on affected systems.

Patches for Elevation of Privilege (EoP) bugs make up nearly 50% of this release, but most simply lead to local attackers executing their code at SYSTEM-level privileges or administrative privileges. There are only two of note. The first is a command injection bug in GitHub Copilot that leads to executing code at the level of the targeted application. The second is a bug in a kernel that leads to SYSTEM but could also be used for a sandbox escape.

There’s a unusually high number of spoofing bugs in this month’s release, and the ones for Outlook are the most troubling. First, the Preview Pane is an attack vector. Secondly, the bugs could be used to relay NTLM credentials via just an email, which could result in credential disclosure. And you’ll need multiple patches to fully address these bugs. At least they can be applied in any order.  There’s a UI misrepresentation bug in Exchange Server that could allow an attacker to either view some sensitive information or “make changes to disclosed information”. At what point does data become disclosed? That odd phrasing makes me think they are using AI to right some of their descriptions. The phrasing also appears in the patch for NTLM. That bug is triggered by opening a specially crafted Office doc, and while they explicitly say it could be used to relay NTLM creds, it sure seems that way. The patch for .NET and Visual Studio fixes a bug that allows attackers to bypass header validation, resulting in the service accepting a message it should reject. Finally, the bug in Azure HDInsight is really just a cross-site scripting (XSS) bug. The caveat here is that you need to restart Ambari server in both of the head nodes to have this fix updated. There is also an XSS in Azure Devops Server, but at least it is labelled as such.

There are a couple of additional security feature bypass bugs to discuss. The first is in Hyper-V and bypasses the Virtualization-based Security feature. The other is in GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code. It’s another command injection, but this one can be used to bypass authentication. Neat.

Looking at the remaining info disclosure bugs getting patched this month, most simply result in info leaks consisting of unspecified memory contents or memory addresses. The exception is the bug in Azure IoT Explorer. This bug could be used to view the contents of the target user’s local file system.

We end this month’s release with two DoS bugs: one in LDAP and one in GDI+. Neither descriptions from Microsoft provide any usable information.

No new advisories are being released this month.

Looking Ahead

I plan on being back home for the March release but wherever I’m at, you can rest assured that March 10, I’ll be here to provide my assessment of the release. Until then, stay safe, happy patching, and may all your reboots be smooth and clean!

]]> <![CDATA[The March 2026 Security Update Review]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694472/it-security-nachrichten/the-march-2026-security-update-review/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694472/it-security-nachrichten/the-march-2026-security-update-review/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:00:43 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de I am back in the friendly confines of the Mid-South headquarters of TrendAI ZDI (a.k.a. my home office), and am all set for the third patch Tuesday of 2026. Take a break from your regularly scheduled activities and let’s take a look at the latest security patches from Adobe and Microsoft.If you’d rather watch the full video recap covering the entire release, you can check it out here:

Adobe Patches for March 2026

For March, Adobe released eight bulletins addressing 80 unique CVEs in Adobe Acrobat Reader, Commerce, Illustrator, Substance 3D Painter, Premier Pro, Experience Manager, Substance 3D Stager, and the Adobe DNG Software Development Kit (SDK). Two of these bugs were submitted through the TrendAI ZDI program. If you need to prioritize, the update for Acrobat likely has the most impact, with the patch fixing two Critical-rated and one Important bugs. The fix for Experience Manager is the largest this month with 33 CVEs addressed. However, these are simple cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs, so it’s not too exciting. The fix for Commerce is also quite large with 19 CVEs. Most of these are also XSS bugs, but there’s a few security feature bypass bugs in there, too. Adobe actually gives this patch a deployment priority of 2, but it’s not under active attack at the time of release.

The fix for Illustrator corrects seven bugs, including a few Critical-rated ones. The patch for Substance 3D Painter fixes nine different CVEs, all rated Important. That’s not the case for Substance 3D Stager, which fixes six different Critical bugs that could lead to arbitrary code execution. The patch for the Adobe DNG Software Development Kit (SDK) addresses one Critical and one Important bug. Finally, the update for Premiere Pro correct a single, Critical-rated bug that could lead to arbitrary code execution.

None of the bugs fixed by Adobe this month are listed as publicly known or under active attack at the time of release, and beyond the update for Commerce, all of the other updates released by Adobe this month are listed as deployment priority 3.

Microsoft Patches for March 2026

This month, Microsoft released 84 new CVEs in Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Azure, SQL Server, Hyper-V Server, and the Windows Resilient File System (ReFS). Counting the third-party and Chromium updates listed in the release, it brings to total number of CVEs to 94. Five of these bugs were reported through the TrendAI ZDI program. Eight of these bugs are rated Critical, and the rest are rated Important in severity.

This volume is relatively typical for a March release, and the lack of bugs under active attack is a nice change from last month. There are two vulnerabilities listed as publicly known at the time of release, but none listed as actively exploited.

Let’s take a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with a bug with an AI slant:

-    CVE-2026-26144 - Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability
This is a fascinating bug and an attack scenario we’re likely to see more often. The vulnerability is a simple cross-site scripting (XSS) bug in Excel, but an attacker could use it to cause the Copilot Agent to exfiltrate data off the target. This essentially makes it a zero-click information disclosure. Although not stated, the disclosure is likely at the level of the logged-on user, so there isn’t a privilege escalation component. Info disclosures rarely get rated Critical, but it makes sense here.

-    CVE-2026-26110/CVE-2026-26113 - Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Another month and another pair of Office bugs where the Preview Pane is an exploit vector. I’ve lost count of how many of these bugs have been patched over the last year, but it’s just a matter of time until they start appearing in active exploits. The latest versions of Outlook allow you to hide the Preview Pane, but it isn’t clear if this would mitigate these attacks. The best option is still to test and deploy the update, but considering how many of these patches exist, it’s likely further updates will be needed to fully address these issues.

-    CVE-2026-23669 - Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Just reading the title makes me twitch with remembrances of Print Nightmare from a few years ago. This bug works in the same manner as those exploits. An authenticated attacker sends specially crafted messages to an affected system to gain arbitrary code execution. No user interaction is required. Let’s hope we don’t end up in a new nightmare of spooler exploits. Test and deploy this one quickly.

-    CVE-2026-23668 - Windows Graphics Component Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This vulnerability was submitted to the ZDI program by Marcin Wiązowski as two separate bugs, and it demonstrates the need for variant investigations when creating security patches. Both cases are caused by the lack of proper locking when performing operations on an object. However, in one case, it’s in the cdd.dll driver while the other is in the win32kfull driver. Either way, an attacker could use these to elevate privileges to SYSTEM and execute arbitrary code. Since the fix for both is to add object locking to the GDI object, the cases are combined into a single CVE. That’s not a problem, but it does show how variants can occur, and fixes should be as broad as possible.

Here’s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for March 2026:

<![if supportMisalignedColumns]> <![endif]>
CVE Title Severity CVSS Public Exploited Type
CVE-2026-26127 .NET Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 Yes No DoS
CVE-2026-21262 SQL Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 Yes No EoP
CVE-2026-23651 Microsoft ACI Confidential Containers Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 6.7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26124 Microsoft ACI Confidential Containers Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 6.7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26122 Microsoft ACI Confidential Containers Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-21536 Microsoft Devices Pricing Program Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26144 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-26110 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26113 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26125 Payment Orchestrator Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Critical 8.6 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26131 .NET Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25177 Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26117 Arc Enabled Servers - Azure Connected Machine Agent Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26130 ASP.NET Core Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-23661 Azure IoT Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-23662 Azure IoT Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-23664 Azure IoT Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-26121 Azure IOT Explorer Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-26118 Azure MCP Server Tools Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23667 Broadcast DVR Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25190 GDI Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-25181 GDI+ Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-26030 * GitHub: CVE-2026-26030 Microsoft Semantic Kernel InMemoryVectorStore filter functionality vulnerable Important 9.9 No No RCE
CVE-2026-23654 * GitHub: Zero Shot SCFoundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26141 Hybrid Worker Extension (Arc-enabled Windows VMs) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23665 † Linux Azure Diagnostic extension (LAD) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23674 MapUrlToZone Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-26123 Microsoft Authenticator Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-26148 † Microsoft Azure AD SSH Login extension for Linux Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25167 Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.4 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26107 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26108 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26109 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26112 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26134 Microsoft Office Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26106 Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26114 Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26105 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 8.1 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-24283 Multiple UNC Provider Kernel Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25165 Performance Counters for Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24282 Push message Routing Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-26115 SQL Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26116 SQL Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-20967 System Center Operations Manager (SCOM) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24285 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24291 Windows Accessibility Infrastructure (ATBroker.exe) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25186 Windows Accessibility Infrastructure (ATBroker.exe) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-23660 † Windows Admin Center in Azure Portal Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24293 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25176 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25178 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25179 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23656 Windows App Installer Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.9 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-25171 Windows Authentication Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23671 Windows Bluetooth RFCOM Protocol Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24292 Windows Connected Devices Platform Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24295 Windows Device Association Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24296 Windows Device Association Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25189 Windows DWM Core Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25174 Windows Extensible File Allocation Table Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25168 Windows Graphics Component Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No DoS
CVE-2026-25169 Windows Graphics Component Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No DoS
CVE-2026-23668 Windows Graphics Component Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25180 Windows Graphics Component Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-25170 Windows Hyper-V Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24297 Windows Kerberos Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-24287 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24289 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26132 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-24288 Windows Mobile Broadband Driver Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 6.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-25175 Windows NTFS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23669 Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-24290 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23673 Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25172 Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-25173 Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26111 Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-25185 Windows Shell Link Processing Spoofing Vulnerability Important 5.3 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-24294 Windows SMB Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26128 Windows SMB Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25166 Windows System Image Manager Assessment and Deployment Kit (ADK) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-25188 Windows Telephony Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23672 Windows Universal Disk Format File System Driver (UDFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-25187 Winlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-3536 * Chromium: CVE-2026-3536 Integer overflow in ANGLE Critical N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-3538 * Chromium: CVE-2026-3538 Integer overflow in Skia Critical N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-3539 * Chromium: CVE-2026-3539 Object lifecycle issue in DevTools High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-3540 * Chromium: CVE-2026-3540 Inappropriate implementation in WebAudio High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-3541 * Chromium: CVE-2026-3541 Inappropriate implementation in CSS High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-3542 * Chromium: CVE-2026-3542 Inappropriate implementation in WebAssembly High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-3543 * Chromium: CVE-2026-3543 Inappropriate implementation in V8 High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-3544 * Chromium: CVE-2026-3544 Heap buffer overflow in WebCodecs High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-3545 * Chromium: CVE-2026-3545 Insufficient data validation in Navigation High N/A No No RCE

* Indicates this CVE had been released by a third party and is now being included in Microsoft releases.

† Indicates further administrative actions are required to fully address the vulnerability.

 

Looking at the other Critical-rated bugs in this month’s release, they are all cloud-native and require no user action. Microsoft has already remediated the vulnerabilities.

Moving on to the other code execution bugs, the vulnerabilities in SharePoint Server pop out first. Both require authentication, but it’s essentially the lowest level of authentication, so these would be ideal cases for lateral movement within an enterprise. There are the standard open-and-own cases within Office components. There an interesting sounding bug in the Windows Mobile Broadband Driver that requires physical access, but Microsoft doesn’t elaborate on the attack scenario beyond that fact. The bug in the System Image Manager Assessment and Deployment Kit (ADK) requires authentication. The bug in GDI requires user interaction. The remaining code execution bugs are in the RRAS protocol. We’ve seen bugs in this component in the past, but never in the wild. I wouldn’t ignore these, but I wouldn’t rush them out either.

Similar to last month, updates for Elevation of Privilege (EoP) bugs make up nearly half of this month’s release. And as we saw last month, but most simply lead to local attackers executing their code at SYSTEM-level privileges or administrative privileges. The bugs in SQL Server allow attackers to elevate to SQL sysadmin privileges. The bug in the Azure MCP Server is more complex. It allows attackers to obtain the permissions associated with the MCP Server’s managed identity, which lets them perform actions that the managed identity is able to reach. The bug in the Azure AD SSH Login extension for Linux leads to root access, and it won’t be easy to patch. You’ll need to run the update instructions from the command line on each affected system. That’s the same case for the bug in the Linux Azure Diagnostic extension (LAD). There’s an odd bug in the Hybrid Worker Extension (Arc‑enabled Windows VMs) that leads to “ELEVATED” privileges, which is something I’ve never seen before. The bug in the Broadcast DVR component allows an attacker to go from low integrity level up to medium. There’s a bug listed as an EoP in the Push message Routing Service, but reading the description, Microsoft notes it could lead to an information disclosure. It’s likely this is an error and should be an Information Disclosure bug. The final EoP is in the Azure Portal Windows Admin Center and leads to SYSTEM. However, there’s no patch to remediate this bug. Instead, you need to install the latest version of the Windows Admin Center extension through the Azure Portal by hand.

There are two security feature bypass patches in the March release. The first is a bypass of the MapURLToZone method, which (as expected) allows attackers to bypass MapURLToZone protections. The third bypass is in Kerberos and could allow an attacker to either view some sensitive information or make changes to “disclosed” information. This is a race condition that occurs while the group policy is being reapplied, so the window to exploit this would be extremely small.

Looking at the remaining info disclosure bugs getting patched this month, only two result in info leaks consisting of unspecified memory contents or memory addresses. Ther others provide more interesting results. There are three bugs in the Azure IoT Explorer have some wide-ranging implications. According to Microsoft, exploitation could result in, “device connection information, authentication tokens, request data, file paths, and other information transmitted between the application and the IoT Hub.” The bug in Authenticator almost reads like a security feature bypass, as exploit results in the disclosure of a one‑time sign‑in code or authentication deep link. The attacker would receive the sign‑in information and could potentially use it to authenticate as the user, allowing access to information or services available to that account. The last info disclosure bug is in the Accessibility Infrastructure and allows an attacker to gain secrets or privileged information belonging to the user of the affected application.

There are only four spoofing bugs in the March release. The first is in SharePoint server and manifests as an XSS. The second bug is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the Azure IoT Explorer. The remaining two are a bit more cryptic. The bug in Windows Shell Link Processing results from the “exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor,” and could lead to spoofing. That sounds like credential exposure, but it’s not explicitly called out. The final spoofing bug results from the insufficient verification of data authenticity in Windows App Installer. Again, this sounds vaguely like credential reflection, but without further information, we can only speculate.

Finally, there are four denial-of-service (DoS) bugs in the release, including one that’s listed as publicly known in the .NET Framework. As usual, Microsoft provides no actionable information about these bugs.

No new advisories are being released this month.

Looking Ahead

I plan on being at RSA for the first time in my career, so if you’re around, please stop by and say hello. I like it when people say hello. Otherwise, I’ll be back on April 14 with my assessment of that patch Tuesday release. Until then, stay safe, happy patching, and may all your reboots be smooth and clean!

]]> <![CDATA[The April 2026 Security Update Review]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694470/it-security-nachrichten/the-april-2026-security-update-review/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694470/it-security-nachrichten/the-april-2026-security-update-review/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:00:42 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de It’s time once again for Patch Tuesday, and this one is huge. We’ve also got multiple exploits in the wild, which adds another layer of urgency to this month’s release. Take a break from your regularly scheduled activities, and let’s take a look at the latest security patches from Adobe and Microsoft. If you’d rather watch the full video recap covering the entire release, you can check it out here:

Adobe Patches for April 2026

For April, Adobe released 12 bulletins addressing 61 unique CVEs in Adobe Acrobat Reader, InDesign, InCopy, FrameMaker, Connect, ColdFusion, Bridge, Photoshop, Illustrator, Experience Manager Screens, and the Adobe DNG SDK. Three of the Cold Fusion bugs came through the TrendAI ZDI program. For this month, I’m introducing an Adobe table as well. I’d love to get your feedback on whether this is helpful.

Bulletin ID Product CVE Count Highest Severity Highest CVSS Exploited Deployment Priority
APSB26-43 Adobe Acrobat Reader 1 Critical 8.6 Yes 1
APSB26-44 Adobe Acrobat Reader 2 Critical 8.6 No 2
APSB26-32 Adobe InDesign 9 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-33 Adobe InCopy 2 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-36 Adobe FrameMaker 11 Critical 8.6 No 3
APSB26-37 Adobe Connect 9 Critical 9.6 No 3
APSB26-38 Adobe ColdFusion 7 Critical 9.3 No 1
APSB26-39 Adobe Bridge 6 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-40 Adobe Photoshop 1 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-42 Adobe Illustrator 1 Critical 7.8 No 3
APSB26-34 Adobe Experience Manager Screens 9 Important 5.4 No 3
APSB26-41 Adobe DNG SDK 3 Important 5.5 No 3

Obviously, the active attack in Reader is the highest priority for this month, but don’t ignore the second bunch of Reader patches. Cold Fusion also gets a deployment priority of 1, so if you’re still running that platform, make sure you get the update. Otherwise, the FrameMaker and Connect patches fix 11 and nine bugs, respectively. InDesign and Experience Manager Screens also have nine CVEs addressed.

Outside of the Reader bug, none of the other bugs fixed by Adobe this month are listed as publicly known or under active attack at the time of release. One of the Reader bugs and Cold Fusion have a deployment priority of one, the other Reader bug has a priority of two, while all of the other updates released by Adobe this month are listed as deployment priority 3.

Microsoft Patches for April 2026

This month, Microsoft released a monstrous 163 new CVEs in Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Azure, .NET and Visual Studio, SQL Server, Hyper-V Server, BitLocker, and the Windows Wallet Service. Counting the third-party and a huge Chromium release, it brings the total number of CVEs to a staggering 247 updates. Six of these bugs were reported through the TrendAI ZDI program. Eight of these bugs are rated Critical, two are rated as Moderate, and the rest are rated Important in severity.

By my count, this is the second-largest monthly release in Microsoft’s history. There are many things we could speculate on to justify the size, but if Microsoft is like the other programs out there (including ours), they are likely seeing a rise in submissions found by AI tools. For us, our incoming rate has essentially tripled, making triage a challenge, to say the least. Whatever the reason, we have a lot of bugs to deal with this month. I should also point out that the Pwn2Own Berlin occurs next month, and it’s typical for vendors to patch as much as they can before the event.

There is one Microsoft bug listed as under active attack at the time of release, and one other that’s publicly known. Let’s take a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with the vulnerability being exploited in the wild:

-    CVE-2026-32201 - Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability
Microsoft doesn’t provide a lot of information about this bug, but Spoofing bugs in SharePoint often manifest as cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs. They do note that attackers could view information or make changes to disclosed information. As always, they don’t provide any information on how widespread these attacks are, but I wouldn’t wait to test and deploy this fix – especially if you have internet-connected SharePoint servers.

-    CVE-2026-33825 - Microsoft Defender Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This bug is listed as publicly known, and this time, we know exactly where it was disclosed. There have been some questions about how exploitable this bug may be, but it does look like it’s a real problem – just with some reliability issues in its current state. I won’t add on to the commentary from the researcher about working with Microsoft. I’m just glad they are offering a fix for the vulnerability. If you rely on Defender, test and deploy this one quickly.

-   CVE-2026-33827 - Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This vulnerability allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to exploit code on affected systems without user interaction. That adds up to a wormable bug – at least on systems with IPv6 and IPSec enabled. It is a race condition, which sets exploitability to High on the CVSS scale, but we see race conditions exploited at Pwn2Own all the time, so don’t rely on that obstacle. If you’re running IPv6, I would test and deploy this fix quickly before public exploits become available.

-    CVE-2026-33824 - Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Service Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Speaking of wormable bugs, here’s our second one this month. By the title, we can tell that systems with IKE enabled are affected, but that leaves plenty of targets for attackers. Microsoft also notes a significant mitigation for this bug. Blocking UDP ports 500 and 4500 at the perimeter prevents external attackers from reaching the affected service. However, insiders could still target this for lateral movement within an enterprise. For enterprises using IKE, get this fix tested and deployed with haste.

Here’s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for April 2026:

April 2026 Patch Tuesday
CVE Title Severity CVSS Public Exploited Type
CVE-2026-32201 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.5 No Yes Spoofing
CVE-2026-5281 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5281 Use after free in Dawn High N/A No Yes RCE
CVE-2026-33825 Microsoft Defender Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 Yes No EoP
CVE-2026-23666 .NET Framework Denial of Service Vulnerability Critical 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-32190 Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-33114 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-33115 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32157 Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-33826 Windows Active Directory Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-33824 Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Service Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 9.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-33827 Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Critical 8.1 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26171 .NET Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-32226 .NET Framework Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.9 No No DoS
CVE-2026-32178 .NET Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-32203 .NET and Visual Studio Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-33116 .NET, .NET Framework, and Visual Studio Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2023-20585 * AMD: CVE-2023-20585 IOMMU Write Buffer Vulnerability Important 5.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32072 Active Directory Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.2 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-25184 Applocker Filter Driver (applockerfltr.sys) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32171 Azure Logic Apps Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32168 Azure Monitor Agent Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32192 Azure Monitor Agent Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32181 Connected User Experiences and Telemetry Service Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-27924 Desktop Window Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32152 Desktop Window Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32154 Desktop Window Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27923 Desktop Window Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32155 Desktop Window Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23653 GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.7 No No Info
CVE-2026-23653 * GitHub: CVE-2026-32631 'git clone' from manipulated repositories can leak NTLM hashes Important 7.4 No No Info
CVE-2026-33096 HTTP.sys Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-25250 * MITRE: CVE-2026-25250 Secure Boot disable Eazy Fix Important 6 No No SFB
CVE-2026-26181 Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32219 Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32091 Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.4 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26152 Microsoft Cryptographic Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33103 Microsoft Dynamics 365 (On-Premises) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-32188 Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-32189 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32197 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32198 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32199 Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32184 Microsoft High Performance Compute (HPC) Pack Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26155 Microsoft Local Security Authority Subsystem Service Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-27914 Microsoft Management Console Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26149 Microsoft Power Apps Security Feature Bypass Important 9 No No SFB
CVE-2026-32200 Microsoft PowerPoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-26143 Microsoft PowerShell Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No SFB
CVE-2026-33120 † Microsoft SQL Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-20945 Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-33822 Microsoft Word Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-33095 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-23657 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32081 Package Catalog Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-26170 PowerShell Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26183 Remote Access Management service/API (RPC server) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26160 Remote Desktop Licensing Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26159 Remote Desktop Licensing Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26151 Remote Desktop Spoofing Vulnerability Important 7.1 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-32085 Remote Procedure Call Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-32167 SQL Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32176 SQL Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-0390 UEFI Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.7 No No SFB
CVE-2026-32220 UEFI Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 4.4 No No SFB
CVE-2026-32212 Universal Plug and Play (upnp.dll) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-32214 Universal Plug and Play (upnp.dll) Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-32079 Web Account Manager Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-33104 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32196 Windows Admin Center Spoofing Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-26178 Windows Advanced Rasterization Platform Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32073 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26168 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26173 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26177 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26182 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27922 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33099 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33100 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32088 Windows Biometric Service Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No SFB
CVE-2026-27913 Windows BitLocker Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 7.7 No No SFB
CVE-2026-26175 Windows Boot Manager Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No SFB
CVE-2026-32162 Windows COM Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.4 No No EoP
CVE-2026-20806 Windows COM Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-26176 Windows Client Side Caching driver (csc.sys) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27926 Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32070 Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33098 Windows Container Isolation FS Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26153 Windows Encrypted File System (EFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32087 Windows Function Discovery Service (fdwsd.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32093 Windows Function Discovery Service (fdwsd.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32086 Windows Function Discovery Service (fdwsd.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32150 Windows Function Discovery Service (fdwsd.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27931 Windows GDI Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-27930 Windows GDI Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-32221 Windows Graphics Component Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 8.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-27906 Windows Hello Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 4.4 No No SFB
CVE-2026-27928 Windows Hello Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.7 No No SFB
CVE-2026-26156 Windows Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32149 Windows Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.3 No No RCE
CVE-2026-27910 Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27912 Windows Kerberos Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26179 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26180 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32195 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26163 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32215 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-32217 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-32218 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-26169 Windows Kernel Memory Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.1 No No Info
CVE-2026-27929 Windows LUA File Virtualization Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32071 Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-20930 Windows Management Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26162 Windows OLE Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-33101 Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32084 Windows Print Spooler Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-27927 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26184 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32069 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32074 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32078 Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26167 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32158 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32159 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32160 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26172 Windows Push Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-20928 Windows Recovery Environment Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 4.6 No No SFB
CVE-2026-32216 Windows Redirected Drive Buffering System Denial of Service Vulnerability Important 5.5 No No DoS
CVE-2026-27909 Windows Search Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26161 Windows Sensor Data Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26174 Windows Server Update Service (WSUS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32224 Windows Server Update Service (WSUS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26154 Windows Server Update Service (WSUS) Tampering Vulnerability Important 7.5 No No Tampering
CVE-2026-26165 Windows Shell Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-26166 Windows Shell Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27918 Windows Shell Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32151 Windows Shell Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-32225 Windows Shell Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 8.8 No No SFB
CVE-2026-32202 Windows Shell Spoofing Vulnerability Important 4.3 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-32082 Windows Simple Search and Discovery Protocol (SSDP) Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32083 Windows Simple Search and Discovery Protocol (SSDP) Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32068 Windows Simple Search and Discovery Protocol (SSDP) Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32183 Windows Snipping Tool Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32089 Windows Speech Brokered Api Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32090 Windows Speech Brokered Api Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32153 Windows Speech Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27907 Windows Storage Spaces Controller Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32076 Windows Storage Spaces Controller Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27908 Windows TDI Translation Driver (tdx.sys) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27921 Windows TDI Translation Driver (tdx.sys) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27915 Windows UPnP Device Host Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27919 Windows UPnP Device Host Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32075 Windows UPnP Device Host Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27916 Windows UPnP Device Host Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27920 Windows UPnP Device Host Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32077 Windows UPnP Device Host Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27925 Windows UPnP Device Host Information Disclosure Vulnerability Important 6.5 No No Info
CVE-2026-32156 Windows UPnP Device Host Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Important 7.4 No No RCE
CVE-2026-32223 Windows USB Printing Stack (usbprint.sys) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 6.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32165 Windows User Interface Core Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-27911 Windows User Interface Core Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32163 Windows User Interface Core Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32164 Windows User Interface Core Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-23670 Windows Virtualization-Based Security (VBS) Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability Important 5.7 No No SFB
CVE-2026-27917 Windows WFP NDIS Lightweight Filter Driver (wfplwfs.sys) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32080 Windows WalletService Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7 No No EoP
CVE-2026-32222 Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Important 7.8 No No EoP
CVE-2026-21637 * HackerOne: CVE-2026-21637 TLS PSK/ALPN Callback Exceptions Bypass Error Handlers Moderate 7.5 No No SFB
CVE-2026-33119 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) for Android Spoofing Vulnerability Moderate 5.4 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-33829 Windows Snipping Tool Spoofing Vulnerability Moderate 4.3 No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-5858 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5858 Heap buffer overflow in WebML Critical N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5859 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5859 Integer overflow in WebML Critical N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5272 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5272 Heap buffer overflow in GPU High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5273 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5273 Use after free in CSS High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5274 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5274 Integer overflow in Codecs High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5275 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5275 Heap buffer overflow in ANGLE High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5276 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5276 Insufficient policy enforcement in WebUSB High N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5277 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5277 Integer overflow in ANGLE High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5279 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5279 Object corruption in V8 High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5280 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5280 Use after free in WebCodecs High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5283 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5283 Inappropriate implementation in ANGLE High N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5284 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5284 Use after free in Dawn High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5285 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5285 Use after free in WebGL High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5286 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5286 Use after free in Dawn High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5287 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5287 Use after free in PDF High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5289 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5289 Use after free in Navigation High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5290 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5290 Use after free in Compositing High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5860 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5860 Use after free in WebRTC High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5861 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5861 Use after free in V8 High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5862 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5862 Inappropriate implementation in V8 High N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5863 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5863 Inappropriate implementation in V8 High N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5864 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5864 Heap buffer overflow in WebAudio High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5865 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5865 Type Confusion in V8 High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5866 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5866 Use after free in Media High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5867 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5867 Heap buffer overflow in WebML High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5868 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5868 Heap buffer overflow in ANGLE High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5869 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5869 Heap buffer overflow in WebML High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5870 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5870 Integer overflow in Skia High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5871 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5871 Type Confusion in V8 High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5872 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5872 Use after free in Blink High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5873 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5873 Out of bounds read and write in V8 High N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5291 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5291 Inappropriate implementation in WebGL Medium N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5292 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5292 Out of bounds read in WebCodecs Medium N/A No No Info
CVE-2026-5874 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5874 Use after free in PrivateAI Medium N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5875 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5875 Policy bypass in Blink Medium N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5876 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5876 Side-channel information leakage in Navigation Medium N/A No No Info
CVE-2026-5877 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5877 Use after free in Navigation Medium N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5878 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5878 Incorrect security UI in Blink Medium N/A No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-5879 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5879 Insufficient validation of untrusted input in ANGLE Medium N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5880 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5880 Incorrect security UI in browser UI Medium N/A No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-5881 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5881 Policy bypass in LocalNetworkAccess Medium N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5882 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5882 Incorrect security UI in Fullscreen Medium N/A No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-5883 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5883 Use after free in Media Medium N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5884 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5884 Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Media Medium N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5885 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5885 Insufficient validation of untrusted input in WebML Medium N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5886 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5886 Out of bounds read in WebAudio Medium N/A No No Info
CVE-2026-5887 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5887 Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Downloads Medium N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5888 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5888 Uninitialized Use in WebCodecs Medium N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5889 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5889 Cryptographic Flaw in PDFium Medium N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5890 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5890 Race in WebCodecs Medium N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5891 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5891 Insufficient policy enforcement in browser UI Medium N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5892 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5892 Insufficient policy enforcement in PWAs Medium N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5893 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5893 Race in V8 Medium N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5894 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5894 Inappropriate implementation in PDF Low N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5895 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5895 Incorrect security UI in Omnibox Low N/A No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-5896 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5896 Policy bypass in Audio Low N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5897 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5897 Incorrect security UI in Downloads Low N/A No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-5898 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5898 Incorrect security UI in Omnibox Low N/A No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-5899 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5899 Incorrect security UI in History Navigation Low N/A No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-5900 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5900 Policy bypass in Downloads Low N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5901 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5901 Policy bypass in DevTools Low N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5902 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5902 Race in Media Low N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5903 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5903 Policy bypass in IFrameSandbox Low N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5904 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5904 Use after free in V8 Low N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5905 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5905 Incorrect security UI in Permissions Low N/A No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-5906 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5906 Incorrect security UI in Omnibox Low N/A No No Spoofing
CVE-2026-5907 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5907 Insufficient data validation in Media Low N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5908 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5908 Integer overflow in Media Low N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5909 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5909 Integer overflow in Media Low N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5910 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5910 Integer overflow in Media Low N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5911 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5911 Policy bypass in ServiceWorkers Low N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5912 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5912 Integer overflow in WebRTC Low N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5913 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5913 Out of bounds read in Blink Low N/A No No Info
CVE-2026-5914 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5914 Type Confusion in CSS Low N/A No No RCE
CVE-2026-5915 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5915 Insufficient validation of untrusted input in WebML Low N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5918 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5918 Inappropriate implementation in Navigation Low N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-5919 * Chromium: CVE-2026-5919 Insufficient validation of untrusted input in WebSockets Low N/A No No SFB
CVE-2026-33118 Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability Low 4.3 No No Spoofing

* Indicates this CVE had been released by a third party and is now being included in Microsoft releases.

† Indicates further administrative actions are required to fully address the vulnerability.

 

Looking at the other Critical-rated bugs in this month’s release, there are three Office-related bugs where the Preview Pane is once again listed as an exploit vector. I would still like to have a full-proof way of disabling the Preview Pane, but I don’t see that as an option. There’s a bug in the RDP client, but that involves connecting to a malicious RDP server. The bug in Active Directory requires authentication and a network adjacent attacker. The final Critical-rated bug is an interesting DoS in .NET Framework. An unauthenticated attacker could deny service over a network – presumably crippling any affected app made in .NET. You rarely see Critical-rated DoS bugs, but this one deserves the moniker.

Moving on to the other code execution bugs, you have quite a few open-and-own bugs in Office components, most notably Excel, where the Preview Pane is not an attack vector. The bug in SQL Server requires authentication, and as usual, additional steps are needed to ensure you have the correct update to remediate this vulnerability. The two bugs in Hyper-V almost reads like a privilege escalation since it allows unauthorized attackers to execute code locally. That’s the same for the bugs in the Windows Snipping Tool and the UPnP Device host.

More than half of this release addresses Elevation of Privilege (EoP) bugs. However, most simply lead to local attackers executing their code at SYSTEM-level privileges or administrative privileges, so there’s not much to add without further technical details about the bugs themselves. The bugs in SQL Server could allow an attacker to gain SQL sysadmin privileges. One of the kernel bugs simply states an attacker could “elevate privileges locally”. How obtuse. That’s similar for the bug in afd.sys and Desktop Windows Manager, but Microsoft also states that these bugs could crash an affected system. There are several bugs that result in a sandbox escape, including Windows Push Notifications, AFD for Winsock, Management Services, and User Interface Core. Of these, CVE-2026-26167 (Push Notifications) is the most notable — it's the only one with low attack complexity, meaning no race condition needed. The rest all require winning a race condition (AC:H). The bugs in UPnP are interesting as they allow attackers to gain access to a limited set of administrator-protected objects. Not a full escalation but definitely getting access to resources they shouldn’t. The vulnerability in the Brokering File System allows attackers to gain the level of the logged on user, so don’t do your normal activities as a user with admin privileges. The bug in Azure Monitor Agent leads to root-level access.

There are a dozen different security features bypass bugs in the April release. Some of these are obvious by the title alone. For example, the bugs in Windows Hello bypass safety features within the Hello app itself. The bug in the Biometric Service allows attackers to bypass biometric protections. The vulns in BitLocker and Secure Boot bypass protections in those components. The bug in Power Apps allows attackers to bypass a security warning dialog and trick targets into triggering an external protocol call that performs unintended actions on the user’s device. The bug in Windows Shell allows attackers to bypass Mark of the Web (MotW) protections. The bug in PowerShell could almost be described as a code execution bug as exploiting it bypasses dynamic-expression security checks, which could result in code execution. The vulnerability in the Windows Recovery Environment allows local attackers to bypass BitLocker device encryption. Finally, the bug in Virtualization‑Based Security (VBS) is the most interesting of the bunch – and not just because VBS is a (relatively) new feature. The problem allows attackers to manipulate allow a compromised Windows kernel to modify memory belonging to the secure kernel, breaking the intended isolation guarantees provided by VBS. Somewhat of a sandbox escape, but this time, you’re escaping from Virtual Trust Level 0 (VTL0) to Virtual Trust Level 1 (VTL1). Neat.

Moving on to the Information Disclosure bugs fixed this month, we have 20 different CVEs. Fortunately, most of these simply result in info leaks consisting of unspecified memory contents or memory addresses. While useful in crafting exploits, they aren’t exactly exciting on their own. There are also several bugs that disclose addresses from an object a contained in a sandboxed execution environment. This includes bugs in the Print Spooler, Package Catalog, and Web Account Manager. The bug in Dynamics 365 discloses the ever ineffable “sensitive information”. There are three different info disclosure bugs in UPnP. Two allow an attacker to read from the file system, while the third discloses anything available to the LOCAL SERVICE account. The final info disclosure bug resides in Copilot and Visual Studio and allows attackers to disclose the contents of the Model Context Protocol (MCP) when using Copilot. There are those who think MCP is dead (thanks to agentic AI agents), but if you’re using a custom MCP, I doubt you would want it leaked.

The April release contains just a handful of Spoofing bugs. Some, like the bugs in .NET, Active Directory, and Windows Shell, just say that they allow spoofing over a network. Others, like the bug in Windows Snipping Tool, say similar but also note that it could be used to relay NTLMv2 hashes. The patch for RDP notes that there are new warning dialogs coming this month. The bug in the Windows Admin Center would allow an attacker to interact with other tenant’s applications and content. Finally, the spoofing bug in SharePoint is another XSS issue.

There are eight DoS bugs in the April release, but as always, Microsoft provides no actionable information about the vulnerabilities. Microsoft does offer a mitigation for the http.sys bug that can be applied while you test and deploy the patch, but I would rely on the patch rather than the mitigation. Another exception is the bug for Connected User Experiences and Telemetry Service, which allows attackers to deny service locally rather than over the network.

The final(!) bug in the April release is a Tampering bug in WSUS that reads like a DoS. According to Microsoft, “An attacker can send specially crafted packets which could affect availability of the service and result in Denial of Service (DoS).” But sure – let’s call it Tampering.

No new advisories are being released this month.

Looking Ahead

I will be in Berlin for the next Patch Tuesday, which will be May 12, and I’ll provide my full thoughts then on what will hopefully be a smaller release than this one. Until then, stay safe, happy patching, and may all your reboots be smooth and clean!

]]> <![CDATA[Researcher Claims Working Jailbreak on Top AI Models Including GPT-5.6, Claude Opus 5, and Fable]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694442/it-security-nachrichten/researcher-claims-working-jailbreak-on-top-ai-models-including-gpt-56-claude-opus-5-and-fable/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694442/it-security-nachrichten/researcher-claims-working-jailbreak-on-top-ai-models-including-gpt-56-claude-opus-5-and-fable/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 19:00:18 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de A well-known AI red teamer claims to have developed a universal jailbreak that works against leading large language models, including heavily guarded flagships such as GPT-5.6 Sol, Claude Opus 5, and Fable. In a public post on X, Pliny the Liberator described the technique as effective “on ALL models” and across every category he tested. […]

The post Researcher Claims Working Jailbreak on Top AI Models Including GPT-5.6, Claude Opus 5, and Fable appeared first on Cyber Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[Russian State-Supported Cyber Actors Conduct Phishing Campaign Targeting Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694430/it-security-nachrichten/russian-state-supported-cyber-actors-conduct-phishing-campaign-targeting-users-of-zimbra-collaboration-suite/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694430/it-security-nachrichten/russian-state-supported-cyber-actors-conduct-phishing-campaign-targeting-users-of-zimbra-collaboration-suite/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 18:59:26 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Russian State-Supported Cyber Actors Conduct Phishing Campaign Targeting Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite

Executive summary 

A group of Russian state-supported cyber actors has been targeting and compromising various Western government and commercial organizations using the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) software since at least July 2025. The Russian state-supported advanced persistent threat (APT) group’s activity is tracked in the cybersecurity community under several names (see Cybersecurity industry tracking), primarily as “LAUNDRY BEAR,” a name initially coined by the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) [1].

LAUNDRY BEAR’s targeting is almost certainly to gather sensitive information for the Russian Federation, with these actors primarily focusing on the covert acquisition of email data. Previous campaigns indicated LAUNDRY BEAR relied on unsophisticated initial access techniques—including password spraying, phishing, and pass-the-cookie—allowing the group to successfully run high-volume operations. The latest campaign targeting ZCS uses a novel exploit that was a zero-day vulnerability when first exploited and continues to be successfully exploited. The vulnerability, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2025-66376, was patched in November 2025. This demonstrates LAUNDRY BEAR’s intent and ability to deploy increasingly sophisticated technical capabilities.

Unlike traditional phishing campaigns that persuade a user into taking an action, such as clicking a link or opening a file, LAUNDRY BEAR’s latest campaign leverages a view-based exploit that only requires a user to view a malicious email within a vulnerable version of the webmail service. Once viewed, the exploit attempts to exfiltrate the victim’s last 90 days of email communications, the organization email directory (i.e., Global Address List [GAL]), and other sensitive information to servers controlled by LAUNDRY BEAR. The exploit also attempts to establish persistent access to victim accounts through a variety of means as detailed in the Persistence and credential access section.

This Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) warns of this ongoing malicious threat activity and urges organizations to update their vulnerable software and implement additional mitigations to thwart these Russian state-supported actors’ continued success. The CSA is being released by the following authoring and co-sealing agencies:

  • United States National Security Agency (NSA)
  • United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
  • Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD)
  • Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)
  • United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
  • United States Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA)
  • United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
  • United States Department of the Treasury
  • United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)
  • Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
  • Communications Security Establishment Canada’s (CSE’s) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
  • New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
  • United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
  • Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)1
  • Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS)2
  • Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS)3
  • Finnish Defence Intelligence (FDI)4
  • Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO)5
  • French General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI)6
  • French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI)7
  • Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE)8
  • Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI)9
  • Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova (SIS RM)10
  • Polish Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW)11
  • The Military Counterintelligence Service of Poland (SKW)12
  • Spain National Intelligence Centre (CNI)13
  • Sweden National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-SE)14

The authoring agencies urge any organizations using ZCS to implement the recommendations listed within the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the risk associated with this activity. This CSA also includes specific remediations for organizations to implement if they discover the presence of the listed Indicators of compromise (IOCs).  

As more organizations update their ZCS software based on this CSA, LAUNDRY BEAR may discontinue the current campaign exploiting this vulnerability; however, based on the success of this and previous campaigns, it is very likely that the group will continue to target ZCS and other email systems used by organizations in Western countries. The actors will almost certainly continue to rely on email to engage potential victims by exploiting novel vulnerabilities and, when necessary, use social engineering techniques to assist with their efforts. The authoring agencies recommend organizations regularly update their mail service software and continuously monitor their email systems and emails for malicious activity.

For a downloadable list of IOCs, see:

Cybersecurity industry tracking

The cybersecurity industry provides overlapping cyber threat intelligence, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and mitigation recommendations related to these Russian state-supported cyber actors. While not exhaustive, the following are threat group names commonly used for these actors within the cybersecurity community:

  • LAUNDRY BEAR
  • Void Blizzard [2]
  • CL-STA-1114 [3]
  • TA488 (formerly UNK_PitStop) [4]

Note: Cybersecurity companies have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this may not be a 1:1 correlation to the U.S. government’s understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

Background

Public advisories from Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), and Microsoft highlighted these Russian state-supported advanced persistent threat (APT) actors in May 2025, calling them LAUNDRY BEAR and Void Blizzard respectively [1] [2]. Both advisories assessed that the group was engaged in malicious cyber activity as early as April 2024.  

The May 2025 advisories highlighted a cluster of activity targeting cloud-based email environments, including Microsoft Exchange in particular, and abusing legitimate APIs to perform data exfiltration in bulk [T1114.002]. The group relied on unsophisticated means of initial access, including procuring stolen credentials on criminal marketplaces [T1078], and using social engineering techniques to lure targets into interacting with a malicious site masquerading as a legitimate one. As of April 2025, one of these sites resembled a European Defence & Security Summit registration portal that required registrants to sign in to their Microsoft account to view. Once a user entered their Microsoft credentials into this malicious site, LAUNDRY BEAR’s modified version of the open source adversary emulation toolkit, Evilginx, intercepted the user’s credentials. LAUNDRY BEAR then used this authentication data, including passwords and session tokens, to access the compromised account and conduct mass email exfiltration, as well as harvest other information. This method of compromise is commonly known as an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique [T1557].  

Beginning around July 2025, LAUNDRY BEAR shifted toward a more technical method of email compromise, highlighting their continued efforts to covertly acquire email communications from a variety of Western organizations of interest and deliver them to the Russian Federation. Using a custom-developed capability [T1587.001] named “Улей” or “Ulej” (Russian for beehive), LAUNDRY BEAR successfully targeted and exfiltrated sensitive user information from organizations who use the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) product [T1114]. Data LAUNDRY BEAR attempted to exfiltrate from compromised accounts included:

  • Last 90 days of emails,
  • Email address,
  • Password [T1589.001],
  • Global Address List (GAL) [T1087],
  • Two-factor authentication (2FA) tokens, and
  • Newly-created Application Passcode [T1098].

The covert and persistent nature of this activity, along with the absence of any known financial extortion, almost certainly indicates this group’s involvement in espionage activities with Russian government backing. Additionally, extensive Ukrainian targeting, prior to use against U.S. and other NATO allies, outlines an increasing trend within Russian cyber threat groups to target Ukrainian users first—both as a priority target and as a testbench for malicious cyber techniques before broader global deployment.

Targeting details

LAUNDRY BEAR has targeted and compromised users in various organizations, including those associated with:

  • the Defense Industrial Base (DIB),  
  • the federal and local government,
  • education,
  • energy,
  • law enforcement,  
  • media,  
  • non-governmental organizations, and
  • technology.

Technical details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 19. This advisory also uses MITRE D3FENDTM version 1.4.015. See Appendix A and Appendix B for tables of the activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK and D3FEND tactics, techniques, and countermeasures.

Ulej is a novel data exfiltration and aggregation capability, that currently (as of the publication of this report) supports a campaign specifically targeting users of ZCS webmail servers. This capability is used to exploit CVE-2025-66376 [Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')], but likely could be adapted to exploit other vulnerabilities. It exfiltrates emails and other sensitive user data from a victim’s system immediately after exploitation and stores the data in an actor-controlled unattributable virtual private server (VPS) [T1074.002] running LAUNDRY BEAR’s “Flowerbed” collection framework. The collected data is almost certainly further exfiltrated to internal network resources for review and long-term retention.

Reconnaissance

LAUNDRY BEAR uses the Ulej capability to exploit the CVE-2025-66376 vulnerability in organizations using ZCS. This campaign’s targeted victimology and limited exploitation capabilities likely indicate this group manually identifies and targets the victim organizations. LAUNDRY BEAR likely identifies organizations with public-facing Zimbra infrastructure by port scanning [T1595] and fingerprinting datasets easily procured through various commercial vendors [T1596.005].  

After identifying a target organization, the group likely compiles email addresses for individual users to target with the exploit [T1589.002] from datasets offered by commercial vendors [T1597.002], open source intelligence [T1593], or previously exfiltrated data [T1597].  

Resource development

The actors procure VPSs from a variety of providers [T1583.003], including those with Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements, and often use fabricated identities. LAUNDRY BEAR primarily uses Mullvad VPN [T1583] when interacting with these servers, further demonstrating the group’s intent to mask their identity and maintain operations security (OPSEC). After the server is provisioned, an automated process deploys the Docker containers necessary for Ulej’s Flowerbed framework [T1608], which then receives and aggregates the data Ulej exfiltrates. These servers are typically only used for 7-60 days before moving to new infrastructure.

Flowerbed framework

Flowerbed is a Python project that uses Docker for containerization. The project includes four different Docker containers:

  • Catcher,
  • Certbot,
  • Nginx, and
  • Gardener.

Catcher acts as both a DNS and HTTP server to receive and aggregate exfiltrated victim information [T1048]. For additional information on Catcher, refer to the Exfiltration section of this advisory. Flowerbed’s next container, Certbot, is based on one of the official Certbot containers, which allows for automated generation of Let’s Encrypt certificates using DNS challenges through Cloudflare. This certificate can then be used by the Nginx container, which serves as an HTTPS reverse proxy for Catcher, enabling Flowerbed to disguise some of its exfiltration activity through an encrypted communications channel [T1048.002]. The Nginx reverse proxy also validates that the Server Name Indicator (SNI) value contains “*.i.*” prior to forwarding the traffic to Catcher. If the SNI does not contain that string, the Nginx server returns a 444 error to the client. This is likely an attempt to reject non-Ulej connections. Finally, the Gardener container functions as a health check for the Catcher service. Gardener is a simple Python script that validates Catcher correctly receives and processes data.

The simplistic Flowerbed codebase has indications that artificial intelligence (AI) played a role in its development. This highlights how AI is increasingly being used to develop malicious capabilities [T1588.007]. The dependence on AI for a simple capability, such as Flowerbed, alongside a previous reliance on open source capabilities, such as Evilginx2 [T1588.002], likely indicates a lack of advanced technical knowledge within LAUNDRY BEAR, especially in relation to true software development capabilities.

Initial access

To gain initial access, LAUNDRY BEAR sends an email containing a malicious JavaScript payload to the target [T1566]. Through exploitation of CVE-2025-66376, this JavaScript payload is immediately executed once the user views the malicious email [T1203], such as the one shown in Figure 1, in the ZCS webmail platform. Since at least November 2025, LAUNDRY BEAR began sending these phishing emails from victim infrastructure through compromised accounts [T1199], as shown in the email metadata in Figure 2. These compromised accounts were likely previous victims of this, or another LAUNDRY BEAR, campaign and their use is intended to further obfuscate and frustrate anti-phishing tools and training.

Figure 1: Example of malicious email
Figure 1: Example of malicious email

Figure 2: Headers from an example malicious email
Figure 2: Headers from an example malicious email

According to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), CVE-2025-66376 was initially published on 5 January 2026. This vulnerability allows for execution of a JavaScript payload included in email content due to improper sanitization of Cascading Style Sheet’s (CSS) @import directives within an email [5]. Because the activity attributed to this campaign began in July 2025—months before Synacor released a patch and the CVE was published—the payload initially exploited a zero-day vulnerability at that time [T1587.004].  

Utilization of a zero-day exploit within this campaign demonstrates the ability for even emerging threat groups like LAUNDRY BEAR to operationalize novel exploits into a highly successful capability.

Hidden in LAUNDRY BEAR’s email is a Base64 encoded payload within the “onload” field of a Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) element [T1027.017], as shown in Figure 3. Leading up to the inclusion of this payload in the SVG element are various instances of @import directives, as required to leverage CVE-2025-66376. This payload includes an XOR encrypted final script encoded in a Base64 inner payload (see Figure 3) [T1027.013]. The outer payload decodes and decrypts the inner payload using an XOR function and a hardcoded key and then executes the script contained within the inner payload containing the collection and exfiltration logic. By changing the key used for the XOR encryption of the inner payload or adding additional @import directives with non-functional code [T1027.010], LAUNDRY BEAR can easily generate new payloads that bypass basic threat detection signatures. This malicious payload attempts to collect and exfiltrate information in 12 asynchronous stages [T1119]. The stages in order of appearance within the payload are as follows:

  1. sendStartPing,
  2. gather_email,
  3. gather_environment,
  4. gather_2fa_codes,
  5. gather_app_password,
  6. gather_device_status,
  7. gather_oauth_consumers,
  8. gather_autocomplete_password,
  9. enable_mail_protocols,
  10. gather_gal,
  11. sendArchives, and
  12. sendFinishPing. 

Figure 3: Malicious payload of example email
Figure 3: Malicious payload of example email

Use of a zero-day exploit within this campaign demonstrates the ability for even emerging threat groups like LAUNDRY BEAR to operationalize novel exploits into a highly successful capability [T1587].

Persistence and credential access

To establish sustained persistence into the victim’s email account, the script attempts to modify account preferences and collect authentication information. Any collected credentials are later exfiltrated, as further described in the Exfiltration section below. Other campaigns attributed to LAUNDRY BEAR also demonstrated the group’s ability to circumvent multi-factor authentication through session token replay [T1550.004], and the Zimbra campaign follows a similar trend.

The script used in this campaign tries to discover the victim’s email address during the gather_email stage [T1087]. The script searches for this email address in two ways. First, it examines the batchInfoResponse variable, which an HTML script element on the webpage can define, for an email address. Even if the script finds an email address there, it also checks whether it acquired a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) token as described later in the Collection section of this advisory. If so, the script uses the “GetIdentitiesRequest” Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace to determine the victim’s email address [T1185] and then exfiltrates it. However, if the script does not have a CSRF token or the SOAP request fails, the script exfiltrates the email value recovered from the first method instead. If both attempts fail to capture the victim’s email, the script sends a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) payload with a key of “email” and value of null over HTTPS and does not attempt DNS exfiltration.

During the gather_autocomplete_password stage, the script attempts to collect the victim’s saved password via the autocomplete feature of the victim’s password manager. The script injects two HTML div elements requesting login credentials onto the page outside of the victim’s view, as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. After waiting five seconds, the script then attempts to extract the password provided automatically by the password manager from the input element shown in Figure 4. If there is no value in that input field, it checks the password input field shown in Figure 5. If neither input field contains a value, a JSON payload with a key of “autocomplete_password” and value of null is sent over HTTPS and DNS exfiltration is not attempted.

Figure 4: First illegitimate login HTML element
Figure 4: First illegitimate login HTML element

Figure 5: Second illegitimate login HTML element
Figure 5: Second illegitimate login HTML element

LAUNDRY BEAR almost certainly relies on a mail client using the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) for persistent access to the victim’s mailbox. During the enable_mail_protocols stage, a SOAP request leveraging the “ModifyPrefsRequest” command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace is sent. This request attempts to set the “zimbraPrefImapEnabled” preference to TRUE. While the default setting for “zimbraPrefImapEnabled” is not well documented, this action is almost certainly intended to ensure that IMAP access to the victim’s mailbox is enabled.

ZCS does not support 2FA for some mail clients, including IMAP. To support users who rely on IMAP clients, ZCS allows for the generation of Application Passcodes. Application Passcodes are randomly generated passwords that can be used for clients that cannot support the normal 2FA process to authenticate. During the gather_app_password stage, the script makes a SOAP request using the “CreateAppSpecificPasswordRequest” command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace to create a new Application Passcode [T1556.006]. The SOAP request uses “ZimbraWeb” as the name of the application.

Additionally, the script also attempts to collect 2FA tokens. During the gather_2fa_codes stage, the script makes a SOAP request using the “GetScratchCodesRequest” command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace. The script then attempts to exfiltrate any non-null 2FA codes collected this way. The number of codes can vary, and each code is exfiltrated to Flowerbed individually.

Collection

As demonstrated in the Persistence and credential access section, this script relies heavily on SOAP requests to collect victim information. To make these requests, the script aims to acquire the victim’s current CSRF token, which it attempts to access within the webpage’s local storage using localStorage.getItem("csrfToken"). If the script is unable to acquire this CSRF token, it will be unable to make any SOAP requests. In addition to the SOAP commands documented in the Persistence and credential access section, other SOAP commands executed to collect victim information are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Additional SOAP commands used

SOAP Command 

Namespace 

Stage 

GetInfoRequest 

zimbraAccount 

gather_environment 

GetDeviceStatusRequest 

zimbraSync 

gather_device_status 

GetOAuthConsumersRequest 

zimbraAccount 

gather_oauth_consumers 

SearchGalRequest 

zimbraAccount 

gather_gal 

The script attempts to collect the victim’s GAL through brute force by searching for each two-character combination from a character set of “abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890.-_”. These queries are conducted using 20 batches of SOAP requests with 77 “SearchGalRequest” SOAP commands in each batch except for the last request containing only 58.

During the gather_environment stage, the script attempts to determine which type of ZCS webmail client the victim is using. The script checks the user’s current URL to determine the client type being used, checking for certain indicators (shown in Table 2) to determine the client type. The corresponding value is then used as the payload when exfiltrating the client type.

Table 2: ZCS webmail client types

Indicator 

Client Type 

Associated Value 

?client=advanced 

Advanced 

c 

/h/ 

Standard 

h 

/modern/ 

Modern 

m 

As part of collection, the script attempts to harvest any emails not marked as “junk” from the last 90 days from the victim’s account. Emails are collected daily by an HTTP GET request to the URL path, “/home/~/?fmt=tgz&meta=0&query=date:-{DAY_OFFSET}d AND (not in:junk)”. The {DAY_OFFSET} value would be between 0 and 89 representing how many days ago the email was sent or received. To prevent redundant collection and exfiltration of emails, a variable with a name based on the email date being queried, using a format of zd_comp_YYYY-MM-DD, and value of true, is saved to the window.top.localStorage property. This variable is saved regardless of whether the email is successfully exfiltrated.  

According to Mozilla documentation, if the user is not in a private browsing session, any data stored to localStorage does not typically expire. This means that if the user happens to execute the script again from the same computer, the script avoids attempting to re-exfiltrate previously captured emails. However, the script always attempts to pull any emails with a {DAY_OFFSET} of zero. In other words, the script always pulls emails sent or received the same day it is run. After email results are returned from the query for each day of email activity, those results are then passed to Flowerbed as described in the Exfiltration section.

The script also provides LAUNDRY BEAR with telemetry on any errors that occur during the collection process. This is accomplished by executing any collection or exfiltration code through helper functions that contain error handling logic. If an error occurs, a payload containing information on the error itself, the context of the error happening, and the stage in which the error occurred is sent to Flowerbed as described in the Exfiltration section below. For cases where the error occurs within a SOAP request, “:api” is concatenated to the stage value in the payload. If an error occurs during the batch SOAP requests that occur when collecting the GAL of the victim, the stage value will use a format of gather_gal:{VAL}:api. The {VAL} placeholder indicates which batch request, a number from 0 to 19, the error occurred in. Errors that occur during the password autocomplete interception process will use “gather_autocomplete_password:dom” for the stage value. Finally, if an error occurs when attempting to collect or exfiltrate a specific day’s emails, the stage will include which day the error occurred on, using the previously defined placeholder {DAY_OFFSET}, with a format of sendArchive:day-{DAY_OFFSET}.

Exfiltration

At the end of each stage in the collection process, the script attempts to exfiltrate acquired information to Flowerbed. The script primarily relies on two forms of data exfiltration: DNS [T1048.003] and HTTPS. Some information is exfiltrated over both the DNS and HTTPS channels.

Prior to exfiltration, a randomized 10- or 11-character alphanumeric string is generated as an identifier for the victim. This identifier is included in the URL of both the DNS- and HTTPS-based exfiltration.  

DNS exfiltration

DNS exfiltration occurs through DNS A record queries. To ensure data exfiltrated through DNS is not corrupted when traversing through non-actor-controlled DNS infrastructure, Ulej maintains compliance with RFC 1035, Domain Names - Implementation and Specification, specifically accounting for the case insensitivity and subdomain length requirements. Base32 encoding is used to create a case-insensitive payload. Once the payload is encoded, a period (“.”) is added every 60 characters to ensure each subdomain is under 63 characters long. The script then creates a new image object sourced from a URL with the scheme defined in Figure 6. Any traffic involving DNS exfiltration will have “d-“ prefixing the victim identifier, and the subdomain immediately following indicates the type of information being exfiltrated.

Figure 6: Structure for information exfiltrated by DNS
Figure 6: Structure for information exfiltrated by DNS

When the script generates an image object, the browser tries to retrieve the complete domain of the URL specified as the source of the image. This triggers a DNS request sent to the actor-controlled server and processed by Flowerbed. Table 3 lists both the information exfiltrated via DNS and their corresponding data type identifiers in the DNS queries.  

Table 3: DNS exfiltration

Type of Information 

Exfiltration Stage 

Data Type 

Victim’s Email Address 

gather_email 

e 

Client Type 

gather_environment 

c 

Zimbra Version 

gather_environment  

v 

URL at Time of Exploitation 

gather_environment 

url 

2FA Scratch Codes 

gather_2fa_codes 

2fa 

Newly Created Application Password 

gather_app_password 

pa 

Harvested Autocomplete Password 

gather_autocomplete_password 

pw 

HTTPS exfiltration

Any information exfiltrated via DNS is also exfiltrated through HTTPS, as well as additional data including email content, contacts, attachments, and error logging information. By using Let’s Encrypt certificates, this group can quickly deploy new infrastructure and leverage encrypted HTTPS communications with valid server certificates when exfiltrating information from the victim’s environment. The HTTPS exfiltration capability only uses two HTTP content types, defined in Table 4. Traffic associated with HTTPS exfiltration will use the URL scheme shown in Figure 7.  

Table 4: HTTPS exfiltration types

Content Type 

URL Path 

application/json 

/v/p 

application/octet-stream 

/v/d 

Figure 7: Structure for information exfiltrated by HTTPS
Figure 7: Structure for information exfiltrated by HTTPS

Some of the data transmitted via HTTPS uses the standard JSON content type format. The script includes the information in a POST request to actor-controlled infrastructure.  

Table 5 provides a summary of the JSON-based exfiltration.

Table 5: HTTPS JSON exfiltration  

Type of Information 

Exfiltration Stage 

JSON Key(s) 

Victim’s Email Address 

gather_email 

email 

Client Type, Version, and Current URL 

gather_environment 

client, version, full_url 

Newly Created Application Password 

gather_app_password 

app_password 

Harvested Autocomplete Password 

gather_autocomplete_password 

autocomplete_password 

The script transmits all HTTPS exfiltration not identified in Table 5 using the Octet-Stream content type as binary data. The POST requests for this method include a filename in the “X-Filename” header. Traditionally, developers use headers prefixed with “X-” to denote custom headers that do not follow a defined standard. The purpose of including this header remains unclear since the Catcher capability ignores the provided filename when saving the data. Table 6 summarizes the data exfiltrated in this format.

 Table 6: HTTPS binary exfiltration

Type of Information 

Exfiltration Stage 

X-Filename Header 

SOAP request for GetInfoRequest 

gather_environment 

zimbra_batch_analytics.json 

SOAP request for GetScratchCodesRequest 

gather_2fa_codes 

zimbra_batch_analytics.json 

SOAP request for GetDeviceStatusRequest 

gather_device_status 

zimbra_batch_analytics.json 

SOAP request for GetOAuthConsumersRequest 

gather_oauth_consumers 

zimbra_batch_analytics.json 

Victim Organization’s Global Address List 

gather_gal 

telemetry_{1-20}.json 

Last 90 Days of Victim’s Emails 

sendArchives 

telemetryData_{0-89}.json 

The script sends all exfiltrated data identified in Table 6 to the Catcher service exactly as received from the SOAP request in a JSON payload, except for email exfiltration. For email exfiltration, the script sends it as a GZIP compressed archive [T1560]. Although most of the exfiltration consists of valid JSON, the script still attempts to exfiltrate all information identified in Table 6 using the application/octet-stream content typing rather than application/json.

At the beginning and end of the collection and exfiltration activity, during the sendStartPing and sendFinishPing stages respectively, the script submits a POST request with a JSON payload to indicate that the script is starting or finishing execution. Throughout execution, the script also logs error events and send the logs using similar JSON payloads. The script sends the JSON in a POST request to the URL documented in Figure 2, using a URL path of “/v/p” and with a “subtype” key that shows which type of action it logged (start, finish, or error).  

Catcher

Ulej exfiltrates information to Flowerbed to be handled by a service named Catcher. Catcher is a containerized Python application, running in Docker as part of Flowerbed, which is detailed in the Resource development section. It receives exfiltrated data and temporarily stores it, enabling its eventual transfer to infrastructure designed for long-term, secure storage.

Catcher acts as an HTTP server over port 8000 and a DNS server on port 53. As described in the Resource development section, the Flowerbed project uses an additional Docker container running an Nginx reverse proxy to enable HTTPS support. This reverse proxy uses a certificate generated by Let’s Encrypt and forwards all traffic with an SNI containing “*.i.*” to port 8000 within the Catcher container.

The DNS service can accept A, AAAA, MX, TXT, and CAA queries. For any MX, AAAA, or CAA queries, the server will always provide an empty response. The system only supports TXT records as needed to process Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) requests, which enable the assignment of Let’s Encrypt certificates. If the server receives an A query, Catcher will always respond with the public IP address of the Flowerbed server.  

However, if a query includes a domain formatted as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, the service saves a log file in JSON format to disk containing the following details of the DNS query:

  • Time of query,
  • Source IP address for query,
  • Queried domain, and
  • Type of query.

The HTTP server typically responds with OK, except in cases where the path is “pixel.gif” when the response contains a 1x1 gif image with a SHA-256 hash of ef1955ae757c8b966c83248350331bd3a30f658ced11f387f8ebf05ab3368629. Like the DNS service, the HTTP service will only log entries when the domain found in the host header of the request follows the expected formatting as seen in Figure 6 and Figure 7. As the HTTPS exfiltration uses non-standardized binary and JSON-formatted payloads when exfiltrating to Catcher, Catcher will check the content type of the request. If the content type is set to “application/json”, Catcher encodes the data in Base64 and includes it in the JSON log entry written to disk. If the content type is set to any other value, Catcher leaves the Base64 payload in the JSON log entry blank and saves the payload to a separate file with the same filename as the JSON log entry with a “.bin” file extension. An HTTPS exfiltration event causes Catcher to save a JSON formatted log file to disk containing the following information from the HTTP request:

  • Time,
  • Source IP address,
  • Request method,
  • Host,
  • Path,
  • Query string,
  • Headers, and
  • Base64 payload.

These JSON event log files and binary output files are then initially saved to the directory /root/hits/tmp and later moved to the /root/hits/ready directory once processed. This prevents incomplete files, which are still being uploaded to Catcher, from premature exfiltration from the server. Approximately every 60 seconds, a likely automated workflow establishes a Secure Shell (SSH) connection with the server hosting Flowerbed for a few seconds, almost certainly exfiltrating the data processed by Catcher to non-public-facing infrastructure. The command in Figure 8 also executes hourly to remove all files last modified at least two days ago from the /root/hits/ready directory.

Figure 8: Command used for automated directory cleanup
Figure 8: Command used for automated directory cleanup

Response strategies

Mitigations

In many cases, by the time an organization identifies a compromise related to this campaign, numerous sensitive and proprietary emails have already been exfiltrated. The significant risk posed by this cyber threat emphasizes the importance for organizations that use ZCS and other similar webmail solutions to take proactive steps to mitigate this risk.

All organizations that use the ZCS webmail service should immediately prioritize ensuring that their ZCS is not running a vulnerable version. A patch for CVE-2025-66376 was released for both 10.1.13 and 10.0.18 versions of ZCS [D3-AH]. If immediate patching is not feasible, organizations should advise employees to use alternative mail clients to access email and avoid using the Classic ZCS webmail client until ZCS is updated to a non-vulnerable version [d3f:Isolate].

System administrators should closely monitor any Internet-connected ZCS or other email systems and the workstations that access those systems and promptly apply available software updates [D3-AH]. Administrators can maintain awareness of active vulnerability exploitation by referencing open source resources, including CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog and NCSC-UK’s Responding to active exploitation of vulnerabilities guidance.

Organizations should consider using a third-party authentication service that supports passkeys for authentication to mediate access to ZCS and other services that do not natively support passkeys. By doing so, organizations can work to eliminate the possibility of automated password collection from autocomplete or password reuse [D3-CH]. However, Application Passcodes may still be necessary and should be monitored closely.  

Organizations should implement network monitoring capabilities with collection and short-term retention of packet capture or NetFlow data and maintain log collection and storage [CPG 3.Q]. This will allow organizations to monitor for and identify suspicious network activity [CPG 4.B], such as:

  • Significant amounts of outbound data being sent to IPs associated with VPS providers not used by the organization [D3-NTA];
  • Frequent DNS queries for a suspicious domain with seemingly random subdomains [D3-DNSTA];
  • A sudden spike of connections to a server associated with a recently established domain [D3-NTCD]; and  
  • Connections to internal services, such as webmail, from VPN providers frequently leveraged by this group for nefarious activity, such as Mullvad VPN [D3-NTCD].

Additionally, for organizations that can inspect the content of outbound HTTPS connections via break-and-inspect infrastructure, security teams should identify traffic matching the characteristics described in the Exfiltration section of this advisory.

Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

Flowerbed infrastructure

The following indicators have been attributed to use by LAUNDRY BEAR for their campaign targeting ZCS’s webmail service as of the publication of this advisory. (Disclaimer: Due to the frequency of operational structure changes by this group, these indicators are intended solely for historic attribution purposes. Some indicators, such as IPs, compromised emails, and domains, may be outdated, so organizations should check for current activity before acting on these IOCs.) Table 7 provides details about the server infrastructure used to host Flowerbed, and Table 8 lists the corresponding SHA-1 hash values for the Let’s Encrypt certificates used by that infrastructure [D3-IAA].

Table 7: Flowerbed server infrastructure

Domain 

IP Address 

First Seen 

Last Seen 

zmailanalytics[.]com 

216.252.238[.]104 

8 July 2025 

15 October 2025 

zimbra-metadata[.]com 

216.252.238[.]18 

20 August 2025 

14 October 2025 

analyticemailmeter[.]com 

37.120.247[.]228 

24 September 2025 

18 March 2026 

emailanalytics.com[.]ua 

185.86.79[.]95 

24 September 2025 

18 March 2026 

mailnalysis[.]com 

104.248.134[.]194 

11 November 2025 

17 February 2026 

zimbrastat[.]com 

64.226.124[.]190 

18 December 2025 

18 March 2026 

zimbrasoft.com[.]ua 

193.238.152[.]66 

20 January 2026 

18 March 2026 

synacorzimbra[.]nl 

216.252.238[.]64 

3 February 2026 

30 March 2026 

istc-cloud[.]com 

194.156.103[.]193 

5 February 2026 

30 March 2026 

Table 8: Flowerbed X.509 certificate SHA-1 hashes  

Associated Domain 

X.509 SHA-1 Hash 

First Seen 

Last Seen 

zmailanalytics[.]com 

2e4f314bc9943cab5005d6fde0b271c74d47bc9d 

8 Jul 2025 

6 Aug 2025 

*.i.zmailanalytics[.]com 

50a87d926621dd06389ba50d86e0ff574ed713a8 

6 Aug 2025 

13 Oct 2025 

*.i.zimbra-metadata[.]com 

c5a72420e7bb308d078e62128430897f82194c95 

20 Aug 2025 

14 Oct 2025 

*.i.analyticemailmeter[.]com 

8959c4d29e29f02ea94ea8bb21c8df2594c5549d 

24 Sep 2025 

8 Nov 2025 

*.i.emailanalytics.com[.]ua 

62eb76432597694edb01c1fe57aab0cfe03a7178 

25 Sep 2025 

27 Sep 2025 

*.i.mailnalysis[.]com 

cddf5c3be1e07f28140aed165b929bf2d614922a 

12 Nov 2025 

17 Dec 2025 

*.i.zimbrastat[.]com 

18b3ad442ce73cc8656d51d75bbd7c855f2cb7e8 

18 Dec 2025 

28 Dec 2025 

*.i.zimbrasoft.com[.]ua 

1b25041ececf2457eef0270fc1d785cec8ec9ded 

21 Jan 2026 

10 Feb 2026 

*.i.synacorzimbra[.]nl 

e4fe6466a4f9a4249fe330651e914e45bbdca44a 

5 Feb 2026 

22 Mar 2026 

*.i.istc-cloud[.]com 

b6b77c9a455225d525834a403ca9ef5481ed0447 

12 Feb 2026 

30 Mar 2026 

LAUNDRY BEAR has used the following email addresses to procure resources used for this campaign:

  • ivanka.zurabishvili@proton[.]me,
  • zmul1@buildandconsulting[.]com,
  • garrysmithme@pinmx[.]net, and
  • hostingclient@pinmx[.]net.

Phishing distribution

LAUNDRY BEAR primarily relied on ProtonMail for distribution of malicious email. However, as stated above, LAUNDRY BEAR’s more recent efforts likely have shifted to distributing the payload through previous victims.  

The following email addresses have distributed payloads attributed to this campaign:

  • c.laurent.ejfa@proton[.]me,
  • j.moreau.epsc@proton[.]me,
  • liberty.insights@proton[.]me,
  • certain email addresses (presumably compromised) at the isofts.kiev[.]ua domain (i.e., ending with @isofts.kiev[.]ua), and
  • certain email addresses (presumably compromised) at the navs.edu[.]ua domain (i.e., ending with @navs.edu[.]ua).

Additionally, the following are SHA-256 hashes of email samples containing the malicious payload attributed to this campaign:

  • 98df604ecc57f884a2e6ce3266a0013ad64455cac48442c2312cfa4765007aaf,
  • 60db9abae75cd8ccc49dd7ea5feb41677566dcd442f12ebc5745ffd2810fb874,
  • b1f5beb1175fc5c7d1806a2f0d900eb124c54f0286c5c52b66eea7a6633adb1d, and
  • 1517b3caa495f6c4e832df9c75fc94667e3c233773f7fa4e056d5e30e5ead760.

Post-compromise artifacts

Currently, the script does not remove artifacts. This leaves additional opportunities to identify victims of this activity. While emphasis should always be placed on consistent monitoring of network traffic and endpoint activity, there are a variety of persistent artifacts described below that can be used to identify victims of this campaign.

This Ulej capability relies on creating a significant number of SOAP requests to collect account information for exfiltration. ZCS logs from these requests are stored, by default, in the /opt/zimbra/log/mailbox.log file [D3-PA]. A significant amount of SOAP request activity that aligns with what was described in the Persistence and credential access and Collection sections of this advisory could indicate a potential compromise. Specific examples of high-risk SOAP request activity might include:

  • Many SearchGalRequest command requests from a single user over a short period of time;
  • Use of the CreateAppSpecificPasswordRequest command, especially in cases where it is creating an Application Passcode named “ZimbraWeb”; and
  • Use of the GetScratchCodesRequest command.

While LAUNDRY BEAR uses the localStorage property to track what days had emails previously exfiltrated, defenders can use this property to identify victims of this campaign and determine the scope of exfiltrated information [D3-PA]. Review of the items stored in that property for an organization’s ZCS webmail client page on an endpoint device could indicate compromise if there are items named with a format of zd_comp_YYYY-MM-DD, as explained in the Collection section of this advisory.

While Application Passcodes have non-malicious purposes, in this case instances of these passcodes with the name “ZimbraWeb” are almost certainly malicious. The ZCS webmail application can support 2FA natively and does not require the use of an Application Passcode, so there is no reason that there should be one named “ZimbraWeb.”

In instances where organizations identify victims of this campaign, they should also examine the inbox of the suspected victim for the original phishing email [D3-MA]. If an email that has a payload exploiting CVE-2025-66376 is discovered, steps should be taken immediately to identify and quarantine other instances of emails with similar body content, senders, and subject lines to prevent further exploitation and exfiltration.  

Remediation

In the event an organization identifies activity associated with this campaign, that organization should take steps to minimize further exploitation. The organization should consider requesting that employees minimize use of the ZCS webmail client until the organization updates to a patched version that is not vulnerable to CVE-2025-66376.

Organizations should use identifiers from the IOCs section of this report to identify any individuals compromised by this campaign and record the date(s) of compromise(s) to determine the scale and scope of emails exfiltrated.

All users from the organization should have all Application Passcodes and 2FA scratch keys revoked. Affected organizations should require all employees to change passwords in line with establishing minimum password strength requirements [CPG 3.B] and creating unique credentials [CPG 3.C], specifically noting that compromised employees might have had any password stored in a password manager exfiltrated.

Works cited

[1] Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD). AIVD and MIVD identify a new Russian cyber threat actor. 2025. https://www.aivd.nl/site/binaries/site-content/collections/documents/2025/05/27/aivd-en-mivd-onderkennen-nieuwe-russische-cyberactor/Advisory+AIVD+en+MIVD+Public+report+on+new+cyber+actor.pdf

[2] Microsoft Corporation. New Russia-affiliated actor Void Blizzard targets critical sectors for espionage. 2025. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/27/new-russia-affiliated-actor-void-blizzard-targets-critical-sectors-for-espionage/

[3] Palo Alto Networks Unit 42. Russian Global Webmail Espionage. 2026. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/russian-webmail-espionage/ 

[4] Proofpoint. TA488 Targets Zimbra Mailservers with Half-Click Exploits. 2026. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta488-zcs-exploit

[5] Seqrite. Operation GhostMail: Russian APT exploits Zimbra Webmail to Target Ukraine State Agency. 2026. https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-ghostmail-zimbra-xss-russian-apt-ukraine/  

Footnotes

1 Národní úřad pro kybernetickou a informační bezpečnost
2 Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste
3 Välisluureamet
4 Sotilastiedustelu
5  Suojelupoliisi
6 Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure
7 Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information
8 Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Esterna
9 Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna
10 Serviciul de Informații și Securitate al Republicii Moldova
11 Agencja Wywiadu
12 Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego
13 Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
14 Nationellt Cybersäkerhetscenter
15 MITRE and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE D3FEND is a trademark of The MITRE Corporation.

Acknowledgements

The authoring agencies acknowledge the contributions to this advisory from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 and Proofpoint.

Disclaimer of endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Organizations have no obligation to respond or provide information back to the authoring organizations in response to this joint advisory. If, after reviewing the information provided, an organization decides to provide information to the authoring organizations, reporting must be consistent with all applicable laws and policies.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring agencies’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

Contact

United States organizations 

  • National Security Agency 
    Cybersecurity Report Feedback: CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov 
    Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DIB_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov 
    Media Inquiries / Press Desk: NSA Media Relations: 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov 
  • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
    CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (contact@cisa.dhs.gov), or by calling 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). 
  • Federal Bureau of Investigation 
    If you or someone you know has fallen victim to this campaign, file a complaint with IC3. 
  • Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency  
    DCSA Counterintelligence, Cyber Mission Center, Cyber Threat Operations Branch: DCSA.CI.CyberOps@mail.mil 
    Cleared Contactors (CCs) should contact their DCSA Counterintelligence Special Agent to report information pertaining to suspicious contacts or physical/digital efforts to obtain illegal or unauthorized access to the CC’s cleared facility/information, as required by 32 CFR 117. 
    Media/Public Inquiries: dcsa.quantico.dcsa-hq.mbx.pa@mail.mil  
  • Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center  
    Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DC3.DCISE@us.af.mil 
    Defense Industrial Base mandatory cyber incident reporting as required by 10 U.S. Code Sections 391 and 393 and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.204-7012 is submitted at https://dibnet.dod.mil 
    Media Inquiries / Press Desk: DC3.Information@us.af.mil 
  • Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
    To report criminal activity impacting the United States Navy, go to www.ncis.navy.mil and click “Submit a Tip”

Dutch organizations 

Australian organizations 

  • Australian Signals Directorate 
    Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories. 

Canadian organizations 

  • The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), part of the Communications Security Establishment, encourages Canadian organizations to report cyber incidents and to strengthen the security of their networking devices.  
    Report an incident or suspicious activity to the Cyber Centre by email at contact@cyber.gc.ca, online via the reporting tool Report a cyber incident - Canadian Centre for Cyber Security or by phone at 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788). 

New Zealand organizations 

United Kingdom organizations 

Estonia organizations 

Finnish organizations 

French organizations 

  • French organizations are encouraged to report suspicious activity or incident related information found in this advisory by contacting ANSSI/CERT-FR at: cert-fr@ssi.gouv.fr or by phone at: 3218 or +33 9 70 83 32 18. 

Italian Organizations 

Moldovan organizations 

  • Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova (SIS RM): cybersec@sis.md 

Polish organizations 

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques

See Table 9 through Table 19 for all the threat actor tactics and techniques referenced in this advisory.

Table 9: Reconnaissance 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials 

T1589.001 

The payload attempts to intercept a victim’s password from their password manager. 

Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses 

T1589.002 

The payload attempts to grab the victim’s email address from various data stores. 

Search Open Websites/Domains 

T1593 

This group likely leverages public information to support target development. 

Active Scanning 

T1595 

Port scanning can be used by this group to assist with determining exploitability of identified targets. 

Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases 

T1596.005 

Various public datasets can provide information to support discovery of exploitable targets. 

Search Closed Sources 

T1597 

Previously exfiltrated data can be used to enhance target development efforts. 

Search Closed Sources: Purchase Technical Data 

T1597.002 

Commercial datasets can also be used to support target development efforts. 
Table 10: Resource Development 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Acquire Infrastructure 

T1583 

This group used Mullvad VPN to anonymize traffic sent to operational infrastructure. 

Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server 

T1583.003 

This group procured VPS servers from a variety of vendors. 

Develop Capabilities 

T1587 

The Ulej capability was developed likely for use by this group to conduct spear phishing campaigns. 

Develop Capabilities: Malware 

T1587.001 

Development of a novel payload that steals a victim’s emails and other sensitive account information. 

Develop Capabilities: Exploits 

T1587.004 

Development of a novel, at the time, cross-site-scripting (XSS) exploit that enables execution of arbitrary JavaScript. 

Obtain Capabilities: Tool 

T1588.002 

Open source tools, such as Evilginx2, have also been used by the group. 

Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence 

T1588.007 

The group appears to have leveraged AI to support development efforts. 

Stage Capabilities 

T1608 

Flowerbed is deployed to a procured server in the cloud. 

Table 11: Initial Access 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Valid Accounts 

T1078 

This actor has used commercial datasets to acquire account credentials and gain unauthorized access to accounts. Additionally, this actor is believed to use previously compromised accounts to conduct spear phishing.  

Trusted Relationship 

T1199 

The group sends malicious payloads to targeted individuals using previously compromised accounts that might have an established relationship with the target.  

Phishing 

T1566 

The actors used spear phishing to lure users into opening malicious email. 

Table 12: Execution 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Exploitation for Client Execution 

T1203 

An XSS vulnerability was leveraged to execute the JavaScript payload. 

Table 13: Persistence 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Account Manipulation 

T1098 

Enabling IMAP and Application Passcodes provides persistent access to the compromised account. 

Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication 

T1556.006 

Creating Application Passcodes to bypass 2FA and stealing a user’s “Scratch Keys,” which can be used in place of a 2FA token. 

Table 14: Privilege Escalation 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Valid Accounts 

T1078 

This actor has used commercial datasets to acquire account credentials and gain unauthorized privileged access to accounts.  

Table 15: Stealth 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation 

T1027.010 

Obfuscated JavaScript payload sent to targets to exploit the XSS vulnerability. 

Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File 

T1027.013 

The JavaScript payload included both a Base64-encoded and XOR-encrypted inner payload. 

Obfuscated Files or Information: SVG Smuggling 

T1027.017 

The payload was contained in an “onload” attribute within an SVG image included in the malicious email. 

Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie 

T1550.004 

Previous campaigns using AiTM leveraged stealing and use of a victim’s session cookies to authenticate. 

Table 16: Credential Access 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication 

T1556.006 

Creating Application Passcodes to bypass 2FA and stealing a user’s “Scratch Keys,” which can be used in place of a 2FA token. 

Adversary-in-the-Middle 

T1557 

Previous campaigns used Evilginx2 as an AiTM toolkit to intercept credentials and session cookies. 

Table 17: Collection 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Data Staged: Remote Data Staging 

T1074.002 

Exfiltrated data was sent to an actor-controlled VPS prior to assumed long-term storage solutions. 

Email Collection 

T1114 

This group has emphasized collection of emails. 

Email Collection: Remote Email Collection 

T1114.002 

Emails are collected via API calls to the ZCS mail server and are not collected from emails stored directly on the victim’s device. 

Automated Collection 

T1119 

Upon execution, the JavaScript payload automatically collects all relevant information in stages. 

Browser Session Hijacking 

T1185 

The JavaScript payload leverages the user’s authenticated browser session to make API requests as the user. 

Archive Collected Data 

T1560 

Emails are exfiltrated with GZIP compression. 

Table 18: Discovery 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Account Discovery 

T1087 

Stolen Global Access Lists provide the group with new users to target. 

Table 19: Exfiltration 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol 

T1048 

Victim information was exfiltrated over both HTTPS and DNS. 

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol 

T1048.002 

Some payloads, especially ones with large amounts of data, were exfiltrated over HTTPS. 

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol 

T1048.003 

Some smaller bandwidth payloads were exfiltrated over DNS using Base32 encoding. 

Appendix B: MITRE D3FEND countermeasures

See Table 20 for a mapping of several of the cybersecurity countermeasures mentioned in this advisory.

Table 20: MITRE D3FEND Countermeasures 

Countermeasure Title 

ID 

Description 

Application Hardening 

D3-AH 
  • Organizations should immediately prioritize patching CVE-2025-66376.  
  • Organizations should promptly apply software updates to all email systems. 

Isolate 

d3f:Isolate 

Organizations that cannot feasibly patch should use alternative mail clients. 

Credential Hardening 

D3-CH 

Organizations should consider using a third-party authentication service that supports passkeys to mediate access to ZCS and other services that do not natively support passkeys. 

Network Traffic Analysis 

D3-NTA 

Organizations should monitor for significant amounts of outbound data being sent to IPs associated with VPS providers not used by the organization. 

DNS Traffic Analysis 

D3-DNSTA 

Organizations should monitor for frequent DNS queries to a suspicious domain for seemingly random subdomains. 

Network Traffic Community Deviation 

D3-NTCD 
  • Organizations should monitor for a sudden spike of connections to a server associated with a recently established domain. 
  • Organizations should monitor for connections to internal services, such as webmail, from VPN providers. 

Identifier Activity Analysis 

D3-IAA 

Organizations should search for the listed known IOCs. 

Process Analysis 

D3-PA 
  • Organizations should search ZCS log files for specific commands used by the malicious script. 
  • Organizations should search the localStorage property in web browsers for the ZCS webmail client for “ZimbraWeb” Application Passcodes. 
Message Analysis D3-MA Organizations that suspect they have victims of this campaign should search for emails with a malicious payload to identify other victims.
]]> <![CDATA[9 Kommandozeilen-Tools, die jeder Dev braucht]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694428/it-security-nachrichten/9-kommandozeilen-tools-die-jeder-dev-braucht/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694428/it-security-nachrichten/9-kommandozeilen-tools-die-jeder-dev-braucht/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 18:59:24 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de
Selbst wenn Sie dieser Anblick nicht in Verzückung versetzt - ein Blick auf diese obligatorischen Kommandozeilen-Tools lohnt sich.

Selbst wenn Sie dieser Anblick nicht in Verzückung versetzt – ein Blick auf diese obligatorischen Kommandozeilen-Tools lohnt sich.

Foto: SkillUp | shutterstock.com

Manche Devs arbeiten mit der Kommandozeile (auch Command Line Interface; CLI), weil sie sie lieben – andere, weil ihnen nichts anderes übrig bleibt. Egal zu welcher Kategorie Sie sich zählen: Diese neun CLI-Tools helfen Ihrer Produktivität und Effizienz (zusätzlich) auf die Sprünge.

tldr

Keine Angst, wir ersparen Ihnen an dieser Stelle eine langwierige, faszinative Abhandlung über die ganz eigene Magie, die die Unix-Shell entfaltet. Fakt ist: Wenn man mit ihr arbeiten will, ist es manchmal erforderlich, vorher ein Handbuch zu lesen. Unix Docs (auch man- oder manual pages) sind diesbezüglich allerdings ein zweischneidiges Schwert: Die benötigte Information ist vorhanden – es ist nur die Frage, wo. Den Teil der Dokumentation aufzuspüren, den Sie gerade benötigen, kann ein entmutigender Task sein. Zwar kann die gute alte Befehlszeile dabei helfen – um ein offizielles Handbuch aufzurufen, genügt:

$ man

Allerdings zeichnen sich man-pages vor allem durch ihre Informationsdichte aus – und die Tatsache, dass sie manchmal aktuelle Informationen für neuere Tools vermissen lassen. Das CLI-Tool tldr versetzt Sie in die Lage, zielgerichteter zu suchen:

$ tldr

tldr in Aktion.

tldr in Aktion.

Foto: Matthew Tyson | IDG

Falls Sie npm installiert haben, ist die tldr-Installation nur einen kurzen Befehl entfernt:

npm install -g tldr

ngrok

Sobald Sie tldr installiert haben, können Sie damit viele weitere Befehle erkunden. Zum Beispiel:

$ tldr ngrok

Reverse proxy that creates a secure tunnel from a public endpoint to a locally running web service.

Mit ngrok eröffnet sich Ihnen eine stressfreie Möglichkeit, von einem Remote-Browser auf eine Entwicklungsmaschine zuzugreifen. Aber das Tool kann noch weit mehr. Sie können damit beispielsweise in der Cloud entwickeln und die Ergebnisse im Browser in Augenschein nehmen. Zudem können Sie mit ngrok auch schnell und einfach laufende Services über HTTPS veröffentlichen – ohne sich mit der Security-Infrastruktur herumschlagen zu müssen. Angenommen, Sie bauen einen Service Worker auf, der HTTPS benötigt, dann ist alles, was Sie für einen sicheren Kontext tun müssen, ngrok zu starten.

Das CLI-Tool ngrok macht Devs das Leben auf verschiedenen Ebenen leichter.

Das CLI-Tool ngrok macht Devs das Leben auf verschiedenen Ebenen leichter.

Foto: Matthew Tyson | IDG

Ein Beispiel, bei dem der HTTP-Port 8080 freigegeben wird:

$ ngrok http 8080

Der ngrok-Output sieht wie folgt aus:

https://f951-34-67-117-59.ngrok-free.app -> http://localhost:8080

Anschließend kann jedermann die zugewiesene URL aufrufen (machen Sie sich keine Mühe).

screen

Mit diesem Befehlszeilen-Tool können Sie eine Shell-Sitzung mit oder ohne laufenden Prozess “beiseite legen” und sie anschließend zu einem beliebigen Zeitpunkt fortsetzen – auch wenn Sie die ursprüngliche Session beenden.

$ tldr screen

Hold a session open on a remote server. Manage multiple windows with a single SSH connection.

Nehmen wir an, Sie starten ngrok, um remote auf eine Webanwendung zuzugreifen: Sie starten den Prozess, lassen diesen dann in screen laufen und programmieren so lange etwas. Währenddessen läuft ngrok die ganze Zeit weiter – Sie können über screen jederzeit wieder darauf zugreifen. Veranschaulicht in Code würde das wie folgt aussehen:

$ screen

// Now we are in a new session

$ ngrok http 8080

// Now ngrok is running, exposing http port 8080

Type ctrl-a

// Now we are in screen's command mode

Type the "d" key, to "detach".

// Now you are back in the shell that you started in, while screen is running your ngrok command in the background:

$ screen -list

There is a screen on:

128861.pts-0.dev3 (04/25/24 14:36:58) (Detached)

Tipp

Wenn Sie eine laufende Sitzung, in der Sie sich gerade befinden, benennen wollen, nutzen Sie die Tastenkombination Strg + A und geben :sessionname ein. Das ist besonders nützlich, wenn Sie mit mehreren Screen-Instanzen arbeiten wollen.

Screen ist ein umfangreiches und potentes CLI-Tool.

Screen ist ein umfangreiches und potentes CLI-Tool.

Foto: Matthew Tyson | IDG

Wenn wie im Beispiel nur eine screen-Instanz läuft, führt der Befehl $ screen -r (für “re-attach”) Sie zurück zu Ihrer ngrok-Sitzung. Im Fall mehrerer Screens können Sie diese mit Hilfe ihrer ID wieder aufrufen:

$ screen -r

Wenn Sie Ihre Session endgültig beenden wollen, beenden Sie ngrok mit Strg + C und geben anschließend exit in die Kommandozeile ein.

sdkman & nvm

Wenn Sie Java oder JavaScript auf einem Server verwenden, sollten Sie sich mit sdkman (für Java) und nvm (für Node) vertraut machen. Beide Kommandozeilen-Tools sind nützlich, wenn es darum geht, mit mehreren Programmiersprachenversionen auf dem selben Rechner zu jonglieren – und dabei sowohl Path Adjustment als auch Umgebungsvariablen überflüssig machen.

Mit sdkman können Sie beispielsweise neuere Java-Versionen erkunden und anschließend wieder zum aktuellen LTS-Release springen. Dieser Prozess wird durch das sdk-Kommando abstrahiert.

sdkman zeigt alle verfügbaren Java-Installationen auf einem lokalen Rechner an - inklusive derjenigen, die gerade in Benutzung ist.

sdkman zeigt alle verfügbaren Java-Installationen auf einem lokalen Rechner an – inklusive derjenigen, die gerade in Benutzung ist.

Foto: Matthew Tyson | IDG

Zwischen den Versionen zu wechseln, gestaltet sich denkbar einfach – $ sdk use java 19-open führt Sie direkt zu JDK Version 19.

$ tldr sdk

Manage parallel versions of multiple Software Development Kits.

Supports Java, Groovy, Scala, Kotlin, Gradle, Maven, Vert.x and many others.

Die nvm-Utility funktioniert ganz ähnlich:

$ tldr nvm

Install, uninstall or switch between Node.js versions.

Supports version numbers like "12.8" or "v16.13.1", and labels like "stable", "system", etc.

Ein Blick auf nvm.

Ein Blick auf nvm.

Foto: Matthew Tyson | IDG

fzf

Sowohl grep als auch find sind Standardbestandteile der Kommandozeilen-Befehlspalette. Allerdings sind beide Tools nicht so funktional, wie sie sein sollten. Das ruft fzf auf den Plan – einen “Fuzzy File Finder”. Mit “Fuzzy” ist dabei gemeint, dass die Details zu dem, was Sie suchen, nicht unbedingt klar definiert sein müssen. Ein Beispiel:

$ tldr fzf

Command-line fuzzy finder.

Similar to sk.

Sobald Sie fzf starten, indiziert das CLI-Tool umgehend das Dateisystem, um Ergebnisvorschläge für Ihre Suchen zu unterbreiten.

In diesem Beispiel suchen wir nach einem Projekt, an dem wir zuletzt gearbeitet haben.

In diesem Beispiel suchen wir nach einem Projekt, an dem wir zuletzt gearbeitet haben.

Foto: Matthew Tyson | IDG

Aus 878.937 Möglichkeiten hat fzf die 25 Dateien und Verzeichnisse ausgewählt, die unseren Anforderungen entsprechen könnten – und das völlig ohne Umwege.

exa

Mit exa werden langweilige alte ls-Listings schöner und nützlicher:

$ tldr

A modern replacement for ls (List directory contents).

Für eine bessere Developer Experience ohne mentalen Overhead statten Sie ls einfach mit einem exa-Alias aus. Das Tool respektiert die meisten ls-Standardoptionen – exa -l funktioniert also (beispielsweise) genau so, wie Sie es erwarten würden.

Exa ist das neue ls.

Exa ist das neue ls.

Foto: Matthew Tyson | IDG

bat

Die bat-Utility ähnelt dem cat-Tool – ist aber besser:

$ tldr bat

Print and concatenate files.

A cat clone with syntax highlighting and Git integration.

Es handelt sich hierbei im Wesentlichen um eine Komfort- beziehungsweise Developer-Experience-Optimierung – ähnlich wie im Fall von exa. Wenn Sie bat verwenden, erwartet Sie ein vollwertiger File Viewer – inklusive Title, Borders, Line Numbers und insbesondere einer hilfreichen Syntax-Highlighting-Funktion für Programmiersprachen oder Konfigurationsdateien. Dabei reagiert bat auf less/more-Befehle – und wird mit “q” beendet. Die Navigation erfolgt über die Pfeiltasten.

Bat ist ein simples Dienstprogramm, das es zu einem echten Erlebnis macht, Dateien auf der Konsole zu durchsuchen.

Bat ist ein simples Dienstprogramm, das es zu einem echten Erlebnis macht, Dateien auf der Konsole zu durchsuchen.

Foto: Matthew Tyson | IDG

nethack

Ein absoluter Kommandozeilen-Klassiker ist nethack – der ursprüngliche, Konsolen-basierte ASCII Dungeon Crawler. Das CLI-Tool wird Ihre Produktivität zwar nicht direkt ankurbeln – kann aber durchaus dabei helfen, ein paar Minuten zur Ruhe zu kommen, um komplexe Dev-Probleme zu durchdringen.

Es gibt neuere Versionen des Nethack-Konzepts - manchmal fährt man jedoch mit dem Original am besten.

Es gibt neuere Versionen des Nethack-Konzepts – manchmal fährt man jedoch mit dem Original am besten.

Foto: Matthew Tyson | IDG

Dieser Artikel ist im Original bei unserer Schwesterpublikation Infoworld.com erschienen.

]]> <![CDATA[From Principles to Practice: Actionable Blueprints for Ethical AI]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694401/it-security-nachrichten/from-principles-to-practice-actionable-blueprints-for-ethical-ai/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694401/it-security-nachrichten/from-principles-to-practice-actionable-blueprints-for-ethical-ai/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 18:57:45 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Sovereign AI has become the public-sector CIO’s control problem]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694400/it-security-nachrichten/sovereign-ai-has-become-the-public-sector-cios-control-problem/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694400/it-security-nachrichten/sovereign-ai-has-become-the-public-sector-cios-control-problem/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 18:57:42 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

In public-sector and regulated-cloud work, I learned that sovereignty rarely starts as a national strategy. It starts as an auditor’s question: Who can prove where the data went, which system made the decision and what changes when the vendor or infrastructure does? That question is now moving into AI, and most sovereign-AI debates answer the wrong version of it.

They ask whether a country can build its own model on domestic data and hardware. For the United States and China, which together hold more than 90% of global AI data-center capacity, per a January 2026 Tony Blair Institute analysis, that question is worth asking. However, for almost every other government, it is the wrong place to start. The operative question is narrower: Once AI is embedded in public services, who controls the stack?

The 5 layers of public-sector control

For a CIO, sovereign AI means enforceable control across the AI lifecycle; model ownership is a separate question. Control has five layers:

  • Data control: Where sensitive public data sits, and whether it can train a vendor’s model.
  • Model control: Which models clear which workloads, and under what validation.
  • Infrastructure control: Whether critical workloads run in approved environments.
  • Operational control: Whether AI-assisted actions are logged, monitored and reversible.
  • Vendor control: Whether the agency keeps portability, audit rights and a real exit.

Those five layers are the control plane for public-service AI. Floyd Dcosta recently made the enterprise case in “AI without sovereignty is just outsourced intelligence”: capability is what a tool can do; authority over how and when it does it is something a buyer can quietly lose. For public services, losing that authority plays out in the public eye.

Public-sector AI risk differs from enterprise risk. A retailer’s bad recommendation costs a sale; a government’s AI touches benefits, tax enforcement, policing and emergency response, raising the bar to due process, records retention and continuity of operations. A government that cannot reconstruct an AI-assisted decision lacks operational sovereignty, even in a domestic data center.

Evaluating risk: Concentration, jurisdiction and shadow AI

Foreign dependency is a real risk, but the exposure that matters is a sudden cutoff: A model you cannot audit, switch or exit, shut off by someone else’s order. A vendor’s nationality is a poor guide to that risk; control is.  Two markers matter. The first is concentration. In July 2024, a single faulty CrowdStrike update crashed about 8.5 million Windows machines, disrupting airlines, hospitals, banks and governments worldwide. No attacker was involved; one homogeneous dependency failed everywhere at once. The lesson points away from vendor nationality and toward uniformity as the fault line, making portability and provider diversity resilience controls.

The second is jurisdiction. In June 2025, Microsoft’s legal director for France told a Senate inquiry, under oath, that it could not guarantee that French public-sector data, even in French data centers, would be protected against US demands under the 2018 CLOUD Act. No such request had been made, and EU data has stayed in the EU since January 2025; senators called the assurance purely declarative. For the most sensitive data, residency does not equal control; the parent’s jurisdiction can matter as much as the server’s. Three US hyperscalers hold about 70% of the European cloud market, while European providers’ share fell from 29% in 2017 to roughly 15%. Concentration plus jurisdiction is the exposure a CIO must price. I have watched teams treat vendor selection as the moment risk was solved; it rarely was.

The wrong response is self-isolation. Most countries will never build frontier models, advanced chips, hyperscale clouds and talent pipelines at once; the Tony Blair Institute calls full self-sufficiency “too expensive, too slow and, for most countries, simply impossible.” The better test is workload sensitivity. Low-risk uses, such as drafting, translation and summarization, can run on commercial platforms with controls; high-risk uses, such as benefits eligibility, fraud investigation and healthcare triage, demand stricter control over data, model behavior and auditability.

Mandating domestic-only provision before a competitive option exists inverts sovereignty. Europe 2031, a five-year scenario from June 2026 by European technologists and policy researchers, illustrates the failure mode: A 2027 “buy European” mandate lands as offensive cyber capability spreads, and agencies that switched to weaker providers are locked out and paying ransoms. The scenario is fiction; the mechanism is not. Leverage comes from being indispensable, not half-hearted self-sufficiency. The closer-to-home effect is shadow AI: Mandate an inferior sanctioned tool and staff bypass it, the way shadow IT grows up around tools people find too slow. A rule that pushes sensitive work into ungoverned shadow AI reduces control instead of adding it.

Regulation and data-residency rules belong in any serious strategy, but carry failure modes. Blanket localization raises hosting costs and slows adoption without guaranteeing control, and a “sovereign cloud” on a foreign parent’s stack can amount to sovereignty theater. The more useful pattern tiers requirements by sensitivity. India’s BHASHINI shows the application layer done well: A public platform serving 100 million-plus inferences a month across 22-plus languages on a vendor- and cloud-agnostic design that keeps data and switching rights public. Sovereignty resides in the portability, not in a national model.

Building an operational sovereignty strategy

Public trust is the constraint sovereignty rhetoric tends to skip. The OECD’s 2025 review of government AI warns that opaque systems make AI-assisted decisions hard to explain and can give public servants false confidence in tools that fail quietly. State-controlled AI is the same problem from the other side: A government that deploys models against its own citizens without audit or record has gained control and lost accountability. An agency that can log, explain and reverse an AI-assisted action can defend it to citizens, courts, auditors and elected officials. If it cannot, it has bought access and called it sovereignty.

None of this is new. AI sovereignty repeats earlier fights over cloud, telecom, semiconductors and cybersecurity. Europe’s flagship cloud project, GAIA-X, became a cautionary tale; the Dutch technologist Bert Hubert called it an “expensive distraction” that produced no European cloud, the familiar result of ambition without absorptive capacity. Cloud taught governments that outsourcing infrastructure does not outsource accountability; telecom, that vendor dependency becomes strategic exposure; chips, that supply chains matter before a crisis; cybersecurity, that trust must be verified continuously. AI inherits all four at once.

Over the next five to ten years, some countries will build national platforms, more will build trusted cloud and trusted model regimes, and most will run hybrids that pair domestic data control with global model access. Trade policy will harden those choices: Export controls on compute and data-localization rules will pull the vendor market into blocs that track alliances more than open markets. For a CIO, that turns a vendor and hosting decision into a five-year bet on whose rules and supply chains will still hold. The ones that succeed will treat sovereignty as an operating requirement, backed by leverage, not a slogan. Start with the control plane before the model: Most agencies will never own the model, and the controls are what decide whether the AI they do run stays accountable. Even when procurement policy is dictated from above, these questions remain within the CIO’s authority:

  1. Can we classify AI workloads by public-service risk?
  2. Can we prove where sensitive data goes across training, retrieval, inference, logging and retention?
  3. Can we restrict which models are approved for which data classes and functions?
  4. Can we reconstruct an AI-assisted action in enough detail to explain it?
  5. Can we change providers without losing continuity or institutional knowledge?
  6. Can we explain the system to citizens, regulators, auditors and elected officials?

A “no” to any of these does not mean the agency lacks AI. It means the agency has access it does not yet control. Public institutions can use global innovation without surrendering public authority, but only once they know what to hold, what to rent and where dependency turns into risk.

This article is published as part of the Foundry Expert Contributor Network.
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]]> <![CDATA[Why I changed how I pitch AI: It’s no longer about saving money, but managing tokens and adoption]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694390/it-security-nachrichten/why-i-changed-how-i-pitch-ai-its-no-longer-about-saving-money-but-managing-tokens-and-adoption/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694390/it-security-nachrichten/why-i-changed-how-i-pitch-ai-its-no-longer-about-saving-money-but-managing-tokens-and-adoption/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 18:55:49 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

I have worked alongside enterprise technology for more than 30 years and watched AI evolve from a lab experiment into the modern boardroom’s core focus. However, the last few years of implementing AI alongside our customers have delivered our most profound reality checks.

The initial hype has faded, leaving CIOs to drive real enterprise value. Based on my experience implementing Google, OpenAI and Anthropic technologies, here are the fundamental, technology-agnostic lessons every leader must anchor their strategy around.

AI as a leadership multiplier

The most common tactical error we see is treating AI as an isolated technology project. What I have observed among our customers is that true success does not come from organizations that define a standalone “AI strategy,” but rather from those leaders that integrate AI into their business strategy.

When our customers isolate AI and define an AI strategy, it inevitably treats it like a “technological toy” to experiment with. This approach yields fragmented, orphaned initiatives that fail to scale because they are fundamentally disconnected from their core corporate objectives. What I learned is that AI is not the ultimate destination; it is a powerful catalyst. We have replaced “What can AI do for our customers?” with a more strategic question, “How does AI accelerate their existing business goals?”

Think of AI like electricity. No modern corporation designs a standalone “electricity strategy.” Instead, all companies route it invisibly across the entire organization to illuminate offices, power production lines and drive communication. AI must be woven into the enterprise fabric in the exact same way, acting as an underlying utility that supercharges your existing operational model.

Integrating AI into the broader business strategy also dictates how we measure success. It forces a shift away from short-term tech vanity metrics and anchors the technology into a long-term roadmap.

When AI remains trapped within the IT department of our customers, we notice that it is relegated to a mere “software experiment.” To become a true competitive advantage, we observed that AI requires intense cross-functional orchestration. This perspective does not diminish the merit of the technical team; their expertise is fundamental for establishing the architecture, data governance and tools your enterprise requires. However, while IT builds the foundational infrastructure, it lacks the organizational authority to decide what should be built on top of it. Only the CEO or the owner of the company can step in to ensure AI leaves the “toy project” phase and integrates into the DNA of the organization.

The requirement for top-down, executive ownership stems from three critical realities observed in the field:

  • Silo-smashing and data collaboration: True enterprise AI is data-hungry and that data lives across disparate business lines, finance, operations, marketing and customer service. Only the CEO possesses the cross-functional authority to demand that data silos be dismantled.
  • Cultural transformation and fear mitigation: AI triggers widespread anxiety over job displacement across all industries and hierarchies. When relegated to an “IT project,” resistance spikes as teams view it as a threat to their livelihoods. When I saw the CEO lead this cultural shift directly is when I noticed the best results.
  • C-Suite education and strategic alignment: The mandate for AI capability cannot just be delegated downward; the transformation must begin at the very top. I have conducted more than 70 presentations for the Board of Directors and C-Level teams. These people need to be actively educated not on technical code, but on specific business use cases, return on investment (ROI) frameworks and how AI resolves core organizational bottlenecks.

PwC’s data found that only 12% of enterprises have achieved both cost and revenue benefits from AI. Those elite 12% succeeded precisely because their CEOs embedded AI extensively across strategic decision-making and cross-functional workflows. AI is simply too disruptive and too critical to be left exclusively in the hands of technical experts. If AI is not on the CEO’s weekly agenda, it is fundamentally missing from the company’s true strategy.

AI as a new operational framework

Traditional IT systems have operated on strict algorithmic certainty: if you input a specific set of data, the system executes an immutable line of code and guarantees the same, predictable output every single time.

AI completely breaks this paradigm. Because modern AI is built on probabilistic models, it does not execute static formulas; instead, it predicts the most likely correct response based on mathematical probabilities. This means that AI solutions carry an inherent, small percentage of uncertainty and variability. A prompt entered today might yield a slightly different, though contextually valid, output tomorrow.

Executive leadership and organizational cultures must be actively educated to accept and navigate this fundamental shift. Traditional quality assurance frameworks for software are designed for a 100% success rate. Applying this rigid standard to AI will paralyze your initiatives, keeping 80% of your projects trapped eternally in the pilot phase. This happened to us in a food and beverage company in Latin America a couple of years ago. After this experience, we started to include conditions in our contracts that tolerate statistical margins of error and still define the project as a success.

In terms of cost calculation, we had to teach CIOs and business managers to forget the monthly subscription model for AI and learn to manage the primary unit of exchange in modern AI: the token.

To understand AI costs, executives must understand how large language models process data. AI models do not read full words; instead, they break text, images or code down into “pieces” called tokens. As a baseline, every 100 words process as approximately 130 to 140 tokens. Because the major AI providers use the token as their currency, your business is billed dynamically based on the exact volume of tokens consumed by every query submitted (input) and every response generated (output).

Many leaders believe AI costs are fixed due to flat-rate enterprise tiers ($25–$30/user). This is a temporary illusion. These venture-capital-subsidized rates mask true operational costs and come with dynamic usage limits. Modeling long-term ROI on them guarantees a severe budget shock when true consumption pricing takes over.

The solution is not to halt AI adoption; doing so means losing your competitive edge. Instead, the cost per token must cease to be treated as a technical footnote relegated to the IT department. It must be elevated to a core business variable.

Risks in the AI adoption model

Since the beginning of the AI boom, I have seen all our customers making a critical tactical error that could cost them heavily in the medium term: they are focusing only on operational efficiency (reducing costs with AI).

I have observed that an alarmingly high percentage of companies remain trapped in pilot phases focused exclusively on short-term cost reduction. Bain & Company’s global Automation and AI Pathfinder Survey found that the largest share of companies measuring their AI initiatives (exactly 40%) realized cost reductions of 10% or less, heavily missing their internal targets. Our customers are putting too many resources and effort into marginal financial gains and in doing so, they are jeopardizing their most valuable assets: service quality, resilience and customer trust.

Utilizing AI solely to slash headcount or cut operational corners is a dangerous trap that introduces severe field liabilities. A financial service organization in Latin America announced that they saved $1 million in customer support by replacing humans with AI chatbots. However, the mid-term reality revealed a different story: a damaged brand reputation due to AI errors and an influx of frustrated clients fleeing because the automated system cannot handle special cases.

Putting a company on an extreme AI diet might make it look leaner on next quarter’s financial statement, but over-indexing on cost-cutting will ultimately leave the business too weak to compete when market dynamics shift. We are now inviting our customers to change the question from “How much money will AI save us?” to “How will we leverage AI to exponentially increase the long-term value of our enterprise?”

Deploying enterprise AI is a marathon, not a sprint, and the terrain changes with every mile. The organizations that thrive in this next era will be those that transition from fascination to discipline, treating AI not as a magic bullet for immediate savings, but as a core capability that demands rigorous governance, architectural foresight and cultural maturity. Navigating this shift requires moving past the theoretical hype and anchoring decisions in raw, field-tested reality.

As we continue to deploy these technologies across industries, the blueprint for success is being rewritten in real time. Let’s keep this conversation going as we map out the future of business intelligence together.

This article is published as part of the Foundry Expert Contributor Network.
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]]> <![CDATA[Palantir’s access to identifiable NHS England patient data is ‘dangerous’, MPs say]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694385/it-security-nachrichten/palantirs-access-to-identifiable-nhs-england-patient-data-is-dangerous-mps-say/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694385/it-security-nachrichten/palantirs-access-to-identifiable-nhs-england-patient-data-is-dangerous-mps-say/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 18:55:42 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Health service has given US tech firm ‘unlimited access’ to certain data to build integrated platform, according to reports

MPs have warned that an NHS decision to grant Palantir access to identifiable patient information in its plan to use AI to improve the health service is “dangerous” and will fuel public fears that data privacy is not being prioritised.

NHS England has allowed staff from the US tech firm and other contractors to access patient data before it has been pseudonymised, despite internal fears of a “risk of loss of public confidence”, the Financial Times reported.

Continue reading...]]> <![CDATA[AI models capable of devastating attacks on governments and business months away, rare Five Eyes statement warns]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694383/it-security-nachrichten/ai-models-capable-of-devastating-attacks-on-governments-and-business-months-away-rare-five-eyes-statement-warns/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694383/it-security-nachrichten/ai-models-capable-of-devastating-attacks-on-governments-and-business-months-away-rare-five-eyes-statement-warns/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 18:55:41 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Signal agencies in Australia, the US, the UK, New Zealand and Canada sound alarm after Trump blocks foreign nationals from Anthropic’s Fable AI model

Powerful AI models capable of devastating new cyber attacks on governments and businesses are mere months away, intelligence agencies for the Five Eyes have warned in a rare joint statement, urging leaders to “act now”.

The surprising public intervention by signals agencies for Australia, the US, the UK, New Zealand and Canada comes after the Trump administration earlier this month decided to block “foreign nationals” from using a much-hyped AI model built by tech company Anthropic, called Fable.

Continue reading...]]> <![CDATA[OpenAI's Rogue Agent Went Unnoticed For a Week]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3694250/it-security-nachrichten/openais-rogue-agent-went-unnoticed-for-a-week/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3694250/it-security-nachrichten/openais-rogue-agent-went-unnoticed-for-a-week/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 18:52:27 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

]]> <![CDATA[Stilvoll und sicher Verreisen]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693688/server/stilvoll-und-sicher-verreisen/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693688/server/stilvoll-und-sicher-verreisen/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 11:03:24 +0200 🐧 Server tsecurity.de Stilvoll und sicher Verreisen
Dunkelblaue Passhülle aus Kunstleder mit goldener Aufschrift "Passport", darunter ein Emblem mit Lorbeerkranz und Sternenfeld sowie der Schriftzug "United Federation of Planets".
Daniel Richey
Die Koffer sind gepackt, der Sommerurlaub ruft, und irgendwo zwischen Sonnencreme und Steckdosenadapter liegt auch der Reisepass bereit. Mit dieser Hülle im Design einer bekannten interstellaren Weltraumflotte reist der Ausweis diesen Sommer nicht nur sicher, sondern auch mit deutlich mehr Stil.
]]> <![CDATA[Building a Mixed-Reality Tour Guide with Android XR, the Geospatial API, and Gemini]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693504/android-tipps/building-a-mixed-reality-tour-guide-with-android-xr-the-geospatial-api-and-gemini/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693504/android-tipps/building-a-mixed-reality-tour-guide-with-android-xr-the-geospatial-api-and-gemini/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 10:15:35 +0200 🤖 Android Tipps tsecurity.de
Posted by Coco Fatus, UX Designer, Alon Hetzroni, UX Engineer, Azin Mehrnoosh, Product Manager Android XR






At this year's Google I/O, we announced an update for spatial experiences: the Geospatial API is now available as a preview in ARCore for Jetpack XR. By bringing Google's Visual Positioning System (VPS) to Android XR, Android XR enables anchoring digital content to the physical world with sub-meter accuracy and precise orientation in supported areas.* To explore what the Geospatial API could unlock, our team built a demo: the XR Geospatial Tour.

Imagine walking into a new city, putting on a pair of wired XR glasses (like the upcoming XREAL Project Aura), and instantly having a knowledgeable, local guide showing you around. You don't need to stare down at a 2D map—instead, 3D models gently guide your path, and an intelligent voice tells you about the historical landmarks right in front of you. We combined the Geospatial APIs, Gemini API using Firebase AI Logic, Google Maps Grounding, and Jetpack XR SDK to create a hands-free, immersive walking tour experience.

*Disclaimer: Video and Tour Guide application are for demonstration purposes only. Some sequences have been shortened. Any hardware depicted may be under development; final product details may differ.

Let’s walk through the implementation details and show how we tied these APIs together to build a world-scale spatial experience.

1. Pinpointing the User with ARCore Geospatial API (VPS)

Enhance your navigation experience on XR by combining the power of GPS with the precision of VPS. The accuracy and precise orientation that comes with VPS allows 3D waypoints to align with the physical world.

This is why the Geospatial API on Android XR can help you build custom experiences. By using advanced computer vision, VPS tries to provide a GeospatialPose (including latitude, longitude, and heading) that is more accurate than GPS.

Here's how we retrieve the user's Geospatial pose by mapping the device's orientation to a Geospatial coordinate:

// Retrieve the current geospatial pose from the ARCore session
val result = geospatial.createGeospatialPoseFromPose(arDevice.state.value.devicePose)
if (result is CreateGeospatialPoseFromPoseSuccess) {
    val pose = result.pose
    Log.d("VPS", "Accurate Location: ${pose.latitude}, ${pose.longitude}")
}

Because the entire experience relies on this accuracy, we monitor the horizontalAccuracy and orientationYawAccuracy until they meet our thresholds. If the user is indoors or in an unrecognized area, we prompt them to "walk to an outdoor public space and look around".

2. Crafting the Itinerary with Gemini API & Google Maps Grounding

Once we have a location, we use the Gemini API using Firebase AI Logic to prompt the Gemini model to act as a local tour guide. We pass the user's coordinates to the model and ask it to output a structured JSON response containing nearby walking tours:

   val configForTools = ToolConfig(
      functionCallingConfig = null,
      retrievalConfig = retrievalConfig {
        latLng = FirebaseLatLng(pose.latitude, pose.longitude)
        languageCode = "en"
      }
    )
    val responseJsonSchema = Schema.obj(
      mapOf(
        "locationIntro" to Schema.string(),
        "tours" to Schema.array(
          Schema.obj(
            mapOf(
              "title" to Schema.string(),
              "description" to Schema.string(),
              "stops" to Schema.array(
                Schema.obj(
                  mapOf(
                    "name" to Schema.string(),
                    "detailedName" to Schema.string(),
                    "description" to Schema.string()
                  )
                )
              )
            )
          )
        )
      )
    )
    val model = Firebase.ai(backend = GenerativeBackend.googleAI()).generativeModel(
      modelName = "gemini-3.5-flash",
      tools = listOf(Tool.googleMaps()),
      generationConfig = generationConfig {
        responseMimeType = "application/json"
        responseSchema = responseJsonSchema
      }
    )
   val result = model.generateContent("The user is at latitude ${pose.latitude} and longitude ${pose.longitude}. Generate exactly 3 diverse tours near this location (e.g., historical, food, nature). All tour ideas should be walking distance only.")

Large Language Models are great at generating rich descriptions, but they can sometimes hallucinate exact latitude/longitude coordinates. To solve this, we used Google Maps Grounding to ground the AI.

3. A Voice to Guide You: Gemini 2.5 TTS

To make the tour guide feel truly present, we implemented dynamic voiceovers.

Using the gemini-2.5-flash-tts model, we can configure our model generation config to natively return audio data instead of just text! Here’s how you can request the ResponseModality.AUDIO:

val ttsModel = Firebase.ai(backend = GenerativeBackend.googleAI())
    .generativeModel(
        modelName = "gemini-2.5-flash-tts",
        generationConfig = generationConfig {
            // Instruct the model to return Audio
            responseModalities = listOf(ResponseModality.AUDIO)
        }
    )
val response = ttsModel.generateContent("Say in a neutral but positive voice:\n$prompt")
// Extract the raw audio bytes from the response
val audioBytes = response.candidates.firstOrNull()?.content?.parts
    ?.filterIsInstance<InlineDataPart>()
    ?.firstOrNull { it.mimeType.contains("audio") }?.inlineData

4. Bringing it to Life in 3D with Jetpack XR

The final piece of the puzzle is rendering this data in the user's field of view. The Jetpack XR SDK makes it intuitive to transition from a 2D Android UI to spatial computing.

We used Jetpack Compose for XR to build spatial components. To represent points of interest along the tour, we built a Composable called InfoSphere, which contains a GltfModel of a 3D orb that floats in space and can be interacted with to reveal information.

Using Jetpack XR SDK, we can place 3D models alongside the Compose UI using SpatialBox and SceneCoreEntity. We also used InteractableComponent to respond to user taps.

@Composable
fun InfoSphere(
    content: InfoBubbleContent,
    session: Session,
    sphereModel: GltfModel,
    isSelected: Boolean,
    onClick: () -> Unit
) {
    // SpatialBox lets us arrange 3D components and SpatialPanels together
    SpatialBox(
        SubspaceModifier
            .offset(x = 2.dp, y = 1.dp, z = (-3).dp) // Positioned in 3D space
    ) {
        // Smoothly animate the visibility of our 2D Compose UI Panel
        AnimatedSpatialVisibility(visible = isSelected) {
            SpatialPanel {
                InfoBubble(content) // Regular 2D Compose UI
            }
        }
        // Render our interactive 3D sphere
        SceneCoreEntity(
            factory = {
                GltfModelEntity.create(session, sphereModel).also { entity ->
                    // Make the 3D model respond to user taps
                    entity.addComponent(InteractableComponent.create(session) { inputEvent ->
                        if (inputEvent.action == InputEvent.Action.UP) {
                            onClick()
                        }
                    })
                }
            }
        )
    }
}

By combining AnimatedSpatialVisibility for traditional Compose UI surfaces with SceneCoreEntity 3D elements, we're able to seamlessly blend data into the physical world.

Explore what’s possible with Android XR today

Building the XR Geospatial Tour app showed us that the barrier to entry for world-scale spatial experiences is lower than ever for Android developers. With the Geospatial API now available in preview on Android XR, your apps can seamlessly understand the physical world around them. By combining Compose for XR’s APIs with the high-precision location data of VPS and the generative capabilities of Gemini, we can create experiences that understand both where the user is and what they are looking at.

To help you get hands-on with Android XR, we are thrilled to open applications for the Android XR Developer Catalyst Program, which includes XREAL Project Aura. Starting today, you can apply to get access to an XREAL Project Aura devkit or our display glasses devkit over the coming months!

*Disclaimer: Available on select devices. Internet connection required. Works on compatible apps and surfaces. Results may vary.


]]> <![CDATA[Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against US and Global Critical Infrastructure]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693383/sicherheitsluecken/pro-russia-hacktivists-conduct-opportunistic-attacks-against-us-and-global-critical-infrastructure/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693383/sicherheitsluecken/pro-russia-hacktivists-conduct-opportunistic-attacks-against-us-and-global-critical-infrastructure/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 09:15:46 +0200 🕵️ Sicherheitslücken tsecurity.de Summary

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory is being published as an addition to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) May 6, 2025, joint fact sheet Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology and European Cybercrime Centre’s (EC3) Operation Eastwood, in which CISA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and EC3 shared information about cyber incidents affecting the operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) of critical infrastructure entities in the United States and globally.

FBI, CISA, National Security Agency (NSA), and the following partners—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are releasing this joint advisory on the targeting of critical infrastructure by pro-Russia hacktivists:

  • U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
  • U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
  • U.S. Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
  • Europol European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)
  • EUROJUST – European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation
  • Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
  • Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
  • Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
  • Czech Republic Military Intelligence (VZ)
  • Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)
  • Czech Republic National Centre Against Terrorism, Extremism, and Cyber Crime (NCTEKK)
  • French National Cybercrime Unit – Gendarmerie Nationale (UNC)
  • French National Jurisdiction for the Fight Against Organized Crime (JUNALCO)
  • German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
  • Italian State Police (PS)
  • Latvian State Police (VP)
  • Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau (LKPB)
  • New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
  • Romanian National Police (PR)
  • Spanish Civil Guard (GC)
  • Spanish National Police (CNP)
  • Swedish Polisen (SC3)
  • United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)

The authoring organizations assess pro-Russia hacktivist groups are conducting less sophisticated, lower-impact attacks against critical infrastructure entities, compared to advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. These attacks use minimally secured, internet-facing virtual network computing (VNC) connections to infiltrate (or gain access to) OT control devices within critical infrastructure systems. Pro-Russia hacktivist groups—Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR), Z-Pentest, NoName057(16), Sector16, and affiliated groups—are capitalizing on the widespread prevalence of accessible VNC devices to execute attacks against critical infrastructure entities, resulting in varying degrees of impact, including physical damage. Targeted sectors include Water and Wastewater Systems, Food and Agriculture, and Energy.

The authoring organizations encourage critical infrastructure organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the likelihood and impact of pro-Russia hacktivist-related incidents. For additional information on Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Russia Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.

Download the PDF version of this report:

Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against US and Global Critical Infrastructure (PDF, 1.53 MB )

Background and Development of Pro-Russia Hacktivist Groups

Over the past several years, the authoring organizations have observed pro-Russia hacktivist groups conducting cyber operations against numerous organizations and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide. The escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 significantly increased the number of these pro-Russia groups. Consisting of individuals who support Russia’s agenda but lack direct governmental ties, most of these groups target Ukrainian and allied infrastructure. However, among the increasing number of groups, some appear to have associations with the Russian state through direct or indirect support.

Cyber Army of Russia Reborn

The authoring organizations assess that the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455—tracked in the cybersecurity community under several names (see Appendix B: Additional Designators Used for Cited Groups)—is likely responsible for supporting the creation of CARR —also known as “The People’s Cyber Army of Russia”—in late February or early March of 2022. Actors suspected to be from GRU unit 74455 likely funded the tools CARR threat actors used to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks through at least September 2024.

In April 2022, the group began using a new Telegram channel featuring the name “CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn” to organize and plan group actions. The channel creators recruited actors to use CARR as an unattributable platform for conducting cyber activities beneath the level of an APT, aimed at deterring anti-Russia rhetoric. CARR threat actors presented themselves as a group of pro-Russia hacktivists supporting Russia’s stance on the Ukrainian conflict, and they soon began claiming responsibility for DDoS attacks against the U.S. and Europe for supporting Ukraine.

CARR documented these actions through embellished images and videos shared on their social media channels, promoting Russian ideology, disseminating talking points, and publicizing leaked information from hacks attributed to Russian state threat actors.

In late 2023, CARR expanded their operations to include attacks on industrial control systems (ICS), claiming an intrusion against a European wastewater treatment facility in October 2023. In November 2023, CARR targeted human-machine interface (HMI) devices, claiming intrusions at two U.S. dairy farms.

The authoring organizations assess that by late September 2024, CARR channel administrators became dissatisfied with the level of support and funding provided by the GRU. This dissatisfaction led CARR administrators and an administrator from another hacktivist group, NoName057(16), to create the Z-Pentest group, employing the same tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as CARR but separate from GRU involvement.

NoName057(16)

The authoring organizations assess that the Center for the Study and Network Monitoring of the Youth Environment (CISM), established on behalf of the Kremlin, created NoName057(16) as a covert project within the organization. Senior executives and employees within CISM developed and customized the NoName057(16) proprietary DDoS tool DDoSia, paid for the group’s network infrastructure, served as administrators on NoName057(16) Telegram channels, and selected DDoS targets.

Active since March 2022, NoName057(16) has conducted frequent DDoS attacks against government and private sector entities in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states and other European countries perceived as hostile to Russian geopolitical interests. The group operates primarily through Telegram channels and used GitHub, alongside various websites and repositories, to host DDoSia and share materials and TTPs with their followers. 

In 2024, NoName057(16) began collaborating closely with other pro-Russia hacktivist groups, operating a joint chat with CARR by mid-2024. In July 2024, NoName057(16) jointly claimed responsibility with CARR for an alleged intrusion against OT assets in the U.S. The high degree of cooperation with CARR likely contributed to the formation of Z-Pentest, which is composed of actors and administrators from both teams, in September 2024.

Z-Pentest

Established in September 2024, Z-Pentest is composed of members from CARR and NoName057(16). The group specializes in OT intrusion operations targeting globally dispersed critical infrastructure entities. Additionally, the group uses “hack and leak” operations and defacement attacks to draw attention to their pro-Russia messaging. Unlike other pro-Russia hacktivist groups, Z-Pentest largely avoids DDoS activities, claiming OT intrusions as attempts to garner more attention from the media.

Shortly after Z-Pentest’s inception, the group announced alliances with CARR and NoName057(16), possibly to leverage the other groups’ subscribers to grow the new channel. In March 2025, Z-Pentest posted evidence claiming OT device intrusions to their channel using a NoName057(16) cyberattack campaign hashtag. Similarly, in April 2025, Z-Pentest shared a video purporting defacement of an HMI by changing system names to NoName057(16) and CARR references. Z-Pentest continues to create new alliances with other groups, like Sector16, to continue growing their subscriber base and incidentally propagate TTPs with new partners.

Sector16

Formed in January 2025, Sector16 is a novice pro-Russia hacktivist group that emerged through collaboration with Z-Pentest. Sector16 actively maintains an online presence, including a public Telegram channel where they share videos, statements, and claims of compromising U.S. energy infrastructure. These communications often align with pro-Russia narratives and reflect their self-proclaimed support for Russian geopolitical objectives.

Members of Sector16 may have received indirect support from the Russian government in exchange for conducting specific cyber operations that further Russian strategic goals. This aligns with broader Russian cyber strategies that involve leveraging non-state threat actors for certain cyber activities, adding a layer of deniability.

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 18. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.

TTP Overview

Pro-Russia hacktivist groups employ easily disseminated and replicated TTPs across various entities, increasing the likelihood of widespread adoption and escalating the frequency of intrusions. These groups have limited capabilities, frequently misunderstanding the processes they aim to disrupt. Their apparent low level of technical knowledge results in haphazard attacks where actors intend to cause physical damage but cannot accurately anticipate actual impact. Despite these limitations, the authoring organizations have observed these groups willfully cause actual harm to vulnerable critical infrastructure.

Pro-Russia hacktivist groups use the TTPs in this Cybersecurity Advisory to target virtual network computing (VNC)-connected HMI devices. These groups are primarily seeking notoriety with their actions. While they have caused damage in some instances, they regularly make false or exaggerated claims about their attacks on critical infrastructure to garner more attention. They frequently misrepresent their capabilities and the impacts of their actions, portraying minor incursions as significant breaches, but such incursions can still lead to lost time and resources for operators remediating systems.

Additionally, pro-Russia hacktivists use an opportunistic targeting methodology. They leverage superficial criteria, such as victim availability and existing vulnerabilities, rather than focusing on strategically significant entities. Their lack of strategic focus can lead to a broad array of targets, ranging from water treatment facilities to oil well systems. Pro-Russia hacktivists have demonstrated a pattern of frequently taking advantage of the widespread availability of vulnerable VNC connections. While system owners typically use VNC connections for legitimate remote system access functions, threat actors can maliciously use these connections to broadly target numerous platforms and services. Consequently, these groups can indiscriminately compromise critical infrastructure entities, including those in the Water and Wastewater, Food and Agriculture, and Energy Sectors.

Pro-Russia hacktivist groups have successfully targeted supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks using basic methods, and in some cases, performed simultaneous DDoS attacks against targeted networks to facilitate SCADA intrusions. As recently as April 2025, threat actors used the following unsophisticated TTPs to access networks and conduct SCADA intrusions:

  • Scan for vulnerable devices on the internet [T0883] with open VNC ports [T1595.002].
  • Initiate temporary virtual private server (VPS) [T1583.003] to execute password brute force software.
  • Use VNC software to access hosts [T1021.005].
  • Confirm connection to the vulnerable device [T0886].
  • Brute force the password, if required [T1110.003].
  • Gain access to HMI devices [T0883], typically with default [T0812], weak, or no passwords [T0859].
  • Log the confirmed vulnerable device IP address, port, and password.
  • Using the HMI graphical interface [T0823], capture screen recordings or intermittent screenshots while conducting the following actions, intending to affect productivity and cause additional costs [T0828]:
    • Modify usernames/passwords [T0892];
    • Modify parameters [T0836];
    • Modify device name [T0892];
    • Modify instrument settings [T0831];
    • Disable alarms [T0878];
    • Create loss of view (a technique that mandates local hands-on operator intervention) [T0829]; and/or
    • Device restart or shutdown [T0816].
  • Disconnect from the device, ending the VNC connection.
  • Research the compromised device company after the intrusion [T1591].

Propagation

To reach a wider audience, pro-Russia hacktivist groups work together, amplify each other’s posts, create additional groups to amplify their own posts, and likely share TTPs. For example, Z-Pentest jointly claimed intrusion of a U.S. system with Sector16. Sector16 later began posting additional intrusions for which the group claimed sole responsibility. It is likely that these and similar groups will continue to iterate and share these methods to disrupt critical infrastructure organizations.

Reconnaissance and Initial Access

The threat actors’ intrusion methodology is relatively unsophisticated, inexpensive to execute, and easy to replicate. These pro-Russia hacktivist groups abuse popular internet-scraping tools, such as Nmap or OPENVAS, to search for visible VNC services and use brute force password spraying tools to access devices via known default or otherwise weak credentials. Threat actors typically search for these services on the default port 5900 or other nearby ports (5901-5910). Their goal is to gain remote access to HMI devices connected to live control networks.

Once threat actors obtain access, they manipulate available settings from the graphical user interface (GUI) on the HMI devices, such as arbitrary physical parameter and setpoint changes, or conduct defacement activities. Because pro-Russia hacktivist groups seem to lack sector-specific expertise or cyber-physical engineering knowledge, they currently cannot reliably estimate the true impact of their actions. Regardless of outcome, pro-Russia hacktivist groups often post images and screen recordings to their social media platforms, boasting the compromises and exaggerating impacts to garner attention from their peers and the media.

Impact

While pro-Russia hacktivist groups currently demonstrate limited ability to consistently cause significant impact, there is a risk that their continued attacks will result in further harm or grievous physical consequences. Attacks have not yet caused injury; however, the attacks against occupied factories and community facilities demonstrate a lack of consideration for human safety.

Victim organizations reported that the most common operational impact caused by these threat actors is a temporary loss of view, necessitating manual intervention to manage processes. However, any modifications to programmatic and systematic procedures can result in damage or disruption, including substantial labor costs from hiring a programmable logic controller programmer to restore operations, costs associated with operational downtime, and potential costs for network remediation.

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

See Table 1 to Table 10 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Table 1. Reconnaissance
Technique Title ID Use
Gather Victim Organization Information T1591 Threat actors use information available on the internet to determine what systems they believe they have compromised and post the information on their social media. This methodology frequently leads to the threat actors misidentifying their claimed victims.
Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning T1595.002 Threat actors use open source tools to look for IP addresses in target countries with visible VNC services on common ports.
Table 2. Resource Development
Technique Title ID Use
Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server T1583.003 Threat actors use virtual infrastructure to obfuscate identifiers.
Table 3. Initial Access
Technique Title ID Use
Internet Accessible Device T0883 Threat actors gain access through less secure HMI devices exposed to the internet.
Table 4. Persistence
Technique Title ID Use
Valid Accounts T0859 Threat actors use password guessing tools to access legitimate accounts on the HMI devices.
Table 5. Credential Access
Technique Title ID Use
Brute Force: Password Spraying T1110.003 Threat actors use tools to rapidly guess common or simple passwords.
Table 6. Lateral Movement
Technique Title ID Use
Default Credentials T0812 Threat actors seek and build libraries of known default passwords for control devices to access legitimate user accounts.
Remote Services T0886 Threat actors leverage VNC services to access system HMI devices.
Remote Services: VNC T1021.005 Threat actors hunt VNC-enabled devices visible on the internet and connect with remote viewer software.
Table 7. Execution
Technique Title ID Use
Graphical User Interface T0823 Threat actors interact with HMI devices via GUIs, attempting to modify control devices.
Table 8. Inhibit Response Function
Technique Title ID Use
Device Restart/Shutdown T0816 While threat actors claim to turn off HMIs, it is possible that operators (not the threat actors) turn the devices off during incident response.
Alarm Suppression T0878 Threat actors use HMI interfaces to clear alarms caused by their activity and alarms already present on the system at the time of their intrusion.
Change Credential T0892 Threat actors change the usernames and passwords of HMI devices in operator lockout attempts, usually resulting in a loss of view and operators switching to manual operations.
Table 9. Impair Process Control
Technique Title ID Use
Modify Parameter T0836 Threat actors attempt to change upper and lower limits of operational devices as available from the HMI.
Unauthorized Command Message T0855 Threat actors attempt to send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, causing possible impact.
Table 10. Impact
Technique Title ID Use
Loss of Productivity and Revenue T0828 Threat actors purposefully attempt to impact productivity and create additional costs for the affected entities.
Loss of View T0829 Threat actors change credentials on HMI devices, preventing operators from modifying processes remotely. 
Manipulation of Control T0831 Threat actors change setpoints in processes, impacting the efficiency of operations for those specific processes.  

Incident Response

If organizations find exposed systems with weak or default passwords, they should assume threat actors compromised the system and begin the following incident response protocols:

  1. Determine which hosts were compromised and isolate them by quarantining or taking them offline.
  2. Initiate threat hunting activities to scope the intrusion. Collect and review artifacts, such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.
  3. Reimage compromised hosts.
  4. Provision new account credentials.
  5. Report the compromise to CISA, FBI, and/or NSA. See the Contact Information section of this advisory.
  6. Harden the network to prevent additional malicious activity. See the Mitigations section of this advisory for guidance.

Mitigations

OT Asset Owners and Operators

The authoring organizations recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture based on the threat actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s CPGs webpage for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

  • Reduce exposure of OT assets to the public-facing internet. When connected to the internet, OT devices are easy targets for malicious cyber threat actors. Many devices can be found by searching for open ports on public IP ranges with search engine tools to target victims with OT components [CPG 3.S].
    • Asset owners should use attack surface management services and web-based search platforms to scan the internet. This mitigation can help identify if there are VNC systems exposed within the IP ranges they own, especially for connections set up by third parties.
      Note: For more information on attack surface management, see CISA’s Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance, CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services for U.S. critical infrastructure, and NSA’s Attack Surface Management for the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.
    • Implement network segmentation between IT and OT networks. Segmenting critical systems and introducing a demilitarized zone (DMZ) for passing control data to enterprise logistics reduces the potential impact of cyber threats and the risk of disruptions to essential OT operations [CPG 3.I].
    • Consider implementing a firewall and/or virtual private network if exposure to the internet is necessary for controlling access to devices.
      • Consider disabling public exposure by default and implementing time-limited remote access to reduce the amount of time systems are exposed.
      • Restrict and monitor both inbound and outbound traffic at OT perimeter firewalls. Configure OT perimeter firewalls to enforce a default-deny policy for all traffic. Asset owners should explicitly permit authorized destinations and protocols based on operational requirements.
      • Implement strict egress filtering to prevent unauthorized data exfiltration or command-and-control callbacks.
      • Regularly audit firewall rulesets and monitor outbound traffic patterns for anomalies indicative of threat actor activity, such as beaconing or unexpected protocol usage.
  • Adopt mature asset management processes, including mapping data flows and access points. Generating a complete picture of both OT and IT assets provides visibility to operators and management, allowing organizations to monitor and assess deviations for criticality [CPG 2.A].
    • Keep remote access services updated with the latest version available and ensure all systems and software are up to date with patches and necessary security updates.
      • Keep VNC systems updated with the latest version available.
    • Refer to the joint Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance for Owners and Operators to help with reducing cybersecurity risk by identifying which assets within their environment should be secured and protected.
  • Ensure OT assets use robust authentication procedures.
    • Many devices lack robust authentication and authorization. Devices with weak authentication are vulnerable targets to threat actors using credential theft techniques.
    • Implement MFA where possible. Where MFA is not feasible, use strong, unique passwords. Apply password standards for operator-accessible services on underlying OT assets, as well as network devices protecting those services. This is especially important for services that require internet accessibility [CPG 3.A] [CPG 3.B] [CPG 3.C] [CPG 3.F].
    • Establish an allowlist that permits only authorized device IP addresses and/or media access control addresses. The allowlist can be refined to operator working hours to further obstruct malicious threat actor activity; organizations are encouraged to establish monitoring and alerting for access attempts not meeting these criteria [CPG 3.E].
    • Disable any unused authentication methods, logic, or features, such as default authentication keys and default passwords. Block all unused high ephemeral ports and monitor for attempted connections using standard protocols on non-standard ports [CPG 3.R].
    • Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device’s state, logic, program, or filesystems.
  • Enable control system security features that can separate and audit view and control functions. Limiting remotely accessible or default user accounts to “view-only” removes the potential for impact without exploiting a vulnerability [CPG 3.G].
  • Implement and practice business recovery/disaster recovery plans. Plans should also take into consideration redundancy, fail-safe mechanisms, islanding capabilities, backup restoration, and manual operation.
    • Include scenarios that necessitate switching to manual operations. Maintaining the capability of an organization to revert to manual controls to quickly restore operations is vital in the immediate aftermath of a cyber incident [CPG 6.A].
    • Create backups of the engineering logic, configurations, and firmware of HMIs to enable fast recovery. Organizations should routinely test backups and standby systems to ensure safe manual operations in the event of an incident [CPG 3.O].
  • Collect and monitor the traffic of OT assets and networking devices. This includes unusual logins or unexpected protocols communicating over the internet, and functions of ICS management protocols that change an asset’s operating mode or modify programs.
  • Review configurations for setpoint ranges or tag values to stay within safe ranges and establish alerting for deviations.
  • Take a proactive approach in the procurement process by following the guidance outlined in the joint guide Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products.

OT Device Manufacturers

Although critical infrastructure organizations can take steps to mitigate risks, it is ultimately the responsibility of OT device manufacturers to build products that are secure by design. The authoring organizations urge device manufacturers to take ownership of the security outcomes of their customers in line with the joint guide Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Secure by Design Software.

  • Eliminate default credentials and require strong passwords. The use of default credentials is a top weakness threat actors exploit to gain access to systems.
  • Mandate MFA for privileged users. Changes to engineering logic or configurations are safety-impacting events in critical infrastructure. MFA should be available for safety critical components at no additional cost.
  • Practice secure by default principles. OT components were initially designed without public internet connectivity in mind. When internet connection becomes necessary, implementing additional security measures is essential to safeguard these systems. Manufacturers should recognize insecure states and promptly inform users so they can make informed risk decisions.
    • Include logging at no additional charge. Change and access control logs allow operators to track safety-impacting events in their critical infrastructure. These logs should be available for no cost and use open standard logging formats.
  • Publish Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs). Vulnerabilities in underlying software libraries can affect a wide range of devices. Without an SBOM, it is nearly impossible for a critical infrastructure system owner to measure and mitigate the impact of a vulnerability on their existing systems. See CISA’s SBOM webpage for more information.

Additionally, see CISA’s Secure by Design Alert on how software manufacturers can shield web management interfaces from malicious cyber activity. By using secure by design tactics, software manufacturers can make their product lines secure “out of the box” without requiring customers to spend additional resources making configuration changes, purchasing tiered security software and logs, monitoring, and making routine updates.

For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage.

Validate Security Controls

In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring organizations recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring organizations recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how it performs against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To start:

  1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 1 to Table 10).
  2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
  3. Test your technologies against the technique.
  4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
  5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
  6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

The authoring organizations recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

Resources

Entities requiring additional support for implementing any of the mitigations in this advisory should contact their regional CISA Cybersecurity Advisor for assistance. Key resources organizations should reference include:

Additional resources that apply to this advisory include:

Contact Information

U.S. organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA, FBI, and/or NSA:

  • Contact CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at contact@cisa.dhs.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472) or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.
  • For NSA cybersecurity guidance inquiries, contact CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov.

Australian organizations: Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.

Canadian organizations: Report incidents by emailing Cyber Centre at contact@cyber.gc.ca.

New Zealand organizations: Report cyber security incidents to incidents@ncsc.govt.nz or call 04 498 7654.

United Kingdom organizations: Report a significant cyber security incident: report.ncsc.gov.uk (monitored 24 hours) or, for urgent assistance, call 03000 200 973.

Disclaimer

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The authoring organizations do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI and co-sealers.

Acknowledgements

Schneider Electric, Nozomi Networks, Eversource Energy, Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Chevron, BP, and Dragos contributed to this advisory.

Version History

December 09, 2025: Initial version.

Appendix A: Targeting Methodologies for Pro-Russia Hacktivist Groups

For further information on targeting methodologies for pro-Russia hacktivist groups, see:

Appendix B: Additional Designators Used for Cited Groups

The cybersecurity industry and cyber actor groups often use various names to reference actor groups. While not exhaustive, the following are the most notable names used within the cybersecurity community to reference the groups in this advisory.

Note: Cybersecurity organizations have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this may not be a 1:1 correlation to the authoring organizations’ understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

  • GRU military unit 74455
    • Sandworm Team
    • Voodoo Bear
    • Seashell Blizzard
    • APT44
  • Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR)
    • CyberArmy of Russia
    • Народная CyberАрмия (НКА)
    • People’s CyberArmy of Russia (PCA)
    • Russian CyberArmy Team (RCAT)
  • NoName057(16)
    • NoName057(16) Spain
    • NoName057(16) Italy
    • NoName057(16) France
  • Z-Pentest
    • Z-Pentest Beograd
    • Z-Pentest Alliance
    • Z-Alliance
]]> <![CDATA[Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693379/sicherheitsluecken/iranian-affiliated-cyber-actors-exploit-programmable-logic-controllers-across-us-critical-infrastructure/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693379/sicherheitsluecken/iranian-affiliated-cyber-actors-exploit-programmable-logic-controllers-across-us-critical-infrastructure/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 09:12:34 +0200 🕵️ Sicherheitslücken tsecurity.de Advisory at a Glance
Title Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure
Original Publication April 7, 2026
Last Update  July 22, 2026
Executive Summary The authoring agencies urgently warn U.S. organizations of ongoing Iranian-affiliated cyber targeting of internet-connected operational technology (OT) devices, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs). These actions disrupted PLCs across several U.S. critical infrastructure sectors through malicious project file interactions and manipulation of data on human machine interface (HMI) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) displays, resulting in operational disruption and financial loss.
Last Update Description This update adds new guidance on detecting malicious changes in reusable code modules exploited within Rockwell Automation PLC programs. It also expands scope to include observed targeting of Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other branded/manufactured PLCs, emphasizing the importance of restricting direct internet access and providing best practices for secure deployment.
Affected Products Potentially all internet exposed PLCs, including Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and other branded/manufactured PLCs.
Key Actions
  • Install PLCs consistent with manufacturers' guidelines and security best practices.
  • Remove PLCs from direct internet exposure via secure gateway and firewall; work with IT/OT team members and/or integrators to perform this action.
  • Query available logs for the provided indicators of compromise (IOCs) and check available logs for suspicious traffic on the ports associated with OT devices, including 44818, 2222, 102, and 502, especially traffic originating from foreign hosting providers.
  • For Rockwell Automation devices, place the physical mode switch on the controller into run position. If you suspect your organization was targeted, including against other branded PLC devices, contact the authoring agencies and PLC manufacturer for guidance.
Indicators of Compromise

For a downloadable copy of July 22, 2026 IOCs, see:

For a downloadable copy of historical April 7, 2026 IOCs, see:
Intended Audience

Organizations: Critical Infrastructure

Sectors: Government Services and Facilities, Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS), and Energy 

Roles: Integrators, asset owners, defensive cybersecurity analysts, OT cybersecurity engineers, cybersecurity architects, secure systems developer

Introduction

Note: This advisory was originally published on April 7, 2026, to provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) related to ongoing cyber exploitation of internet-connected operational technology (OT) devices by Iranian-affiliated advanced persistent threat (APT) actors. The authoring agencies updated this advisory on July 22, 2026, to add new guidance on detecting malicious changes in reusable code modules leveraged within Rockwell Automation PLC programs. It also expands the manufacturer scope to include observed targeting of Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other branded/manufactured PLCs, emphasizing the importance of restricting direct internet access and providing best practice resources for secure deployment.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Energy (DOE), United States Cyber Command – Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) (hereafter referred to as the “authoring agencies”) are urgently warning U.S. organizations of ongoing cyber exploitation of internet-connected OT devices—including PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other manufactured PLCs—across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors. As a result of this activity, organizations from multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors experienced disruptions through malicious interactions with PLC project files1 and the manipulation of data displayed on human machine interface (HMI) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) displays. In a few cases, this activity caused operational disruption and financial loss.

The authoring agencies assess a group of Iranian-affiliated APT actors is conducting this activity to cause disruptive effects within the United States. The group targeted devices spanning multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Services and Facilities (to include local municipalities), Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS), and Energy Sectors. The authoring agencies previously reported on similar activity targeting PLCs by CyberAv3ngers (aka Shahid Kaveh Group)—a cyber threat actor affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cyber Electronic Command (CEC).

Due to the widespread use of these PLCs, and the potential for additional targeting of other branded OT devices across critical infrastructure, the authoring agencies recommend U.S. organizations urgently review the TTPs and IOCs in this advisory for indications of current or historical activity on their networks, and apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the risk of compromise.

If owners and operators discover an affected internet-accessible device in their environment, additional technical measures may be necessary to evaluate the risk of compromise. Please engage your cyber incident response plans and contact the authoring agencies and applicable vendors through existing support channels available to customers and integrators (see Contact Information) to receive support, mitigation, and investigation assistance.

For more information on Iranian malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and the FBI’s Iran Threat and Iran Cyber Threat Overview webpages.

Download the PDF version of this report:

Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure (PDF, 1.09 MB )

(New, July 22, 2026) For a downloadable copy of July 22, 2026 IOCs, see:

For a downloadable copy of historical April 7, 2026 IOCs, see:

AA26-097A.stix_.xml (XML, 35.97 KB )
AA26-097A.stix_.json (JSON, 11.87 KB )

Background Information

Similar Historical Activity Targeting Programmable Logic Controllers

During a similar campaign beginning in November 2023, the IRGC CEC-affiliated cyber threat actors known as "CyberAv3ngers” targeted U.S.-based PLCs and HMIs, causing disruptive effects. Private industry and open sources also refer to this group as Hydro Kitten, Storm-0784, APT Iran, Bauxite, Mr. Soul, Soldiers of Solomon, UNC5691, and the Shahid Kaveh Group. These attacks compromised at least 75 devices, targeting U.S.-based Unitronics PLC devices with an HMI used across multiple critical infrastructure sectors, including the WWS. APT actors developed and deployed custom ladder logic code to these devices, replacing the valid ladder logic with malicious code that continues to be observed to date.

For more information on this group’s activity, see the joint Cybersecurity Advisory IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities.

Ongoing Threat Actor Activity Against U.S.-Based Programmable Logic Controllers

The FBI observed Iranian-affiliated APT actors targeting internet-exposed PLCs with the intent to cause disruptions—including maliciously interacting with project files, and manipulating data displayed on HMI and SCADA displays—to U.S. critical infrastructure organizations. Iranian-affiliated APT targeting campaigns against U.S. critical infrastructure have recently escalated, likely in response to hostilities between Iran, and the United States and Israel.

(New, July 22, 2026) At one U.S. victim, the FBI observed the APT actors download a malicious project file to a targeted PLC using configuration software. Analysis indicated the project file retained ladder logic for downstream function but added logic that overrode specific instruction sets responsible for maintaining safe operating parameters in the victim’s environment.

Since at least March 2026, the authoring agencies identified (through engagements with victim organizations) an Iranian-affiliated APT group disrupted the function of PLCs. Organizations across several U.S. critical infrastructure sectors (including Government Services and Facilities, WWS, and Energy Sectors) deployed these PLCs within a wide variety of industrial automation processes. Some of the victims experienced operational disruption and financial loss.

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 19. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for tables of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.

Initial Access

(Updated, July 22, 2026) The authoring agencies observed Iranian-affiliated APT actors using several foreign-based IP addresses to access internet-facing PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other manufactured PLCs [T0883]. The actors used leased, third-party hosted infrastructure and manufacturers’ PLC programming software to connect to misconfigured victim PLCs. Inbound malicious traffic has been observed targeting PLC devices on the following ports: 44818, 2222, 102, and 502, as well as targeting modems on port 22. Targeted devices include:

  • Rockwell Automation: CompactLogix and Micro850 PLCs
  • Schneider Electric: BMX P34/Modicon M340 PLCs
  • Siemens: S7-1200 series PLCs

Command and Control

(Updated, July 22, 2026) The targeting of ports [T0885] associated with other OT vendors’ protocols suggests these actors are opportunistically targeting devices manufactured by companies other than Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, including Schneider Electric and Siemens. In one reported instance, the actors utilized Dropbear Secure Shell (SSH) software on victim modems to enable them to gain remote access through port 22 [T1219].

Exfiltration

(New, July 22, 2026) The authoring agencies observed Iranian-affiliated APT actors using configuration software—such as Rockwell Automation’s Studio 5000 Logix Designer, Schneider Electric’s EcoStruxure Control Expert, and Siemens’ Totally Integrated Automation (TIA) Portal—on leased, third-party hosted infrastructure to exfiltrate device project files from PLC devices to threat-actor-controlled infrastructure [T1041].

Impact

(Updated, July 22, 2026) After the actors extracted device project files, the FBI and CISA identified the modification and deletion of project file logic, to include Add-On Instructions (AOIs) and data manipulation on HMI and SCADA displays [T1565]. Additionally, the changes disabled critical shutdown and alarm logic, allowing systems to enter unsafe conditions without notifying operators of the anomalies.

Note: An AOI is analogous to a “Function Block” or “User Defined Function Block” used in other PLC vendor programs.

Indicators of Compromise

See Table 1 and Table 2 for recent IP addresses used by the Iranian-affiliated APT actors to communicate with PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, and Siemens in the United States.

Disclaimer: The FBI observed the threat actors using the IP addresses listed below in the specified time frames. This data is being provided for customers to query against logs for indications of historical targeting by the Iranian-affiliated APT actors. The authoring agencies recommend organizations investigate or vet these IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking.

Table 1. Indicators of Compromise (New, July 22, 2026)
Indicator Beginning of Actor Association End of Actor Association
185.82.73[.]175 September 2025 February 2026
141.11.164[.]153 January 2026 June 2026
175.110.121[.]42 February 2026 March 2026
175.110.121[.]39 February 2026 March 2026
175.110.121[.]41 February 2026 March 2026
175.110.121[.]107 February 2026 February 2026
192.142.54[.]79 May 2026 June 2026
84.200.205[.]165 May 2026 June 2026
185.225.17[.]225 June 2026 July 2026
79.133.46[.]209 July 2026 July 2026
88.80.150[.]199 July 2026 July 2026
88.80.150[.]200 July 2026 July 2026
88.80.150[.]202 July 2026 July 2026
Table 2. Indicators of Compromise 
Indicator Beginning of Actor Association End of Actor Association
185.82.73[.]162 January 2025 March 2026
185.82.73[.]164 January 2025 March 2026
185.82.73[.]165 January 2025 March 2026
185.82.73[.]167 January 2025 March 2026
185.82.73[.]168 January 2025 March 2026
185.82.73[.]170 January 2025 March 2026
185.82.73[.]171 January 2025 March 2026
135.136.1[.]133 March 2026 March 2026

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

See Table 3 to Table 6 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend organizations review historical TTPs for similar Iranian-affiliated cyber actor activity in IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Table 3. Initial Access
Technique Title ID Use
Internet Accessible Device T0883 The actors accessed and interacted with publicly exposed, internet-accessible PLCs that lacked sufficient network and/or hardening security controls.

 

Table 4. Command and Control
Technique Title ID Use
Commonly Used Port T0885 The actors leveraged commonly used OT ports to communicate with PLCs.
Remote Access Tools  T1219 The actors deployed Dropbear SSH software on victim modems to enable them to gain remote access through port 22.
Table 5. Exfiltration (New, July 22, 2026)
Technique Title ID Use
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041 The actors used remote, third-party hosted infrastructure as a C2 channel to transfer device project files out of victim environments.
Table 6. Impact
Technique Title ID Use
Data Manipulation T1565 The actors maliciously interacted with project files, including modifying and deleting project file logic, and altered data displayed on HMI and SCADA displays.

Mitigations

The authoring agencies recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of the threat actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats and TTPs. Visit CISA’s CPGs webpage for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

Network Defenders

The cyber threat actors accessed PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other branded/manufactured PLCs to cause disruptions to victim systems. To safeguard against this threat and threats to other types of PLCs, the authoring agencies urge organizations to consider the following mitigations.

(Updated, July 22, 2026) In addition to contacting the authoring agencies, organizations and integrators operating PLCs from the manufacturers mentioned in this advisory should review the previously issued guidance to strengthen the security of their OT deployments:

  • Rockwell Automation: Contact the Rockwell Automation Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) at PSIRT@rockwellautomation.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents related to Rockwell Automation products.
    • Refer to Rockwell Automation Security Advisory SD1771 for recommended PLC hardening measures and configuration guidance.
  • Schneider Electric: Contact the Schneider Electric Corporate Product Cyber Emergency Response Team (CPCERT) at cpcert@se.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents related to Schneider Electric products.
  • Siemens: Contact Siemens ProductCERT at productcert@siemens.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents and vulnerabilities related to Siemens products.

Immediate steps to prevent the attack:

  • Disconnect the PLC from the public-facing internet [CPG 3.S]. Follow the joint guidance Secure connectivity principles for OT to safely allow remote access. Specifically, “remove inbound port exposure,” so the OT system is never directly exposed to the internet or external networks, and to ensure all access is mediated, monitored, and controlled. Do this through a secure gateway (jump host) that brokers the connection.
    • Ensure cellular modems, used for remote field connectivity and access, are secured with strong authentication and updated.
    • Enable logs for connected modems and regularly review for suspicious activity to detect intrusions and improve incident response speed.
    • (New, July 22, 2026) To mitigate unauthorized access to OT via cellular modems, organizations should consider implementing isolated architectures, such as private Access Point Name (APN), 5G Public Network Integrated Non-Public Network (PNI-NPN), cellular Software-Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN), Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA), or a site-to-site virtual private network (VPN).
  • (New, July 22, 2026) Strictly control network access to PLC devices.
    • Configure firewall rules or access control list (ACL) security features on PLCs or programmable controllers to allow only authorized communications between expected control system devices. Block access from unauthorized or threat actor-controlled IP addresses, such as those associated with hosting providers.
  • For controllers with a physical mode switch, place the physical mode switch into run position to prevent remote modification. Devices should only be in the program or remote position when updating or downloading software online and immediately switched back to the run position when complete. (See Rockwell Automation’s2 System Security Design Guidelines for manufacturer’s instructions.)
    • (New, July 22, 2026) Prior to switching the device to run mode, review and validate project files, as changing modes will lock in the current project file downloaded to the device.
  • For devices that allow software key switching, enable programming protection in PLC configuration software (S7 TIA Portal) to limit who can modify PLCs remotely. (See Siemens’ Cybersecurity for Industry Operational Guidelines for the manufacturer’s instructions.)

Follow-up steps to strengthen security posture:

  • (New, July 22, 2026) Review project files running on PLCs for unauthorized changes. Use vendor-provided integrity checking tools and visually compare the running program to known good logic. Ensure reusable logic and input/output configurations are valid. For Rockwell Automation PLCs listed in the Customer Guidance to Disconnect Devices from the Internet, check the AOIs for any anomalous modifications.
    • If restoring from backups, verify the backup does not contain malicious logic before deployment.
    • Review logs and configurations on all connected devices, including modems, HMIs, and workstations, to assess potential lateral movement by threat actors. If it appears the actors connected to additional devices, reimage these devices to remove any potential malicious changes or access tools.
  • (New, July 22, 2026) Ensure device passwords are changed from their default and are configured to use complex, unique combinations of letters, numbers, and symbols that are not easily guessable. Implementing robust password practices remains a critical security measure that can help prevent unauthorized access and strengthen the overall security posture of OT devices.
  • (New, July 22, 2026) Take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation. Conduct comprehensive impact analysis and risk assessments prior to deploying defensive measures.
  • Create and test strong backups of the logic and configurations of PLCs. Store backup files offline and secure the physical removal media to enable fast recovery.
  • Implement multifactor authentication (MFA) [CPG 3.F] for access to the OT network from an external network.
  • If remote access is required, implement a network proxy, gateway, firewall, and/or VPN in front of the PLC to control network access.
    • A VPN or gateway device can enable MFA for remote access even if the PLC does not support MFA. Implement security rules on these higher-level network security mechanisms to prevent the type of repeated and sustained login attempts seen during a brute force attack. When possible, implement a device control list for workstations sending messages or connecting to OT components.
    • Use the device control list to monitor for logon activity for unexpected or unusual access to devices from the internet.
  • Keep PLC devices updated with the latest software patches issued by the manufacturer. Use established downtime windows to install patches. Known Exploited Vulnerabilities may need to be prioritized outside a downtime window.
  • Configure external and internal firewalls to block traffic using common ports associated with network protocols that are unnecessary for the particular network segment.
  • Disable any unused authentication methods, logic, or features, such as default authentication keys and passwords, as well as unused or needed services such as Teletype Network (Telnet), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Virtual Network Computing (VNC), and web services.
  • Monitor asset management systems for device configuration changes, which can be used to understand expected parameter settings.
  • Monitor the content of network traffic for the following:
    • Unusual logins to internet-connected devices or unexpected protocols to/from the internet. 
    • Functions of industrial control systems management protocols that change an asset’s operating mode or modify programs.
  • (New, July 22, 2026) Ensure service providers are informed of active threats targeting internet-connected PLC devices. Owners and operators should communicate directly with service providers to address risks, especially when remote monitoring or maintenance is involved. Some service providers may rely on internet connectivity essential to monitor and maintain OT/ICS operations but may not be fully aware of active threats.

In addition, the authoring agencies recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques, as well as reduce the impact and risk of compromise by cyber threat actors:

  • Reduce risk exposure. CISA offers a range of services at no cost, including scanning and testing, to help organizations reduce exposure to threats via mitigating attack vectors. CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services can help provide additional review of organizations’ internet-accessible assets. 

Device Manufacturers

Note: The following guidance is general in nature and not specific to any OT vendor. Some of the features, settings, and practices may already be offered by certain vendors. The inclusion of this guidance should not be interpreted as an assertion that vendors referenced do not offer such security features. Also, this advisory is not highlighting a new vulnerability in the identified products, but instead discusses opportunistic targeting. Device manufacturers can make opportunistic attacks more difficult at scale by encouraging more secure behavior by default and in operations, as discussed below. 

Although critical infrastructure organizations using PLC devices can take steps to mitigate the risks, it is ultimately the responsibility of the device manufacturer to build products secured by design and default. The authoring agencies urge device manufacturers to take ownership of their customers’ security outcomes by following the principles in the joint guide Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for OT Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products, primarily:

  • Change the manufacturers’ default settings to prevent exposing administrative interfaces to the internet.
  • Do not charge additional fees for basic security features needed to operate the product securely.
  • Support MFA, including via phishing-resistant methods.

By using secure by design tactics, software manufacturers can make product lines secure “out of the box” without requiring customers to spend additional resources making configuration changes, purchasing tiered security software and logs, monitoring, and making routine updates.

For more information on common misconfigurations and guidance on reducing their prevalence, see joint advisory NSA and CISA Red and Blue Teams Share Top Ten Cybersecurity Misconfigurations. For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage and joint guide.

Validate Security Controls

In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

  1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 3 to Table 6).
  2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
  3. Test your technologies against the technique.
  4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
  5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
  6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

The authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

Resources

Contact Information

U.S. organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA, the FBI, and/or NSA:

  • Contact CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at contact@cisa.dhs.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). File a claim with FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) or contact your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: 
    • Date, time, and location of the incident;
    • Type of activity;
    • Number of people affected;
    • Type of equipment used for the activity; and
    • Name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.
  • For NSA cybersecurity guidance inquiries, contact CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov.
  • Entities required to report incidents to DOE should follow established reporting requirements, as appropriate. For other energy sector inquiries, contact EnergySRMA@hq.doe.gov.
  • Contact the Rockwell Automation PSIRT for questions regarding their guidance or for reporting cyber incidents related to Rockwell Automation products at PSIRT@rockwellautomation.com.
  • Contact the Schneider Electric CPCERT at cpcert@se.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents related to Schneider Electric products.
  • Contact Siemens ProductCERT for up-to-date information about the security of Siemens products or to report cybersecurity vulnerabilities at productcert@siemens.com. For support with increasing the security of installed Siemens PLCs, contact Siemens Industrial Cybersecurity Services at services.automation@siemens.com. See Siemens ProductCERT and Siemens CERT for more information.

Disclaimer

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and the authoring agencies do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA and the authoring agencies.

Version History

April 7, 2026: Initial version.

July 22, 2026: Update includes new guidance on detecting malicious activity, expanded scope of observed targeting, and best practices for secure PLCs deployment.

Notes

1Project file refers to the software file that contains ladder logic and configuration settings. On Rockwell Automation devices, it is referred to as an .ACD file.

2 See CompactLogix 5370 Controllers (Chapter 5: “Select the Operating Mode of the Controller”) for more information on functions available for the switch.

]]> <![CDATA[Defending Against China-Nexus Covert Networks of Compromised Devices]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693378/sicherheitsluecken/defending-against-china-nexus-covert-networks-of-compromised-devices/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693378/sicherheitsluecken/defending-against-china-nexus-covert-networks-of-compromised-devices/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 09:10:14 +0200 🕵️ Sicherheitslücken tsecurity.de

Defending against china-nexus covert networks of compromised devices

executive summary

Defending against China-nexus covert networks of compromised devices 

Explaining the widespread shift in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) towards networks of compromised infrastructure, and how to defend against it 

Summary

With support from the UK Cyber League, this advisory has been jointly released by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK) and international partners: 

  • Australian Signals Directorate’s (ASD’s) Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC)
  • Communications Security Establishment Canada’s (CSE’s) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
  • Germany Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution -   Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV)
  • Germany Federal Intelligence Service – Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)
  • Germany Federal Office for Information Security - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
  • Japan National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) - 国家サイバー統括室
  • Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service - Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)
  • Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service - Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD)
  • New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
  • Spain National Cryptologic Centre – Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN)
  • Sweden National Cyber Security Centre - Nationellt cybersäkerhetscenter (NCSC-SE)
  • United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
  • United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
  • United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
  • United States National Security Agency (NSA) 

Its purpose is to provide network defenders with the tools needed to defend against China-nexus cyber actors and their tactic of using large scale networks of compromised devices (covert networks) to route their cyber activity. 

Introduction  

Over the past few years there has been a major shift in the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by China-nexus cyber actors, moving away from the use of individually procured infrastructure, and towards the use of externally provisioned, large-scale networks of compromised devices. 

The NCSC believes that the majority of China-nexus threat actors are using these networks (hereafter “covert networks”), that multiple covert networks have been created and are being constantly updated, and that a single covert network could be being used by multiple actors. These networks are mainly made up of compromised Small Office Home Office (SOHO) routers, as well as Internet of Things (IoT) and smart devices. 

Anyone who is a target of China-nexus cyber actors may be impacted by the use of covert networks. They have been used by Chinese state-sponsored actors Volt Typhoon to pre-position offensive cyber capabilities on critical national infrastructure. The group Flax Typhoon used a different covert network of compromised infrastructure to conduct cyber espionage. 

The use of covert networks of compromised devices - also known as botnets - to facilitate malicious cyber activity is not new, but China-nexus cyber actors are now using them strategically, and at scale.  

This advisory describes the typical makeup of a covert network and what they are being used for. It also includes protective advice for organizations being targeted by cyber activity using a covert network as an access vector.

Covert Networks 

Covert networks are used to connect across the internet in a low-cost, low-risk, deniable way, disguising the origin and attribution of malicious activity. Actors have been observed using them for each phase of their Cyber Kill Chains, from performing scans as part of reconnaissance, to the delivery of malware, communicating with said malware, and exfiltrating stolen data from a victim. They can also be used for general deniable internet browsing, allowing threat actors to research exploitation techniques, new TTPs, and their victims without attribution. Some covert networks are also used by legitimate customers to browse the internet, making it challenging to attribute malicious activity. 

There is evidence that covert networks used by China-nexus actors are created and maintained by Chinese information security companies. A network known to network defenders as Raptor Train, which in 2024 infected more than 200,000 devices worldwide, was controlled and managed by the Chinese company, Integrity Technology Group. This company was also assessed by the FBI to be responsible for the computer intrusion activities attributed to China-based hackers known as Flax Typhoon. 

Botnet operations represent a significant threat to the UK by exploiting vulnerabilities in everyday internet-connected devices with the potential to carry out large-scale cyber attacks – NCSC Director of Operations, Paul Chichester 

Covert networks mostly consist of compromised SOHO routers, but they also pull in any vulnerable device they can exploit at scale. Raptor Train was made up of thousands of SOHO routers and IoT devices, such as web cameras and video recorders, as well as firewalls and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices. The KV Botnet used by Volt Typhoon was mainly made up of vulnerable Cisco and NetGear routers. The edge devices were vulnerable because they were “end of life” – out of date and no longer receiving updates or security patches by their manufacturers. 

The cyber security industry has been aware of examples of these networks for some time and has publicly reported on the widespread scale of the threat and its implications. Mandiant Intelligence produced a public blog in May 2024 talking about covert networks in which they highlighted a key issue for defenders – indicator of compromise (IOC) Extinction. If a particular threat group could now come from one of many covert networks, each with potentially hundreds of thousands of endpoints, and each used by multiple threat actors, old network defense paradigms of static malicious IP block lists will be less effective. This is compounded by the dynamic nature of these networks where new nodes will be added as old devices are patched or removed from use. 

Typical Network Topology

The number of covert networks used by China-nexus cyber actors is large, with new networks regularly developed and deployed. The existing covert networks change too, either because of defensive or legal action, or simply as a result of software updates and new exploits being used to target different technologies for incorporation into the network. 

Because of this, a description of all known covert networks in detail, including how they are constructed and how they communicate, would immediately be out of date – and for most network defenders would not be practically useful. 

However, most covert networks of compromised devices use the same basic set up. Understanding this generalized structure can aid researchers and defenders by helping them to understand which part of a network they may have found, and how to defend against it. 

A diagram illustrating the basic setup of a covert network.
A diagram illustrating the basic setup of a covert network.

The diagram above illustrates the basic setup of a covert network, where typically an actor will connect to the network via an on-ramp or entry node. Their traffic will be forwarded through multiple compromised devices, used as traversal nodes, before exiting the network from an exit node, usually in the same geographic region as the target. 

Protective Advice 

Defending from attackers using covert networks is not straightforward, and defensive tactics will be different based on the levels of resource and the nature of the target organization. General advice for good cyber security practice should be followed, and some key messages can be found in the appendix of this advisory.  

The following advice is specifically tailored to steps which can be taken to combat the risk of attacks coming from large, dynamic networks of compromised devices. 

Further guidance for all organizations facing cyber security threats is available on the NCSC website. 

This guidance should be considered alongside all applicable laws and regulations of the UK and co-sealing countries relating to the security of networks and data. It will be each organization’s responsibility to ensure compliance with any such laws and regulations. Organizations should note that following the recommended actions set out below will not remove all risks.

All organizations

The NCSC recommends the following steps for all affected organizations to either take themselves, or ask their managed service and/or security providers to investigate for them: 

  • Map and understand network edge devices, developing a clear understanding of organizational assets and what should be connecting to them.
  • Baseline normal connections, especially to corporate virtual private networks (VPNs) or other similar services.
    • Would you expect connections from consumer broadband ranges?
  • Leverage available dynamic threat feeds which include covert network infrastructure.
  • Implement multifactor authentication for remote connections.

Smaller organizations should consider creating and actioning a free NCSC Cyber Action Toolkit. 

Larger or more at-risk organizations

Some more comprehensive measures may be appropriate if the risk to an organization is high enough, to be conducted either in-house or through a security provider:  

  • Apply IP address allow lists rather than deny lists for connections to corporate VPNs for remote workers.
  • Use geographic allow lists or profile incoming connections based on operating system, time zones, and/or organization specific system configuration settings.
  • Implement zero trust policies for connections.
  • Enforce machine certificates for Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connections.
  • Reduce the internet-facing presence of the IT estate.
  • Investigate machine learning techniques to profile normal network edge activity to detect and block anomalies. 

The NCSC's Cyber Essentials can help protect organizations of all sizes. 

Largest or most at-risk organizations 

If Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) tracking is part of an organization’s in-house capability, or if it is part of the service provided by a security vendor, consider tracking China-nexus covert networks as APTs in their own right.

  • Active hunting – look for connections from IP addresses likely to be part of a covert network of compromised devices, for instance those hosting SOHO routers or IoT devices.
  • Track and map covert networks reported by industry or government by looking at banners and certificates.
  • Use threat reporting and threat feeds to create and implement dynamic blocklists and create alert rules to detect incoming threats.
  • Consider using NetFlow feeds to look upstream and map covert networks to find new nodes. 

The NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework provides guidance for organizations under the highest levels of threat, including those operating essential services, in sectors such as energy, healthcare, transport, digital infrastructure and government.  

MITRE ATT&CK® 

This advisory has been compiled with respect to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework, a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. 

Tactic 

ID 

Technique 

Procedure 

Resource Development 

T1584.005 

Compromise Infrastructure: Botnet 

Botnets are used as core components of covert networks 

Resource Development 

T1584.008 

Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices 

Devices are compromised and added to botnets 

Resource Development 

T1583.003 

Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server 

Virtual private servers (VPS) are used in covert networks, typically as on-ramps 

Command and Control 

T1090.003 

Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy 

Used by China-nexus cyber actors to route traffic 

 Appendix: Cyber Security Best Practices 

In addition to the protective advice outlined in this advisory, a number of cyber security best practices will also be useful in defending against the activity described in this advisory. 

Disclaimer  

This report draws on information derived from NCSC and industry sources. Any NCSC findings and recommendations made have not been provided with the intention of avoiding all risks and following the recommendations will not remove all such risk. Ownership of information risks remains with the relevant system owner at all times. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by co-sealers. UK readers should refer to the NCSC website for information about NCSC assured services. 

This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation.  

Refer any FOIA queries to ncscinfoleg@ncsc.gov.uk.  

All material is UK Crown Copyright © 

]]> <![CDATA[Improve Router Hygiene to Protect Against Russian State-Sponsored Targeting]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693346/sicherheitsluecken/improve-router-hygiene-to-protect-against-russian-state-sponsored-targeting/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693346/sicherheitsluecken/improve-router-hygiene-to-protect-against-russian-state-sponsored-targeting/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 08:51:21 +0200 🕵️ Sicherheitslücken tsecurity.de Russian Government-Sponsored Activity Targets Poorly Configured and Vulnerable Devices Across Critical Sectors

Executive summary

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 cyber actors continue to exploit poorly configured and vulnerable networking devices worldwide, opportunistically compromising multiple critical infrastructure sector networks. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) builds on FBI’s Russian Government Cyber Actors Targeting Networking Devices, Critical Infrastructure Public Service Announcement of the decade-plus FSB Center 16 cyber activity by providing additional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to enable defenders to more fully understand and counter the threat. [1] 

This CSA is being released by the following authoring and co-sealing agencies: 

  • United States National Security Agency (NSA)
  • United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
  • United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
  • United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
  • Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
  • Communications Security Establishment Canada’s (CSE’s) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
  • New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
  • United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
  • Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)1 
  • Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS)2 
  • Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS)3 
  • Estonian Information System Authority (RIA)4
  • Finnish Defence Intelligence (FDI)5
  • Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO)6
  • French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI)7
  • Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE)8 
  • Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI)9
  • The Military Counterintelligence Service of Poland (SKW)10 
  • Sweden National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-SE)11 

The authoring and co-sealing agencies strongly urge device owners and network defenders to take mitigation and remediation actions against Russian government-sponsored exploitation of vulnerable routers.

Adversary Techniques and corresponding Mitigation Actions as described in the Technical details and Mitigation actions sections.
Figure 1: FSB Center 16 activity and recommended mitigation actions

Download the PDF version of this report:

Cybersecurity industry tracking 

The cybersecurity industry provides overlapping cyber threat intelligence, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and mitigation recommendations related to this activity. Although not all encompassing, the following list contains the most notable threat group names commonly used within the cybersecurity community related to this activity: 

  • Berserk Bear 
  • Energetic Bear
  • Crouching Yeti 
  • Dragonfly
  • Ghost Blizzard
  • Static Tundra

Note: Cybersecurity companies have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this list may not provide a 1:1 correlation to the authoring agencies’ understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

Targeting details

Critical infrastructure sectors most at risk from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 cyber actors’ targeting include:

  • Communications,
  • Defense Industrial Base,
  • Energy,
  • Financial Services,
  • Government Services and Facilities, especially organizations at the state and local level, and
  • Healthcare and Public Health.

Technical details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise12 framework, version 19. See Appendix A for tables of the activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This advisory also uses MITRE DEFENDTM version 1.4.0.

The Russian FSB Center 16 cyber actors primarily use scanning to identify poorly configured networking devices, primarily routers, for exploitation. The actors scan for Internet IP ranges with active Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agents that accept common or default community strings for authentication [T1595.001, T1595.002]. These scans, run via proxies, consist of SNMP Set-Requests from a spoofed IP address [T1027] containing Object Identifiers (OIDs) that instruct the SNMP agent on poorly configured networking devices to [T1569, T1602.001, T1090]:

  • Copy its configuration to a file, often called “config.bkp” or “output.txt” [T1003, T1602.002].
  • Transfer the file, typically using Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), to an actor-controlled leased virtual private server (VPS) or compromised FTP server [T1583.003, T1090, T1071, T1048].

While SNMP scanning is the primary method the actors use to discover and exploit poorly configured networking devices, they occasionally exploit common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) in Cisco devices, Cisco’s Smart Install (SMI) functionality, and web portals to manage network devices. The actors previously exploited at least the following CVEs [T1584.008, T1588.005, T1190, T1068]: 

Many of these TTPs overlap with activity by other malicious cyber actors, such as Salt Typhoon. Even though this CSA focuses on Russian FSB Center 16 cyber activity, the mitigations below should detect and counter these and similar TTPs used by other actors.

Mitigation actions

The authoring agencies highly recommend network defenders implement the following mitigations to harden networks against this exploitation:

  • Disable Cisco Smart Install on all devices [D3-ACH]. [2]
  • Use SNMPv3 with “authPriv” configured to the most modern encryption standard that is supported by the device instead of SNMPv1 or SNMPv2 [D3-ACH]. [3]
    • Disable SNMPv1 and SNMPv2. These are legacy protocols and should no longer be needed on current devices. If they are necessary, change all community strings from defaults and only allow read-only community strings rather than read-write access.
    • SNMPv3 adds strong authentication and data encryption that are unavailable in SNMPv1 and v2. SNMPv3 replaces clear text shared passwords, known as community strings, with more securely encoded parameters, and authenticates and encrypts data [D3-MAN, D3-MENCR].
  • Use strong, unique passwords for local accounts on network devices and configure credentials to be stored securely to prevent reuse of compromised passwords [D3-CH].
    • Cisco devices protect passwords in the configuration file using different hashing types. Use hashing type 8 for user credentials. Avoid using hashing type 0, 4, and 7 as they are insecure or store passwords in plaintext in the configuration file. [4]
    • Monitor for unusual credentials that do not conform to standard organizational naming conventions [D3-PM]. 
    •  Monitor for and alert on logins using local accounts. Local accounts should only be used in emergency situations when accounts supported by centralized authentication servers are unavailable. Centralized authentication to network devices should support multi-factor authentication where feasible. [3]
  • Monitor and restrict access to SNMP OIDs using a Management Information Base (MIB) allow list [D3-ACH]. [5] Reference the vendor-specific MIB for the network devices and monitor OIDs for indications of reconnaissance or misconfiguration in logs or intrusion detection systems (IDS). IDS rules should be written for inbound SNMP Set-Requests that contain OIDs targeting sensitive device data [D3-PM].
    • Example OIDs include:
      • 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1 (Cisco Config Copy)
      • 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5 (Config Copy Server Address, value for this OID is where the configuration file is being sent to) 
  • Restrict management protocols [D3-NTF].
    • Use Access Control Lists (ACLs) to only allow management protocols, such as SNMP, from management devices, preferably on an out-of-band network. [3]
    • On edge firewalls and devices deny all external communications on the following ports unless mission critical, with strict monitoring if blocking is not feasible:
      • User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port 69 (TFTP) 
      • Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 4786 (SMI)
      • UDP ports 161 and 162 (SNMP)
      • TCP/UDP ports 10161 and 10162 (SNMPv3)
  • Update network device software and firmware images, especially to patch known vulnerabilities, and upgrade end-of-life devices to supported ones. 
    • Use an attack surface management service to identify and secure Internet-facing systems with weak configurations and known vulnerabilities [D3-NVA].
      • U.S.-based federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and U.S. critical infrastructure organiztions should consider signing up for CISA’s no-cost Cyber Hygiene services.
      • U.S. Defense Industrial Base organizations should consider signing up for NSA’s DIB Cybersecurity Services.

Resources

United States:

Canada:

Works cited

[1] FBI. Russian Government Cyber Actors Targeting Networking Devices, Critical Infrastructure. Alert Number: I-082025-PSA. 2025. https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2025/PSA250820

[2] NSA. Cisco Smart Install Protocol Misuse. 2017. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/16/2002157833/-1/-1/0/CSA-CISCO-SMART-INSTALL-PROTOCOL-MISUSE.PDF

[3] NSA. Network Infrastructure Security Guide. 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/15/2003018261/-1/-1/0/CTR_NSA_NETWORK_INFRASTRUCTURE_SECURITY_GUIDE_20220615.PDF

[4] NSA. Cybersecurity Information Sheet Cisco Password Types: Best Practices. 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/17/2002940795/-1/-1/0/CSI_CISCO_PASSWORD_TYPES_BEST_PRACTICES_20220217.PDF

[5] NSA. Cybersecurity Information Sheet: Reducing the Risk of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Abuse. 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jul/09/2003959459/-1/-1/0/CSI_REDUCING_RISK_OF_SNMP_ABUSE.PDF

Footnotes

1  Národní úřad pro kybernetickou a informační bezpečnost

2  Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste

3 Välisluureamet

4 Riigi Infosüsteem Amet

5 Sotilastiedustelu

6 Suojelupoliisi

7 Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information

8 Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Esterna

9 Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna

10 Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego

11 Nationellt Cybersäkerhetscenter

12 MITRE and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE DEFEND is a trademark of the MITRE Corporation.

13 CVE-2008-4128 only affects end-of-life Cisco devices.

Disclaimer of Endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring agencies’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

Contact

United States organizations

  • National Security Agency (NSA)
  • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    •  U.S. organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System, its 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870), or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment user for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. 
  • United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)  
    • Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DC3.DCISE@us.af.mil 
    • Defense Industrial Base mandatory cyber incident reporting as required by 10 U.S. Code Sections 391 and 393 and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.204-7012 is submitted at https://dibnet.dod.mil.
    •  Media Inquiries / Press Desk: DC3.Information@us.af.mil

Australian organizations

  • Australian Signals Directorate
    • Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.

Canadian organizations

  • The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), part of the Communications Security Establishment, encourages Canadian organizations to report cyber incidents and to strengthen the security of their networking devices. 

New Zealand organizations

United Kingdom organizations

Estonia organizations

Finnish organizations

French organizations

  • French organizations are encouraged to report suspicious activity or incident related information found in this advisory by contacting ANSSI/CERT-FR at: cert-fr@ssi.gouv.fr or by phone at: 3218 or +33 9 70 83 32 18.

Italian Organizations

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques

See Table 1 through Table 10 for all the threat actor tactics and techniques referenced in this advisory.

Table 1: Reconnaissance

Technique Title

ID

Use
Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks T1595.001 Scan range of IP addresses
Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning T1595.002 Scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting
Table 2: Resource Development

Technique Title

ID

Use
Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Servers  T1583.003  Leverage VPS as infrastructure 
Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices  T1584.008  Compromise intermediate routers 
Obtain Capabilities: Exploits  T1588.005  Use publicly available code to exploit vulnerable devices 
Table 3: Initial Access

Technique Title

ID

Use
Exploit Public-Facing Application  T1190  Exploit publicly known CVEs 
Proxy T1090 Use a connection proxy to direct network traffic 
Table 4: Execution

Technique Title

ID

Use
System Services T1569 Executing commands via SNMP
Table 5: Privilege Escalation

Technique Title

ID

Use
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068 Exploit publicly known CVEs for escalated privileges
Table 6: Stealth

Technique Title

ID

Use
Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 Obfuscate source IP addresses in system logs, as actions may be recorded as originating from local IP addresses
Table 7: Credential Access

Technique Title

ID

Use
OS Credential Dumping T1003 Collect router configuration with weak Cisco Type 7 passwords and Type 0
Table 8: Collection

Technique Title

ID

Use
Data from Configuration Repository: SNMP (MIB Dump)  T1602.001  Target MIB to collect network information via SNMP 
Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump T1602.002 Acquire credentials by collecting network device configurations
Table 9: Command and Control

Technique Title

ID

Use
Proxy  T1090  Use VPS for C2 
Application Layer Protocol  T1071  Open and expose a variety of different services, including TFTP and FTP
Table 10: Exfiltration

Technique Title

ID

Use
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol T1048 Exfiltrating over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. 

Appendix B: MITRE D3FEND countermeasures

See Table 11 for a mapping of several of the cybersecurity countermeasures mentioned in this advisory.

Table 11: MITRE D3FEND Countermeasures

Countermeasure Title

ID

Description
Application Configuration Hardening D3-ACH
  • Use SNMPv3 and disable SNMPv1 and SNMPv2. 
  • Use SNMP allowlisting to restrict access to OIDs and MIBs. 
  • Disable Cisco Smart Install.
Message Authentication D3-MAN
  • Use SNMPv3 with strong authentication.
Message Encryption D3-MENCR
  • Use SNMPv3 to encrypt payloads.
Credential Hardening D3-CH
  • Use strong, unique passwords and store them securely.
Platform Monitoring D3-PM
  • Monitor for unusual credentials. 
  • Monitor SNMP Set-Requests for OIDs targeting sensitive device data.
Network Traffic Filtering D3-NTF
  • Use ACLs to only allow management protocols from management devices. 
  • Block TFTP, SMI, and SNMP at edge firewalls.
Network Vulnerability Assessment D3-NVA
  • Use an attack surface management service.
]]> <![CDATA[The Rust Programming Language Blog: Announcing Rust 1.96.0]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693296/tools/the-rust-programming-language-blog-announcing-rust-1960/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693296/tools/the-rust-programming-language-blog-announcing-rust-1960/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 08:37:36 +0200 💾 Tools tsecurity.de The Rust team is happy to announce a new version of Rust, 1.96.0. Rust is a programming language empowering everyone to build reliable and efficient software.

If you have a previous version of Rust installed via rustup, you can get 1.96.0 with:

$ rustup update stable

If you don't have it already, you can get rustup from the appropriate page on our website, and check out the detailed release notes for 1.96.0.

If you'd like to help us out by testing future releases, you might consider updating locally to use the beta channel (rustup default beta) or the nightly channel (rustup default nightly). Please report any bugs you might come across!

What's in 1.96.0 stable

New Range* types

Many users expect Range and related core::ops types to be Copy, but this is not the case: they implement Iterator directly, and it is a footgun to implement both Iterator and Copy on the same type so this has been avoided. RFC3550 proposed a set of replacement range types that implement IntoIterator rather than Iterator, meaning they can also be Copy. The standard library portion of that RFC is now stable, introducing:

  • core::range::Range
  • core::range::RangeFrom
  • core::range::RangeInclusive
  • Associated iterators

A Rust version in the near future will also add core::range::RangeFull and core::range::RangeTo as re-exports from core::ops (these do not implement Iterator and already implement Copy), and core::range::legacy::* as the new home for the current ranges. Range syntax like 0..1 still produces the legacy types for now, but will be updated to core::range types in a future edition.

With these stabilizations, it is now possible to store slice accessors in Copy types without splitting start and end:

use core::range::Range;

#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Span(Range<usize>);

impl Span {
    pub fn of(self, s: &str) -> &str {
        &s[self.0]
    }
}

The new RangeInclusive also makes its fields public, unlike the legacy version which avoided exposing the exhausted iterator state. This isn't a concern with the new type since it must be converted to begin iteration.

Library authors should consider making use of impl RangeBounds in public API, which accepts both legacy and new range types. If a concrete type is needed, prefer using new ranges as this will eventually become the default.

Assert matching patterns

The new macros assert_matches! and debug_assert_matches! check that a value matches a given pattern, panicking with a Debug representation of the value otherwise. These are essentially the same as assert!(matches!(..)) and debug_assert!(matches!(..)), but the printed value improves the possibility of diagnosing the failure.

These new macros have not been added to the standard prelude, because they would collide with popular third-party crates that provide macros with the same name. Instead, they should be manually imported from core or std before use.

use core::assert_matches;

/// [Random Number](https://xkcd.com/221/)
fn get_random_number() -> u32 {
    // chosen by a fair dice roll.
    // guaranteed to be random.
    4
}

fn main() {
    assert_matches!(get_random_number(), 1..=6);
}

Changes to WebAssembly targets

WebAssembly targets no longer pass --allow-undefined to the linker which means that undefined symbols when linking are now a linker error instead of being converted to WebAssembly imports from the "env" module. This change prevents modules from linking unless all linking-related symbols are defined to catch bugs earlier and prevent accidental issues with symbol naming or similar.

Undefined linking-related symbols are often indicative of build-time related bugs or misconfiguration. If, however, the old behavior is intended then it can be re-enabled with RUSTFLAGS=-Clink-arg=--allow-undefined or by editing the source code and using #[link(wasm_import_module = "env")] on the block defining the symbol.

This change was previously announced on this blog, and now takes effect in Rust 1.96.

Stabilized APIs

Two Cargo advisories

Rust 1.96 contains fixes for two vulnerabilities for users of third-party registries.

  • CVE-2026-5223 is a medium severity vulnerability regarding extraction of crate tarballs with symlinks.

  • CVE-2026-5222 is a low severity vulnerability regarding authentication with normalized URLs.

Users of crates.io are not affected by either vulnerability.

Other changes

Check out everything that changed in Rust, Cargo, and Clippy.

Contributors to 1.96.0

Many people came together to create Rust 1.96.0. We couldn't have done it without all of you. Thanks!

]]> <![CDATA[Mozilla Security Blog: Improving Transparency and Assurance in the Web PKI: Mozilla Root Store Policy v3.1]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693288/tools/mozilla-security-blog-improving-transparency-and-assurance-in-the-web-pki-mozilla-root-store-policy-v31/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693288/tools/mozilla-security-blog-improving-transparency-and-assurance-in-the-web-pki-mozilla-root-store-policy-v31/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 08:37:23 +0200 💾 Tools tsecurity.de Mozilla remains committed to maintaining a secure, trustworthy, and transparent Web PKI. Today we are announcing the publication of Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP) version 3.1, effective July 1, 2026.

While previous policy updates focused heavily on certificate revocation, automation, and operational resilience, MRSP v3.1 focuses on a different challenge: ensuring that Certification Authority (CA) operations are sufficiently transparent, understandable, and auditable.

Trust in the Web PKI depends not only on technical requirements, but also on the ability of Mozilla, auditors, and the broader community to understand how CA systems are designed, operated, and assessed. MRSP v3.1 introduces new requirements intended to improve the quality of CA documentation and strengthen independent assurance of the design and effectiveness of controls that protect CA systems.

Improving CP/CPS Documentation

Certification Practice Statements (CPSes) and combined Certificate Policy / Certification Practice Statement documents (CP/CPSes) are among the most important public documents published by a CA. They describe how a CA conducts its operations and meets industry requirements.

Over the years, we have seen significant variation in the quality, structure, and level of detail provided in CP/CPS documentation. Some documents provide extensive implementation detail, while others rely heavily on incorporation by reference or provide only high-level descriptions of CA practices.

The revised policy will continue to require conformance with RFC 3647, as modified by applicable CA/Browser Forum requirements. Improvements to section 3.3 in the MRSP will establish clearer expectations regarding the content and quality of CP/CPS documentation. The new requirements emphasize that documentation must be explicit, bounded, auditable, and sufficiently detailed to describe the CA operator’s certificate issuance and management activities, while also establishing requirements for version control, accessibility, and ongoing maintenance. The objective is to ensure that a technically competent reviewer will be better-able to determine what commitments the CA has made, how those commitments are implemented, and whether the documented practices support technical, operational, and performance oversight.

Mozilla believes that these new CP/CPS requirements will improve transparency, reduce misunderstandings, support more effective audits, and help reduce the risk of certificate misissuance by ensuring that operational practices are documented accurately, consistently, and in sufficient detail to permit meaningful review.

Introducing Detailed Controls Reports

A second major enhancement in MRSP v3.1 is the introduction of Detailed Controls Reports (DCRs). Traditional WebTrust and ETSI audit reports provide valuable independent assurance regarding compliance with established criteria. However, they generally provide only limited visibility into the specific controls, testing procedures, and operational environments that support those conclusions.

Beginning with audit periods starting on or after July 1, 2027, CA operators with root certificates enabled for TLS website authentication will be required to obtain a DCR. The purpose of the DCR is to provide CA management, auditors, and Mozilla with greater visibility into the controls, testing, and operating effectiveness of CA systems that support compliance with the CA/Browser Forum’s TLS Baseline Requirements and Network and Certificate System Security Requirements. Mozilla generally expects to review DCRs only on an as-needed basis, such as during compliance reviews, incident investigations, root inclusion evaluations, or other oversight activities.

A DCR must include:

  • The scope and boundaries of the audited CA systems;
  • Applicable audit criteria;
  • Controls implemented by the CA;
  • The auditor’s testing procedures;
  • Results of control testing; and
  • Information regarding control exceptions or deficiencies.

Mozilla expects that DCRs will complement existing audit reports and strengthen transparency and assurance by providing additional detail regarding system boundaries, control implementation, testing procedures, and control effectiveness that is not typically available in traditional audit reports. Effective compliance requires more than documented policies and successful audits; it also requires management understanding, oversight, and engagement. By providing greater visibility into CA systems, controls, testing activities, and operational risks, DCRs can help reinforce a strong tone at the top regarding compliance expectations, support informed decision-making and resource allocation, enable earlier identification of weaknesses, and promote a culture of continuous improvement. The intent is not to replace existing audit reports, but to provide additional information that supports effective governance, oversight, and informed trust decisions.

Additional Clarifications and Improvements

MRSP v3.1 also includes several targeted clarifications and refinements:

  • aligns Mozilla’s mass revocation planning requirements with the corresponding CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, helping ensure consistency across compliance frameworks;
  • clarifies audit expectations for root inclusion requests, including requirements relating to audit continuity and root key generation ceremonies;
  • requires root CA key pairs submitted for inclusion to have been generated within the previous five years, helping ensure that newly included roots are based on contemporary cryptographic practices and controls; and
  • clarifies expectations when ownership or operational control of a CA changes, helping ensure that Mozilla receives timely notice and can evaluate the impact of acquisitions or organizational changes on continued compliance.

Looking Forward

Mozilla recognizes that these changes will require preparation by CA operators, auditors, and other ecosystem participants. To support implementation, Mozilla is publishing accompanying wiki guidance regarding both CP/CPS Documentation and Detailed Controls Reports.

As with previous policy updates, these changes were informed by discussions with CA operators, auditors, and members of the Web PKI community. We appreciate the feedback received during the review process and look forward to continued collaboration as the ecosystem evolves.

Mozilla has a longstanding focus on building confidence in the Web PKI through transparency, accountability, and continuous improvement. By requiring higher-quality CP/CPS documentation and strengthening independent assurance, MRSP v3.1 advances Mozilla’s commitment to protecting its users and maintaining their trust in the systems that help secure the web.

The post Improving Transparency and Assurance in the Web PKI: Mozilla Root Store Policy v3.1 appeared first on Mozilla Security Blog.

]]> <![CDATA[The Rust Programming Language Blog: crates.io: development update]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693285/tools/the-rust-programming-language-blog-cratesio-development-update/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693285/tools/the-rust-programming-language-blog-cratesio-development-update/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 08:37:18 +0200 💾 Tools tsecurity.de Another six months have passed since our last development update, and the crates.io team has been busy. Here's a summary of the most notable changes and improvements made to crates.io since then.

Source Code Viewer

Crate pages now have a "Code" tab that lets you browse the contents of published crate versions directly on crates.io. This shows you the exact files that cargo downloads when you add a crate as a dependency, which might differ from the linked repository. This makes it much easier to audit your dependencies, including files that never appear in the repository, like the normalized Cargo.toml files that cargo generates.

Source code viewer showing the "Code" tab of the serde crate

The viewer comes with a file tree sidebar with search functionality, syntax highlighting, and GitHub-style line selection, where clicking or dragging line numbers produces shareable #L10-L20 URLs.

Under the hood, the server now builds a zip file for every published version. Since the .crate files that cargo consumes are gzipped tarballs without random access support, a background job re-packs each of them into a seekable zip archive plus a JSON manifest describing the contained files. Both are served from our static CDN. The frontend then fetches only the manifest and loads each file on demand with an HTTP range request. Because of this architecture, browsing crate sources essentially adds no load on the crates.io API servers. Existing crate versions have been backfilled, so this works for old releases too.

The rendering library behind the code viewer is a diff renderer at heart, and that's no accident: a version-to-version diff viewer built on the same infrastructure is currently in the works. This will allow you to review exactly what changed between two published versions, right on crates.io. Stay tuned!

Untangling crates.io Accounts from GitHub

At the end of May, the crates.io team accepted RFC #3946. Crates.io accounts always have been tightly coupled to GitHub: signing in means "Log in with GitHub", and your crates.io identity is your GitHub username. The RFC changes that. It introduces usernames that are native to crates.io and independent of linked GitHub accounts, as a prerequisite for eventually supporting login via other identity providers.

The implementation of crates.io usernames has started, but there is still a lot left to do, most visibly the ability to change your crates.io username. After that is complete, there will be future RFCs and implementation for signing in with identity providers other than GitHub. Since all of this touches authentication and account security, we are deliberately taking it slow and rolling these changes out in small, carefully reviewed steps.

Advisories and Suggestions

In our January update we introduced the "Security" tab, which shows security advisories from the RustSec database. We have since taken this integration one step further: crates that RustSec has flagged as unmaintained now show a warning banner directly on their crate pages, linking to the corresponding advisory for details and possible alternatives. Thanks to Dirkjan Ochtman for implementing this feature!

Unmaintained warning banner on the ansi_term crate page

Related to this, some popular crates have been largely absorbed into the Rust standard library over the years, like lazy_static, which has been superseded by std::sync::LazyLock since Rust 1.80. Crate pages of such crates now show a friendly "You might not need this dependency" banner describing the standard library replacement, and superseded crates in dependency lists get a small light bulb icon with a similar hint.

"You might not need this dependency" banner on the lazy_static crate page

The dataset behind this feature lives in the new rust-lang/std-replacement-data repository, together with a documented inclusion policy: standard library replacements only, every entry must cite the stable std, core, or alloc API and Rust version, and crate maintainers get a notice-and-comment window before an entry is added. New entries can be proposed upstream and can benefit other tools too.

Ferris

The most delightful change of this cycle: the Ferris on our error pages now follows your mouse cursor with its eyes:

Ferris' eyes following the mouse cursor on the error page

Getting a 404 error on crates.io is now slightly less sad.

Svelte Frontend Migration Completed

In our January update, we announced that we were experimenting with porting the crates.io frontend from Ember.js to Svelte. This experiment has concluded successfully: the new frontend reached feature parity, went through a public testing phase in April, became the default at the beginning of May, and the Ember.js app has been removed from our repository.

We designed this change to be invisible for our users, since the new frontend is a 1:1 port of the previous design and functionality. For the team and our contributors, however, it is a big deal: the frontend is now built on a more modern framework, which should make it easier for new contributors to get started. It also allows us to iterate faster, as the source code viewer above demonstrates.

We want to thank the Ember.js team for a framework that served crates.io well for many years, and the Svelte team for making the transition so enjoyable.

Miscellaneous

These were some of the more visible changes to crates.io over the past six months, but a lot has happened "under the hood" as well:

  • Search performance: Relevance-sorted search queries previously ranked every crate matching the query, which could take 1-2 seconds for short or common search terms. Ranking is now bounded to the 1,000 matching crates with the highest recent download counts.

  • Reverse dependencies performance: The reverse dependencies endpoint no longer recomputes the full dependent set on every request. It is now served from a precomputed table kept in sync by database triggers, turning an expensive join into a bounded index scan and greatly reducing the chance of getting a timeout error.

  • New ARCHITECTURE.md: If you've ever wondered how crates.io actually works, our ARCHITECTURE.md document got a complete rewrite. It is now organized around the high-level systems that make up crates.io and how they fit together, and includes walkthroughs of what happens when you run cargo publish, why a typical crate download never touches our API servers, and how download counts are derived from CDN access logs.

  • Definition lists: READMEs now render Markdown definition lists, a widely used Markdown extension. Our markdown renderer comrak already supported them, the extension just wasn't enabled yet. Thanks to @mistaste for this contribution!

  • CDN cache tags: Files uploaded to our static CDN now carry cache-tag metadata, allowing us to invalidate all cached files of a crate or a specific release in a single operation, instead of issuing one invalidation per file URL.

  • Caching improvements: We removed a global Vary: Cookie response header that was preventing our CDNs from caching public API responses and frontend assets effectively. Per-user responses now use Cache-Control: no-store instead, resulting in better cache hit rates at the CDN edge.

  • Accessibility: We have made crates.io friendlier to screen readers: decorative icons are now hidden from the accessibility tree, heading hierarchies have been fixed, and lists are marked up as proper lists. ARIA snapshot tests now ensure that regressions can't slip in unnoticed. We plan to continue to improve crates.io accessibility over the coming months.

  • Git index performance: The background worker's local clone of the git index is now a bare and shallow repository, eliminating roughly 250,000 checked-out files and the full commit history from its disk, improving its performance as we see increased rates of crate publication. The periodic index squashing now goes through the GitHub API instead of generating large git packs locally, which had previously caused out-of-memory failures on the production worker.

Feedback

We hope you enjoyed this update on the development of crates.io. If you have any feedback or questions, please let us know on Zulip or GitHub. We are always happy to hear from you and are looking forward to your feedback!

]]> <![CDATA[CIOs beware: DNS KSK rollover could kick off wave of mysterious outages]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693085/it-nachrichten/cios-beware-dns-ksk-rollover-could-kick-off-wave-of-mysterious-outages/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693085/it-nachrichten/cios-beware-dns-ksk-rollover-could-kick-off-wave-of-mysterious-outages/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 06:16:22 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Predicting an outage is tricky business, but CIOs might want to circle Oct. 11, 2026, through Jan. 11, 2027, for likely trouble of a potentially widespread and puzzling nature.

That’s because a relatively trivial update to DNSSEC on Oct. 11, one that will take full effect by Jan. 11, is likely to deliver a series of seemingly unrelated system outages. This will come from oceans of dependencies from third-party, shadow, agentic, gen AI, SaaS, homegrown, and legacy apps — among many other quiet executable hiding spots, including virtual environments and containers.

Sai Joshitha Kathari, senior site reliability engineer at payment card giant Visa, says most enterprises have far more DNS-related exposure than they realize because of these many dependencies.

“This has the potential to create real downstream destruction when unresolved failures sit underneath important business functions,” Kathari says. 

The danger is that so many of these issues are either unknown to IT or handled by a third-party vendor and no one in IT has had reason to ask those vendors about DNS updates. 

“The risky areas are usually not the obvious managed DNS services. They are the older internal applications, hardcoded resolvers, containerized workloads, sidecar configurations, custom scripts, partner integrations, VM images, stale base images, and service-to-service dependencies that nobody has touched in a long time,” Kathari explains. “These systems can keep working quietly for years, then fail during a DNS or certificate-related change because they bypassed the normal platform standards.”

Independent technology analyst Carmi Levy says that CIOs need to take this event very seriously. 

“The two-pronged deadline — October 11, 2026, when the new Key Signing Key (KSK) begins signing the root zone, and January 11, 2027, when the old key is retired — should be marked in red on everyone’s calendar, just as December 31, 1999, once was,” Levy says. “Failure to comply could result in websites, critical business applications, and related resources dropping off the face of the Earth once the transition is complete.”

Levy adds: “Custom-built code that lives outside conventional support mechanisms may or may not function when the DNS changes go into effect.”

The DNSSEC update itself is straightforward, but it is also the first significant DNSSEC change — specifically a change in the trust anchor — since 2018. 

The rollout statement noted that “the trust anchor is formally known as the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) root zone Key Signing Key (KSK). The KSK is the cryptographic key at the core of the DNSSEC trust anchor and is used to verify that DNS responses are legitimate and have not been modified in transit.”

Expect nearly every enterprise to be impacted

Kim Davies, vice president of IANA Services and president of public technical identifiers at ICANN, says the extent of the impact on enterprises is unknowable, given the nature of shadow IT and other edge cases. 

But based on the massive number of dependencies both known and unknown in the typical global enterprise, Davies guesses that just about every enterprise will be impacted, to varying degrees. 

“In highly complex organizations, it is very likely there will be some impact in the corners, in the margins, of the organization,” Davies tells CIO. “DNS is such a core technology that underpins everything.”

As the updates propagate, hiccups will materialize, Davies notes. “When the system cannot validate the [DNS] information, it will treat it as suspect and DNS lookups will fail.”

Visa’s Kathari says, “Enterprises should expect some secondary DNS-related glitches when major DNSSEC-related changes happen, not necessarily because the core infrastructure teams will ignore the update, but because large environments have many hidden dependency paths.”

Making this problem far worse, Kathari notes, is that the glitches will likely initially look like anything other thana DNS glitch. That will force IT staff to waste a vast number of hours chasing causes that ultimately prove to be unrelated to the incidents. 

“The impact for CIOs is that DNS failures rarely announce themselves as DNS failures. They look like application timeouts, broken logins, failed API calls, queue lag, payment failures, partner connectivity issues, or random regional instability,” Kathari explains. “That makes troubleshooting slower because teams may spend hours looking at the application, database, network, or cloud provider before realizing name resolution is part of the failure path.”

Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research, agrees that IT will likely spin its wheels chasing the wrong ghosts.

“A validation failure rarely stays in its lane. It surfaces as an application error, an API timeout, or a reachability problem, which turns a resolver fault into a coordination failure,” Gogia says. “The application team blames the network, the network team blames the cloud, and the user simply watches work stop.”

“Images and templates are the frontier most teams miss,” Gogia adds. “A resolver fixed in summer can be broken again in October the instant a stale golden image is redeployed, because automation no longer lets configuration drift slowly. It restores yesterday’s assumptions at machine speed.”

It is widely expected that enterprises will not have any problems executing the change or, more likely, relying on their hyperscalers to properly handle the change. That is the concern. 

“CIOs are being distracted so much with AI and this is such a deep in the weeds infrastructure issue that this can and willcatch people off-guard,” Justin Greis, CEO of consulting firm Acceligence, tells CIO. “I think we’ll see a meaningful number of enterprise disruptions associated with the DNSSEC trust anchor rollover. Not because the update itself is especially difficult, but because it will expose weaknesses that already exist inside many organizations.”

Most enterprise IT operations have had no reason to compile a comprehensive list of all DNS dependencies, but many will be instantly discovered in January. 

Potentially widespread fallout

A major retailer, for example, might suddenly be unable to connect with FedEx to arrange for deliveries or a hospital may find that test results are no longer being shared with patient portals. It might manifest as an assembly line that halts because an IIoT component can no longer share files with its vendor system or a truck fleet that stops being tracked. 

“There will almost certainly be systems that fall through the cracks. Some will be legacy applications that rely on outdated DNS configurations that have not been updated in years,” Greis says. “Others will be business-unit-developed tools, contractor-built solutions, embedded systems, manufacturing and industrial systems, or highly customized workloads that operate outside normal IT oversight. These are the types of systems that often surface during infrastructure events like this.”

Greis adds that many enterprises will discover in January problems created by their own automation.

“Over time, enterprises build layers of processes, templates, and deployment mechanisms that are reused across teams and environments,” Greis notes. “Even after DNS infrastructure is updated correctly, older settings can inadvertently be reintroduced through routine updates and system changes, creating intermittent and difficult-to-diagnose failures.”

The good news from this situation is that enterprises are not going to likely lose all DNS access if any of these glitches occur. But that may be of no comfort because even if the disruptions are only with small edge cases, that can still cause massive operational disruptions.

Cricket Liu, EVP and chief evangelist at Infoblox, gives the example of a DNS server that responds to factory-floor system queries.

“Or let’s say this disrupts [an enterprise’s key] SaaS application. All name resolution may stop and it will show a server failure. It will not deliver a response whenever I look anything up. That’s not subtle at all,” Liu says. “It’s highly likely that companies are going to see some effects.”

Back in 2017, the switchover was relatively uneventful, giving some CIOs hope that January 2027 will also be a non-event. But given the technology advancements in the last 10 years and the resulting tidal wave of new enterprise tech dependencies, few are realistically expecting no problems this go around. 

Impossible to predict what will happen

One of the top network experts on DNS effects in enterprises is Geoff Huston, chief scientist at the Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC), the regional Internet Registry administering IP addresses for the Asia Pacific region.

Huston says it is difficult to project what will happen in January until it happens.

“Just like the last time, we are flying blind with this key roll. Because nothing really terrible happened last time, there is some confidence that nothing terrible will happen this time, but we just can’t tell in advance as there are no good measurement approaches that allow us to peek inside the trust state of recursive resolvers,” he says.

As for potential edge-case glitches, Huston says it is possible, but if third-party vendors do not properly handle the update, there will be other issues as well, as the KSK cryptographic key used within DNSSEC signs and validates the keys that protect DNS records. 

“If it is not standards-compliant, then you have more problems than just the KSK roll,” Huston says, “as it raises the obvious question of ‘What else is not correctly implemented in the DNS resolver that I’m running?’”

As a silver lining, Acceligence’s Greis says any hiccups that result from the DNS KSK update may be a gift in disguise for CIOs. 

“The irony is that some of the most business-critical components in the technology stack are often the least visible because they work in the background,” Greis says. January “may reveal how much modern business resilience depends on infrastructure that many organizations rarely examine until something breaks. For CIOs, that’s the real lesson. This is not fundamentally a story about a DNS update. It is a story about operational visibility, resilience, and governance. Organizations that treat the rollover as a routine infrastructure task will likely complete the update and move on. Organizations that use it as an opportunity to understand and strengthen the foundations of their technology environment may gain far more value than simply avoiding an outage.”

]]> <![CDATA[Atos launches sovereign cloud service to power comeback]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693082/it-nachrichten/atos-launches-sovereign-cloud-service-to-power-comeback/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693082/it-nachrichten/atos-launches-sovereign-cloud-service-to-power-comeback/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 06:13:49 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Atos has launched a new sovereign cloud platform aimed squarely at European public sector bodies, healthcare providers and defense organizations. It’s the latest effort by European companies in their fight back against US dominance.

Atos Sovereign Cloud offers a range of controls for data management, providing customers with resilience and full control over their data, complying with existing European legislation on data residency.

“Digital sovereignty has become a global operational priority for organizations that need to manage dependencies, jurisdictional exposure and disruption risks across complex digital environments. Atos Sovereign Cloud gives customers a practical way to apply sovereign controls to their most critical workloads, while preserving flexibility, resilience and the ability to innovate securely,” said Michael Kollar, Atos Group digital sovereignty leader.

There has been a concerted effort by European organizations to meet US competition head-on. Earlier this month, four companies signed up to the certification program introduced by the European cloud body, CISPE,

This is the latest effort by Atos to get the company back on track. In April, it sold its supercomputer company, Bull to the French government, after a previous attempt in 2024 to sell off its computer services division and after a refinancing deal in the same year.

The company implemented a further round of refinancing this year and in its half-yearly report claimed that this was an “important milestone” in securing the company’s future. However, in its first-quarter results revenue showed an organic decline of 11 percent, so any projected growth may be some time in the future. Whether its Sovereign Cloud offering is the harbinger of the revival remains to be seen.

]]> <![CDATA[Should you use AI for a task? Here’s a simple way to decide | Bruce Schneier]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3693080/it-nachrichten/should-you-use-ai-for-a-task-heres-a-simple-way-to-decide-bruce-schneier/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3693080/it-nachrichten/should-you-use-ai-for-a-task-heres-a-simple-way-to-decide-bruce-schneier/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 06:11:43 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de Sometimes, what matters isn’t your output but what you put into the process. Think of it like work v the gym

I teach public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Munk School at the University of Toronto. And it will come as no surprise to you that my students regularly use AI to complete their writing assignments. Doing so is a waste of their tuition money. But if their entire career is going to include AI writing assistants, why shouldn’t they embrace their future?

The best way I’ve found to explain the dilemma comes from the AI researcher Daniel Meissler: it’s the difference between work and the gym.

Continue reading...]]> <![CDATA[Reverse-engineered CME's undocumented USB-MIDI config protocol (U6MIDI Pro / U2MIDI Pro) off the wire — full byte map + a public-domain codec]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692868/reverse-engineering/reverse-engineered-cmes-undocumented-usb-midi-config-protocol-u6midi-pro-u2midi-pro-off-the-wire-full-byte-map-a-public-domain-codec/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692868/reverse-engineering/reverse-engineered-cmes-undocumented-usb-midi-config-protocol-u6midi-pro-u2midi-pro-off-the-wire-full-byte-map-a-public-domain-codec/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 04:08:18 +0200 🕵️ Reverse Engineering tsecurity.de /u/wmellema
[link] [comments]]]> <![CDATA[Instagram Is Now Banning Pickup Artists, Pranksters Who Use Meta Glasses]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692818/it-security-nachrichten/instagram-is-now-banning-pickup-artists-pranksters-who-use-meta-glasses/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692818/it-security-nachrichten/instagram-is-now-banning-pickup-artists-pranksters-who-use-meta-glasses/ Sat, 25 Jul 2026 03:07:36 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

]]> <![CDATA[javascript: v1.0.0]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692469/it-security-tools/javascript-v100/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692469/it-security-tools/javascript-v100/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 22:21:54 +0200 💾 IT Security Tools tsecurity.de 1.0.0 (2026-07-24)

Stable release. The package surface has been stable for a long time; 1.0.0 makes that explicit.

⚠ BREAKING CHANGES

  • voice: silenceTailBytes removed from ElevenLabsAgentAdapterOptions — no longer needed after the ElevenLabs SDK migration; remove from any adapter config.
  • voice: ELEVENLABS_CONVAI_URL_TEMPLATE constant removed from public exports — construct the URL directly or read it from the SDK.
  • voice: .url getter removed from public exports.

Features

  • graduate to 1.0.0 (6379130)
  • 1.0 release prep, stable classifiers and unstuck langwatch pins (#842) (616c506)

Code Refactoring

]]> <![CDATA[Meta just created a moderation nightmare for its smart glasses]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692397/it-nachrichten/meta-just-created-a-moderation-nightmare-for-its-smart-glasses/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692397/it-nachrichten/meta-just-created-a-moderation-nightmare-for-its-smart-glasses/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 21:33:57 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Why Autonomous Systems Need Their Own Cybersecurity Framework]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692265/it-security-nachrichten/why-autonomous-systems-need-their-own-cybersecurity-framework/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692265/it-security-nachrichten/why-autonomous-systems-need-their-own-cybersecurity-framework/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 20:18:28 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Autonomous systems are moving from pilots and prototypes into mission-critical operations. Drones inspect infrastructure. Robots support industrial workflows. Uncrewed platforms are becoming part of defense, public safety, logistics, energy, and...

The post Why Autonomous Systems Need Their Own Cybersecurity Framework appeared first on Cyber Defense Magazine.

]]> <![CDATA[John C. Dvorak, an Early and Influential Technology Journalist, Dies At 80]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692180/it-security-nachrichten/john-c-dvorak-an-early-and-influential-technology-journalist-dies-at-80/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692180/it-security-nachrichten/john-c-dvorak-an-early-and-influential-technology-journalist-dies-at-80/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 19:18:29 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

]]> <![CDATA[The New Siri AI Leaves Old Siri in the Dust on Apple Watch]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692153/it-nachrichten/the-new-siri-ai-leaves-old-siri-in-the-dust-on-apple-watch/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692153/it-nachrichten/the-new-siri-ai-leaves-old-siri-in-the-dust-on-apple-watch/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 19:11:51 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Build in public, fail in public: what it’s like to be a founder under 20 right now ]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692148/it-nachrichten/build-in-public-fail-in-public-whatitslike-to-be-a-founder-under-20right-now/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692148/it-nachrichten/build-in-public-fail-in-public-whatitslike-to-be-a-founder-under-20right-now/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 19:09:40 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[GitHub ordered to remove decentralized messaging app Bitchat in India]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692131/it-security-nachrichten/github-ordered-to-remove-decentralized-messaging-app-bitchat-in-india/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692131/it-security-nachrichten/github-ordered-to-remove-decentralized-messaging-app-bitchat-in-india/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 19:04:24 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de India's Ministry of Home Affairs has ordered GitHub to remove repositories hosting Jack Dorsey's decentralized messaging app Bitchat, arguing that the Bluetooth mesh platform could be used to evade internet shutdowns and lawful surveillance. The order, which was made public by Dorsey after it was sent to GitHub, essentially targets the software itself rather than …

The post GitHub ordered to remove decentralized messaging app Bitchat in India appeared first on CyberInsider.

]]> <![CDATA[Certighost Active Directory CS Exploit Allows Low-Privileged Users to Compromise Domain]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692130/it-security-nachrichten/certighost-active-directory-cs-exploit-allows-low-privileged-users-to-compromise-domain/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692130/it-security-nachrichten/certighost-active-directory-cs-exploit-allows-low-privileged-users-to-compromise-domain/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 19:04:23 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de A newly disclosed Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) vulnerability, dubbed Certighost, allowed a low-privilege domain user to impersonate a Domain Controller and take over an entire Active Directory domain. Tracked as CVE-2026-54121, the flaw was patched in Microsoft’s July 2026 security updates following responsible disclosure earlier this year. AD CS is Microsoft’s public key […]

The post Certighost Active Directory CS Exploit Allows Low-Privileged Users to Compromise Domain appeared first on Cyber Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[iPhone exploit legal fight is really about who owns security research]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692084/ios-mac-os/iphone-exploit-legal-fight-is-really-about-who-owns-security-research/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692084/ios-mac-os/iphone-exploit-legal-fight-is-really-about-who-owns-security-research/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 18:41:21 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de iPhone exploit taken offline after Magnet Forensics argued it wasn't independent security research at all, but instead a stolen trade secret.

Hand holding a modern smartphone outdoors, screen lit with colorful app icons arranged in rows on a beach-themed wallpaper backgroundiPhone X

U.S. District Judge Victoria Marie Calvert partially approved Magnet's request for a preliminary injunction. She directed Paradigm Shift and former Magnet exploit engineer Mario Del Gaudio to delete the usbliter8 article, code, technical details, and related materials in their possession by 11:59 p.m. Eastern on July 23.

By July 23, Paradigm Shift had replaced the original article with a page indicating the blog post was unavailable. The preliminary injunction will continue throughout the litigation unless the court removes it in a separate order.

Magnet's July 7 complaint asserts that usbliter8 originated from a confidential A12 and A13 SecureROM access capability integrated into a commercial forensic product. The company alleges Del Gaudio acquired the technique while employed by Magnet and later shared it through Paradigm Shift.


Continue Reading on AppleInsider | Discuss on our Forums]]> <![CDATA[Cloudflare Internal DNS puts public and private DNS on one policy engine]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3692009/it-security-nachrichten/cloudflare-internal-dns-puts-public-and-private-dns-on-one-policy-engine/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3692009/it-security-nachrichten/cloudflare-internal-dns-puts-public-and-private-dns-on-one-policy-engine/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 18:18:13 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Enterprises typically operate separate systems for internal and external DNS because the two serve different audiences. Public DNS resolves names for services meant to be reached from the internet. Private DNS resolves internal resources, such as databases and internal applications, that should never be visible outside the corporate network. 

While public DNS is usually a single system, private DNS is often scattered across on-premises appliances, cloud-native resolvers, and split-horizon setups, where the same hostname resolves to a different answer depending on whether the query comes from inside or outside the network. Coordinating those deployments across headquarters, branch offices, and multiple clouds means ongoing manual synchronization work for network teams. 

Private DNS itself is not a new concept. It is already available from hyperscalers and established enterprise DNS vendors, but it typically runs apart from public DNS, with its own console, control plane and policy engine.

Cloudflare’s answer is a product it calls Internal DNS.

“Many organizations already use Cloudflare for their public DNS,” Enrique Somoza, product, performance and infrastructure at Cloudflare, told Network World. “Internal DNS extends that same platform to private DNS, so public and private are managed from the same global network and control plane.” 

How it works

Query handling starts at the resolver, not at the zone. That consolidation extends to daily operations as well.

“Instead of operating two separate DNS systems, customers use one API, one audit trail, one dashboard, and one policy engine for every DNS query—whether it is for a public website or an internal application,” Somoza said.

Policy first. The resolver sits ahead of every lookup, not behind it. “Architecturally, Cloudflare Gateway becomes the resolver that customers connect to, and can use WARP, DNS over HTTPS, DNS over TLS, or traditional DNS,” Somoza said. “Gateway evaluates zero -trust policies first, then routes the query to the appropriate DNS view based on context, such as source IP, device posture, or network location.”

No public path in. Internal zones sit outside the public DNS hierarchy entirely. “Internal zones are never assigned public nameservers—they are only reachable through Gateway, so every query is evaluated before it is resolved,” Somoza said.

One hostname, multiple answers. Branch offices, data centers and cloud environments no longer each need their own resolver stack. “Operationally, this simplifies environments that span branch offices, data centers, and multiple clouds,” Somoza said. “The same internal hostname can return different answers depending on where the request originated without maintaining separate resolver infrastructure, conditional forwarders, or duplicate zone files.”

Somoza described the underlying objective in direct terms: “The goal is to make internal DNS behave like a single service instead of a collection of independent deployments,” he said.

View selection. The same hostname can resolve to different IP addresses depending on where the request comes from. Gateway makes that call using several client signals. 

“View selection is policy driven,” Somoza said. “Gateway resolver policies evaluate the context of each DNS query, including attributes like source IP, device identity, or network location and determine which DNS view should answer the request.”

A view is a container, not a separate infrastructure stack. Somoza explained that a view is simply a logical grouping of internal zones. For example, a company could have separate views for Europe and North America, or for corporate users and operational technology networks.

Latency and resilience. Internal DNS inherits its performance characteristics from Cloudflare’s existing public network. “Internal DNS runs on Cloudflare’s global network, so queries are answered by the nearest available Gateway location, helping keep latency low for connected users,” Somoza said. “Because Internal DNS runs on the same global infrastructure as Cloudflare’s public DNS, it benefits from the same anycast architecture, geographic distribution, and resilient network design.”

How this differs from split-horizon DNS

Internal DNS replaces the duplicate-zone model traditional split-horizon setups depend on.

“Before migrating, many organizations maintain multiple versions of the same internal DNS zones across headquarters, branch offices, and cloud environments,” Somoza explained. “Conditional forwarders determine which resolver answers each query, and keeping those environments synchronized becomes an ongoing operational task.”

Internal DNS collapses those duplicate zones into a single authoritative copy split across views instead. “With Internal DNS, that configuration becomes much simpler,” Somoza said. “A customer might create a single corp.internal zone in Cloudflare and define multiple DNS views.”

For example, users in headquarters could receive one internal IP address for wiki.corp.internal, while branch offices receive a different address. Somoza emphasized that the zone itself only exists once. “Instead of maintaining multiple copies of the same configuration, administrators manage a single source of truth,” he said.

Early use cases and migration challenges

Not surprisingly, Somoza noted that the first use case Cloudflare sees for Internal DNS is for split-horizon DNS consolidation. There is also interest from organizations that operate across multiple cloud providers that want one consistent internal DNS service instead of managing separate DNS platforms in each environment.

Another common use case is extending zero-trust policies to internal name resolution. “Customers already use Gateway to control access to internet traffic, and Internal DNS lets them apply similar policy decisions before internal names are resolved,” Somoza said.

When it comes to migration, the friction customers report during migration is procedural rather than architectural.

“Customers need to think through API permissions, connectivity, and how existing local DNS forwarding rules interact with Gateway,” Somoza said. “Those are all well understood migration steps and customers often run both environments in parallel before completing the transition.”

]]> <![CDATA[GitHub restructures bug bounty program following flood of AI-generated reports]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691955/it-nachrichten/github-restructures-bug-bounty-program-following-flood-of-ai-generated-reports/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691955/it-nachrichten/github-restructures-bug-bounty-program-following-flood-of-ai-generated-reports/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 17:49:18 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Default Azure Automation Setting Enables Cross-Tenant Identity Takeover]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691868/it-security-nachrichten/default-azure-automation-setting-enables-cross-tenant-identity-takeover/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691868/it-security-nachrichten/default-azure-automation-setting-enables-cross-tenant-identity-takeover/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 17:05:03 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Dispatch records cut claims of major Apple Park fire damage down to size]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691791/ios-mac-os/dispatch-records-cut-claims-of-major-apple-park-fire-damage-down-to-size/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691791/ios-mac-os/dispatch-records-cut-claims-of-major-apple-park-fire-damage-down-to-size/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 16:29:40 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de
Aerial view of a huge circular futuristic office complex surrounding a landscaped green park with trees, pathways, small buildings, and a central circular courtyardApple Park headquarters

A public PulsePoint listing from Santa Clara County Fire shows an outside fire reported at 5:38 p.m. Pacific time on July 23 at 18922 Forge Drive. The department closed the call at 6:24 p.m., about 45 minutes later, and the listing identifies Engine 71 as the only assigned unit.

The dispatch record doesn't describe the damage, identify what burned, or say how the fire started. It also doesn't mention an Apple employee, a cigarette, injuries, evacuations, structural damage, or any disruption to Apple Park.

A July 24 post from ShrimpApplePro claimed that an Apple employee discarded a cigarette near the campus fence, starting a fire that spread to fencing installed in 2025. ShrimpApplePro didn't identify a source, provide a damage estimate, or offer evidence connecting an employee to the fire.


Continue Reading on AppleInsider | Discuss on our Forums]]> <![CDATA[Updated Cyber Threat Actor Naming System]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691731/it-security-nachrichten/updated-cyber-threat-actor-naming-system/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691731/it-security-nachrichten/updated-cyber-threat-actor-naming-system/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 16:04:12 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Introduction 

Today, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) will begin rolling out a unified naming schema for tracking threat actors. This new naming taxonomy represents an effort to standardize tracking across platforms and public reporting.

Why are we Adopting a Different Naming System?

Historically, Mandiant and Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) maintained distinct tracking systems, relying on parallel naming schemas that grew independently over time. The creation of GTIG has necessitated a new, fused tracking system, and a new naming system. Thinking to the future, GTIG’s new system will rely on cryptonyms. Relying on sequential numbers or disparate identifiers (e.g. APT1) fails to provide defenders the critical context needed to operate quickly. Threat tracking shouldn’t be an exercise in memorization, but rather one of intuition. The new naming convention aligns with industry standard threat actor naming systems. 

Our New Schema

Our new schema utilizes a cryptonym-based approach, employing memorable two-word combinations for each distinct threat actor:

  • The first word is a unique and memorable term chosen to represent the specific actor, particularly names that may have been used in prior public reporting. If no previously used term exists, this word is randomly generated to remove bias, then vetted by our analysts.

  • The second word categorizes threat clusters by motivation, attribution, or activity type based on which category we consider to be most important for defense and response strategies.

The table below provides a sample of how threat actor categories will map to the second word in each cryptonym:

Origin or Type

Group Name

People’s Republic of China

CASTLE

Iran

ION

North Korea

NEPTUNE

Russia

RELIC

Cybercriminal

COMET

Table 1: Examples of Google’s new threat actor naming system categories

We know there are many threat actor tracking schemas in the industry, so we are intentionally seeking to keep this system as simple as possible to streamline operations and facilitate mapping to other naming taxonomies. However, a significant caveat remains: because no two organizations have the exact same visibility into the threat landscape, direct, apples-to-apples comparisons between threat actors are rarely possible. Transitioning to a convention that is simpler to follow and remember is a practical step toward managing a highly intricate tracking problem. 

A Work in Progress

We have initially prioritized renaming several dozen of the most active groups, and will continue this process on a rolling basis. Previous names will remain indexed and searchable in the Google Threat Intelligence (GTI) platform, with MITRE ATT&CK mappings and other vendor aliases preserved, see Figure 1. 

Updated Cyber Threat Actor Naming System Image 1

Figure 1: Threat actor name appearance in GTI platform on initial rollout

We will continue to use UNC, or “uncategorized” designations for threat clusters that are still in the early stages of investigation, as described here.

]]> <![CDATA[AI firms want more data centers; Trump's EPA may give neighbors less say]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691730/ai-nachrichten/ai-firms-want-more-data-centers-trumps-epa-may-give-neighbors-less-say/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691730/ai-nachrichten/ai-firms-want-more-data-centers-trumps-epa-may-give-neighbors-less-say/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 15:58:57 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Home Assistant Device Database public preview]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691683/linux-tipps/home-assistant-device-database-public-preview/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691683/linux-tipps/home-assistant-device-database-public-preview/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 15:33:35 +0200 🐧 Linux Tipps tsecurity.de The Open Home Foundation, which governs the Home Assistant home-automation project, has announced the "public preview" of its Device Database:

Providing a public, open way to browse the anonymous, aggregated device data we collect was always part of the plan, and this preview is our first step toward it.

You can already use it to search and filter devices to see aggregated community insights, starting with a deliberately focused set of specifics, such as whether a device requires an internet connection, and which protocols and integrations it works with. We've kept that initial scope narrow on purpose, giving us a solid foundation we can build on together with you, our community, as the database grows.

LWN looked at Home Assistant in May 2025.

]]> <![CDATA[The Cyber Express Weekly Roundup: Ransomware Surge, Data Breaches, and Rising Digital Threats]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691669/it-security-nachrichten/the-cyber-express-weekly-roundup-ransomware-surge-data-breaches-and-rising-digital-threats/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691669/it-security-nachrichten/the-cyber-express-weekly-roundup-ransomware-surge-data-breaches-and-rising-digital-threats/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 15:30:41 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de The Cyber Express weekly roundup July 2026

This week’s cybersecurity landscape highlights the continued expansion of cyber risks across governments, businesses, and consumers. From ransomware campaigns targeting organizations worldwide to credential-based attacks, data breaches, online fraud, and digital piracy crackdowns, recent incidents show how threat actors are exploiting both technical vulnerabilities and human behavior.  The latest developments underline the need for stronger security practices, including improved identity protection, faster incident response, and greater awareness of evolving cyber threats. Organizations are increasingly dealing with attacks that go beyond data theft, affecting operations, customer trust, and critical services. 

The Cyber Express Weekly Roundup 

U.S. Accounts for Nearly Half of Global Ransomware Attacks in H1 2026 

The United States experienced 1,721 ransomware attacks during the first half of 2026, representing nearly 45% of all incidents tracked globally, according to research from Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL). The report identified ransomware groups Qilin and Akira as among the most active threat actors during the period. Read more... 

Dubai Police Warns Against Online Visa Fraud Schemes 

Dubai Police has issued a warning about fraudulent online advertisements offering work, residency, and visit visas in exchange for payment. Scammers have reportedly used social media platforms and messaging applications to impersonate government entities or unauthorized service providers to trick victims. Read more... 

Craneware Data Breach Exposes Employee and Customer Information 

Healthcare technology company Craneware confirmed that unauthorized individuals accessed part of its data environment, resulting in the exposure of employee information as well as some customer and partner records. The company stated that the incident has been contained and has not disrupted business operations or customer services. Read more...  

U.S. Targets Illegal FIFA World Cup Streaming Networks 

The U.S. Department of Justice seized more than 1,000 domains allegedly involved in illegally streaming FIFA World Cup 2026 matches. The action was carried out under Operation Offsides, an initiative focused on combating online piracy and protecting intellectual property rights. Read more... 

Chick-fil-A Customer Accounts Targeted in Credential Attack 

Chick-fil-A confirmed that certain customer accounts were accessed during an automated credential-stuffing attack between June 17 and June 19, 2026. The attackers used account credentials obtained from an external source to gain unauthorized access. The company said affected information may have included customer names, email addresses, membership details, and limited payment-related data. Read more... 

South Korea Diplomatic System Breach Lasted Nearly 10 Months 

South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that attackers maintained access to the National Diplomatic Academy’s online education system for almost 10 months. The breach, which began in April 2025, exposed information linked to thousands of current and former ministry employees. Compromised data included user IDs, names, email addresses, and encrypted passwords. Read more... 

Weekly Cybersecurity Takeaway 

The week’s incidents demonstrate how cyber threats continue to evolve across multiple areas, from ransomware and account compromise to online scams and government-related breaches. Attackers are increasingly targeting weaknesses in identity management, user behavior, and digital infrastructure.  Organizations and individuals must focus on proactive security measures, including stronger authentication controls, regular monitoring, timely updates, and greater awareness of social engineering tactics. As cyber threats become more widespread and interconnected, improving resilience remains essential for protecting data, services, and public trust. ]]> <![CDATA[When is an apology not an apology? When it comes from an AI boss with an out-of-control chatbot | Marina Hyde]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691539/ai-nachrichten/when-is-an-apology-not-an-apology-when-it-comes-from-an-ai-boss-with-an-out-of-control-chatbot-marina-hyde/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691539/ai-nachrichten/when-is-an-apology-not-an-apology-when-it-comes-from-an-ai-boss-with-an-out-of-control-chatbot-marina-hyde/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 14:34:55 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de An incident in which an autonomous OpenAI agent hacked a startup either confirms that the end is nigh – or that the product is just amazingly sophisticated

Throughout history, many things have been seen by terrified populaces as a harbinger of doom. A comet. A crow on the battlefield. A solar eclipse. A mutant livestock birth. Yet times move on. In the modern era, the leading harbinger of doom is literally any picture of the OpenAI CEO, Sam Altman, attached to a news story. You know it’s not going to be good, right? You know that by the time you’ve read it, you’ll be begging to go back to the time when the worst thing that could happen to us at the hands of the techlords was just some democracy-subversion, or childhood destruction, usually followed by Mark Zuckerberg putting on a suit and claiming: “We will learn from this.”

Anyway: a lot of pictures of Sam Altman in the news of late. Most recently, this week, one darkened the skies alongside the tale of how an OpenAI autonomous agent went rogue during a supposedly sandboxed/guardrailed test, and hacked a major startup that functions as a repository of coding information. (I’m slightly obsessed with the fact that the startup in question is called Hugging Face, adding weight to my suspicion that some vast, tweely benign emoji is the last face humanity will see before it dies.)

Marina Hyde is a Guardian columnist

Continue reading...]]> <![CDATA[Should you use AI for a task? Here’s a simple way to decide | Bruce Schneier]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691471/ai-nachrichten/should-you-use-ai-for-a-task-heres-a-simple-way-to-decide-bruce-schneier/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691471/ai-nachrichten/should-you-use-ai-for-a-task-heres-a-simple-way-to-decide-bruce-schneier/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 14:06:15 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de Sometimes, what matters isn’t your output but what you put into the process. Think of it like work v the gym

I teach public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Munk School at the University of Toronto. And it will come at no surprise to you that my students regularly use AI to complete their writing assignments. Doing so is a waste of their tuition money. But if their entire career is going to include AI writing assistants, why shouldn’t they embrace their future?

The best way I’ve found to explain the dilemma comes from the AI researcher Daniel Meissler: it’s the difference between work and the gym.

Continue reading...]]> <![CDATA[Fujitsu joins £14.9B UK framework despite public sector bid freeze]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691465/it-nachrichten/fujitsu-joins-149b-uk-framework-despite-public-sector-bid-freeze/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691465/it-nachrichten/fujitsu-joins-149b-uk-framework-despite-public-sector-bid-freeze/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 14:05:19 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[TikTok’s protection of minors should not be opt-in, warns EU]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691456/it-nachrichten/tiktoks-protection-of-minors-should-not-be-opt-in-warns-eu/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691456/it-nachrichten/tiktoks-protection-of-minors-should-not-be-opt-in-warns-eu/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 14:04:52 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Atos launches sovereign cloud service to power comeback]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691386/it-security-nachrichten/atos-launches-sovereign-cloud-service-to-power-comeback/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691386/it-security-nachrichten/atos-launches-sovereign-cloud-service-to-power-comeback/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 13:26:14 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Atos has launched a new sovereign cloud platform aimed squarely at European public sector bodies, healthcare providers and defense organizations. It’s the latest effort by European companies in their fight back against US dominance.

Atos Sovereign Cloud offers a range of controls for data management, providing customers with resilience and full control over their data, complying with existing European legislation on data residency.

“Digital sovereignty has become a global operational priority for organizations that need to manage dependencies, jurisdictional exposure and disruption risks across complex digital environments. Atos Sovereign Cloud gives customers a practical way to apply sovereign controls to their most critical workloads, while preserving flexibility, resilience and the ability to innovate securely,” said Michael Kollar, Atos Group digital sovereignty leader.

There has been a concerted effort by European organizations to meet US competition head-on. Earlier this month, four companies signed up to the certification program introduced by the European cloud body, CISPE,

This is the latest effort by Atos to get the company back on track. In April, it sold its supercomputer company, Bull to the French government, after a previous attempt in 2024 to sell off its computer services division and after a refinancing deal in the same year.

The company implemented a further round of refinancing this year and in its half-yearly report claimed that this was an “important milestone” in securing the company’s future. However, in its first-quarter results revenue showed an organic decline of 11 percent, so any projected growth may be some time in the future. Whether its Sovereign Cloud offering is the harbinger of the revival remains to be seen.

This article first appeared on CIO.

]]> <![CDATA[Google’s anti-search-scraping lawsuit dismissed]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691374/it-nachrichten/googles-anti-search-scraping-lawsuit-dismissed/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691374/it-nachrichten/googles-anti-search-scraping-lawsuit-dismissed/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 13:20:02 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de

A court has dismissed Google’s case against SerpApi over that company’s scraping of search results to train AI models.

The US District Court for the Northern District of California found that there was no indication that any copyright had been breached.

Google announced in December that it was suing SerpApI for its alleged web scraping, claiming that it was protecting copyright holders. In February, SerpApI fought back and asked the court to dismiss Google’s case. And this week, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers agreed with SerpApi that Google’s case has no merit.

Google’s argument was that SerpApi’s actions breached the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA). It made two claims: first, that no person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title, and second that no person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, or component protected by the Act.

SerpApi claimed that the URLs and other links that were being served by Google did not in themselves entail copyright and the judge agreed. In her judgment, she said that there was no indication that the copyright holders had authorized Google to take action against SerpApi.

The case is not completely over as the judge has given Google 21 days to amend its complaint to demonstrate that it was acting on behalf of the copyright owners. It remains to be seen whether its war against the web scrapers is finally over.

]]> <![CDATA[Golden Chickens Resurfaces With Four New Malware Families and Modular Implants]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691352/it-security-nachrichten/golden-chickens-resurfaces-with-four-new-malware-families-and-modular-implants/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691352/it-security-nachrichten/golden-chickens-resurfaces-with-four-new-malware-families-and-modular-implants/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 13:12:39 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de The threat actors behind the Golden Chickens malware-as-a-service (MaaS) ecosystem have resurfaced with four new malware families, indicating that the operators are showing no signs of stopping despite extensive public disclosures into their inner workings. The malware families in question…

Read more →

The post Golden Chickens Resurfaces With Four New Malware Families and Modular Implants appeared first on IT Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[Atos launches sovereign cloud service to power comeback]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691349/it-security-nachrichten/atos-launches-sovereign-cloud-service-to-power-comeback/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691349/it-security-nachrichten/atos-launches-sovereign-cloud-service-to-power-comeback/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 13:12:35 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Atos has launched a new sovereign cloud platform aimed squarely at European public sector bodies, healthcare providers and defense organizations. It’s the latest effort by European companies in their fight back against US dominance.

Atos Sovereign Cloud offers a range of controls for data management, providing customers with resilience and full control over their data, complying with existing European legislation on data residency.

“Digital sovereignty has become a global operational priority for organizations that need to manage dependencies, jurisdictional exposure and disruption risks across complex digital environments. Atos Sovereign Cloud gives customers a practical way to apply sovereign controls to their most critical workloads, while preserving flexibility, resilience and the ability to innovate securely,” said Michael Kollar, Atos Group digital sovereignty leader.

There has been a concerted effort by European organizations to meet US competition head-on. Earlier this month, four companies signed up to the certification program introduced by the European cloud body, CISPE,

This is the latest effort by Atos to get the company back on track. In April, it sold its supercomputer company, Bull to the French government, after a previous attempt in 2024 to sell off its computer services division and after a refinancing deal in the same year.

The company implemented a further round of refinancing this year and in its half-yearly report claimed that this was an “important milestone” in securing the company’s future. However, in its first-quarter results revenue showed an organic decline of 11 percent, so any projected growth may be some time in the future. Whether its Sovereign Cloud offering is the harbinger of the revival remains to be seen.

]]> <![CDATA[Beam Eye Tracker app adds Linux and macOS support in Beta]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691330/linux-tipps/beam-eye-tracker-app-adds-linux-and-macos-support-in-beta/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691330/linux-tipps/beam-eye-tracker-app-adds-linux-and-macos-support-in-beta/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 13:05:03 +0200 🐧 Linux Tipps tsecurity.de

Read the full article on GamingOnLinux.

]]> <![CDATA[Why I changed how I pitch AI: It’s no longer about saving money, but managing tokens and adoption]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691324/it-nachrichten/why-i-changed-how-i-pitch-ai-its-no-longer-about-saving-money-but-managing-tokens-and-adoption/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691324/it-nachrichten/why-i-changed-how-i-pitch-ai-its-no-longer-about-saving-money-but-managing-tokens-and-adoption/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 13:04:13 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de

I have worked alongside enterprise technology for more than 30 years and watched AI evolve from a lab experiment into the modern boardroom’s core focus. However, the last few years of implementing AI alongside our customers have delivered our most profound reality checks.

The initial hype has faded, leaving CIOs to drive real enterprise value. Based on my experience implementing Google, OpenAI and Anthropic technologies, here are the fundamental, technology-agnostic lessons every leader must anchor their strategy around.

AI as a leadership multiplier

The most common tactical error we see is treating AI as an isolated technology project. What I have observed among our customers is that true success does not come from organizations that define a standalone “AI strategy,” but rather from those leaders that integrate AI into their business strategy.

When our customers isolate AI and define an AI strategy, it inevitably treats it like a “technological toy” to experiment with. This approach yields fragmented, orphaned initiatives that fail to scale because they are fundamentally disconnected from their core corporate objectives. What I learned is that AI is not the ultimate destination; it is a powerful catalyst. We have replaced “What can AI do for our customers?” with a more strategic question, “How does AI accelerate their existing business goals?”

Think of AI like electricity. No modern corporation designs a standalone “electricity strategy.” Instead, all companies route it invisibly across the entire organization to illuminate offices, power production lines and drive communication. AI must be woven into the enterprise fabric in the exact same way, acting as an underlying utility that supercharges your existing operational model.

Integrating AI into the broader business strategy also dictates how we measure success. It forces a shift away from short-term tech vanity metrics and anchors the technology into a long-term roadmap.

When AI remains trapped within the IT department of our customers, we notice that it is relegated to a mere “software experiment.” To become a true competitive advantage, we observed that AI requires intense cross-functional orchestration. This perspective does not diminish the merit of the technical team; their expertise is fundamental for establishing the architecture, data governance and tools your enterprise requires. However, while IT builds the foundational infrastructure, it lacks the organizational authority to decide what should be built on top of it. Only the CEO or the owner of the company can step in to ensure AI leaves the “toy project” phase and integrates into the DNA of the organization.

The requirement for top-down, executive ownership stems from three critical realities observed in the field:

  • Silo-smashing and data collaboration: True enterprise AI is data-hungry and that data lives across disparate business lines, finance, operations, marketing and customer service. Only the CEO possesses the cross-functional authority to demand that data silos be dismantled.
  • Cultural transformation and fear mitigation: AI triggers widespread anxiety over job displacement across all industries and hierarchies. When relegated to an “IT project,” resistance spikes as teams view it as a threat to their livelihoods. When I saw the CEO lead this cultural shift directly is when I noticed the best results.
  • C-Suite education and strategic alignment: The mandate for AI capability cannot just be delegated downward; the transformation must begin at the very top. I have conducted more than 70 presentations for the Board of Directors and C-Level teams. These people need to be actively educated not on technical code, but on specific business use cases, return on investment (ROI) frameworks and how AI resolves core organizational bottlenecks.

PwC’s data found that only 12% of enterprises have achieved both cost and revenue benefits from AI. Those elite 12% succeeded precisely because their CEOs embedded AI extensively across strategic decision-making and cross-functional workflows. AI is simply too disruptive and too critical to be left exclusively in the hands of technical experts. If AI is not on the CEO’s weekly agenda, it is fundamentally missing from the company’s true strategy.

AI as a new operational framework

Traditional IT systems have operated on strict algorithmic certainty: if you input a specific set of data, the system executes an immutable line of code and guarantees the same, predictable output every single time.

AI completely breaks this paradigm. Because modern AI is built on probabilistic models, it does not execute static formulas; instead, it predicts the most likely correct response based on mathematical probabilities. This means that AI solutions carry an inherent, small percentage of uncertainty and variability. A prompt entered today might yield a slightly different, though contextually valid, output tomorrow.

Executive leadership and organizational cultures must be actively educated to accept and navigate this fundamental shift. Traditional quality assurance frameworks for software are designed for a 100% success rate. Applying this rigid standard to AI will paralyze your initiatives, keeping 80% of your projects trapped eternally in the pilot phase. This happened to us in a food and beverage company in Latin America a couple of years ago. After this experience, we started to include conditions in our contracts that tolerate statistical margins of error and still define the project as a success.

In terms of cost calculation, we had to teach CIOs and business managers to forget the monthly subscription model for AI and learn to manage the primary unit of exchange in modern AI: the token.

To understand AI costs, executives must understand how large language models process data. AI models do not read full words; instead, they break text, images or code down into “pieces” called tokens. As a baseline, every 100 words process as approximately 130 to 140 tokens. Because the major AI providers use the token as their currency, your business is billed dynamically based on the exact volume of tokens consumed by every query submitted (input) and every response generated (output).

Many leaders believe AI costs are fixed due to flat-rate enterprise tiers ($25–$30/user). This is a temporary illusion. These venture-capital-subsidized rates mask true operational costs and come with dynamic usage limits. Modeling long-term ROI on them guarantees a severe budget shock when true consumption pricing takes over.

The solution is not to halt AI adoption; doing so means losing your competitive edge. Instead, the cost per token must cease to be treated as a technical footnote relegated to the IT department. It must be elevated to a core business variable.

Risks in the AI adoption model

Since the beginning of the AI boom, I have seen all our customers making a critical tactical error that could cost them heavily in the medium term: they are focusing only on operational efficiency (reducing costs with AI).

I have observed that an alarmingly high percentage of companies remain trapped in pilot phases focused exclusively on short-term cost reduction. Bain & Company’s global Automation and AI Pathfinder Survey found that the largest share of companies measuring their AI initiatives (exactly 40%) realized cost reductions of 10% or less, heavily missing their internal targets. Our customers are putting too many resources and effort into marginal financial gains and in doing so, they are jeopardizing their most valuable assets: service quality, resilience and customer trust.

Utilizing AI solely to slash headcount or cut operational corners is a dangerous trap that introduces severe field liabilities. A financial service organization in Latin America announced that they saved $1 million in customer support by replacing humans with AI chatbots. However, the mid-term reality revealed a different story: a damaged brand reputation due to AI errors and an influx of frustrated clients fleeing because the automated system cannot handle special cases.

Putting a company on an extreme AI diet might make it look leaner on next quarter’s financial statement, but over-indexing on cost-cutting will ultimately leave the business too weak to compete when market dynamics shift. We are now inviting our customers to change the question from “How much money will AI save us?” to “How will we leverage AI to exponentially increase the long-term value of our enterprise?”

Deploying enterprise AI is a marathon, not a sprint, and the terrain changes with every mile. The organizations that thrive in this next era will be those that transition from fascination to discipline, treating AI not as a magic bullet for immediate savings, but as a core capability that demands rigorous governance, architectural foresight and cultural maturity. Navigating this shift requires moving past the theoretical hype and anchoring decisions in raw, field-tested reality.

As we continue to deploy these technologies across industries, the blueprint for success is being rewritten in real time. Let’s keep this conversation going as we map out the future of business intelligence together.

This article is published as part of the Foundry Expert Contributor Network.
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]]> <![CDATA[Golden Chickens Resurfaces With Four New Malware Families and Modular Implants]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691317/it-security-nachrichten/golden-chickens-resurfaces-with-four-new-malware-families-and-modular-implants/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691317/it-security-nachrichten/golden-chickens-resurfaces-with-four-new-malware-families-and-modular-implants/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 12:56:06 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Top AIs invent same fake PyPl and npm package names]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691314/it-security-nachrichten/top-ais-invent-same-fake-pypl-and-npm-package-names/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691314/it-security-nachrichten/top-ais-invent-same-fake-pypl-and-npm-package-names/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 12:56:02 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Enterprise software developers continue to be in danger of falling victim to slopsquatting, where AI coding tools hallucinate the existence of nonexistent libraries and hackers create malicious packages in response.

The top AI coding tools are remarkably consistent in their hallucinations: Researcher Aleksandr Churilov found the same 127 fake package names generated by five different LLMs.

Slopsquatting is a relatively new form of malware attack that involves the creation of malicious packages in response to the hallucinations of AI coding tools, causing the malicious packages to be incorporated into legitimate applications.

Churilov set out his findings in a research paper, The Range Shrinks, the Threat Remains: Re-evaluating LLM Package Hallucinations on the 2026 Frontier-Model Cohort, which is yet to be peer-reviewed. He found 127 hallucinated package names were shared across Claude Sonnet 4.6, Claude Haiku 4.5, GPT-5.4-mini, Gemini 2.5 Pro, and DeepSeek V3.2.

 As of April this year, 53 of those names — 41 on the PyPI software repository and 12 on npm —are still available for registration.

According to the study, there are two reasons for this amount of conformity in the output of the models. First, models may learn the same incorrect package references from shared public training material, such as tutorials and documentation.

Second, they may independently extrapolate plausible names from ecosystem conventions. In this way, they could produce names that look correct, even if they don’t actually exist.

While Churilov’s research will worry CISOs and security-conscious developers, there is some relief. The research has not yet found any evidence that any of the remaining 53 names have been registered maliciously, nor used in an attack.

This article first appeared on InfoWorld.

]]> <![CDATA[Top AIs invent same fake PyPl and npm package names]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691310/ai-nachrichten/top-ais-invent-same-fake-pypl-and-npm-package-names/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691310/ai-nachrichten/top-ais-invent-same-fake-pypl-and-npm-package-names/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 12:51:25 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Enterprise software developers continue to be in danger of falling victim to slopsquatting, where AI coding tools hallucinate the existence of nonexistent libraries and hackers create malicious packages in response.

The top AI coding tools are remarkably consistent in their hallucinations: Researcher Aleksandr Churilov found the same 127 fake package names generated by five different LLMs.

Slopsquatting is a relatively new form of malware attack that involves the creation of malicious packages in response to the hallucinations of AI coding tools, causing the malicious packages to be incorporated into legitimate applications.

Churilov set out his findings in a research paper, The Range Shrinks, the Threat Remains: Re-evaluating LLM Package Hallucinations on the 2026 Frontier-Model Cohort, which is yet to be peer-reviewed. He found 127 hallucinated package names were shared across Claude Sonnet 4.6, Claude Haiku 4.5, GPT-5.4-mini, Gemini 2.5 Pro, and DeepSeek V3.2.

 As of April this year, 53 of those names — 41 on the PyPI software repository and 12 on npm —are still available for registration.

According to the study, there are two reasons for this amount of conformity in the output of the models. First, models may learn the same incorrect package references from shared public training material, such as tutorials and documentation.

Second, they may independently extrapolate plausible names from ecosystem conventions. In this way, they could produce names that look correct, even if they don’t actually exist.

While Churilov’s research will worry CISOs and security-conscious developers, there is some relief. The research has not yet found any evidence that any of the remaining 53 names have been registered maliciously, nor used in an attack.

]]> <![CDATA[CIOs beware: DNS KSK rollover could kick off wave of mysterious outages]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691225/it-security-nachrichten/cios-beware-dns-ksk-rollover-could-kick-off-wave-of-mysterious-outages/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691225/it-security-nachrichten/cios-beware-dns-ksk-rollover-could-kick-off-wave-of-mysterious-outages/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 12:09:00 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Predicting an outage is tricky business, but CIOs might want to circle Oct. 11, 2026, through Jan. 11, 2027, for likely trouble of a potentially widespread and puzzling nature.

That’s because a relatively trivial update to DNSSEC on Oct. 11, one that will take full effect by Jan. 11, is likely to deliver a series of seemingly unrelated system outages. This will come from oceans of dependencies from third-party, shadow, agentic, gen AI, SaaS, homegrown, and legacy apps — among many other quiet executable hiding spots, including virtual environments and containers.

Sai Joshitha Kathari, senior site reliability engineer at payment card giant Visa, says most enterprises have far more DNS-related exposure than they realize because of these many dependencies.

“This has the potential to create real downstream destruction when unresolved failures sit underneath important business functions,” Kathari says. 

The danger is that so many of these issues are either unknown to IT or handled by a third-party vendor and no one in IT has had reason to ask those vendors about DNS updates. 

“The risky areas are usually not the obvious managed DNS services. They are the older internal applications, hardcoded resolvers, containerized workloads, sidecar configurations, custom scripts, partner integrations, VM images, stale base images, and service-to-service dependencies that nobody has touched in a long time,” Kathari explains. “These systems can keep working quietly for years, then fail during a DNS or certificate-related change because they bypassed the normal platform standards.”

Independent technology analyst Carmi Levy says that CIOs need to take this event very seriously. 

“The two-pronged deadline — October 11, 2026, when the new Key Signing Key (KSK) begins signing the root zone, and January 11, 2027, when the old key is retired — should be marked in red on everyone’s calendar, just as December 31, 1999, once was,” Levy says. “Failure to comply could result in websites, critical business applications, and related resources dropping off the face of the Earth once the transition is complete.”

Levy adds: “Custom-built code that lives outside conventional support mechanisms may or may not function when the DNS changes go into effect.”

The DNSSEC update itself is straightforward, but it is also the first significant DNSSEC change — specifically a change in the trust anchor — since 2018. 

The rollout statement noted that “the trust anchor is formally known as the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) root zone Key Signing Key (KSK). The KSK is the cryptographic key at the core of the DNSSEC trust anchor and is used to verify that DNS responses are legitimate and have not been modified in transit.”

Expect nearly every enterprise to be impacted

Kim Davies, vice president of IANA Services and president of public technical identifiers at ICANN, says the extent of the impact on enterprises is unknowable, given the nature of shadow IT and other edge cases. 

But based on the massive number of dependencies both known and unknown in the typical global enterprise, Davies guesses that just about every enterprise will be impacted, to varying degrees. 

“In highly complex organizations, it is very likely there will be some impact in the corners, in the margins, of the organization,” Davies tells CIO. “DNS is such a core technology that underpins everything.”

As the updates propagate, hiccups will materialize, Davies notes. “When the system cannot validate the [DNS] information, it will treat it as suspect and DNS lookups will fail.”

Visa’s Kathari says, “Enterprises should expect some secondary DNS-related glitches when major DNSSEC-related changes happen, not necessarily because the core infrastructure teams will ignore the update, but because large environments have many hidden dependency paths.”

Making this problem far worse, Kathari notes, is that the glitches will likely initially look like anything other thana DNS glitch. That will force IT staff to waste a vast number of hours chasing causes that ultimately prove to be unrelated to the incidents. 

“The impact for CIOs is that DNS failures rarely announce themselves as DNS failures. They look like application timeouts, broken logins, failed API calls, queue lag, payment failures, partner connectivity issues, or random regional instability,” Kathari explains. “That makes troubleshooting slower because teams may spend hours looking at the application, database, network, or cloud provider before realizing name resolution is part of the failure path.”

Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research, agrees that IT will likely spin its wheels chasing the wrong ghosts.

“A validation failure rarely stays in its lane. It surfaces as an application error, an API timeout, or a reachability problem, which turns a resolver fault into a coordination failure,” Gogia says. “The application team blames the network, the network team blames the cloud, and the user simply watches work stop.”

“Images and templates are the frontier most teams miss,” Gogia adds. “A resolver fixed in summer can be broken again in October the instant a stale golden image is redeployed, because automation no longer lets configuration drift slowly. It restores yesterday’s assumptions at machine speed.”

It is widely expected that enterprises will not have any problems executing the change or, more likely, relying on their hyperscalers to properly handle the change. That is the concern. 

“CIOs are being distracted so much with AI and this is such a deep in the weeds infrastructure issue that this can and willcatch people off-guard,” Justin Greis, CEO of consulting firm Acceligence, tells CIO. “I think we’ll see a meaningful number of enterprise disruptions associated with the DNSSEC trust anchor rollover. Not because the update itself is especially difficult, but because it will expose weaknesses that already exist inside many organizations.”

Most enterprise IT operations have had no reason to compile a comprehensive list of all DNS dependencies, but many will be instantly discovered in January. 

Potentially widespread fallout

A major retailer, for example, might suddenly be unable to connect with FedEx to arrange for deliveries or a hospital may find that test results are no longer being shared with patient portals. It might manifest as an assembly line that halts because an IIoT component can no longer share files with its vendor system or a truck fleet that stops being tracked. 

“There will almost certainly be systems that fall through the cracks. Some will be legacy applications that rely on outdated DNS configurations that have not been updated in years,” Greis says. “Others will be business-unit-developed tools, contractor-built solutions, embedded systems, manufacturing and industrial systems, or highly customized workloads that operate outside normal IT oversight. These are the types of systems that often surface during infrastructure events like this.”

Greis adds that many enterprises will discover in January problems created by their own automation.

“Over time, enterprises build layers of processes, templates, and deployment mechanisms that are reused across teams and environments,” Greis notes. “Even after DNS infrastructure is updated correctly, older settings can inadvertently be reintroduced through routine updates and system changes, creating intermittent and difficult-to-diagnose failures.”

The good news from this situation is that enterprises are not going to likely lose all DNS access if any of these glitches occur. But that may be of no comfort because even if the disruptions are only with small edge cases, that can still cause massive operational disruptions.

Cricket Liu, EVP and chief evangelist at Infoblox, gives the example of a DNS server that responds to factory-floor system queries.

“Or let’s say this disrupts [an enterprise’s key] SaaS application. All name resolution may stop and it will show a server failure. It will not deliver a response whenever I look anything up. That’s not subtle at all,” Liu says. “It’s highly likely that companies are going to see some effects.”

Back in 2017, the switchover was relatively uneventful, giving some CIOs hope that January 2027 will also be a non-event. But given the technology advancements in the last 10 years and the resulting tidal wave of new enterprise tech dependencies, few are realistically expecting no problems this go around. 

Impossible to predict what will happen

One of the top network experts on DNS effects in enterprises is Geoff Huston, chief scientist at the Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC), the regional Internet Registry administering IP addresses for the Asia Pacific region.

Huston says it is difficult to project what will happen in January until it happens.

“Just like the last time, we are flying blind with this key roll. Because nothing really terrible happened last time, there is some confidence that nothing terrible will happen this time, but we just can’t tell in advance as there are no good measurement approaches that allow us to peek inside the trust state of recursive resolvers,” he says.

As for potential edge-case glitches, Huston says it is possible, but if third-party vendors do not properly handle the update, there will be other issues as well, as the KSK cryptographic key used within DNSSEC signs and validates the keys that protect DNS records. 

“If it is not standards-compliant, then you have more problems than just the KSK roll,” Huston says, “as it raises the obvious question of ‘What else is not correctly implemented in the DNS resolver that I’m running?’”

As a silver lining, Acceligence’s Greis says any hiccups that result from the DNS KSK update may be a gift in disguise for CIOs. 

“The irony is that some of the most business-critical components in the technology stack are often the least visible because they work in the background,” Greis says. January “may reveal how much modern business resilience depends on infrastructure that many organizations rarely examine until something breaks. For CIOs, that’s the real lesson. This is not fundamentally a story about a DNS update. It is a story about operational visibility, resilience, and governance. Organizations that treat the rollover as a routine infrastructure task will likely complete the update and move on. Organizations that use it as an opportunity to understand and strengthen the foundations of their technology environment may gain far more value than simply avoiding an outage.”

]]> <![CDATA[NodeBB Patches Eight AI-Found Flaws Exposing Admin Access and Private Chats]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691090/it-security-nachrichten/nodebb-patches-eight-ai-found-flaws-exposing-admin-access-and-private-chats/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691090/it-security-nachrichten/nodebb-patches-eight-ai-found-flaws-exposing-admin-access-and-private-chats/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 11:09:26 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Eight security flaws in NodeBB went public on Wednesday, along with the code to exploit them. Aikido Security rates all eight as high severity and says its AI pentest agents found them in a six-hour review of the forum software’s…

Read more →

The post NodeBB Patches Eight AI-Found Flaws Exposing Admin Access and Private Chats appeared first on IT Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[How to execute queries in parallel using EF Core]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691080/ai-nachrichten/how-to-execute-queries-in-parallel-using-ef-core/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691080/ai-nachrichten/how-to-execute-queries-in-parallel-using-ef-core/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 11:04:59 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

EF Core is Microsoft’s flagship ORM (object-relational mapper), the software layer that allows .NET developers to work with relational databases. The DbContext class is the core component of the EF Core framework for managing database operations. However, the DbContext class in EF Core is not thread-safe. Hence, if you share DbContext instances between multiple threads, you will often encounter data corruption issues and the InvalidOperationException.

In this article, we’ll learn how we can execute queries in parallel in EF Core by handling thread-safety issues to avoid concurrency errors. To work with the code examples provided in this article, you should have Visual Studio 2026 installed in your system. You can download Visual Studio 2026 here.

Executing EF Core queries in parallel – the problem

When working in today’s data-driven applications, you will often need to fetch data from multiple unrelated datasets. In applications that use concurrency, thread-safety is critical to guaranteeing correct execution, avoiding data corruption and race conditions, and ensuring data consistency. Let’s understand this with an example.

Let’s say we want to populate a dashboard that displays all recently processed orders, metrics, logs, and traces, as well as your application’s performance metadata. We might write the following code. 

public class Dashboard
{
    public List Orders { get; set; } = new();
    public Metrics Metrics { get; set; } = new();
    public List Logs { get; set; } = new();
    public List Traces { get; set; } = new();
}
public static async Task LoadDashboardAsync(ProductService productService)
{
    Task<List>    ordersTask  = productService.GetProcessedOrdersAsync();
    Task        metricsTask = productService.GetMetricsAsync();
    Task<List> logsTask    = productService.GetRecentLogsAsync();
    Task<List>    tracesTask  = productService.GetTracesAsync();
    await Task.WhenAll(ordersTask, metricsTask, logsTask, tracesTask);
    return new Dashboard
    {
        Orders  = await ordersTask,
        Metrics = await metricsTask,
        Logs    = await logsTask,
        Traces  = await tracesTask
    };
}

In the preceding code snippet, there are four read operations that are executed by four different Task instances. Our objective is to ensure that the database round trips run in parallel instead of in sequence. We can accomplish this by usingTask.WhenAll, which starts the four tasks, waits for every task to finish, then returns the data wrapped inside a new Dashboard instance.

If we executed these queries sequentially, the user would have to wait until each query completed its execution in turn—for a total wait time equal to the sum of the times for all four queries. However, by running these queries in parallel, we reduce the wait time considerably. The user will need to wait only as long as it takes for the slowest of the four queries to complete its execution.

However, there is a danger with the above approach. If you run multiple operations on the same DbContext instance, you will see an InvalidOperationException with the following message:

A second operation started in this context before the previous operation was completed. This is usually caused by multiple threads using the same DbContext instance; instance members are not guaranteed to be thread-safe.

Databases such as SQL Server, PostgreSQL, and Oracle Database follow a request-response communication model at the connection level: a single connection can process only one command at a time. Hence, you cannot run multiple queries concurrently using the connection. If you await several operations using the same connection, EF Core detects the overlapping use of a non-thread-safe context and throws an InvalidOperationException. To run queries in parallel, you must give each task its own connection or context.

Why DbContext isn’t thread-safe – and how to work around it

The DbContext class in EF Core is designed to manage a single unit of work. To be more precise, EF Core does not provide support for running multiple operations on the same DbContext instance. This design approach creates inherent challenges when you use the same DbContext instance across multiple threads. If DbContext were thread-safe, extensive locking would be required, which would degrade data access performance.

This stateful design of DbContext makes it unsuitable for concurrent access patterns that involve loading, modifying, or tracking different sets of data simultaneously, because it needs to maintain the internal representation of database state.

The change tracker is one of the most important components of DbContext in EF Core. It monitors all entities loaded into memory and detects any changes made to them after they have been loaded. It keeps track of the original, current, and changed values of the entities, thereby enabling the EF Core runtime to know the current state of these entities when you call the SaveChanges() method on the DbContext instance.

To implement thread-safety when working with DbContext, we must write our code to ensure that each concurrent operation gets its own copy of a short-lived instance. Now, we could accomplish this by wrapping a shared DbContext instance inside a thread-safe block using the lock keyword, so that all calls to the database take place using one and only one thread at a time. This approach is illustrated in the code snippet below. 

using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
public class Product
{
    public int Id { get; set; }
    public string Name { get; set; } = string.Empty;
    public decimal Price { get; set; }
    public int Quantity { get; set; }
}
public class AppDbContext : DbContext
{
    public AppDbContext(DbContextOptions options) : base(options) { }
    public DbSet Products => Set();
}

However, while the above approach gives us the thread-safety we need, it can degrade data access performance considerably. A better approach is to use IDbContextFactory , which creates fresh DbContext instances on demand. Calling its CreateDbContext() method is cheap and produces a fresh, isolated context every time.

The following code snippet shows how you can register an instance of type IDbContextFactory as a singleton. You can safely call this code from any thread.

builder.Services.AddDbContextFactory(options =>
    options.UseSqlServer(
        builder.Configuration.GetConnectionString("Default")));

Executing EF Core queries in parallel – the solution

Now let’s see how we can put IDbContextFactory to work. The following code illustrates a class named ProductService that uses a factory to create DbContext instances for each scope of work.

public class ProductService
{
    private readonly IDbContextFactory _factory;
    public ProductService(IDbContextFactory factory)
        => _factory = factory;
    public async Task GetByIdAsync(int id)
    {
        await using var context = await _factory.CreateDbContextAsync();
        return await context.Products.FindAsync(id);
    }
    public async Task UpdateStockQuantityAsync(int id, int updateQuantity)
    {
        await using var context = await _factory.CreateDbContextAsync();
        var product = await context.Products.FindAsync(id);
        if (product is null) return;
        product.Quantity += updateQuantity;
        await context.SaveChangesAsync();
    }
}

Note that ProductService has two methods, GetByIdAsync and UpdateStockQuantityAsync. An instance of the DbContext class is created locally in each of these methods. Now, suppose you have two threads, T1 and T2, that execute these methods concurrently. That is, thread T1 executes the GetByIdAsync method while thread T2 executes the UpdateStockQuantityAsync method. Because each of these methods is executed in isolation, they will have their own context, connection, and change-tracking information, and there will be no mutable state, so you don’t need to implement thread synchronization in either of these methods.

Consider the following code that executes a read operation and an update operation in two separate tasks. 

public static async Task RunMethodsInParallelAsync(ProductService productService)
{
      Task readTask = productService.GetByIdAsync(1);
      Task updateTask = productService.UpdateStockQuantityAsync(3, 5);
      await Task.WhenAll(readTask, updateTask);
      Product? product = await readTask;
 }

The Task.WhenAll method runs the two tasks in parallel and waits until both have finished. The reason this approach is thread-safe, and will not create concurrency errors, is that each of these two methods creates its own DbContext instance internally. Therefore the read operation and the update operation use independent DbContext instances.

Use DbContext pooling to reduce allocation cost

Although creating DbContext instances is not that costly, you should consider using pooled contexts in applications that require high scalability and high performance. The following code snippet shows how you can register a pooled context. 

builder.Services.AddPooledDbContextFactory(options =>
    options.UseSqlServer(connectionString));

A call to AddDbContext() will register a DbContext instance as scoped per HTTP request. Each request will run on a different thread and each will have its own context. However, keep in mind that the default scoped registration of the DbContext will not always suffice.

You will need a factory to create instances of DbContext when you’re using a background service, or performing some work inside a particular request, or running some business logic operation over multiple contexts.

Key takeaways

  • If you use EF Core in the data access layer of your application, you must implement thread safety measures whenever you run your queries in parallel.
  • You cannot execute multiple queries in parallel in EF Core using the same DbContext instance.
  • The IDbContextFactory enables you to create a DbContext instance for each thread, thereby enabling you to work with these instances in isolation.
  • Although using a DbContext pool involves a small allocation overhead, it becomes a non-issue if you need high throughput.
]]> <![CDATA[NodeBB Patches Eight AI-Found Flaws Exposing Admin Access and Private Chats]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3691058/it-security-nachrichten/nodebb-patches-eight-ai-found-flaws-exposing-admin-access-and-private-chats/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3691058/it-security-nachrichten/nodebb-patches-eight-ai-found-flaws-exposing-admin-access-and-private-chats/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 10:58:49 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Why enterprises should care about Nokia’s AI-RAN platform]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690985/it-security-nachrichten/why-enterprises-should-care-about-nokias-ai-ran-platform/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690985/it-security-nachrichten/why-enterprises-should-care-about-nokias-ai-ran-platform/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 10:13:45 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Earlier this month, Nokia provided an AI-RAN platform update that brings an AI-native and programmable compute which is projected to double spectral efficiency by 2028. This increases speed, but more importantly, it can allow mobile operators to create some actual monetization beyond connectivity.

With this release, Nokia is introducing what it calls the industry’s first commercial AI-RAN platform, built on its AI‑native anyRAN software and Nvidia’s Aerial AI-RAN stack running on merchant GPU-based accelerated computing. The company is already seeing more than 20% gains in spectral efficiency from AI-driven radio algorithms, with a roadmap to reach 50% by 2027 and more than 100% by 2028, effectively doubling capacity on existing spectrum in dense cells.

Legacy RAN infrastructure enables connectivity but not much beyond that. The AI-RAN makes the network intelligent and extends AI into the physical world, enabling telcos to get more from their infrastructure investments, including providing a path to 6G. The partnership with Nvidia brings CUDA and AI into mobile environments.

For Network World readers, the headline isn’t just that Nokia got to market first with AI‑RAN—it’s that the company is using AI and GPUs to break the historical coupling between radio performance and custom silicon refresh cycles, and to turn the RAN into an application platform.

What AI-RAN actually is

At a technical level, Nokia’s AI‑RAN is a software‑defined baseband architecture that runs Layer 1/Layer 2 RAN functions and AI models on accelerated compute, primarily GPUs, instead of being locked into fixed‑function ASICs. Udayan Mukherjee, Nokia’s CTO for RAN and core, summarized the vision in the analyst briefing: “AI‑RAN is essentially a platform that turns the radio network into a true AI‑native programmable platform… one software detached from the hardware, defining flexible hardware deployment configurations, including part of the AI grid.”

Several pillars stand out:

  • AI‑native design: Algorithms move from traditional linear models to increasingly nonlinear techniques (e.g., advanced channel estimation, deep receivers/transmitters, RKHS-based methods), which demand tensor-heavy compute best delivered by GPUs.
  • Software-defined RAN: The same anyRAN software stack runs across different hardware configurations—plug‑in cards, standalone AI‑RAN nodes, and COTS/cloud RAN—so innovation comes via software releases rather than baseband card swaps.
  • Programmable “D‑apps” layer: Nokia is pushing a new real‑time E3 interface from Layer 1/2 into an application layer for distributed apps (D‑apps) that can tap IQ samples, channel estimation and scheduling data for use cases such as sensing and location services.
  • Crucially, this isn’t meant to replace all custom silicon overnight. Mukherjee was explicit: “We are not dropping the purpose‑built product… but we want to also get to merchant silicon, because that’s the future as we want to develop bigger models and AI elements and value‑added services on top of it.” The result is a hybrid era where AI‑accelerated platforms coexist with existing basebands but begin to shoulder the most compute‑intensive workloads.

Why AI-RAN matters for operators

Nokia and its early operator partners are trying to solve three perennial problems: finite spectrum, changing traffic patterns, and the drag of hardware refresh cycles.

First, spectrum constraints. Aji Ed, Nokia’s head of AI‑RAN and cloud RAN, called spectrum “the first constraint everybody has,” noting that operators have paid “huge amount of money” for bands and now need to “get up to the 2x spectrum” in terms of usable capacity. By running more complex AI models for multi‑user MIMO pairing, channel estimation, carrier aggregation and deep receiver/transmitter functions on GPUs, Nokia believes it can unlock those gains where traditional platforms simply run out of compute headroom.

Second, traffic is shifting. Generative AI and distributed inference workloads are driving more uplink-heavy, latency‑sensitive patterns that current RANs weren’t designed for. AI‑RAN’s ability to adapt scheduling, beamforming and resource allocation dynamically via AI models deployed at the baseband is meant to keep up with this shift.

Third, innovation cadence. In Ed’s words, “hardware upgrades can’t keep up with the innovation… we can’t really have a silicon refresh cycle linked with every three‑year cycle.” Nokia’s subscription‑based software model is designed to deliver new AI algorithms, spectral‑efficiency improvements and network optimization features continuously, without requiring “forklift” hardware replacements.

For operators, the message is attractive: comparable TCO and power to existing basebands, “no hardware premium” for GPU adoption, but higher capacity and a path to new services. Nokia told analysts it has reached performance, price and energy efficiency parity between its custom GridShark silicon and GPU-based systems, while moving the baseband roadmap to merchant silicon.

Nokia’s differentiation strategy

Every major RAN vendor is talking about AI‑enhanced radio, but Nokia is drawing a line between incremental gains and what it claims is a platform shift. When asked why its 2x spectral efficiency ambition is so much higher than the ~20% numbers competitors discuss, Ed pointed to the underlying architecture: “We are able to bring much more complex algorithms into this compute infrastructure… all of these require much higher compute, which is exactly what is coming from the accelerated computing.”

Several differentiators emerge:

  • Aggressive spectral roadmap: Nokia is targeting 1.5x by 2027 and 2x by 2028, across TDD massive MIMO and FDD scenarios, with a feature roadmap built jointly with Nvidia and other partners.
  • Single code base, three deployment paths: The same anyRAN software stack runs on (1) a GPU‑powered AirScale capacity plug‑in card, (2) a high‑capacity standalone AI‑RAN node, and (3) GPU‑based COTS/cloud RAN servers. This lets operators modernize “at their own pace” and mix brownfield evolution with greenfield AI-native deployments.
  • Open ecosystem with D‑apps: Nokia is leaning into ORAN compliance (front‑haul, O1/O2) and actively championing the E3 interface and D‑apps concept within ORAN and AI‑RAN alliances, with Bell Labs and at least two external partners already building sensing and location applications on the platform.
  • Software subscription tied to value: The commercial model builds on existing software subscriptions but ties pricing more explicitly to delivered value, such as spectral efficiency improvements and new AI services, rather than pure license metrics.

Mukherjee emphasized the openness angle in the briefing: “We see a lot of third‑party applications, whether it’s improving spectral efficiency or location service or sensing, can be developed on this platform… any AI‑powered services from us in Nokia or from ecosystems can be actually developed on top of it.” For operators burned by closed optimization stacks, that’s a notable pivot.

How AI-RAN unlocks new revenue

Most operators will sign off on AI‑RAN if the capacity and TCO story holds, but the more strategic question is monetization beyond connectivity. Nokia’s spokespeople spent considerable time on this in the analyst call, pointing to several classes of services that are difficult or impossible to deliver without AI running in the RAN itself.

Examples include:

  • Integrated sensing: Turning the RAN into a distributed sensor grid that can support applications such as 3D mapping, gesture recognition and environmental monitoring, using the same RF infrastructure. Mukherjee noted, “We have at least two to three partners developing sensing applications on top of it… as well as two other companies developing location services.”
  • Physical AI and location services: For factories, logistics hubs and smart cities, AI‑RAN can provide high‑precision positioning and real‑time telemetry for robots, drones and autonomous systems by fusing radio data and AI models at the edge.
  • Distributed AI infrastructure: Operators exploring “AI‑native cities” can use AI‑RAN nodes and COTS GPU servers as a distributed inference fabric for applications that need tight latency to endpoints—think AR/VR offload, real‑time video analytics or interactive generative AI experiences.
  • Premium connectivity tiers: With fine‑grained, AI‑driven control over uplink/downlink scheduling and QoS, operators can create differentiated SLAs for enterprise slices, mission‑critical IoT and AI workloads, charging for guaranteed performance rather than best‑effort connectivity.

Ed framed the opportunity as a continuum: Superior connectivity from 2x spectral efficiency creates “space for new AI workloads and other use cases,” while the D‑apps ecosystem and subscription model provide a mechanism to package and sell those capabilities. In practice, that could look like:

  • Industrial sensing-as-a-service, where Nokia and partners supply D‑apps for integrated sensing and positioning, and operators monetize them per site or per device.
  • Network‑exposed APIs for inference, location and RF sensing, integrated into operators’ broader network API portfolios as they pursue “network-as-a-platform” strategies.
  • Sector‑specific AI‑native services, such as stadium analytics, transportation corridor monitoring, or drone traffic management, built by ISVs on top of Nokia’s exposed E3 data.

For operators that already use Nokia’s MantaRay and SMO stacks for cross‑network optimization, AI‑RAN essentially becomes the local real‑time execution environment, while R‑apps/X‑apps continue to orchestrate macro-level behaviors. Mukherjee described this layered architecture as “DU and CU on the platform running D‑apps using E3, interfacing to X‑apps and R‑apps through E2SM and connecting to the overall management system/SMO for lifecycle management.”

Adoption path and reality check

Nokia is not promising instant transformation. AI‑RAN pilots are slated for late 2026, with commercial availability on card‑based systems in 2027 and AirScale-based systems around 2028, all driven from a single software stack that supports 4G, 5G and is upgradable to 6G. The company already has trials and collaborations underway with T‑Mobile US, SoftBank, Indosat Ooredoo Hutchison, BT, Elisa, Vodafone, Orange, NTT Docomo, Deutsche Telekom and others.

There are still open questions around 3GPP vs ORAN standardization of E3, the maturity of the D‑apps ecosystem, and how operators will digest yet another subscription layer tied to radio software. But Nokia’s move puts a stake in the ground: in the AI era, the RAN is not just a throughput engine; it’s a programmable AI computer that can be monetized.

For Network World readers evaluating vendor roadmaps, this launch suggests a clear directional change. If Nokia hits its targets, AI‑RAN could mark the point where baseband becomes less about hardware SKUs and more about an AI platform strategy—one where spectral efficiency and new services are rolled out at “software speed,” as Ed described it, rather than at the pace of the next card generation.

]]> <![CDATA[Speicherfresser unter macOS ausfindig machen]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690875/server/speicherfresser-unter-macos-ausfindig-machen/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690875/server/speicherfresser-unter-macos-ausfindig-machen/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 09:01:05 +0200 🐧 Server tsecurity.de Speicherfresser unter macOS ausfindig machen
Screenshot der macOS-Anwendung Disk Inventory X mit einer bunten Treemap-Grafik, links eine Dateiliste mit dem Programm iPhoto und dessen Unterordnern, rechts eine Farblegende der verschiedenen Dateitypen.
Daniel Richey
Wer aus der Windows-Welt Tools wie WinDirStat kennt, sucht auf dem Mac oft vergeblich nach einem würdigen Pendant. Mit "Disk Inventory Xs" bekommt ein Klassiker aus den Nullerjahren jetzt endlich ein Update für Apple Silicon.
]]> <![CDATA[Russian-Linked Hackers Target Zimbra Users With Zero-Day Exploit]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690812/it-security-nachrichten/russian-linked-hackers-target-zimbra-users-with-zero-day-exploit/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690812/it-security-nachrichten/russian-linked-hackers-target-zimbra-users-with-zero-day-exploit/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 08:25:49 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Zimbra phishing campaign

A Zimbra phishing campaign attributed to Russian state-supported cyber actors has targeted Western government and commercial organizations, exploiting CVE-2025-66376 to access sensitive email data and other information, according to a joint cybersecurity advisory issued in July 2026. The activity has been linked primarily to LAUNDRY BEAR, a Russian state-supported advanced persistent threat (APT) group tracked under several names across the cybersecurity industry. The advisory said the campaign has been active since at least July 2025 and has targeted organizations using the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS). Unlike conventional phishing attacks that typically require victims to click a malicious link or open an attachment, the campaign uses a view-based exploit. A user only needs to view a malicious email in a vulnerable version of ZCS webmail for the exploit to attempt execution.

Zimbra Phishing Campaign Uses CVE-2025-66376

The campaign centers on CVE-2025-66376, a vulnerability that was initially exploited as a zero-day vulnerability before a patch was released. According to the advisory, the activity began in July 2025, months before the vulnerability was published and patched. The vulnerability allows a JavaScript payload contained in email content to execute because of improper sanitization of CSS @import directives within an email. The malicious payload uses Base64 encoding and XOR encryption and can be modified to help bypass basic threat detection signatures. Once triggered, the payload attempts to collect and exfiltrate information through 12 stages. These include gathering the victim's email address and environment information, collecting two-factor authentication codes and application passwords, attempting to capture saved passwords, enabling mail protocols, gathering the Global Address List (GAL), and sending archived email data. The advisory said the campaign's use of a zero-day exploit demonstrates the ability of LAUNDRY BEAR to operationalize novel vulnerabilities into a successful attack capability.

LAUNDRY BEAR Targets Email and Sensitive Data

The primary objective of the Russian state-supported cyber actors appears to be the covert acquisition of email data. The campaign attempts to steal the last 90 days of email communications, email addresses, passwords, the organization's Global Address List, 2FA tokens and newly created application passcodes. The actors have targeted organizations connected to the defense industrial base, government, education, energy, law enforcement, media, non-governmental organizations and technology sectors. The advisory said LAUNDRY BEAR likely identifies organizations with publicly exposed Zimbra infrastructure through port scanning and commercially available datasets. It may then compile individual user email addresses using commercial data, open-source intelligence or previously exfiltrated information. The group has also used compromised accounts to distribute phishing emails. Since at least November 2025, malicious emails were reportedly sent from victim infrastructure, potentially using previously compromised accounts to make the activity harder to detect and to bypass anti-phishing measures.

Ulej and Flowerbed Support Email Data Exfiltration

The campaign uses a custom capability called Ulej, which was developed to exploit ZCS and exfiltrate sensitive information. The collected data is sent to infrastructure associated with the Flowerbed framework. Flowerbed is a Python project using Docker and includes four containers: Catcher, Certbot, Nginx and Gardener. Catcher receives and aggregates stolen information, while Nginx operates as an HTTPS reverse proxy. The framework uses DNS and HTTPS channels for email data exfiltration. The advisory said the campaign can exfiltrate email content, contacts, attachments, authentication information and other data. The stolen information is initially stored by Catcher before being transferred to non-public-facing infrastructure. The report also noted indications that artificial intelligence may have played a role in developing the Flowerbed codebase, highlighting the increasing use of AI in developing malicious capabilities.

Organizations Urged to Patch Vulnerable Zimbra Systems

The advisory urged organizations using ZCS to immediately ensure their systems are not running vulnerable versions. A patch for CVE-2025-66376 was released for ZCS versions 10.1.13 and 10.0.18. If immediate patching is not possible, organizations are advised to have employees use alternative mail clients and avoid the Classic ZCS webmail client until the software is updated. Security teams are also advised to monitor internet-connected ZCS systems, workstations accessing those systems and network traffic for signs of suspicious activity. Recommended monitoring includes looking for large outbound data transfers to unfamiliar VPS providers, unusual DNS queries with random subdomains, sudden connections to newly established domains and connections involving VPN providers such as Mullvad. Organizations should also consider authentication services that support passkeys and maintain network monitoring, packet capture or NetFlow data and relevant logs. The advisory further recommends that organizations identifying victims revoke Application Passcodes and 2FA scratch keys and require affected employees to change their passwords. Security teams should also investigate the original phishing email and quarantine similar messages to prevent further exploitation and data theft.]]> <![CDATA[One Country Absorbed Nearly Half of the World’s Ransomware Attacks in Just Six Months – The United States]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690767/it-security-nachrichten/one-country-absorbed-nearly-half-of-the-worlds-ransomware-attacks-in-just-six-months-the-united-states/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690767/it-security-nachrichten/one-country-absorbed-nearly-half-of-the-worlds-ransomware-attacks-in-just-six-months-the-united-states/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 07:42:03 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Ransomware Attacks, Qilin, US, Ransomware Attacks on US

Strip away the geopolitics, the hacktivist noise, and the espionage headlines, and one number from the first half of 2026 stands out above everything else: 1,721. That's how many ransomware attacks hit organizations in the United States between January and June, according to new research from Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL). It's not just the highest total of any country tracked in the report — it's more than the next nine most-targeted countries combined.

Canada, in second place worldwide, recorded 179 attacks. Germany logged 155. The United Kingdom, 138. Add up the rest of the global top 10 — France, Italy, Spain, Thailand, India and Brazil — and the total still falls more than 600 attacks short of the U.S. figure alone. Out of 3,836 ransomware attacks CRIL tracked worldwide this half, roughly 45% landed on American soil.

Also read: Fairlife Ransomware Attack Hits Production Systems, U.S. Operations Suspended

A Single Region, an Outsized Share

Widen the lens slightly and the picture holds. North America as a whole recorded 1,981 ransomware attacks in H1 2026 — more than half of every ransomware incident Cyble observed globally — alongside 35 data breach and leak incidents and 9 initial access sale listings. The report describes the region as home to "a mature, persistently active RaaS ecosystem operating at high volume across a wide range of industries and geographies."

Two ransomware-as-a-service operators did much of the damage. Qilin, the single most prolific gang worldwide, claimed 370 of those North American attacks on its own — nearly 19% of the regional total. Akira followed with 268, and INC Ransom added another 164. Together, Qilin and Akira alone accounted for more than half of all recorded ransomware activity across the region, a level of concentration that points to a small number of highly organized affiliate networks doing the bulk of the damage rather than a diffuse swarm of opportunists.

Also read: Qilin Ransomware Group’s TTPs Examined by Researchers

Where the Pressure Lands

Professional Services bore the brunt of North American ransomware activity, with INC Ransom showing a marked preference for law firms and other high-value services with sensitive client data. Construction, Manufacturing and Healthcare followed close behind.

One operator, AiLock, stood out for a coordinated wave of victim disclosures that all landed on the same day — March 3 — a pattern consistent with a mass-exploitation campaign rather than isolated intrusions. LockBit, despite years of law enforcement pressure and takedown attempts, kept up a steady tempo against public-sector and educational targets throughout the period, showcasing how difficult the group has been to fully dismantle.

On the data breach side, Technology and financial services (BFSI) were the most frequently targeted sectors in North America, together accounting for roughly 43% of incidents — a reflection of how much intellectual property and monetizable personal data those industries hold.

Notably, Agriculture & Livestock emerged as a significant target for initial access brokers, accounting for a third of all access listings tied to the region. Cyble flags this as a sign of "growing risk in the food supply chain," an area that has historically drawn less attention from ransomware operators than finance or healthcare.

The initial access market itself was strikingly concentrated: two sellers, tracked under the handles "redpin" and "xpl0itrs," accounted for nearly all listings targeting North American organizations. Threat actors also continued to lean on known and zero-day vulnerabilities in widely deployed enterprise platforms — including products from Ivanti and Palo Alto Networks — as their preferred way into corporate networks.

Hacktivism Blurs into Cybercrime

North America wasn't spared the hacktivism wave sweeping the rest of the world either. Collectives including SOLDADOS DIGITALES – UNIÓN AMERICANA and LYSTIC TEAM #ID drove roughly 56 data leak or dump posts and touched about 360 unique domains across the region, with Government, Technology, financial services and telecommunications entities most frequently in the crosshairs.

Cyble's broader findings suggest many groups marketing themselves as ideologically driven hacktivists are, in practice, running side businesses in stolen data brokerage and DDoS-for-hire services — a blurring of motive that complicates how defenders triage the threat.

The scale of the U.S. numbers doesn't necessarily mean American companies have weaker defenses than their global peers — the concentration also reflects the sheer size and digital density of the U.S. economy, and its outsized share of the high-value targets ransomware affiliates chase. But the data does argue for a shift in posture.

Cyble's broader recommendations — treating data exfiltration, not just encryption, as the primary risk; prioritizing patches for the recurring vendor list; and monitoring initial access markets as a leading indicator rather than an afterthought — apply nowhere more urgently than in a country absorbing this much of the world's ransomware volume on its own.

]]> <![CDATA[Microsoft launches new in-house AI models it says cut costs up to 89% versus OpenAI]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690504/it-nachrichten/microsoft-launches-new-in-house-ai-models-it-says-cut-costs-up-to-89-versus-openai/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690504/it-nachrichten/microsoft-launches-new-in-house-ai-models-it-says-cut-costs-up-to-89-versus-openai/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 02:50:17 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de Microsoft AI released two new in-house models into public preview on Wednesday — MAI-Image-2.5-Pro, its highest-fidelity image generator to date, and MAI-Voice-2-Flash, a speech model built for high-volume enterprise workloads — while publishing production data that amounts to the company's most aggressive argument yet that it can power its own products without leaning on OpenAI's frontier models.

The announcement, made by Microsoft AI's Superintelligence team, lands roughly a year after the company committed to building purpose-built models internally, and it arrives with an unusual level of specificity about where those models now run: Bing, PowerPoint, OneDrive, Dynamics 365, Excel, GitHub Copilot, and Azure. The message to enterprise buyers — and, implicitly, to OpenAI — is that Microsoft's homegrown models are no longer research projects. They are production infrastructure serving millions of users.

"Each of these enhancements is a step toward the same goal: Microsoft products, powered by Microsoft models," the company wrote in its announcement blog.

How MAI-Image-2.5-Pro and MAI-Voice-2-Flash stake out opposite ends of the AI cost curve

The two new releases occupy opposite ends of what Microsoft calls the quality-speed-cost curve, and the positioning is deliberate. MAI-Image-2.5-Pro targets the premium tier: hero imagery, detailed editing, and precise in-image text rendering — the last of which has long been a notorious weak spot for image generation models. Microsoft priced the model at $5 per million text input tokens, $8 per million image input tokens, and $106 per million image output tokens. The base MAI-Image-2.5 model recently launched at No. 2 for image editing on Arena, the community leaderboard that has become a de facto scoreboard for generative media.

The creative industry appears to be taking notice. Rob Reilly, global chief creative officer at advertising giant WPP, called the Pro model "a strong leap forward for GenMedia tools" in a statement included in Microsoft's announcement, adding that "Microsoft has firmly established itself among the leaders in generative AI."

MAI-Voice-2-Flash goes the other direction. First previewed at Microsoft's Build conference, Flash runs twice as fast as MAI-Voice-2 and costs 32% less, priced at $15 per million characters. It is designed for the unglamorous but enormous market of high-volume voice — call centers, voice agents, and real-time speech applications where latency and cost-per-call matter more than marginal gains in expressiveness. Together, the two models reflect a strategy of building families of models rather than a single flagship, because, as the company put it, a creative studio chasing maximum fidelity has very different needs from a customer service operation handling millions of calls a day.

Microsoft's production metrics show in-house models cutting GPU costs by up to 89%

The model launches are arguably less newsworthy than the deployment metrics Microsoft attached to them — numbers that read like a systematic case for swapping out third-party frontier models across its product portfolio. 

Bing Image Creator now runs entirely on MAI-Image-2.5, end to end, marking the first time the consumer image tool is fully in-house. In PowerPoint, Microsoft says MAI-Image-2.5 reduces GPU costs by up to 84% compared with GPT-Image-2, OpenAI's image model. In OneDrive, where MAI-Image-2.5 is now the default for key image-editing scenarios, the company reports a 26% increase in save rates, roughly 25% lower P95 latency, and 2.5 times greater efficiency under medium-utilization production workloads.

On the voice side, MAI-Voice-2-Flash now powers Dynamics 365 Contact Center — the platform used by customers including T-Mobile and EasyJet — where Microsoft claims GPU cost reductions of up to 89%. The model is also integrated into Azure Voice Live for developers building speech-to-speech agents.

Perhaps the most consequential deployment sits in healthcare. Microsoft's Dragon Copilot, used by 170,000 medical providers and responsible for processing 28 million patient encounters last quarter, now runs on MAI-Transcribe-1.5 for its multilingual workflow across 58 languages. Microsoft says internal evaluations show a 50% relative reduction in both transcription and language-identification error rates across most languages — a meaningful claim in a domain where transcription errors can propagate directly into clinical notes.

Inside the 'hill-climbing' strategy that lets small models beat GPT-5.6 in Excel

In a companion post published the same day, Microsoft detailed the methodology behind these results — what it calls its "hill-climbing machine," an integrated flywheel of data, models, and the product "harness" that surrounds them.

The clearest example is MAI-Code-1-Flash, the lightweight coding model launched in GitHub Copilot in June. Microsoft says the model achieves an approximately 10% higher code accept rate than GPT-5.4 Mini and Claude Haiku 4.5 in VS Code, while using 10% fewer median tokens. Developer retention tells a similar story: users were 6% more likely to return across multiple days than with GPT-5.4 Mini, and 11% more likely than with Claude Haiku 4.5.

Then Microsoft did something more interesting. It took the MAI-Code-1-Flash checkpoint and further trained it inside an Excel reinforcement learning environment, teaching a coding model the tools and workflows of spreadsheet knowledge work. The result, according to production user feedback, is a model on par with GPT-5.6 for the most common Excel tasks — while being small enough to run on Nvidia's older H100 and even A100 GPUs rather than requiring the latest-generation accelerators.

That hardware detail deserves emphasis. Every major AI company is fighting for allocation of cutting-edge chips, and a model that delivers frontier-adjacent quality on two-generation-old silicon fundamentally changes the deployment economics. It also frees the newest hardware — including Microsoft's now-operational GB200 cluster — for training rather than serving.

Satya Nadella's 'frontier diffusion' manifesto redraws the OpenAI relationship

Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella framed the announcements in a lengthy post on X titled "Frontier Diffusion & Control," which functions as something close to a strategic manifesto. "We can now take saturated frontier capabilities and deliver them at scale and at lower cost through models optimized for high-usage products, while continuing to use frontier models for frontier needs," Nadella wrote, adding that Microsoft is "beginning to route traffic across our first-party surfaces to MAI whenever our models match or outperform frontier alternatives."

Translated from executive prose: capabilities that were state-of-the-art a year ago are now table stakes, and Microsoft believes it can replicate them cheaply for the specific, repetitive tasks that dominate real product usage. Why pay frontier prices for a frontier model when a user just wants to reformat a spreadsheet column?

Nadella was careful to note that "frontier models from OpenAI and Anthropic are part of the orchestration system alongside MAI" — but he also articulated a pointed principle of model independence, arguing that a company's evaluations "should continue to hill climb even when any given model has been removed." 

“Keeping the harness, memory, context, and skills outside the model, he argued, is what gives Microsoft control. The subtext is hard to miss. Reuters reported in April that Microsoft’s exclusive license to OpenAI’s technology had been revised into a non-exclusive arrangement, and The Information reported last September that Microsoft had begun incorporating Anthropic models into some products. Wednesday’s announcement completes the triangle: Microsoft as orchestrator, with its partners’ frontier models as interchangeable components and its own models absorbing an ever-larger share of routine traffic.”

Developers cheer cheaper task-specific models while skeptics question Microsoft's track record

The response online captured both the appeal and the skepticism surrounding the strategy. "I love when people use small models for niche tasks," wrote one X user, @mavihsk, responding to Nadella's post. "Why do I have to use the all-knowing model just to change my field in Excel?" Another user, @nabu_lines, distilled the pitch neatly: "cost and performance both improve when you stop overusing the biggest model."

Others were less charitable about Microsoft's execution track record. "Microsoft is the worst when it comes to listening to user feedback," wrote designer @designedbyabin, arguing the company "will lose the AI race because they repeatedly failed to understand user needs." And one user, @tokenoverflow, offered a drier critique of the model-independence pitch: "i want it keep hill climbing after removing microsoft."

The skeptics raise a fair point. Microsoft's self-reported metrics — accept rates, save rates, GPU savings — come from its own internal evaluations, not independent benchmarks, and the company chooses which comparisons to publish.

But the strategy's logic does not depend on any single number. Nadella's framing that software now has "real marginal cost for the first time" explains why Microsoft is obsessive about tokens, GPUs, and serving costs: when AI features run on every keystroke across a billion-user product portfolio, an 84% GPU cost reduction is not an optimization. It is the difference between a viable business and a money pit.

Why Microsoft is turning its internal AI playbook into an Azure product

The final piece of the strategy is that Microsoft is selling the playbook, not just the models. Nadella explicitly positioned the hill-climbing approach as "a template for every other AI native, SaaS, or Enterprise company," and Microsoft is packaging the toolchain through Foundry and what it calls Frontier Tuning — letting enterprises train specialized models against their own proprietary evaluations and reinforcement learning environments. That turns Microsoft's internal cost-cutting exercise into an Azure product, and it gives enterprise customers a reason to run their AI workloads on Microsoft's cloud even if the models themselves come from elsewhere.

The company's emphasis on models trained "on clean, traceable, enterprise-grade data, without distillation from third-party models" serves the same commercial end. In an industry facing mounting scrutiny over training data provenance, Microsoft is betting that enterprise buyers — and courts — will care where model capabilities come from. Microsoft says it is now extending the hill-climbing approach to Copilot Chat, Outlook, and PowerPoint, and both new models are available in public preview through Microsoft Foundry and the MAI Playground. "None of this is an endpoint," the company wrote. "We're just getting started."

Seven years ago, Microsoft bet more than $13 billion that OpenAI would build the future of AI. Wednesday's announcement suggests the company has since learned a cheaper lesson: the future of AI may belong to whoever builds the frontier, but the profits belong to whoever makes it ordinary.

]]> <![CDATA[CVE-2026-8264 | Tenda AC6 15.03.06.23 httpd /goform/WifiApScan formWifiApScan wl2g.public.country/wl5g.public.country os command injection]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690446/sicherheitsluecken/cve-2026-8264-tenda-ac6-15030623-httpd-goformwifiapscan-formwifiapscan-wl2gpubliccountrywl5gpubliccountry-os-command-injection/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690446/sicherheitsluecken/cve-2026-8264-tenda-ac6-15030623-httpd-goformwifiapscan-formwifiapscan-wl2gpubliccountrywl5gpubliccountry-os-command-injection/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 01:44:06 +0200 🕵️ Sicherheitslücken tsecurity.de critical, was found in Tenda AC6 15.03.06.23. Affected by this vulnerability is the function formWifiApScan of the file /goform/WifiApScan of the component httpd. Executing a manipulation of the argument wl2g.public.country/wl5g.public.country can lead to os command injection. This vulnerability is registered as CVE-2026-8264. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. Furthermore, an exploit is available.]]> <![CDATA[I built a Linux filesystem benchmark for corruption, snapshots, rebuilds and ENOSPC across 26 storage layouts]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690327/linux-tipps/i-built-a-linux-filesystem-benchmark-for-corruption-snapshots-rebuilds-and-enospc-across-26-storage-layouts/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690327/linux-tipps/i-built-a-linux-filesystem-benchmark-for-corruption-snapshots-rebuilds-and-enospc-across-26-storage-layouts/ Fri, 24 Jul 2026 00:13:06 +0200 🐧 Linux Tipps tsecurity.de

Most filesystem benchmarks measure throughput on a freshly formatted single device. That is useful, but it misses many of the reasons people choose btrfs, ZFS or bcachefs in the first place.

I built modern-fs-benchmark to examine modern filesystems as complete storage systems, including their features, failure modes and behavior over time.

The current matrix contains 26 configurations across btrfs, ZFS, bcachefs, ext4 and XFS over md/LVM, dm-integrity, native and LUKS encryption, parity layouts, and XFS on a ZFS zvol.

Hosted CI dashboard:

https://bartosz.fenski.pl/modern-fs-benchmark/

Experimental real-hardware dashboard:

https://bartosz.fenski.pl/modern-fs-benchmark/real-hw/

Apache-2.0 licensed source and complete methodology:

https://github.com/fenio/modern-fs-benchmark

The raw benchmark datasets are published under CC BY 4.0. Every result records the kernel and filesystem tool/module versions. CI artifacts also contain a full command trace, so the exact workload is inspectable rather than hidden behind a chart.

Why I started this project

Many filesystem benchmarks follow a familiar pattern: create a filesystem with mostly default options, mount it, run fio or another generic workload, and compare throughput.

General-purpose suites such as the Phoronix Test Suite are useful for conventional performance comparisons, but they do not focus on the machinery that makes modern copy-on-write filesystems interesting.

I wanted a benchmark designed around btrfs, ZFS and bcachefs as multi-device storage systems rather than treating them as interchangeable replacements for ext4 on a single freshly formatted disk.

That means testing behavior such as:

- Redundancy and degraded operation

- Snapshot aging, scaling and reclamation

- Compression and encryption

- Reflinks and clone divergence

- Fsync tail latency and responsiveness under load

- Rebuild and scrub behavior

- Near-full and hard-ENOSPC behavior

- Data integrity and recovery from corruption

Ext4 and XFS over md, LVM and dm-integrity are included as classic-stack baselines so the costs and benefits of integrated CoW designs can be compared with layered alternatives.

Silent corruption is one particularly important example. When one redundant copy is deliberately corrupted behind the filesystem, checksumming filesystems such as btrfs, ZFS and bcachefs can identify the damaged copy and recover from a valid replica.

Traditional md/LVM redundancy without data checksums can notice during a scrub that its copies disagree, but it cannot determine which one is correct. In my tests, some classic configurations returned corrupted data successfully without an application-visible error.

The dm-integrity configuration shows that a classic layered stack can obtain integrity protection too, with a measurable performance cost.

An important limitation

The main dashboard uses loop devices on GitHub-hosted VMs. Absolute throughput numbers and small differences between filesystems should not be interpreted as hardware rankings.

The hosted runs are primarily useful for:

- Correctness and integrity outcomes

- Comparisons within the same job

- Large behavioral differences

- Snapshot-aging and near-full shapes

- Trends across repeated runs

Real disks are required for meaningful absolute performance, concurrency scaling, device parallelism and mixed-media topologies.

I am aware of this limitation and do not want the hosted dashboard to suggest more precision than the underlying environment can provide.

The real-hardware experiment

Kent Overstreet, the creator of bcachefs, made one of his Hetzner machines available for a real-hardware experiment.

The server had two physical NVMe devices. It completed three full benchmark runs, which are available in the separate real-hardware dashboard. These runs provided meaningful absolute measurements and exposed concurrency behavior that cannot be observed when several loop devices share one virtual disk.

During the fourth run, one NVMe controller entered the kernel’s dead state. The existing machine environment had its operating system on RAID0 across the two NVMe devices, so the hardware failure also made part of /nix/store unreadable and eventually prevented new SSH sessions.

The incomplete fourth run is not being published as benchmark data. This was a failure of the underlying hardware, not a result attributable to any filesystem being tested.

I am grateful to Kent for providing the machine and making the real-hardware experiment possible. Without that access, the three existing hardware runs would not exist.

Where I would like to take it

Better hardware would not merely produce more reliable throughput numbers. It would enable an entirely new class of tests designed for multi-device and multi-tier filesystems.

I would eventually like to run the suite on a machine containing several storage classes, for example two HDDs, two SSDs and an NVMe device.

That could support scenarios such as:

- HDD, SSD and NVMe baselines using identical workloads

- bcachefs foreground and background targets

- ZFS HDD data vdevs with SSD special vdevs

- Separate ZFS L2ARC and SLOG experiments

- LVM dm-cache in writeback and writethrough modes

- Metadata and small-block placement on faster media

- Foreground latency during background migration

- Contention between fast and slow storage tiers

- Degraded operation and rebuild under application load

- Performance before, during and after promoting or evacuating a storage tier

These are the kinds of scenarios for which multi-device and multi-tier filesystems are built, but they cannot be represented honestly when every “device” is a loop file backed by the same cloud disk.

I am considering either renting a suitable dedicated server or eventually building and hosting my own machine. Providers such as Worldstream offer configurations close to what I need, but the recurring cost is currently outside the project’s budget.

For now, the benchmark will remain in its hosted-CI form for an unknown amount of time. The existing dashboard will continue to be useful for correctness, behavioral comparisons and regression tracking, but it cannot answer every real-hardware performance question or model complex mixed-media topologies.

I am also open to running the suite on hardware provided by someone else. A useful environment would need Linux root access, clearly identified block devices that may be wiped, and enough uninterrupted access to complete repeated runs. The hardware description, methodology and resulting data would remain public.

I would appreciate technical feedback:

- Which current tests are misleading or unfair?

- Which failure scenarios are missing?

- Which mixed-media topologies would be most useful?

- Which additional filesystems or layered stacks should be included?

- Which results deserve deeper investigation?

The methodology, implementation and raw results are public. If a filesystem is being tested in a way that misrepresents it, I consider that a bug in the benchmark.

submitted by /u/bfenski
[link] [comments]]]> <![CDATA[2nd Public Beta of iOS 27, iPadOS 27, & MacOS 27 Golden Gate Available for Testing]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690101/ios-mac-os/2nd-public-beta-of-ios-27-ipados-27-macos-27-golden-gate-available-for-testing/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690101/ios-mac-os/2nd-public-beta-of-ios-27-ipados-27-macos-27-golden-gate-available-for-testing/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 21:37:49 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de Apple has released the second public beta versions of iOS 27, iPadOS 27, and MacOS 27 Golden Gate, to users who are eligible. If you’re interested in installing those betas on your device, you can read instructions for iPhone and iPad here, or for Mac here. MacOS 27, iOS 27, and iPadOS 27 have an ... Read More

The post 2nd Public Beta of iOS 27, iPadOS 27, & MacOS 27 Golden Gate Available for Testing appeared first on OS X Daily.

]]> <![CDATA[Apple Confirms The Morning Show Will End With Season 5]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690100/ios-mac-os/apple-confirms-the-morning-show-will-end-with-season-5/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690100/ios-mac-os/apple-confirms-the-morning-show-will-end-with-season-5/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 21:37:48 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Crank up Apple’s Liquid Glass to maximum transparency and you’ll enjoy every warped second]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690099/ios-mac-os/crank-up-apples-liquid-glass-to-maximum-transparency-and-youll-enjoy-every-warped-second/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690099/ios-mac-os/crank-up-apples-liquid-glass-to-maximum-transparency-and-youll-enjoy-every-warped-second/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 21:37:46 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de Apple’s Liquid Glass interface has always been a bold, polarizing experiment in translucency. With the iOS 27 public beta, the company…

The post Crank up Apple’s Liquid Glass to maximum transparency and you’ll enjoy every warped second appeared first on MacDailyNews.

]]> <![CDATA[Black Forest Labs launches FLUX 3 capable of generating images and 20-second video with audio — but in limited release to start]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690017/it-nachrichten/black-forest-labs-launches-flux-3-capable-of-generating-images-and-20-second-video-with-audio-but-in-limited-release-to-start/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690017/it-nachrichten/black-forest-labs-launches-flux-3-capable-of-generating-images-and-20-second-video-with-audio-but-in-limited-release-to-start/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:48:22 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de Black Forest Labs (BFL) is expanding its FLUX family beyond image generation with today's launch of FLUX 3, a multimodal frontier model trained to understand and generate images, or combined audio/video clips up to 20 seconds from a single prompt — and to extend the same underlying architecture to robotic vision and actions.

The Freiburg, Germany-based AI lab says FLUX 3 is jointly trained across those modalities rather than assembling separate image, video and audio models behind a common interface.

That distinction is central to the company's pitch: BFL wants enterprises to think about creative generation, simulation, computer use and robotics as connected applications of a single capability it calls visual intelligence — models, in the company's words, "that can perceive, predict, and act across physical and digital environments." This release marks BFL's first public video generation model.

FLUX 3 will be offered through four product lines: FLUX 3 Video, FLUX 3 Image, FLUX 3 Action and the upcoming, open source FLUX 3 Dev. FLUX 3 Video, with optional native audio generation, and FLUX 3 Action are entering a gated "Early Access" program now, to which anyone can apply, but which BFL must approve.

There is presently no public access through BFL's application programming interface (API) or those of partners yet, but the company says FLUX 3 Image will roll out in the coming weeks, followed by general availability. The limited initial availability rollout echoes the release strategies of new models from other frontier labs in the U.S. lately, including Anthropic and OpenAI, though those were ostensibly for security concerns and due to government request.

What the company has not announced is pricing, production service-level commitments, evaluation methodology, sample sizes, rater counts or any image-model benchmarks at all. Enterprise buyers therefore cannot yet calculate total cost of ownership or independently reproduce the video comparisons.

Another big notable omission: FLUX 3 is not launching with downloadable weights at this time, nor an open source license. BFL says faster and open-weight versions will arrive later this year, and its technical blog names FLUX 3 Dev as "open-weight access to a multimodal backbone, for content creation (video, audio and image) and action prediction" — a considerably broader commitment than any previous FLUX Dev release, all of which covered images only.

But it arrives last in the sequence. Developers accustomed to receiving a locally deployable FLUX variant alongside — or soon after — a major model announcement will have to wait. That delay does not negate the company's commitment, but it is disappointing given the role open weights have played in FLUX's adoption thus far.

Flux 3 is rated higher than the competition, but missing pricing and benchmarking details may prevent rapid enterprise adoption

BFL has published several benchmark comparisons, but they're qualified as preliminary — with full benchmark results and methodology to be published later during broader general availability.

In early head-to-head preference testing on 10-second, 720p text-to-video clips with audio, the company says FLUX 3 was preferred over Luma Ray 3.2 in 93% of comparisons, Runway Gen-4.5 in 77%, Grok Imagine Video in 69%, Kling v3 Pro in 60%, Happy Horse v1 in 59%, Happy Horse 1.1 in 57%, and both Seedance 2.0 and Google's Gemini Omni Flash in 52%.

One caveat travels with every one of those figures, and it comes from BFL itself. The chart carrying the results is labeled a "preliminary evaluation of an early FLUX 3 candidate" — meaning the numbers describe a pre-release checkpoint rather than the model now entering early access. That cuts both ways: the shipping model may perform better, but nothing published today measures what customers will actually call.

Luma Ray 3.2 and Runway Gen-4.5, where FLUX 3 posted 93% and 77%, are the softest comparisons on the list — established products, but not the models currently setting the pace in independent video rankings. Those are real wins, and they are the ones least likely to change an enterprise shortlist.

Seedance 2.0, at 52%, is a statistical coin flip against a model most Western enterprises cannot currently procure. ByteDance indefinitely postponed Seedance 2.0's international rollout after Netflix, Warner Bros., Disney, Paramount and Sony sent legal threats over alleged systematic copyright infringement, and that suspension remains in place. Tying a frozen product is neither a strong claim nor a damaging one.

Gemini Omni Flash, also at 52%, matters much more. Omni is the closest large-platform analogue to what FLUX 3 is attempting — multimodal input, video and audio-aware creation, conversational editing — and by BFL's own measurement, the two are indistinguishable on 10-second text-to-video quality.

Google's advantage in that matchup is that Omni is generally available via Google's Gemini API for $0.10 per second of generated 720p video, or a 10-second clip for around.

One regional wrinkle matters for a German company's home market. Editing uploaded video is unavailable to Omni Flash users in the European Economic Area, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, though editing video the model itself generated is permitted. A European enterprise that wants to run its existing footage through a generative editing pass cannot currently do so on Omni Flash.

Here's a rough guide for enterprises considering which video models to rely upon:

Model

Max single-generation duration

Max resolution

Key constraints

Price per 10-second clip (720p)

Price per 10-second clip (1080p)

Price per 10-second clip (4K)

FLUX 3 Video

20 seconds

Not stated; evaluations run at 720p

Early access; no published SLA or pricing

Not announced

Not announced

Not announced

HappyHorse 1.1

15 seconds

1080p

No 4K; closed weights

Not published (v1.0 reseller rate is ~$1.82)

Not published (v1.0 reseller rate is ~$3.12)

n/a

Veo 3.1

Per-second billing

4K

Supports clip extension; preview

$4.00

$4.00

$6.00

Veo 3.1 Fast

Per-second billing

4K

Preview

$1.00

$1.20

$3.00

Veo 3.1 Lite

Per-second billing

1080p

No 4K, no clip extension; preview

$0.50

$0.80

n/a

Gemini Omni Flash

10 seconds (3s minimum)

720p at 24 FPS

Preview abd no EU access

$1.00

n/a

n/a

One architecture for media generation and physical action

FLUX 3 builds on Self-Flow, BFL's method for aligning multimodal understanding and generation within one architecture, publicized back in March 2026.

The company says it significantly scaled up compute and data to train across video, images and audio simultaneously, and that testing showed video generation and action prediction do not require separate foundations — the same architecture could be extended to action prediction without sacrificing what it learned from video.

"We place vision at the center of our approach because it is the most signal-rich medium of the physical world. Images convey structure, images and video teach spatial relationships, video teaches dynamics, and actions reveal causal relationships. But vision alone is not the complete picture," said Robin Rombach, co-founder and CEO of BFL, in a pre-release statement provided to VentureBeat. "True intelligence means perceiving the world: predicting how it will change, taking action, and learning from the results. Joint training within one unified architecture is what will get us there, because each training modality strengthens the others. Audio conveys timing, prosody, and physical events that elude vision. Language conveys goals, abstractions, and instructions that pixels cannot easily express."

He put the case more bluntly elsewhere in the announcement: "You can't cheat reality. A model that only learns images can only generate images. But the world is not made of still frames. It moves, sounds, changes, and responds."

BFL says FLUX 3 targets creative tooling, media, design, e-commerce and physical AI, supporting video generation with synchronized audio, precise image editing, product and material consistency across motion, multilingual generation and robotic action prediction. It is already being tested by Canva, Burda, Magnific (formerly Freepik), Krea and Picsart.

For creative software companies, the appeal is consolidation. A single foundation could potentially support storyboarding, image editing, product rendering, video variation and localization without repeatedly translating assets and instructions between disconnected models.

For robotics teams, the potential value is data efficiency. Models that already encode motion, object behavior and physical change may need less task-specific robot training than systems starting from raw demonstrations.

What FLUX 3 Video can actually do

The video tier is the most concretely specified part of the launch, and it settles a question that had been circulating as rumor: FLUX 3 generates clips of up to 20 seconds with audio in a single generation.

Every video output comes with native audio. For comparison, HappyHorse 1.0 tops out at 15 seconds of 1080p with synchronized audio — though BFL has not stated what resolution its 20-second clips run at, and its published evaluations were conducted at 720p. Still, a 20-second long clip from a single prompt is among the longest yet achieved, matching OpenAI's discontinued Sora model.

The capability list BFL published covers:

  • Text-to-video generation.

  • Image-to-video generation, either animating from a starting frame or using images as visual references.

  • Video-to-video generation from a reference clip, carrying elements such as a specific character into a new scene or context.

  • Generative video-audio continuation from existing video and audio input.

  • Keyframe-to-video generation for controlled transitions between defined moments.

  • Multilingual dialogue.

  • A broad range of visual styles and aspect ratios, from candid camcorder footage to animation and cinematics.

  • Typography generation and animated design.

  • Agentic chaining of individual clips into longer, multi-shot sequences.

That last item is the one enterprise video teams should look at hardest. BFL claims the capabilities combine to produce sequences lasting several minutes, with visual references keeping characters consistent across scenes. If that holds up under production conditions, it addresses the constraint that has kept generative video out of most commercial pipelines: not clip quality, but continuity across shots.

It is also the capability where competition is most direct. HappyHorse 1.1's headline upgrade is R2V, or Reference-to-Video, which accepts multiple character reference images to hold identity stable across generated footage — the same problem, approached at the input layer rather than through agentic clip chaining. Alibaba also claims zero-drift lip sync and has specifically targeted the artifacts that mark commercial AI video as synthetic, including facial oiliness and over-sharpening. Character consistency is where this category is being contested, and both companies know it.

BFL says FLUX 3 Video is already particularly strong at human facial expressions, associating sounds with physical events, and multilingual output. On the image side, the company says preliminary evaluations conducted during midtraining show significant improvement over earlier FLUX versions in complex prompt handling and text generation, including high-accuracy text in multiple languages. It published no image benchmarks or win rates.

FLUX-mimic tests whether video models can become robot models

BFL is applying its unified-architecture thesis through FLUX-mimic, a video-action model built on FLUX 3 and developed with Swiss firm Mimic Robotics, one of the first partners to receive early access.

The technical blog describes two distinct routes to action prediction: integrating native action prediction directly into FLUX 3, scaling up the initial Self-Flow work; and using the pretrained video backbone as a dynamics-aware foundation from which specialized action models can be finetuned with limited task-specific data. FLUX-mimic is the second route — the FLUX 3 backbone combined with mimic's robot-learning and production-deployment expertise in dexterous manipulation.

FLUX-mimic is designed for general-purpose robotic manipulation: helping robots understand a visual scene, predict the consequences of an action, and adapt to new tasks with far less task-specific data.

BFL and Mimic Robotics say that depending on task difficulty, the model can be finetuned for a specific manipulation task with as little as 30 minutes of robot data, where prior approaches have required 30 or more hours.

"The hardest part of robotics is data," said Elvis Nava, CTO of Mimic Robotics, in a statement provided to VentureBeat. "Every new task normally means hours of a robot repeating itself. Because FLUX-mimic is built on top of frontier video models that already understand how the physical world behaves, it picks up a new task in minutes, not days. This way, we can leapfrog the current state of the art in robot learning."

BFL argues that a model trained only on images cannot understand a world that "moves, sounds, changes, and responds," and that physical understanding is what produces convincing generated footage. Google makes a nearly identical claim for Gemini Omni.

Its developer documentation cites "world knowledge" that combines "an understanding of physics" with Gemini's grasp of history, science and cultural context. Its marketing is blunter still: "Most AI models just predict the next pixel to build a narrative or an image. Gemini Omni is different," the company posted in June, crediting the model with "an intuitive understanding of forces like gravity, kinetic energy, and fluid dynamics for more realistic movements that follow real-world logic."

The practical consequence for enterprise buyers is that world-model language is not a differentiator. Two of the three leading video systems now market physical understanding as their central advantage, and neither has published a benchmark that measures it.

There is no standard test for whether generated water behaves like water, whether a dropped object falls at a plausible rate, or whether a sound arrives when the impact does. Human preference ratings capture some of it indirectly. Nothing else on offer captures it at all.

Open weights helped make FLUX an industry standard

BFL officially launched in summer 2024 and gained a name for itself in the AI industry in the intervening two years for its commitment to open sourcing high-quality AI image models beloved by developers, creatives, and enterprises.

The company's founders, including Rombach, Andreas Blattmann and Patrick Esser, previously helped create VQGAN, latent diffusion and Stable Diffusion, the latter the open source technology that kicked off broad AI generation capabilities for the masses and currently used by many AI image generators and companies.

That reach translated into commercial distribution. FLUX models now power generative features inside Adobe Photoshop, Picsart and Nous Research's Hermes Agent, among other platforms, and the company cites film director Martin Scorsese among professional users.

Wired magazine described Black Forest Labs as a relatively small company that nevertheless became a leading competitor to Silicon Valley's largest AI labs, with FLUX models ranking near the top of image benchmarks and becoming some of the most downloaded text-to-image models on AI code sharing community Hugging Face. The company says it now runs a 100-person team across Freiburg and San Francisco.

FLUX.1 Dev, FLUX.1 Kontext Dev, FLUX.1 Fill Dev and related control models, released shortly after the firm's launch, gave researchers and creative-tool developers access to downloadable checkpoints, local inference and integrations with frameworks including Hugging Face Diffusers and ComfyUI. FLUX.1 Kontext Dev, for example, was released as an open-weight model for research and noncommercial use, with generated outputs permitted for commercial purposes under the applicable license.

The company continued that pattern with FLUX.2 Dev in late 2025, a 32-billion-parameter open-weight model combining generation and multi-reference editing. Black Forest Labs called it the strongest open-weight image generation and editing model available at launch and released weights, reference inference code and optimized implementations for consumer Nvidia GPUs.

FLUX 3 Dev raises the stakes on that evaluation. Previous Dev releases were image models. This one is described as a multimodal backbone spanning video, audio, image and action prediction — meaning a single license will govern whether a company can locally deploy a model that touches both content production and physical machinery. BFL hasn't yet shared information about its license, the parameter count, quantizations or hardware requirements.

The company frames open weights as an enterprise feature rather than a community gesture, arguing they enable secure, low-latency local deployment for applications like robotic control systems and let teams adapt FLUX 3 to their own data, products and workflows.

The financial backing behind FLUX 3 is worth noting alongside the technical claims. Black Forest Labs is valued at $3.25 billion and has raised more than $450 million from investors including a16z, AMP, Salesforce Ventures, Nvidia, General Catalyst, Adobe Ventures, Figma Ventures, Canva and Deutsche Telekom's T.Capital.

]]> <![CDATA[AMD raises the AI stakes with Helios, Venice and robotics]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3690010/it-nachrichten/amd-raises-the-ai-stakes-with-helios-venice-and-robotics/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3690010/it-nachrichten/amd-raises-the-ai-stakes-with-helios-venice-and-robotics/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:48:09 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de

AMD executives took to the stage at its Advancing AI 2026 event in San Francisco today to detail the company’s next generation of AI infrastructure solutions, from Instinct MI455X AI accelerator GPUs and 6th Gen EPYC “Venice” CPUs, to Pensando networking, ROCm.AI software and its Helios rack-scale platform that ties it all together.

AMD has been working towards rack-scale AI system solutions for years. Its ZT Systems acquisition last year added valuable engineering talent and intellectual property that is now finally bearing the real fruits. Its Helios AI platform is a major platform evolution for AMD, with shipments scheduled to begin in the second half of this year (which is here and now).

The announcements at Advancing AI show how the company has engineered its AI platform solutions for large reasoning models, sustained inference and agentic workflows. These workloads pressure memory capacity, data movement, networking and CPU orchestration. AMD’s approach is to keep as much data close to the compute engines as possible and move it more efficiently throughout the system, but there’s deeper nuance here that’s obvious versus AMD’s chief rival, NVIDIA.  

AMD’s MI455X targets the AI memory wall

The Instinct MI455X GPU is the compute engine that fuels the Helios rack, and the first GPU based on AMD’s new CDNA 5 architecture. Built with a modular mix of 2nm and 3nm chiplets, it carries 432GB of HBM4 and 23.3TB/s of peak memory bandwidth.

Compared to AMD’s current MI355X, the MI455X offers 1.5 times the memory capacity, up to 2.9 times the peak memory bandwidth and up to four times the peak matrix performance with MXFP4 and MXFP8 data types, which are lower-precision numerical formats designed to accelerate AI processing while reducing memory demands. With MXFP6 (6-bit floating point), performance is rated at up to twice that of MI355X.

AMD also shared some actual, measured internal results using production silicon. The company claims MI455X delivers 3.8 times higher FP8 decode performance, 3.5 times more measured FP4 compute performance and between 2.5 and 3.5 times more networking bandwidth than MI355X, depending on the transfer path tested. Those figures provide more context than just numerical specifications, though they remain AMD-provided comparisons that will need independent validation.

AMD Instinct chart showing generational leap in performance

AMD

The architectural choices behind the numbers are important. Reasoning models and long context windows require sizeable KV caches for maintaining AI attention states, while mixture-of-experts models frequently move large amounts of data across accelerators. MI455X should let more model data, activation states and cache remain local. New dedicated IP in hardware can transfer data while the GPU continues processing, and expanded cache and multicast capabilities are designed to reduce redundant data movement to further improve efficiency.

The aforementioned lower-precision formats can also raise throughput and reduce memory use, but model developers still have to determine where they can be applied without unacceptable accuracy loss.

AMD’s Helios rack takes aim at Vera Rubin

AMD Helios rack

Dave Altavilla

Helios is AMD’s primary rack-scale competitor to NVIDIA’s Vera Rubin platform. Each liquid-cooled rack combines 72 MI455X GPUs, 18 single-socket Venice host CPUs and Pensando networking technologies.

In its most complete, premium configuration, AMD rates Helios for 2.9 exaflops of low-precision AI compute, with 31TB of aggregate HBM4 capacity, 1.7PB/s of memory bandwidth, 260TB/s of bidirectional scale-up bandwidth and 43TB/s of scale-out bandwidth.

These are formidable figures, but they are technical specifications rather than actual application benchmarks. The more consequential development is AMD’s move from collections of eight-GPU servers to a 72-GPU shared-memory domain. Models too large for one node can operate across the rack without treating every exchange as a scale-out networking transaction, which benefits large-model inference as well as training.

AMD uses UALink over Ethernet, or UALoE, for an open standard scale-up fabric. Each MI455X provides 3.6TB/s of bidirectional scale-up bandwidth, while the complete rack delivers all-to-all connectivity through a single switch layer. AMD also claims six times more scale-out bandwidth per GPU than MI355X when MI455X is configured with three Pensando Vulcano 800 AI NICs.

While open standards give cloud providers more control over suppliers and system design, AMD and its partners now have to prove those components can deliver the predictable performance, reliability and deployment experience customers expect from a tightly controlled, more vertically integrated platform.

Finally, AMD designed Helios with automatic rerouting around failed links, virtual rack partitions, tray-level serviceability and rack-wide power, cooling and health monitoring. Major hyperscalers and potentially large-scale enterprise customers will likely key in on these capabilities, which can affect the availability, total cost and consistency of the AI services they consume.

Kind of like cowbell, AMD Venice gives agentic AI more CPU

Chart showing AMD EPYC CPU performance

AMD

AMD’s agentic CPU messaging regarding its upcoming Venice-based EPYC processors is mostly marketing speak, but the underlying requirement is very real. An AI agent can invoke retrieval, databases, security checks, code execution and other tools before a GPU generates a response. Running many agents concurrently increases the amount of conventional compute requirements surrounding the accelerators.

Venice scales to 256 Zen 6 cores with support for 512 threads, 16 memory channels, up to 1GB of L3 cache per socket, along with PCIe 6.0 and CXL 3.1 connectivity. AMD is also offering several Venice configurations for other applications, including general-purpose servers, high-frequency workloads, GPU hosts and high-density CPU sandbox systems used to execute agent tools.

Treating the CPU solely as a GPU host understates its role. Gateways, tokenization, vector search, databases and short-lived code execution stress different mixes of per-core performance, thread count, memory bandwidth and I/O. Specifically, AMD’s internal testing shows Venice significantly outperforming its current EPYC 9965 Turin CPU across five parts of the agentic AI pipeline, including gateway processing, context assembly, vector search, enterprise applications and short-lived tool execution. Individual gains vary by workload, but AMD details the overall generational improvement at up to a 1.7 times lift. As with the MI455X figures though, these comparisons come from AMD and will require independent validation.

Pensando networking and ROCm software advance

Keeping GPUs fed with data and coordinating traffic across racks directly affects utilization and operating costs. In fact, GPU utilization is a pretty sad state of affairs currently for some of the major frontier model providers.

As such, Pensando networking has become central to AMD’s roadmap. Helios can connect each MI455X to as many as three 800Gbps Vulcano AI NICs, while Salina DPUs handle front-end networking and infrastructure services.

On the software side, which is an equally critical component, AMD also introduced ROCm.AI, an AI-assisted development layer due to arrive in August. It includes reusable skills for coding agents, simplified management and Hyperloom, which can profile workloads, tune serving configurations, modify kernels and validate results.

These tools address two persistent AMD challenges: developer efficiency and ease of use, and software tuning. Automated optimization still has to produce repeatable gains without creating hard-to-maintain code, however. And while ROCm has progressed significantly over the last few years, NVIDIA’s CUDA retains an advantage in maturity, tooling and developer familiarity.

Customer commitments underscore rack-scale confidence

AMD now has commitments that give its MI450 generation and Helios considerably more weight. Meta and OpenAI have announced multi-generation agreements composed of up to 6GW of AMD compute capacity, with initial 1GW deployments planned for the second half of 2026.

Oracle plans a 50,000-GPU public cloud cluster beginning in the third quarter, while Microsoft will deploy Helios for Azure AI inference. Finally, just before the AMD event, Anthropic announced a strategic partnership for up to 2 Gigawatts of AMD-fueled AI compute, with its first gigawatt expected online in the first half of 2027.

Commitments of this scale reflect confidence in more than just MI455X performance. These customers are evaluating the complete architecture, including Venice CPUs, Pensando networking, ROCm software, rack integration, serviceability and AMD’s ability to deliver and execute across multiple product generations.

There is some financial alignment behind the agreements as well. AMD issued OpenAI performance-based warrants and committed to investing up to $5 billion in Anthropic. That context matters when evaluating these deals as market validation, but these planned deployments are substantial nonetheless and put Helios on a much stronger foundation as it begins shipping.

AMD expands its robotics and embedded foundation

AMD also expanded its physical AI portfolio, building on credible traction from its Xilinx-derived Kria adaptive system-on-modules and embedded technologies that are already powering robotics, machine vision and industrial automation applications.

The new Ryzen AI Embedded X100 combines up to 16 Zen 5 CPU cores, integrated Radeon graphics, a second-generation NPU and as much as 128GB of unified LPDDR5X memory shared across its compute engines. To me this looks a lot like a repackaging and optimization of the company’s Strix Halo platform, but with specific optimizations for the embedded space. Regardless, AMD is pairing X100 with the Kria AI Robotics Developer Platform, which includes a System Module or SOM, and a new Robotics Partner Network spanning hardware, software and platform providers.

Samples began shipping in June, with full production expected in the fourth quarter. This broader objective is to give developers a path across AMD x86 CPUs, GPUs, NPUs and FPGAs for real-time autonomous systems, rather than requiring them to assemble those hardware engines and software components independently.

Execution for AMD is now the test

AMD has assembled a credible platform for the burgeoning agentic AI market that’s blowing up currently with no signs of stopping. MI455X addresses memory and data movement, Venice handles dense agentic CPU workloads, Pensando networking connects global system resources, and ROCm.AI addresses software complexity. Finally, Helios assembles these components into a true competitive threat for NVIDIA’s latest Vera Rubin platform.

AMD’s open architecture may appeal to customers seeking supplier choice, but openness must also translate into reliable deployments, competitive total cost and software that does not require a significant rip-up. NVIDIA enters this cycle with a stronger ecosystem and far more rack-scale deployment experience. The true test will be how easily and reliably customers can integrate, operate and maintain these AMD solutions at scale.

As it stands, AMD now has major customers and a clearly defined architecture with systems engineering expertise behind it. Delivering Helios on schedule and showing that its performance claims translate into a real production workload throughput advantage and total cost of ownership gains will determine how much the competitive gap narrows. And of course, this is in a market that is clamoring for ever-more compute resources with a seemingly insatiable demand for AI services and capacity. That’s an environment for big iron success. Now AMD just has to deliver optimized, turnkey AI platforms. This is far easier said than done, but time will soon tell as deployments take shape this year.

This article is published as part of the Foundry Expert Contributor Network.
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]]> <![CDATA[Anthropic Raises Public First Action Funding to $40M]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689984/it-nachrichten/anthropic-raises-public-first-action-funding-to-40m/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689984/it-nachrichten/anthropic-raises-public-first-action-funding-to-40m/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:32:43 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Rockwell Automation ThinManager]]> =1...]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689943/it-security-nachrichten/rockwell-automation-thinmanager/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689943/it-security-nachrichten/rockwell-automation-thinmanager/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:17:43 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de View CSAF

Summary

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an authenticated attacker to write arbitrary files to restricted system directories outside of the application's intended directory.

The following versions of Rockwell Automation ThinManager are affected:

  • ThinManager >=13.0.0|<13.0.7, >=13.1.0|<13.1.5, >=13.2.0|<13.2.4, >=14.0.0|<14.0.2
CVSS Vendor Equipment Vulnerabilities
v3 8.1 Rockwell Automation Rockwell Automation ThinManager Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Background

  • Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Chemical, Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Food and Agriculture, Water and Wastewater
  • Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
  • Company Headquarters Location: United States

Vulnerabilities

Expand All +

CVE-2026-11917

A path traversal security issue exists within Rockwell Automation ThinManager software due to improper limitation of file save operations within the API. An authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to write arbitrary files to restricted system directories outside of the application's intended directory.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Rockwell Automation ThinManager
Vendor:
Rockwell Automation
Product Version:
Rockwell Automation ThinManager: >=13.0.0|<13.0.7, Rockwell Automation ThinManager: >=13.1.0|<13.1.5, Rockwell Automation ThinManager: >=13.2.0|<13.2.4, Rockwell Automation ThinManager: >=14.0.0|<14.0.2
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Mitigation
Users using the affected software, should upgrade to one of the corrected versions as follows:

Vendor fix
ThinManager Versions 13.0.0 - 13.0.7 --> 13.0.8

Vendor fix
ThinManager Versions 13.1.0 - 13.1.5 --> 13.1.6

Vendor fix
ThinManager Versions 13.2.0 - 13.2.4 --> 13.2.5

Vendor fix
ThinManager Versions 14.0.0 - 14.0.2 --> 14.0.3

Mitigation
Users using the affected software, who are not able to upgrade to one of the corrected versions, should use Rockwell Automation's security best practices.
https://support.rockwellautomation.com/app/answers/answer_view/a_id/1085012/loc/en_US#__highlight

Mitigation
For more information, refer to Rockwell Automation's Securitry Advisory page.
https://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories.html

Relevant CWE: CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 8.1 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
4.0 7.2 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Acknowledgments

  • Rockwell Automation reported this vulnerability to CISA

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability.

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.

Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.

When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.

Refer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.

Refer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.

Revision History

  • Initial Release Date: 2026-07-14
Date Revision Summary
2026-07-14 1 Initial Publication by Rockwell Automation
2026-07-21 2 Initial Republication of Rockwell Automation advisory

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

]]> <![CDATA[Johnson Controls C-CURE 9000 and Victor application server]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689942/it-security-nachrichten/johnson-controls-c-cure-9000-and-victor-application-server/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689942/it-security-nachrichten/johnson-controls-c-cure-9000-and-victor-application-server/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:17:06 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de View CSAF

Summary

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker with network access to achieve remote code execution.

The following versions of Johnson Controls C-CURE 9000 and Victor application server are affected:

  • C-CURE 9000 and victor <=v2.90_v3.0 
  • victor Web <=v7.1 
CVSS Vendor Equipment Vulnerabilities
v3 9.6 Johnson Controls Johnson Controls C-CURE 9000 and Victor application server Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Execution with Unnecessary Privileges

Background

  • Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Critical Manufacturing
  • Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
  • Company Headquarters Location: Ireland

Vulnerabilities

Expand All +

CVE-2026-21655

Under certain circumstances, successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker on the adjacent network to achieve arbitrary code execution on the C-CURE 9000 or victor application server, as well as connected clients (e.g., workstations of physical security personnel). Such an attack could impact physical security controls.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Johnson Controls C-CURE 9000 and Victor application server
Vendor:
Johnson Controls
Product Version:
Johnson Controls C-CURE 9000 and victor: <=v2.90_v3.0
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Mitigation
Johnson Controls recommends the following defensive measures to help reduce the risk of exploitation: (CVE-2026-21655) Upgrade to C-CURE 9000 / victor version 3.20 or later, which addresses the vulnerable deserialization path (LV1.1).

Vendor fix
Network segmentation - Isolate the C-CURE 9000 and victor application servers on a dedicated network segment and restrict access to port 8999 to only authorized systems that require connectivity.

Mitigation
Firewall / access control lists - Implement strict firewall rules to block all unnecessary inbound connections to port 8999 from untrusted network segments.

Mitigation
Intrusion detection / prevention - Deploy IDS/IPS signatures tuned to detect known .NET deserialization exploit payloads (e.g., ysoserial.net patterns) targeting port 8999.

Mitigation
Application whitelisting - Enforce application whitelisting on application server hosts to prevent unauthorized executables from being launched by the server process.

Mitigation
Least privilege - Ensure the application server process runs with the minimum privileges necessary, reducing the impact of successful exploitation.

Mitigation
Monitor and audit - Enable detailed logging on application server hosts and monitor for anomalous process creation by SoftwareHouse.CrossFire.Server.exe.

Mitigation
Disable unnecessary services - If the ClientConnectionManager_NF.SynchronousServerNotification callback interface is not required, disable or restrict it to reduce attack surface.

Mitigation
For more detailed mitigation instructions, please see Johnson Controls Product Security Advisories JCI-PSA-2026-07, JCI-PSA-2026-13, and JCI-PSA-2026-16 at the following location: https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/security-advisories
https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/security-advisories

Relevant CWE: CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 8.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 8.7 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE-2026-21653

Under certain circumstances, successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to forge server-side HTTP requests from the victor Web application. This could be leveraged to interact with internal services running on the host or accessible on the local network, potentially leading to unauthorized information disclosure or lateral movement within the network.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Johnson Controls C-CURE 9000 and Victor application server
Vendor:
Johnson Controls
Product Version:
Johnson Controls victor Web: <v7.0
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
(CVE-2026-21653, CVE-2026-34496) Update all victor Web installations to version 7.0 or later, which contains the fix for this vulnerability. The fix has been validated through independent retest.

Mitigation
Firewall / access control lists - Implement strict firewall rules to block all unnecessary inbound connections to port 8999 from untrusted network segments.

Mitigation
Intrusion detection / prevention - Deploy IDS/IPS signatures tuned to detect known .NET deserialization exploit payloads (e.g., ysoserial.net patterns) targeting port 8999.

Mitigation
Application whitelisting - Enforce application whitelisting on application server hosts to prevent unauthorized executables from being launched by the server process.

Mitigation
Least privilege - Ensure the application server process runs with the minimum privileges necessary, reducing the impact of successful exploitation.

Mitigation
Monitor and audit - Enable detailed logging on application server hosts and monitor for anomalous process creation by SoftwareHouse.CrossFire.Server.exe.

Mitigation
Disable unnecessary services - If the ClientConnectionManager_NF.SynchronousServerNotification callback interface is not required, disable or restrict it to reduce attack surface.

Mitigation
For more detailed mitigation instructions, please see Johnson Controls Product Security Advisories JCI-PSA-2026-07, JCI-PSA-2026-13, and JCI-PSA-2026-16 at the following location: https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/security-advisories
https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/security-advisories

Relevant CWE: CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 9.6 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 9.4 CRITICAL CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

CVE-2026-34496

Under certain circumstances, successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in low privilege users accessing unauthorized pages such as Users and Logs. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to view sensitive system information, user account details, and audit logs beyond their intended access level, potentially enabling further attacks or unauthorized administrative actions.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Johnson Controls C-CURE 9000 and Victor application server
Vendor:
Johnson Controls
Product Version:
Johnson Controls victor Web: <=v7.1
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
(CVE-2026-21653, CVE-2026-34496) Update all victor Web installations to version 7.0 or later, which contains the fix for this vulnerability. The fix has been validated through independent retest.

Mitigation
Firewall / access control lists - Implement strict firewall rules to block all unnecessary inbound connections to port 8999 from untrusted network segments.

Mitigation
Intrusion detection / prevention - Deploy IDS/IPS signatures tuned to detect known .NET deserialization exploit payloads (e.g., ysoserial.net patterns) targeting port 8999.

Mitigation
Application whitelisting - Enforce application whitelisting on application server hosts to prevent unauthorized executables from being launched by the server process.

Mitigation
Least privilege - Ensure the application server process runs with the minimum privileges necessary, reducing the impact of successful exploitation.

Mitigation
Monitor and audit - Enable detailed logging on application server hosts and monitor for anomalous process creation by SoftwareHouse.CrossFire.Server.exe.

Mitigation
Disable unnecessary services - If the ClientConnectionManager_NF.SynchronousServerNotification callback interface is not required, disable or restrict it to reduce attack surface.

Mitigation
For more detailed mitigation instructions, please see Johnson Controls Product Security Advisories JCI-PSA-2026-07, JCI-PSA-2026-13, and JCI-PSA-2026-16 at the following location: https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/security-advisories
https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/security-advisories

Relevant CWE: CWE-250 Execution with Unnecessary Privileges

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 8.7 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Acknowledgments

  • Harrison Neal reported these vulnerabilities to CISA

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.

Refer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.

Refer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.

Revision History

  • Initial Release Date: 2026-07-23
Date Revision Summary
2026-07-23 1 Initial Republication of Johnson Controls Product Security Advisories JCI-PSA-2026-07, JCI-PSA-2026-13, and JCI-PSA-2026-16

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

]]> <![CDATA[Johnson Controls XAAP Android]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689941/it-security-nachrichten/johnson-controls-xaap-android/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689941/it-security-nachrichten/johnson-controls-xaap-android/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:17:02 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de View CSAF

Summary

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in an attacker obtaining confidential information from the device.

The following versions of Johnson Controls XAAP Android are affected:

  • XAAP Android <1.53
CVSS Vendor Equipment Vulnerabilities
v3 3.3 Johnson Controls Johnson Controls XAAP Android Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information

Background

  • Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Critical Manufacturing
  • Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
  • Company Headquarters Location: Ireland

Vulnerabilities

Expand All +

CVE-2026-34490

A cleartext storage weakness exists in the Fire Solutions Android application, which stores application data locally on the device without encryption. An attacker with physical access to the device and one able to compromise the device through a separate, unrelated flaw, could potentially read this data in plaintext. Exploitation does not require network access and is limited to the local device environment.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Johnson Controls XAAP Android
Vendor:
Johnson Controls
Product Version:
Johnson Controls XAAP Android: <1.53
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
Johnson Controls recommends users update the XAAP Android application to version 1.53 or later, which contains the fix for this vulnerability.

Mitigation
Johnson Controls recommends users restrict physical access to devices running the XAAP Android application.

Mitigation
Johnson Controls recommends users ensure devices are hardened with up-to-date Android OS versions, device encryption enabled, and screen lock protections in place.

Mitigation
Johnson Controls recommends users implement a Mobile Device Management (MDM) solution to enforce security policies, including encryption requirements, application whitelisting, and remote wipe capabilities.

Mitigation
Johnson Controls recommends users Avoid rooting or jailbreaking devices used in production environments, as this weakens OS-level security controls that help protect local application data.

Mitigation
For more detailed mitigation instructions, please see Johnson Controls Product Security Advisory JCI-PSA-2026-10.

Relevant CWE: CWE-312 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 3.3 LOW CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
4.0 4.8 MEDIUM CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Acknowledgments

  • Johnson Controls reported this vulnerability to CISA

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability.

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.

Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.

When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.

Revision History

  • Initial Release Date: 2026-07-23
Date Revision Summary
2026-07-23 1 Initial Republication of Johnson Controls JCI-PSA-2026-10

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

]]> <![CDATA[MZ Automation libIEC61850]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689940/it-security-nachrichten/mz-automation-libiec61850/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689940/it-security-nachrichten/mz-automation-libiec61850/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:16:58 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de View CSAF

Summary

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker to crash critical IEC 61850 services or execute arbitrary code, disrupting or compromising protection, visibility, and control functions.

The following versions of MZ Automation libIEC61850 are affected:

  • libIEC61850 >=v1.0.0|<=v1.6.1 
CVSS Vendor Equipment Vulnerabilities
v3 8.1 MZ Automation MZ Automation libIEC61850 Stack-based Buffer Overflow, Heap-based Buffer Overflow, Improper Handling of Syntactically Invalid Structure, NULL Pointer Dereference

Background

  • Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Transportation Systems
  • Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
  • Company Headquarters Location: Germany

Vulnerabilities

Expand All +

CVE-2026-50039

The affected product is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow, which may allow an attacker to cause a memory corruption via a ReadRequest.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

MZ Automation libIEC61850
Vendor:
MZ Automation
Product Version:
MZ Automation libIEC61850: >=v1.0.0|<=v1.6.1
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
MZ Automation recommends updating to the latest build of the libIEC61850 standard. Documentation can be found at https://github.com/mz-automation/libiec61850.
https://github.com/mz-automation/libiec61850

Relevant CWE: CWE-121 Stack-based Buffer Overflow

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 7.5 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
4.0 8.7 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE-2026-49035

The affected product is vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overflow via a crafted MMS Initiate request. Remote code execution (RCE) has been demonstrated when ASLR is disabled; memory corruption or denial of service may occur in configurations where ASLR is enabled.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

MZ Automation libIEC61850
Vendor:
MZ Automation
Product Version:
MZ Automation libIEC61850: >=v1.0.0|<=v1.6.1
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
MZ Automation recommends updating to the latest build of the libIEC61850 standard. Documentation can be found at https://github.com/mz-automation/libiec61850.
https://github.com/mz-automation/libiec61850

Relevant CWE: CWE-122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 8.1 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 9.2 CRITICAL CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE-2026-50103

A NULL pointer dereference in the L2 GOOSE and R-GOOSE shared parser, which may allow a network-adjacent attacker to crash a subscribing application by sending a crafted GOOSE frame containing a malformed TLV value.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

MZ Automation libIEC61850
Vendor:
MZ Automation
Product Version:
MZ Automation libIEC61850: >=v1.0.0|<=v1.6.1
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
MZ Automation recommends updating to the latest build of the libIEC61850 standard. Documentation can be found at https://github.com/mz-automation/libiec61850.
https://github.com/mz-automation/libiec61850

Relevant CWE: CWE-228 Improper Handling of Syntactically Invalid Structure

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 6.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
4.0 7.1 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE-2026-50032

A NULL pointer dereference in the MMS Write Named Variable List handler, which may allow a network adjacent attacker to crash the server by sending a WriteRequest with an empty listOfData field.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

MZ Automation libIEC61850
Vendor:
MZ Automation
Product Version:
MZ Automation libIEC61850: >=v1.0.0|<=v1.6.1
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
MZ Automation recommends updating to the latest build of the libIEC61850 standard. Documentation can be found at https://github.com/mz-automation/libiec61850.
https://github.com/mz-automation/libiec61850

Relevant CWE: CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 7.5 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
4.0 8.7 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Acknowledgments

  • Abhinav Agarwal reported these vulnerabilities to CISA

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities.

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.

Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.

When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.

Refer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.

Refer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.

Revision History

  • Initial Release Date: 2026-07-23
Date Revision Summary
2026-07-23 1 Initial Publication

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

]]> <![CDATA[MZ Automation lib60870]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689939/it-security-nachrichten/mz-automation-lib60870/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689939/it-security-nachrichten/mz-automation-lib60870/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:16:52 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de View CSAF

Summary

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could cause the parsing process to crash, which will cause a denial of service.

The following versions of MZ Automation lib60870 are affected:

  • lib60870 <=2.4.0
CVSS Vendor Equipment Vulnerabilities
v3 8.2 MZ Automation MZ Automation lib60870 Out-of-bounds Read

Background

  • Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Chemical, Energy, Water and Wastewater
  • Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
  • Company Headquarters Location: Germany

Vulnerabilities

Expand All +

CVE-2026-16002

The affected product is vulnerable to an Out-of-bounds read, which may allow an attacker to crash the parsing process and cause a denial of service.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

MZ Automation lib60870
Vendor:
MZ Automation
Product Version:
MZ Automation lib60870: <=2.4.0
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
MZ automation recommends users update to version 2.4.1 or later. Documentation can be found at https://github.com/mz-automation/lib60870/security/advisories/GHSA-f5xp-w6f3-vvrv.
https://github.com/mz-automation/lib60870/security/advisories/GHSA-f5xp-w6f3-vvrv

Relevant CWE: CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 8.2 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
4.0 8.8 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Acknowledgments

  • Lars Tray reported this vulnerability to CISA

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this (these) vulnerability(ies).

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.

Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.

When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.

Refer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.

Refer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.

Revision History

  • Initial Release Date: 2026-07-23
Date Revision Summary
2026-07-23 1 Initial Publication

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

]]> <![CDATA[Panduit IntraVUE]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689938/it-security-nachrichten/panduit-intravue/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689938/it-security-nachrichten/panduit-intravue/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:16:33 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de View CSAF

Summary

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker with access to the IT network to manipulate industrial control devices without requiring physical access, specialized insider knowledge, or advanced tooling.

The following versions of Panduit IntraVUE are affected:

  • IntraVUE <=3.2.1a14 
CVSS Vendor Equipment Vulnerabilities
v3 10 Pronetiqs Panduit IntraVUE Plaintext Storage of a Password, Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy'), Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere, Inadequate Encryption Strength

Background

  • Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Information Technology, Water and Wastewater
  • Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
  • Company Headquarters Location: Netherlands

Vulnerabilities

Expand All +

CVE-2026-40430

Pronetiqs IntraVUE Versions 3.2.1a14 and prior have a plaintext storage of a password vulnerability that could expose cleartext credentials through the API.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Panduit IntraVUE
Vendor:
Pronetiqs
Product Version:
Pronetiqs IntraVUE: <=3.2.1a14
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
Pronetiqs advises users to update to the latest version of the IntraVUE software, version 3.2.1a16 or later.

Mitigation
For further questions, please contact Pronetiqs at info@pronetiqs.com.
mailto:info@pronetiqs.com

Relevant CWE: CWE-256 Plaintext Storage of a Password

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 7.5 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
4.0 8.7 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE-2026-42933

Pronetiqs IntraVUE versions 3.2.1a14 and prior have an unintended proxy or intermediary vulnerability which could allow an attacker to use an active proxy, which would bypass OT segmentation.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Panduit IntraVUE
Vendor:
Pronetiqs
Product Version:
Pronetiqs IntraVUE: <=3.2.1a14
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
Pronetiqs advises users to update to the latest version of the IntraVUE software, version 3.2.1a16 or later.

Mitigation
For further questions, please contact Pronetiqs at info@pronetiqs.com.
mailto:info@pronetiqs.com

Relevant CWE: CWE-441 Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 10 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 10 CRITICAL CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

CVE-2026-44955

Pronetiqs IntraVUE versions 3.2.1a14 and prior have an exposure of sensitive system information to an unauthorized control sphere vulnerability which could allow for asset discovery by unauthenticated users.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Panduit IntraVUE
Vendor:
Pronetiqs
Product Version:
Pronetiqs IntraVUE: <=3.2.1a14
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
Pronetiqs advises users to update to the latest version of the IntraVUE software, version 3.2.1a16 or later.

Mitigation
For further questions, please contact Pronetiqs at info@pronetiqs.com.
mailto:info@pronetiqs.com

Relevant CWE: CWE-497 Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 5.3 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
4.0 6.9 MEDIUM CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE-2026-50044

Pronetiqs IntraVUE versions 3.2.1a14 and prior have an inadequate encryption strength vulnerability which could allow an attacker to steal admin credentials via weak hash or a pass-the-hash attack.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Panduit IntraVUE
Vendor:
Pronetiqs
Product Version:
Pronetiqs IntraVUE: <=3.2.1a14
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
Pronetiqs advises users to update to the latest version of the IntraVUE software, version 3.2.1a16 or later.

Mitigation
For further questions, please contact Pronetiqs at info@pronetiqs.com.
mailto:info@pronetiqs.com

Relevant CWE: CWE-326 Inadequate Encryption Strength

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 6.8 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
4.0 7.6 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE-2026-28698

Pronetiqs IntraVUE versions 3.2.1a14 and prior have an exposure of sensitive system information to an unauthorized control sphere vulnerability which could expose the underlying host/share filesystem.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Panduit IntraVUE
Vendor:
Pronetiqs
Product Version:
Pronetiqs IntraVUE: <=3.2.1a14
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
Pronetiqs advises users to update to the latest version of the IntraVUE software, version 3.2.1a16 or later.

Mitigation
For further questions, please contact Pronetiqs at info@pronetiqs.com.
mailto:info@pronetiqs.com

Relevant CWE: CWE-497 Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 8.6 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
4.0 9.2 CRITICAL CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

Acknowledgments

  • Phlebas of Lumintel reported these vulnerabilities to CISA

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities.

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the Internet.

Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.

When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.

Refer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.

Refer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.

Revision History

  • Initial Release Date: 2026-07-23
Date Revision Summary
2026-07-23 1 Initial Publication

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

]]> <![CDATA[Weintek cMT3092X]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689937/it-security-nachrichten/weintek-cmt3092x/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689937/it-security-nachrichten/weintek-cmt3092x/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:16:14 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de View CSAF

Summary

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow a non-privileged user to escalate privileges or view the credentials of other users.

The following versions of Weintek cMT3092X are affected:

  • cMT3092X firmware <20210218 
  • EasyWeb <v2.1.20
CVSS Vendor Equipment Vulnerabilities
v3 8.8 Weintek Weintek cMT3092X Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking in a Security Decision, Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource, Plaintext Storage of a Password, Incorrect User Management

Background

  • Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Critical Manufacturing
  • Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
  • Company Headquarters Location: Taiwan

Vulnerabilities

Expand All +

CVE-2026-60134

Weintek cMT3092X HMI allows a non-privileged user to modify cookies to gain elevated privileges.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Weintek cMT3092X
Vendor:
Weintek
Product Version:
Weintek cMT3092X firmware: <20210218, Weintek EasyWeb: <v2.1.20
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
Weintek recommends users apply the patch package named cmt_typeB_20260316_007.patch, which contains a newer EasyWeb 2.3.17-typeb. This fix will be delivered as a patch-only update; no separate standard firmware release is planned. Users may request the patch directly from Weintek support (https://www.weintek.com/globalw/Support/Knowledge.aspx) or from distributors.
https://www.weintek.com/globalw/Support/Knowledge.aspx

Mitigation
Weintek has published a document with more details about this issue at https://dl.weintek.com/public/Document/TEC/TEC25003E_cMT_EasyWeb_V2_Security_Issues.pdf.
https://dl.weintek.com/public/Document/TEC/TEC25003E_cMT_EasyWeb_V2_Security_Issues.pdf

Relevant CWE: CWE-784 Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking in a Security Decision

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 8.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 8.7 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE-2026-61892

Weintek cMT3092X HMI allows a non-privileged user to modify tokens to escalate privileges.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Weintek cMT3092X
Vendor:
Weintek
Product Version:
Weintek cMT3092X firmware: <20210218, Weintek EasyWeb: <v2.1.20
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
Weintek recommends users apply the patch package named cmt_typeB_20260316_007.patch, which contains a newer EasyWeb 2.3.17-typeb. This fix will be delivered as a patch-only update; no separate standard firmware release is planned. Users may request the patch directly from Weintek support (https://www.weintek.com/globalw/Support/Knowledge.aspx) or from distributors.
https://www.weintek.com/globalw/Support/Knowledge.aspx

Mitigation
Weintek has published a document with more details about this issue at https://dl.weintek.com/public/Document/TEC/TEC25003E_cMT_EasyWeb_V2_Security_Issues.pdf.
https://dl.weintek.com/public/Document/TEC/TEC25003E_cMT_EasyWeb_V2_Security_Issues.pdf

Relevant CWE: CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 8.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 8.7 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE-2026-61886

Weintek cMT3092X HMI stores user account passwords in plaintext.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Weintek cMT3092X
Vendor:
Weintek
Product Version:
Weintek cMT3092X firmware: <20210218, Weintek EasyWeb: <v2.1.20
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
Weintek recommends users apply the patch package named cmt_typeB_20260316_007.patch, which contains a newer EasyWeb 2.3.17-typeb. This fix will be delivered as a patch-only update; no separate standard firmware release is planned. Users may request the patch directly from Weintek support (https://www.weintek.com/globalw/Support/Knowledge.aspx) or from distributors.
https://www.weintek.com/globalw/Support/Knowledge.aspx

Mitigation
Weintek has published a document with more details about this issue at https://dl.weintek.com/public/Document/TEC/TEC25003E_cMT_EasyWeb_V2_Security_Issues.pdf.
https://dl.weintek.com/public/Document/TEC/TEC25003E_cMT_EasyWeb_V2_Security_Issues.pdf

Relevant CWE: CWE-256 Plaintext Storage of a Password

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 6.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
4.0 7.1 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE-2026-60135

An attacker can modify data that should be restricted to read‑only access.

View CVE Details

Affected Products

Weintek cMT3092X
Vendor:
Weintek
Product Version:
Weintek cMT3092X firmware: <20210218, Weintek EasyWeb: <v2.1.20
Product Status:
known_affected
Remediations

Vendor fix
Weintek recommends users apply the patch package named cmt_typeB_20260316_007.patch, which contains a newer EasyWeb 2.3.17-typeb. This fix will be delivered as a patch-only update; no separate standard firmware release is planned. Users may request the patch directly from Weintek support (https://www.weintek.com/globalw/Support/Knowledge.aspx) or from distributors.
https://www.weintek.com/globalw/Support/Knowledge.aspx

Mitigation
Weintek has published a document with more details about this issue at https://dl.weintek.com/public/Document/TEC/TEC25003E_cMT_EasyWeb_V2_Security_Issues.pdf.
https://dl.weintek.com/public/Document/TEC/TEC25003E_cMT_EasyWeb_V2_Security_Issues.pdf

Relevant CWE: CWE-286 Incorrect User Management

Metrics

CVSS Version Base Score Base Severity Vector String
3.1 6.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
4.0 7.1 HIGH CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Acknowledgments

  • Vincenzo Giuseppe Colacino of Secoore reported these vulnerabilities to CISA

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

Practice principles of least privilege.

Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.

Refer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.

Refer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.

Revision History

  • Initial Release Date: 2026-07-23
Date Revision Summary
2026-07-23 1 Initial Publication

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

]]> <![CDATA[Tech Moves: Agility Robotics gets CFO; Microsoft security departure; Zap’s legal officer; new KEXP CTO]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689917/it-nachrichten/tech-moves-agility-robotics-gets-cfo-microsoft-security-departure-zaps-legal-officer-new-kexp-cto/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689917/it-nachrichten/tech-moves-agility-robotics-gets-cfo-microsoft-security-departure-zaps-legal-officer-new-kexp-cto/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:06:06 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de
Agility Robotics names a CFO ahead of its plans to go public, moving its current CFO/COO into an operations-focused role. Microsoft loses another security leader while Zap Energy gets a chief legal officer. Read More]]> <![CDATA[An AI now judges every move Rubrik's agents make, its AI chief said at VB Transform 2026 — but no one's measured if the judge is right]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689833/it-nachrichten/an-ai-now-judges-every-move-rubriks-agents-make-its-ai-chief-said-at-vb-transform-2026-but-no-ones-measured-if-the-judge-is-right/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689833/it-nachrichten/an-ai-now-judges-every-move-rubriks-agents-make-its-ai-chief-said-at-vb-transform-2026-but-no-ones-measured-if-the-judge-is-right/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 19:19:49 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de At a CISO roundtable organized by Anthropic's chief information security officer, Dev Rishi asked a simple question: Did everyone in the room have their AI governance and security policies written down? Every hand went up — about 14 people, by his count. His follow-up, about how anyone actually enforces those policies in practice, got a different response. "And everybody chuckled," Rishi, the GM of AI at Rubrik, recalled at VB Transform 2026 fireside chat in Menlo Park. "It was like the dirty secret in the room that everyone has these policies, but no way to actually make them real."

“Our founder and CTO has actually been really pushing to enable our agents in YOLO mode,” Rishi told the audience. That admission comes from a publicly traded data security firm whose business is backing up what he called the most important data in the world.

YOLO mode strips the permission prompt out of agent workflows and lets the agent act on its own. In Rubrik's version, a second AI judges every action in real time against policy in place of a human clicking approve. Rubrik is running the experiment on itself first. Rishi treats autonomy as a settled capability question and an open judgment question. "If you ask the agent to act autonomously, it will," he said. "It's a question that you have internally. Should it?"

Rubrik earned that question the hard way. When Claude Code and Cowork pilots rolled out, the company required every command to run in ask mode so the employee issuing it carried the liability, and the developer pushback filled a single Slack thread 120 messages deep.

"The developers basically are pushing back, and they're like, this is like the iTunes service agreement. I'm just hitting check, check, check, check, check, check, check," Rishi said. "There's no way that I can actually read through this. And it becomes security theater." Roughly 80% of respondents are in the same bind, Rishi said, citing Rubrik Zero Labs research that found monitoring and approving agent actions takes more time than the agents save. The State of the Agent, the April report behind that figure, surveyed more than 1,600 IT and security leaders.

SAGE is the reason Rubrik trusts the bet. Short for Semantic AI Governance Engine, SAGE is the arbitration layer inside Rubrik Agent Cloud that watches every action an agent takes and reads the semantic intent behind it, then rules the action in or out against policies written in natural language. "We took what people said was human in the loop, a good idea, and we replaced it with AI in the loop," Rishi said, describing the pitch to security chiefs he characterized as skittish about non-deterministic systems.

Security approval, not cost, blocks AI ROI

Rishi’s path to Rubrik ran through Predibase, the generative AI infrastructure startup he co-founded and ran as CEO until Rubrik agreed to acquire it in June 2025. Before that, he led ML product at Google on the team that became Vertex AI, served as Kaggle's first product manager as it grew from about one million to ten million users, and holds bachelor's and master's degrees in computer science from Harvard.

Over roughly his first three and a half months at Rubrik, Rishi set up 200 customer conversations with IT and security leaders across a customer base that looks like the Global 2000, asking open-ended questions about cost, latency, performance, and orchestration. "Pretty consistently, what I heard through all of those conversations was that all of those are pretty secondary," he said. "The main challenge is actually, how do I get this approved from a security and risk standpoint? I'm concerned about all the different things that could go wrong. Actually, I felt like that was one of the biggest things constraining ROI."

VentureBeat Pulse research presented on the Transform stage earlier in the day confirms the gap Rishi kept hearing. Two-thirds of enterprises, 66%, already allow or are actively building toward production deployment with zero human review, yet only 5% fully trust the automated evaluations that would make that decision.

One AI reading what the rulebook can't

Rubrik's own policies exposed why written rules fail as enforcement. One internal rule states that agents should respect Rubrik's customer data use policy, which sounds enforceable until someone tries. "Rubrik's customer data use policy is like a three-page document of legal text," Rishi said. "I have no idea how to write that in there as a rule." Asked on stage how a team of AI infrastructure people took on a problem that security engineers own, Rishi answered, "with a lot of naivety and innocence, honestly." His team bet that models good at understanding language could police other models, and SAGE became the answer.

The case for putting a model in the judgment seat comes down to precision. A rule like "agents should not be able to edit revenue fields in Salesforce" fails in conventional tooling because Salesforce does not delineate which fields count as revenue, Rishi explained, so administrators fall back on approving every Salesforce action by hand. SAGE reads the intent instead and acts as a judge, carrying organizational context, which can tell a benign lookup from the edit the policy prohibits.

Keeping the judge small is what makes the economics work. SAGE runs on a small language model that Rishi said operates at an order of magnitude lower cost and latency than a frontier LLM. "If I told you, don't worry, you're gonna be secure and governed, but I'm gonna double your cost and latency, you would tell me to get out of the room," Rishi said.

When Rishi asked who in the audience had worried about token consumption over the past year, half the hands went up. "And I guess the other half is probably just too lazy to raise their hand," he said.

SAGE is an aggregation of judges based on parameter-efficient fine-tuning that Rubrik uses to take on task-specific variants of a base model with shared organizational context. One judge watches for tool-use hallucinations while another suppresses PII before it can leave, each running as its own enforceable policy. Security and GRC teams have started writing financial rules into the same layer, including one internal policy barring AI spend on personal projects.

The lethal trifecta

Asked which attacks worry him most, Rishi pointed at the lethal trifecta, the term security researcher Simon Willison coined in June 2025 for an agent that holds private data while taking in content nobody vetted, with a channel to send what it finds to the outside world. The danger, according to Rishi, is what happens when individually legitimate permissions stack. An agent granted Salesforce access and email access on an employee's credentials has done nothing wrong yet, with yet being the operative word. "A very simple example is that an agent can start pulling data from Salesforce and then decide to accidentally leak and exfiltrate that out via an email," he told the audience. A financial services company he met the morning of the session made the point for him, telling Rishi that none of the individual permissions are bad on their own and the agent needs every one of them to do its job. "It should have permission to each of those systems, but it's the combination that ends up becoming really destructive," Rishi said.

Traditional identity and access management never priced in that combination because it relied on the judgment of the employee holding the credentials, Rishi argued, and agents supply none. "I can tell you the number of times Claude Code has tried to leak some of our sensitive source code to a public GitHub repository is incredibly high," he said. Cutting agents off from public resources entirely would defeat their purpose, which returns the problem to adjudicating intent in context rather than revoking access.

A separate VentureBeat June Pulse survey of 107 qualified enterprise respondents maps the blast radius of exactly this pattern. On the Transform stage that morning, VentureBeat research reported that 69% of companies run credential sharing somewhere in their agent fleet. Companies with shared credentials anywhere got hit more often, reporting a security incident or near-miss at a 63.5% rate (47 of 74), against 40.9% (9 of 22) where every agent carries its own scoped identity.

The attacks no single turn reveals

Rubrik Agent Cloud reached general availability in February, though not everything Rishi described ships in it yet. Backtesting is just starting to roll out. The feature replays an organization's historical agent actions and tool calls against a new policy, showing where the policy would have stepped in and where an action would have sailed through uncaught, with policy edits applied in real time. Rishi called that archive one of the most valuable data troves an enterprise holds.

Real-time detection and blocking turn out to be the entry point rather than the whole product. Some attacks never trip a single-action rule. "No individual turn of the conversation was problematic, but if you took the session as a full trace, that ended up being problematic," Rishi said. Agent Cloud runs batch analysis across entire session traces every hour or every day and surfaces what Rubrik calls insights, the problems no individual guardrail caught. The same Zero Labs report found that 88% say they lack the ability to roll back agent actions without system disruption, a recovery gap that sits squarely in Rubrik's original line of business.

A skeptical CISO will ask the question the fireside did not answer. SAGE is a non-deterministic model policing other non-deterministic models, and Rishi offered no false positive or false negative rate for the judge itself. The closest thing the architecture gives to an answer is auditability, since backtesting and the batch insights both leave a human-reviewable trail of each call SAGE made and whatever got past it. Who watches the watcher, for now, is a trail of receipts rather than a benchmark. Until that benchmark exists, AI in the loop stays an operational wager rather than a quantified control.

Three questions fall out of the session for security teams. How many of the guardrails now in production depend on a human clicking approve, and what happens to that workload as agent count grows? Does anything in the stack enforce semantic intent, or is it all allow and deny lists? And can the team backtest agent behavior against a new policy, then unwind a multi-turn session without taking systems down?

Rishi's timing has a market behind it. In the same VentureBeat research, 82% of enterprises still name their primary AI provider's built-in guardrails and cloud controls as their main agent security layer, and 59% plan to adopt, add, or replace agent security tooling within the next 12 months. Only 12% include an agent-identity product in what they are considering, even with credential sharing still the norm. Every CISO at that Anthropic roundtable had a policy document and no enforcement mechanism, and Rubrik built a product for the space between the two. YOLO mode is the bet that an AI watching other AIs can finally make the policies real.

]]> <![CDATA[Ich habe ChatGPT um 100 Ideen gebeten: Darum sollten Sie das auch machen]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689734/windows-tipps/ich-habe-chatgpt-um-100-ideen-gebeten-darum-sollten-sie-das-auch-machen/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689734/windows-tipps/ich-habe-chatgpt-um-100-ideen-gebeten-darum-sollten-sie-das-auch-machen/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 18:48:59 +0200 🪟 Windows Tipps tsecurity.de

Wenn Sie einen KI-Chatbot darum bitten, Namen für einen Podcast, ein WLAN-Netzwerk oder ein kleines Unternehmen zu entwickeln, werden Sie wahrscheinlich eine Liste mit Vorschlägen erhalten, die ein wenig unkreativ ist.

Große Sprachmodelle wie ChatGPT, Claude und Gemini haben kein Problem damit, ein Dutzend Namen für Ihr Lieblingsprojekt oder Ihre Website zu generieren. Aber ein Dutzend Namen zu erhalten, die wirklich vielfältig, einzigartig und einprägsam sind? Das ist deutlich schwieriger – aber dennoch möglich. Sie müssen nur wissen, wie Sie die Modelle auf die richtige Weise in verschiedene Richtungen lenken können.

Bitten Sie ChatGPT zunächst nicht nur um 10 oder 20 Ideen, sondern um 100. Eine Studie der Wharton School [PDF] legt nahe, dass die Ideen, wenn Sie eine KI um so viele Ideen bitten, umso interessanter werden, je weiter Sie in der Liste nach unten gehen. Dies ist der „Dump“-Teil dieser zweistufigen Prompt-Technik.

In der zweiten Stufe bitten Sie ChatGPT, die Liste zu durchforsten, nach ähnlichen Einträgen zu suchen und diese durch neue zu ersetzen – alles mit dem Ziel, eine möglichst breite und vielfältige Ideensammlung zu schaffen.

Hier ist ein Beispiel für die erste Stufe der Eingabeaufforderung:

Gib mir 100 Ideen zu [Thema X]. Nummeriere diese von 1 bis 100. Gib für jede Idee nur einen kurzen Titel oder Namen an – keine Erklärungen, keine Beschreibungen. Beziehe alles mit ein, auch offensichtliche, schlechte, seltsame oder unausgereifte Antworten. Filtere nicht nach Qualität; das folgt später. Quantität ist das einzige Ziel.

Sobald die KI ihre Liste geliefert hat, fahren Sie mit der zweiten Phase fort:

Überarbeite nun die Liste im Hinblick auf maximale Vielfalt. Wo immer zwei oder mehr Ideen auf demselben Grundkonzept beruhen, behalte die beste davon bei und ersetze die anderen durch Ideen aus Blickwinkeln, die sonst nirgendwo auf der Liste abgedeckt sind. Das Ziel sind 100 Ideen, bei denen keine zwei auf dasselbe zugrunde liegende Konzept verweisen – sie müssen sich in ihrer Art unterscheiden, nicht nur im Wortlaut.

Optional können Sie mit einer Eingabe für die dritte Phase fortfahren, die die KI dazu veranlasst, die Liste nach Qualität zu filtern (ich empfehle jedoch, alle 100 Ideen der zweiten Phase selbst durchzugehen):

Was sind die 10 interessantesten Ideen auf der zweiten Liste?

Ich habe diese „100-Ideen“-Anweisung (die ich aus einer in der oben genannten Wharton-Studie vorgestellten Anweisungskombination adaptiert habe) für einen lang gehegten Traum ausprobiert: die Eröffnung meines eigenen Cafés. Eine der größten Hürden ist natürlich die Wahl eines einfallsreichen Namens, also habe ich diese zweistufige Anweisung gestartet.

Ich möchte Sie nicht mit der gesamten Liste der Vorschläge langweilen, die ich erhalten habe. Aber hier sind die ersten 10 aus der ursprünglichen Auswahl:

  • The Daily Grind
  • Bean There
  • Brewed Awakening
  • Central Perk
  • The Coffee House
  • Morning Cup
  • Java Junction
  • Common Grounds
  • Cup & Bean
  • The Roasted Bean

Dabei kamen die üblichen Verdächtigen heraus, bis hin zum „Central Perk“ aus der Serie Friends. Aber auch einige interessante Wortwitze.

Nach der Aufforderung der zweiten Stufe und der optionalen dritten Stufe („Nenne mir die 10 interessantesten Namen aus der zweiten Liste“) kam ich schließlich auf folgende Ergebnisse:

  • Warm Noise
  • Morning Object
  • Public Living Room
  • Moth & Match
  • Localhost
  • Borrowed Sugar
  • Unfinished Sentence
  • Blue Hour
  • The Loading Bar
  • Sunday Weather

Das sind wirklich ungewöhnliche, unkonventionelle Ideen für den Namen meines zukünftigen Cafés. Einige davon sind ein wenig techniklastig („Localhost“) oder einfach nur seltsam („Morning Object“), andere hingegen haben meine Aufmerksamkeit geweckt. „Blue Hour“ und „Borrowed Sugar“ gefallen mir tatsächlich sehr gut.

Probieren Sie diese zweistufige „100-Ideen“-Übung doch einmal aus, wenn Sie das nächste Mal Ideen benötigen. Selbst wenn dabei nicht gleich der perfekte Name für ein Café, einen Podcast oder einen Blog herauskommt, wird sie zumindest Ihre Kreativität anregen.

ChatGPT im Alltag – 16 lästige Aufgaben, die KI für Sie erledigen kann

Hören Sie auf, ChatGPT Ihre Texte schreiben zu lassen – Versuchen Sie das stattdessen

]]> <![CDATA[Hackers Abuse GitHub Actions to Exploit cPanel and WHM Servers and Steal Cloud Credentials]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689713/it-security-nachrichten/hackers-abuse-github-actions-to-exploit-cpanel-and-whm-servers-and-steal-cloud-credentials/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689713/it-security-nachrichten/hackers-abuse-github-actions-to-exploit-cpanel-and-whm-servers-and-steal-cloud-credentials/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 18:44:33 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de A large-scale cyber campaign is abusing GitHub Actions to turn trusted open source projects into weapons against web hosting servers. Attackers plant malicious workflow files inside compromised repositories and use free GitHub compute power to scan the public internet for…

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]]> <![CDATA[What Is Cryptocurrency and How Does It Actually Work?]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689518/it-security-nachrichten/what-is-cryptocurrency-and-how-does-it-actually-work/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689518/it-security-nachrichten/what-is-cryptocurrency-and-how-does-it-actually-work/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 17:43:13 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[What Is Cryptocurrency and How Does It Actually Work?]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689508/it-security-nachrichten/what-is-cryptocurrency-and-how-does-it-actually-work/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689508/it-security-nachrichten/what-is-cryptocurrency-and-how-does-it-actually-work/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 17:41:05 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Learn how cryptocurrency works, from blockchains and wallets to private keys, custody, and secure transactions, with practical security tips. for confident use. This article has been indexed from Hackread – Cybersecurity News, Data Breaches, AI and More Read the original…

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]]> <![CDATA[GitHub slashes public bug bounty payouts as AI report flood buries its security team]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689468/it-nachrichten/github-slashes-public-bug-bounty-payouts-as-ai-report-flood-buries-its-security-team/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689468/it-nachrichten/github-slashes-public-bug-bounty-payouts-as-ai-report-flood-buries-its-security-team/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 17:18:36 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Russian State-Supported Cyber Actors Conduct Phishing Campaign Targeting Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689407/sicherheitsluecken/russian-state-supported-cyber-actors-conduct-phishing-campaign-targeting-users-of-zimbra-collaboration-suite/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689407/sicherheitsluecken/russian-state-supported-cyber-actors-conduct-phishing-campaign-targeting-users-of-zimbra-collaboration-suite/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 16:59:29 +0200 🕵️ Sicherheitslücken tsecurity.de Russian State-Supported Cyber Actors Conduct Phishing Campaign Targeting Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite

Executive summary 

A group of Russian state-supported cyber actors has been targeting and compromising various Western government and commercial organizations using the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) software since at least July 2025. The Russian state-supported advanced persistent threat (APT) group’s activity is tracked in the cybersecurity community under several names (see Cybersecurity industry tracking), primarily as “LAUNDRY BEAR,” a name initially coined by the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) [1].

LAUNDRY BEAR’s targeting is almost certainly to gather sensitive information for the Russian Federation, with these actors primarily focusing on the covert acquisition of email data. Previous campaigns indicated LAUNDRY BEAR relied on unsophisticated initial access techniques—including password spraying, phishing, and pass-the-cookie—allowing the group to successfully run high-volume operations. The latest campaign targeting ZCS uses a novel exploit that was a zero-day vulnerability when first exploited and continues to be successfully exploited. The vulnerability, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2025-66376, was patched in November 2025. This demonstrates LAUNDRY BEAR’s intent and ability to deploy increasingly sophisticated technical capabilities.

Unlike traditional phishing campaigns that persuade a user into taking an action, such as clicking a link or opening a file, LAUNDRY BEAR’s latest campaign leverages a view-based exploit that only requires a user to view a malicious email within a vulnerable version of the webmail service. Once viewed, the exploit attempts to exfiltrate the victim’s last 90 days of email communications, the organization email directory (i.e., Global Address List [GAL]), and other sensitive information to servers controlled by LAUNDRY BEAR. The exploit also attempts to establish persistent access to victim accounts through a variety of means as detailed in the Persistence and credential access section.

This Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) warns of this ongoing malicious threat activity and urges organizations to update their vulnerable software and implement additional mitigations to thwart these Russian state-supported actors’ continued success. The CSA is being released by the following authoring and co-sealing agencies:

  • United States National Security Agency (NSA)
  • United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
  • Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD)
  • Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)
  • United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
  • United States Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA)
  • United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
  • United States Department of the Treasury
  • United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)
  • Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
  • Communications Security Establishment Canada’s (CSE’s) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
  • New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
  • United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
  • Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)1
  • Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS)2
  • Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS)3
  • Finnish Defence Intelligence (FDI)4
  • Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO)5
  • French General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI)6
  • French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI)7
  • Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE)8
  • Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI)9
  • Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova (SIS RM)10
  • Polish Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW)11
  • The Military Counterintelligence Service of Poland (SKW)12
  • Spain National Intelligence Centre (CNI)13
  • Sweden National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-SE)14

The authoring agencies urge any organizations using ZCS to implement the recommendations listed within the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the risk associated with this activity. This CSA also includes specific remediations for organizations to implement if they discover the presence of the listed Indicators of compromise (IOCs).  

As more organizations update their ZCS software based on this CSA, LAUNDRY BEAR may discontinue the current campaign exploiting this vulnerability; however, based on the success of this and previous campaigns, it is very likely that the group will continue to target ZCS and other email systems used by organizations in Western countries. The actors will almost certainly continue to rely on email to engage potential victims by exploiting novel vulnerabilities and, when necessary, use social engineering techniques to assist with their efforts. The authoring agencies recommend organizations regularly update their mail service software and continuously monitor their email systems and emails for malicious activity.

For a downloadable list of IOCs, see:

Cybersecurity industry tracking

The cybersecurity industry provides overlapping cyber threat intelligence, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and mitigation recommendations related to these Russian state-supported cyber actors. While not exhaustive, the following are threat group names commonly used for these actors within the cybersecurity community:

  • LAUNDRY BEAR
  • Void Blizzard [2]
  • CL-STA-1114 [3]
  • TA488 (formerly UNK_PitStop) [4]

Note: Cybersecurity companies have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this may not be a 1:1 correlation to the U.S. government’s understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

Background

Public advisories from Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), and Microsoft highlighted these Russian state-supported advanced persistent threat (APT) actors in May 2025, calling them LAUNDRY BEAR and Void Blizzard respectively [1] [2]. Both advisories assessed that the group was engaged in malicious cyber activity as early as April 2024.  

The May 2025 advisories highlighted a cluster of activity targeting cloud-based email environments, including Microsoft Exchange in particular, and abusing legitimate APIs to perform data exfiltration in bulk [T1114.002]. The group relied on unsophisticated means of initial access, including procuring stolen credentials on criminal marketplaces [T1078], and using social engineering techniques to lure targets into interacting with a malicious site masquerading as a legitimate one. As of April 2025, one of these sites resembled a European Defence & Security Summit registration portal that required registrants to sign in to their Microsoft account to view. Once a user entered their Microsoft credentials into this malicious site, LAUNDRY BEAR’s modified version of the open source adversary emulation toolkit, Evilginx, intercepted the user’s credentials. LAUNDRY BEAR then used this authentication data, including passwords and session tokens, to access the compromised account and conduct mass email exfiltration, as well as harvest other information. This method of compromise is commonly known as an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique [T1557].  

Beginning around July 2025, LAUNDRY BEAR shifted toward a more technical method of email compromise, highlighting their continued efforts to covertly acquire email communications from a variety of Western organizations of interest and deliver them to the Russian Federation. Using a custom-developed capability [T1587.001] named “Улей” or “Ulej” (Russian for beehive), LAUNDRY BEAR successfully targeted and exfiltrated sensitive user information from organizations who use the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) product [T1114]. Data LAUNDRY BEAR attempted to exfiltrate from compromised accounts included:

  • Last 90 days of emails,
  • Email address,
  • Password [T1589.001],
  • Global Address List (GAL) [T1087],
  • Two-factor authentication (2FA) tokens, and
  • Newly-created Application Passcode [T1098].

The covert and persistent nature of this activity, along with the absence of any known financial extortion, almost certainly indicates this group’s involvement in espionage activities with Russian government backing. Additionally, extensive Ukrainian targeting, prior to use against U.S. and other NATO allies, outlines an increasing trend within Russian cyber threat groups to target Ukrainian users first—both as a priority target and as a testbench for malicious cyber techniques before broader global deployment.

Targeting details

LAUNDRY BEAR has targeted and compromised users in various organizations, including those associated with:

  • the Defense Industrial Base (DIB),  
  • the federal and local government,
  • education,
  • energy,
  • law enforcement,  
  • media,  
  • non-governmental organizations, and
  • technology.

Technical details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 19. This advisory also uses MITRE D3FENDTM version 1.4.015. See Appendix A and Appendix B for tables of the activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK and D3FEND tactics, techniques, and countermeasures.

Ulej is a novel data exfiltration and aggregation capability, that currently (as of the publication of this report) supports a campaign specifically targeting users of ZCS webmail servers. This capability is used to exploit CVE-2025-66376 [Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')], but likely could be adapted to exploit other vulnerabilities. It exfiltrates emails and other sensitive user data from a victim’s system immediately after exploitation and stores the data in an actor-controlled unattributable virtual private server (VPS) [T1074.002] running LAUNDRY BEAR’s “Flowerbed” collection framework. The collected data is almost certainly further exfiltrated to internal network resources for review and long-term retention.

Reconnaissance

LAUNDRY BEAR uses the Ulej capability to exploit the CVE-2025-66376 vulnerability in organizations using ZCS. This campaign’s targeted victimology and limited exploitation capabilities likely indicate this group manually identifies and targets the victim organizations. LAUNDRY BEAR likely identifies organizations with public-facing Zimbra infrastructure by port scanning [T1595] and fingerprinting datasets easily procured through various commercial vendors [T1596.005].  

After identifying a target organization, the group likely compiles email addresses for individual users to target with the exploit [T1589.002] from datasets offered by commercial vendors [T1597.002], open source intelligence [T1593], or previously exfiltrated data [T1597].  

Resource development

The actors procure VPSs from a variety of providers [T1583.003], including those with Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements, and often use fabricated identities. LAUNDRY BEAR primarily uses Mullvad VPN [T1583] when interacting with these servers, further demonstrating the group’s intent to mask their identity and maintain operations security (OPSEC). After the server is provisioned, an automated process deploys the Docker containers necessary for Ulej’s Flowerbed framework [T1608], which then receives and aggregates the data Ulej exfiltrates. These servers are typically only used for 7-60 days before moving to new infrastructure.

Flowerbed framework

Flowerbed is a Python project that uses Docker for containerization. The project includes four different Docker containers:

  • Catcher,
  • Certbot,
  • Nginx, and
  • Gardener.

Catcher acts as both a DNS and HTTP server to receive and aggregate exfiltrated victim information [T1048]. For additional information on Catcher, refer to the Exfiltration section of this advisory. Flowerbed’s next container, Certbot, is based on one of the official Certbot containers, which allows for automated generation of Let’s Encrypt certificates using DNS challenges through Cloudflare. This certificate can then be used by the Nginx container, which serves as an HTTPS reverse proxy for Catcher, enabling Flowerbed to disguise some of its exfiltration activity through an encrypted communications channel [T1048.002]. The Nginx reverse proxy also validates that the Server Name Indicator (SNI) value contains “*.i.*” prior to forwarding the traffic to Catcher. If the SNI does not contain that string, the Nginx server returns a 444 error to the client. This is likely an attempt to reject non-Ulej connections. Finally, the Gardener container functions as a health check for the Catcher service. Gardener is a simple Python script that validates Catcher correctly receives and processes data.

The simplistic Flowerbed codebase has indications that artificial intelligence (AI) played a role in its development. This highlights how AI is increasingly being used to develop malicious capabilities [T1588.007]. The dependence on AI for a simple capability, such as Flowerbed, alongside a previous reliance on open source capabilities, such as Evilginx2 [T1588.002], likely indicates a lack of advanced technical knowledge within LAUNDRY BEAR, especially in relation to true software development capabilities.

Initial access

To gain initial access, LAUNDRY BEAR sends an email containing a malicious JavaScript payload to the target [T1566]. Through exploitation of CVE-2025-66376, this JavaScript payload is immediately executed once the user views the malicious email [T1203], such as the one shown in Figure 1, in the ZCS webmail platform. Since at least November 2025, LAUNDRY BEAR began sending these phishing emails from victim infrastructure through compromised accounts [T1199], as shown in the email metadata in Figure 2. These compromised accounts were likely previous victims of this, or another LAUNDRY BEAR, campaign and their use is intended to further obfuscate and frustrate anti-phishing tools and training.

Figure 1: Example of malicious email
Figure 1: Example of malicious email

Figure 2: Headers from an example malicious email
Figure 2: Headers from an example malicious email

According to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), CVE-2025-66376 was initially published on 5 January 2026. This vulnerability allows for execution of a JavaScript payload included in email content due to improper sanitization of Cascading Style Sheet’s (CSS) @import directives within an email [5]. Because the activity attributed to this campaign began in July 2025—months before Synacor released a patch and the CVE was published—the payload initially exploited a zero-day vulnerability at that time [T1587.004].  

Utilization of a zero-day exploit within this campaign demonstrates the ability for even emerging threat groups like LAUNDRY BEAR to operationalize novel exploits into a highly successful capability.

Hidden in LAUNDRY BEAR’s email is a Base64 encoded payload within the “onload” field of a Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) element [T1027.017], as shown in Figure 3. Leading up to the inclusion of this payload in the SVG element are various instances of @import directives, as required to leverage CVE-2025-66376. This payload includes an XOR encrypted final script encoded in a Base64 inner payload (see Figure 3) [T1027.013]. The outer payload decodes and decrypts the inner payload using an XOR function and a hardcoded key and then executes the script contained within the inner payload containing the collection and exfiltration logic. By changing the key used for the XOR encryption of the inner payload or adding additional @import directives with non-functional code [T1027.010], LAUNDRY BEAR can easily generate new payloads that bypass basic threat detection signatures. This malicious payload attempts to collect and exfiltrate information in 12 asynchronous stages [T1119]. The stages in order of appearance within the payload are as follows:

  1. sendStartPing,
  2. gather_email,
  3. gather_environment,
  4. gather_2fa_codes,
  5. gather_app_password,
  6. gather_device_status,
  7. gather_oauth_consumers,
  8. gather_autocomplete_password,
  9. enable_mail_protocols,
  10. gather_gal,
  11. sendArchives, and
  12. sendFinishPing. 

Figure 3: Malicious payload of example email
Figure 3: Malicious payload of example email

Use of a zero-day exploit within this campaign demonstrates the ability for even emerging threat groups like LAUNDRY BEAR to operationalize novel exploits into a highly successful capability [T1587].

Persistence and credential access

To establish sustained persistence into the victim’s email account, the script attempts to modify account preferences and collect authentication information. Any collected credentials are later exfiltrated, as further described in the Exfiltration section below. Other campaigns attributed to LAUNDRY BEAR also demonstrated the group’s ability to circumvent multi-factor authentication through session token replay [T1550.004], and the Zimbra campaign follows a similar trend.

The script used in this campaign tries to discover the victim’s email address during the gather_email stage [T1087]. The script searches for this email address in two ways. First, it examines the batchInfoResponse variable, which an HTML script element on the webpage can define, for an email address. Even if the script finds an email address there, it also checks whether it acquired a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) token as described later in the Collection section of this advisory. If so, the script uses the “GetIdentitiesRequest” Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace to determine the victim’s email address [T1185] and then exfiltrates it. However, if the script does not have a CSRF token or the SOAP request fails, the script exfiltrates the email value recovered from the first method instead. If both attempts fail to capture the victim’s email, the script sends a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) payload with a key of “email” and value of null over HTTPS and does not attempt DNS exfiltration.

During the gather_autocomplete_password stage, the script attempts to collect the victim’s saved password via the autocomplete feature of the victim’s password manager. The script injects two HTML div elements requesting login credentials onto the page outside of the victim’s view, as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. After waiting five seconds, the script then attempts to extract the password provided automatically by the password manager from the input element shown in Figure 4. If there is no value in that input field, it checks the password input field shown in Figure 5. If neither input field contains a value, a JSON payload with a key of “autocomplete_password” and value of null is sent over HTTPS and DNS exfiltration is not attempted.

Figure 4: First illegitimate login HTML element
Figure 4: First illegitimate login HTML element

Figure 5: Second illegitimate login HTML element
Figure 5: Second illegitimate login HTML element

LAUNDRY BEAR almost certainly relies on a mail client using the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) for persistent access to the victim’s mailbox. During the enable_mail_protocols stage, a SOAP request leveraging the “ModifyPrefsRequest” command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace is sent. This request attempts to set the “zimbraPrefImapEnabled” preference to TRUE. While the default setting for “zimbraPrefImapEnabled” is not well documented, this action is almost certainly intended to ensure that IMAP access to the victim’s mailbox is enabled.

ZCS does not support 2FA for some mail clients, including IMAP. To support users who rely on IMAP clients, ZCS allows for the generation of Application Passcodes. Application Passcodes are randomly generated passwords that can be used for clients that cannot support the normal 2FA process to authenticate. During the gather_app_password stage, the script makes a SOAP request using the “CreateAppSpecificPasswordRequest” command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace to create a new Application Passcode [T1556.006]. The SOAP request uses “ZimbraWeb” as the name of the application.

Additionally, the script also attempts to collect 2FA tokens. During the gather_2fa_codes stage, the script makes a SOAP request using the “GetScratchCodesRequest” command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace. The script then attempts to exfiltrate any non-null 2FA codes collected this way. The number of codes can vary, and each code is exfiltrated to Flowerbed individually.

Collection

As demonstrated in the Persistence and credential access section, this script relies heavily on SOAP requests to collect victim information. To make these requests, the script aims to acquire the victim’s current CSRF token, which it attempts to access within the webpage’s local storage using localStorage.getItem("csrfToken"). If the script is unable to acquire this CSRF token, it will be unable to make any SOAP requests. In addition to the SOAP commands documented in the Persistence and credential access section, other SOAP commands executed to collect victim information are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Additional SOAP commands used

SOAP Command 

Namespace 

Stage 

GetInfoRequest 

zimbraAccount 

gather_environment 

GetDeviceStatusRequest 

zimbraSync 

gather_device_status 

GetOAuthConsumersRequest 

zimbraAccount 

gather_oauth_consumers 

SearchGalRequest 

zimbraAccount 

gather_gal 

The script attempts to collect the victim’s GAL through brute force by searching for each two-character combination from a character set of “abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890.-_”. These queries are conducted using 20 batches of SOAP requests with 77 “SearchGalRequest” SOAP commands in each batch except for the last request containing only 58.

During the gather_environment stage, the script attempts to determine which type of ZCS webmail client the victim is using. The script checks the user’s current URL to determine the client type being used, checking for certain indicators (shown in Table 2) to determine the client type. The corresponding value is then used as the payload when exfiltrating the client type.

Table 2: ZCS webmail client types

Indicator 

Client Type 

Associated Value 

?client=advanced 

Advanced 

c 

/h/ 

Standard 

h 

/modern/ 

Modern 

m 

As part of collection, the script attempts to harvest any emails not marked as “junk” from the last 90 days from the victim’s account. Emails are collected daily by an HTTP GET request to the URL path, “/home/~/?fmt=tgz&meta=0&query=date:-{DAY_OFFSET}d AND (not in:junk)”. The {DAY_OFFSET} value would be between 0 and 89 representing how many days ago the email was sent or received. To prevent redundant collection and exfiltration of emails, a variable with a name based on the email date being queried, using a format of zd_comp_YYYY-MM-DD, and value of true, is saved to the window.top.localStorage property. This variable is saved regardless of whether the email is successfully exfiltrated.  

According to Mozilla documentation, if the user is not in a private browsing session, any data stored to localStorage does not typically expire. This means that if the user happens to execute the script again from the same computer, the script avoids attempting to re-exfiltrate previously captured emails. However, the script always attempts to pull any emails with a {DAY_OFFSET} of zero. In other words, the script always pulls emails sent or received the same day it is run. After email results are returned from the query for each day of email activity, those results are then passed to Flowerbed as described in the Exfiltration section.

The script also provides LAUNDRY BEAR with telemetry on any errors that occur during the collection process. This is accomplished by executing any collection or exfiltration code through helper functions that contain error handling logic. If an error occurs, a payload containing information on the error itself, the context of the error happening, and the stage in which the error occurred is sent to Flowerbed as described in the Exfiltration section below. For cases where the error occurs within a SOAP request, “:api” is concatenated to the stage value in the payload. If an error occurs during the batch SOAP requests that occur when collecting the GAL of the victim, the stage value will use a format of gather_gal:{VAL}:api. The {VAL} placeholder indicates which batch request, a number from 0 to 19, the error occurred in. Errors that occur during the password autocomplete interception process will use “gather_autocomplete_password:dom” for the stage value. Finally, if an error occurs when attempting to collect or exfiltrate a specific day’s emails, the stage will include which day the error occurred on, using the previously defined placeholder {DAY_OFFSET}, with a format of sendArchive:day-{DAY_OFFSET}.

Exfiltration

At the end of each stage in the collection process, the script attempts to exfiltrate acquired information to Flowerbed. The script primarily relies on two forms of data exfiltration: DNS [T1048.003] and HTTPS. Some information is exfiltrated over both the DNS and HTTPS channels.

Prior to exfiltration, a randomized 10- or 11-character alphanumeric string is generated as an identifier for the victim. This identifier is included in the URL of both the DNS- and HTTPS-based exfiltration.  

DNS exfiltration

DNS exfiltration occurs through DNS A record queries. To ensure data exfiltrated through DNS is not corrupted when traversing through non-actor-controlled DNS infrastructure, Ulej maintains compliance with RFC 1035, Domain Names - Implementation and Specification, specifically accounting for the case insensitivity and subdomain length requirements. Base32 encoding is used to create a case-insensitive payload. Once the payload is encoded, a period (“.”) is added every 60 characters to ensure each subdomain is under 63 characters long. The script then creates a new image object sourced from a URL with the scheme defined in Figure 6. Any traffic involving DNS exfiltration will have “d-“ prefixing the victim identifier, and the subdomain immediately following indicates the type of information being exfiltrated.

Figure 6: Structure for information exfiltrated by DNS
Figure 6: Structure for information exfiltrated by DNS

When the script generates an image object, the browser tries to retrieve the complete domain of the URL specified as the source of the image. This triggers a DNS request sent to the actor-controlled server and processed by Flowerbed. Table 3 lists both the information exfiltrated via DNS and their corresponding data type identifiers in the DNS queries.  

Table 3: DNS exfiltration

Type of Information 

Exfiltration Stage 

Data Type 

Victim’s Email Address 

gather_email 

e 

Client Type 

gather_environment 

c 

Zimbra Version 

gather_environment  

v 

URL at Time of Exploitation 

gather_environment 

url 

2FA Scratch Codes 

gather_2fa_codes 

2fa 

Newly Created Application Password 

gather_app_password 

pa 

Harvested Autocomplete Password 

gather_autocomplete_password 

pw 

HTTPS exfiltration

Any information exfiltrated via DNS is also exfiltrated through HTTPS, as well as additional data including email content, contacts, attachments, and error logging information. By using Let’s Encrypt certificates, this group can quickly deploy new infrastructure and leverage encrypted HTTPS communications with valid server certificates when exfiltrating information from the victim’s environment. The HTTPS exfiltration capability only uses two HTTP content types, defined in Table 4. Traffic associated with HTTPS exfiltration will use the URL scheme shown in Figure 7.  

Table 4: HTTPS exfiltration types

Content Type 

URL Path 

application/json 

/v/p 

application/octet-stream 

/v/d 

Figure 7: Structure for information exfiltrated by HTTPS
Figure 7: Structure for information exfiltrated by HTTPS

Some of the data transmitted via HTTPS uses the standard JSON content type format. The script includes the information in a POST request to actor-controlled infrastructure.  

Table 5 provides a summary of the JSON-based exfiltration.

Table 5: HTTPS JSON exfiltration  

Type of Information 

Exfiltration Stage 

JSON Key(s) 

Victim’s Email Address 

gather_email 

email 

Client Type, Version, and Current URL 

gather_environment 

client, version, full_url 

Newly Created Application Password 

gather_app_password 

app_password 

Harvested Autocomplete Password 

gather_autocomplete_password 

autocomplete_password 

The script transmits all HTTPS exfiltration not identified in Table 5 using the Octet-Stream content type as binary data. The POST requests for this method include a filename in the “X-Filename” header. Traditionally, developers use headers prefixed with “X-” to denote custom headers that do not follow a defined standard. The purpose of including this header remains unclear since the Catcher capability ignores the provided filename when saving the data. Table 6 summarizes the data exfiltrated in this format.

 Table 6: HTTPS binary exfiltration

Type of Information 

Exfiltration Stage 

X-Filename Header 

SOAP request for GetInfoRequest 

gather_environment 

zimbra_batch_analytics.json 

SOAP request for GetScratchCodesRequest 

gather_2fa_codes 

zimbra_batch_analytics.json 

SOAP request for GetDeviceStatusRequest 

gather_device_status 

zimbra_batch_analytics.json 

SOAP request for GetOAuthConsumersRequest 

gather_oauth_consumers 

zimbra_batch_analytics.json 

Victim Organization’s Global Address List 

gather_gal 

telemetry_{1-20}.json 

Last 90 Days of Victim’s Emails 

sendArchives 

telemetryData_{0-89}.json 

The script sends all exfiltrated data identified in Table 6 to the Catcher service exactly as received from the SOAP request in a JSON payload, except for email exfiltration. For email exfiltration, the script sends it as a GZIP compressed archive [T1560]. Although most of the exfiltration consists of valid JSON, the script still attempts to exfiltrate all information identified in Table 6 using the application/octet-stream content typing rather than application/json.

At the beginning and end of the collection and exfiltration activity, during the sendStartPing and sendFinishPing stages respectively, the script submits a POST request with a JSON payload to indicate that the script is starting or finishing execution. Throughout execution, the script also logs error events and send the logs using similar JSON payloads. The script sends the JSON in a POST request to the URL documented in Figure 2, using a URL path of “/v/p” and with a “subtype” key that shows which type of action it logged (start, finish, or error).  

Catcher

Ulej exfiltrates information to Flowerbed to be handled by a service named Catcher. Catcher is a containerized Python application, running in Docker as part of Flowerbed, which is detailed in the Resource development section. It receives exfiltrated data and temporarily stores it, enabling its eventual transfer to infrastructure designed for long-term, secure storage.

Catcher acts as an HTTP server over port 8000 and a DNS server on port 53. As described in the Resource development section, the Flowerbed project uses an additional Docker container running an Nginx reverse proxy to enable HTTPS support. This reverse proxy uses a certificate generated by Let’s Encrypt and forwards all traffic with an SNI containing “*.i.*” to port 8000 within the Catcher container.

The DNS service can accept A, AAAA, MX, TXT, and CAA queries. For any MX, AAAA, or CAA queries, the server will always provide an empty response. The system only supports TXT records as needed to process Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) requests, which enable the assignment of Let’s Encrypt certificates. If the server receives an A query, Catcher will always respond with the public IP address of the Flowerbed server.  

However, if a query includes a domain formatted as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, the service saves a log file in JSON format to disk containing the following details of the DNS query:

  • Time of query,
  • Source IP address for query,
  • Queried domain, and
  • Type of query.

The HTTP server typically responds with OK, except in cases where the path is “pixel.gif” when the response contains a 1x1 gif image with a SHA-256 hash of ef1955ae757c8b966c83248350331bd3a30f658ced11f387f8ebf05ab3368629. Like the DNS service, the HTTP service will only log entries when the domain found in the host header of the request follows the expected formatting as seen in Figure 6 and Figure 7. As the HTTPS exfiltration uses non-standardized binary and JSON-formatted payloads when exfiltrating to Catcher, Catcher will check the content type of the request. If the content type is set to “application/json”, Catcher encodes the data in Base64 and includes it in the JSON log entry written to disk. If the content type is set to any other value, Catcher leaves the Base64 payload in the JSON log entry blank and saves the payload to a separate file with the same filename as the JSON log entry with a “.bin” file extension. An HTTPS exfiltration event causes Catcher to save a JSON formatted log file to disk containing the following information from the HTTP request:

  • Time,
  • Source IP address,
  • Request method,
  • Host,
  • Path,
  • Query string,
  • Headers, and
  • Base64 payload.

These JSON event log files and binary output files are then initially saved to the directory /root/hits/tmp and later moved to the /root/hits/ready directory once processed. This prevents incomplete files, which are still being uploaded to Catcher, from premature exfiltration from the server. Approximately every 60 seconds, a likely automated workflow establishes a Secure Shell (SSH) connection with the server hosting Flowerbed for a few seconds, almost certainly exfiltrating the data processed by Catcher to non-public-facing infrastructure. The command in Figure 8 also executes hourly to remove all files last modified at least two days ago from the /root/hits/ready directory.

Figure 8: Command used for automated directory cleanup
Figure 8: Command used for automated directory cleanup

Response strategies

Mitigations

In many cases, by the time an organization identifies a compromise related to this campaign, numerous sensitive and proprietary emails have already been exfiltrated. The significant risk posed by this cyber threat emphasizes the importance for organizations that use ZCS and other similar webmail solutions to take proactive steps to mitigate this risk.

All organizations that use the ZCS webmail service should immediately prioritize ensuring that their ZCS is not running a vulnerable version. A patch for CVE-2025-66376 was released for both 10.1.13 and 10.0.18 versions of ZCS [D3-AH]. If immediate patching is not feasible, organizations should advise employees to use alternative mail clients to access email and avoid using the Classic ZCS webmail client until ZCS is updated to a non-vulnerable version [d3f:Isolate].

System administrators should closely monitor any Internet-connected ZCS or other email systems and the workstations that access those systems and promptly apply available software updates [D3-AH]. Administrators can maintain awareness of active vulnerability exploitation by referencing open source resources, including CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog and NCSC-UK’s Responding to active exploitation of vulnerabilities guidance.

Organizations should consider using a third-party authentication service that supports passkeys for authentication to mediate access to ZCS and other services that do not natively support passkeys. By doing so, organizations can work to eliminate the possibility of automated password collection from autocomplete or password reuse [D3-CH]. However, Application Passcodes may still be necessary and should be monitored closely.  

Organizations should implement network monitoring capabilities with collection and short-term retention of packet capture or NetFlow data and maintain log collection and storage [CPG 3.Q]. This will allow organizations to monitor for and identify suspicious network activity [CPG 4.B], such as:

  • Significant amounts of outbound data being sent to IPs associated with VPS providers not used by the organization [D3-NTA];
  • Frequent DNS queries for a suspicious domain with seemingly random subdomains [D3-DNSTA];
  • A sudden spike of connections to a server associated with a recently established domain [D3-NTCD]; and  
  • Connections to internal services, such as webmail, from VPN providers frequently leveraged by this group for nefarious activity, such as Mullvad VPN [D3-NTCD].

Additionally, for organizations that can inspect the content of outbound HTTPS connections via break-and-inspect infrastructure, security teams should identify traffic matching the characteristics described in the Exfiltration section of this advisory.

Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

Flowerbed infrastructure

The following indicators have been attributed to use by LAUNDRY BEAR for their campaign targeting ZCS’s webmail service as of the publication of this advisory. (Disclaimer: Due to the frequency of operational structure changes by this group, these indicators are intended solely for historic attribution purposes. Some indicators, such as IPs, compromised emails, and domains, may be outdated, so organizations should check for current activity before acting on these IOCs.) Table 7 provides details about the server infrastructure used to host Flowerbed, and Table 8 lists the corresponding SHA-1 hash values for the Let’s Encrypt certificates used by that infrastructure [D3-IAA].

Table 7: Flowerbed server infrastructure

Domain 

IP Address 

First Seen 

Last Seen 

zmailanalytics[.]com 

216.252.238[.]104 

8 July 2025 

15 October 2025 

zimbra-metadata[.]com 

216.252.238[.]18 

20 August 2025 

14 October 2025 

analyticemailmeter[.]com 

37.120.247[.]228 

24 September 2025 

18 March 2026 

emailanalytics.com[.]ua 

185.86.79[.]95 

24 September 2025 

18 March 2026 

mailnalysis[.]com 

104.248.134[.]194 

11 November 2025 

17 February 2026 

zimbrastat[.]com 

64.226.124[.]190 

18 December 2025 

18 March 2026 

zimbrasoft.com[.]ua 

193.238.152[.]66 

20 January 2026 

18 March 2026 

synacorzimbra[.]nl 

216.252.238[.]64 

3 February 2026 

30 March 2026 

istc-cloud[.]com 

194.156.103[.]193 

5 February 2026 

30 March 2026 

Table 8: Flowerbed X.509 certificate SHA-1 hashes  

Associated Domain 

X.509 SHA-1 Hash 

First Seen 

Last Seen 

zmailanalytics[.]com 

2e4f314bc9943cab5005d6fde0b271c74d47bc9d 

8 Jul 2025 

6 Aug 2025 

*.i.zmailanalytics[.]com 

50a87d926621dd06389ba50d86e0ff574ed713a8 

6 Aug 2025 

13 Oct 2025 

*.i.zimbra-metadata[.]com 

c5a72420e7bb308d078e62128430897f82194c95 

20 Aug 2025 

14 Oct 2025 

*.i.analyticemailmeter[.]com 

8959c4d29e29f02ea94ea8bb21c8df2594c5549d 

24 Sep 2025 

8 Nov 2025 

*.i.emailanalytics.com[.]ua 

62eb76432597694edb01c1fe57aab0cfe03a7178 

25 Sep 2025 

27 Sep 2025 

*.i.mailnalysis[.]com 

cddf5c3be1e07f28140aed165b929bf2d614922a 

12 Nov 2025 

17 Dec 2025 

*.i.zimbrastat[.]com 

18b3ad442ce73cc8656d51d75bbd7c855f2cb7e8 

18 Dec 2025 

28 Dec 2025 

*.i.zimbrasoft.com[.]ua 

1b25041ececf2457eef0270fc1d785cec8ec9ded 

21 Jan 2026 

10 Feb 2026 

*.i.synacorzimbra[.]nl 

e4fe6466a4f9a4249fe330651e914e45bbdca44a 

5 Feb 2026 

22 Mar 2026 

*.i.istc-cloud[.]com 

b6b77c9a455225d525834a403ca9ef5481ed0447 

12 Feb 2026 

30 Mar 2026 

LAUNDRY BEAR has used the following email addresses to procure resources used for this campaign:

  • ivanka.zurabishvili@proton[.]me,
  • zmul1@buildandconsulting[.]com,
  • garrysmithme@pinmx[.]net, and
  • hostingclient@pinmx[.]net.

Phishing distribution

LAUNDRY BEAR primarily relied on ProtonMail for distribution of malicious email. However, as stated above, LAUNDRY BEAR’s more recent efforts likely have shifted to distributing the payload through previous victims.  

The following email addresses have distributed payloads attributed to this campaign:

  • c.laurent.ejfa@proton[.]me,
  • j.moreau.epsc@proton[.]me,
  • liberty.insights@proton[.]me,
  • certain email addresses (presumably compromised) at the isofts.kiev[.]ua domain (i.e., ending with @isofts.kiev[.]ua), and
  • certain email addresses (presumably compromised) at the navs.edu[.]ua domain (i.e., ending with @navs.edu[.]ua).

Additionally, the following are SHA-256 hashes of email samples containing the malicious payload attributed to this campaign:

  • 98df604ecc57f884a2e6ce3266a0013ad64455cac48442c2312cfa4765007aaf,
  • 60db9abae75cd8ccc49dd7ea5feb41677566dcd442f12ebc5745ffd2810fb874,
  • b1f5beb1175fc5c7d1806a2f0d900eb124c54f0286c5c52b66eea7a6633adb1d, and
  • 1517b3caa495f6c4e832df9c75fc94667e3c233773f7fa4e056d5e30e5ead760.

Post-compromise artifacts

Currently, the script does not remove artifacts. This leaves additional opportunities to identify victims of this activity. While emphasis should always be placed on consistent monitoring of network traffic and endpoint activity, there are a variety of persistent artifacts described below that can be used to identify victims of this campaign.

This Ulej capability relies on creating a significant number of SOAP requests to collect account information for exfiltration. ZCS logs from these requests are stored, by default, in the /opt/zimbra/log/mailbox.log file [D3-PA]. A significant amount of SOAP request activity that aligns with what was described in the Persistence and credential access and Collection sections of this advisory could indicate a potential compromise. Specific examples of high-risk SOAP request activity might include:

  • Many SearchGalRequest command requests from a single user over a short period of time;
  • Use of the CreateAppSpecificPasswordRequest command, especially in cases where it is creating an Application Passcode named “ZimbraWeb”; and
  • Use of the GetScratchCodesRequest command.

While LAUNDRY BEAR uses the localStorage property to track what days had emails previously exfiltrated, defenders can use this property to identify victims of this campaign and determine the scope of exfiltrated information [D3-PA]. Review of the items stored in that property for an organization’s ZCS webmail client page on an endpoint device could indicate compromise if there are items named with a format of zd_comp_YYYY-MM-DD, as explained in the Collection section of this advisory.

While Application Passcodes have non-malicious purposes, in this case instances of these passcodes with the name “ZimbraWeb” are almost certainly malicious. The ZCS webmail application can support 2FA natively and does not require the use of an Application Passcode, so there is no reason that there should be one named “ZimbraWeb.”

In instances where organizations identify victims of this campaign, they should also examine the inbox of the suspected victim for the original phishing email [D3-MA]. If an email that has a payload exploiting CVE-2025-66376 is discovered, steps should be taken immediately to identify and quarantine other instances of emails with similar body content, senders, and subject lines to prevent further exploitation and exfiltration.  

Remediation

In the event an organization identifies activity associated with this campaign, that organization should take steps to minimize further exploitation. The organization should consider requesting that employees minimize use of the ZCS webmail client until the organization updates to a patched version that is not vulnerable to CVE-2025-66376.

Organizations should use identifiers from the IOCs section of this report to identify any individuals compromised by this campaign and record the date(s) of compromise(s) to determine the scale and scope of emails exfiltrated.

All users from the organization should have all Application Passcodes and 2FA scratch keys revoked. Affected organizations should require all employees to change passwords in line with establishing minimum password strength requirements [CPG 3.B] and creating unique credentials [CPG 3.C], specifically noting that compromised employees might have had any password stored in a password manager exfiltrated.

Works cited

[1] Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD). AIVD and MIVD identify a new Russian cyber threat actor. 2025. https://www.aivd.nl/site/binaries/site-content/collections/documents/2025/05/27/aivd-en-mivd-onderkennen-nieuwe-russische-cyberactor/Advisory+AIVD+en+MIVD+Public+report+on+new+cyber+actor.pdf

[2] Microsoft Corporation. New Russia-affiliated actor Void Blizzard targets critical sectors for espionage. 2025. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/27/new-russia-affiliated-actor-void-blizzard-targets-critical-sectors-for-espionage/

[3] Palo Alto Networks Unit 42. Russian Global Webmail Espionage. 2026. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/russian-webmail-espionage/ 

[4] Proofpoint. TA488 Targets Zimbra Mailservers with Half-Click Exploits. 2026. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta488-zcs-exploit

[5] Seqrite. Operation GhostMail: Russian APT exploits Zimbra Webmail to Target Ukraine State Agency. 2026. https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-ghostmail-zimbra-xss-russian-apt-ukraine/  

Footnotes

1 Národní úřad pro kybernetickou a informační bezpečnost
2 Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste
3 Välisluureamet
4 Sotilastiedustelu
5  Suojelupoliisi
6 Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure
7 Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information
8 Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Esterna
9 Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna
10 Serviciul de Informații și Securitate al Republicii Moldova
11 Agencja Wywiadu
12 Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego
13 Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
14 Nationellt Cybersäkerhetscenter
15 MITRE and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE D3FEND is a trademark of The MITRE Corporation.

Acknowledgements

The authoring agencies acknowledge the contributions to this advisory from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 and Proofpoint.

Disclaimer of endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Organizations have no obligation to respond or provide information back to the authoring organizations in response to this joint advisory. If, after reviewing the information provided, an organization decides to provide information to the authoring organizations, reporting must be consistent with all applicable laws and policies.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring agencies’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

Contact

United States organizations 

  • National Security Agency 
    Cybersecurity Report Feedback: CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov 
    Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DIB_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov 
    Media Inquiries / Press Desk: NSA Media Relations: 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov 
  • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
    CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (contact@cisa.dhs.gov), or by calling 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). 
  • Federal Bureau of Investigation 
    If you or someone you know has fallen victim to this campaign, file a complaint with IC3. 
  • Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency  
    DCSA Counterintelligence, Cyber Mission Center, Cyber Threat Operations Branch: DCSA.CI.CyberOps@mail.mil 
    Cleared Contactors (CCs) should contact their DCSA Counterintelligence Special Agent to report information pertaining to suspicious contacts or physical/digital efforts to obtain illegal or unauthorized access to the CC’s cleared facility/information, as required by 32 CFR 117. 
    Media/Public Inquiries: dcsa.quantico.dcsa-hq.mbx.pa@mail.mil  
  • Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center  
    Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DC3.DCISE@us.af.mil 
    Defense Industrial Base mandatory cyber incident reporting as required by 10 U.S. Code Sections 391 and 393 and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.204-7012 is submitted at https://dibnet.dod.mil 
    Media Inquiries / Press Desk: DC3.Information@us.af.mil 
  • Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
    To report criminal activity impacting the United States Navy, go to www.ncis.navy.mil and click “Submit a Tip”

Dutch organizations 

Australian organizations 

  • Australian Signals Directorate 
    Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories. 

Canadian organizations 

  • The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), part of the Communications Security Establishment, encourages Canadian organizations to report cyber incidents and to strengthen the security of their networking devices.  
    Report an incident or suspicious activity to the Cyber Centre by email at contact@cyber.gc.ca, online via the reporting tool Report a cyber incident - Canadian Centre for Cyber Security or by phone at 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788). 

New Zealand organizations 

United Kingdom organizations 

Estonia organizations 

Finnish organizations 

French organizations 

  • French organizations are encouraged to report suspicious activity or incident related information found in this advisory by contacting ANSSI/CERT-FR at: cert-fr@ssi.gouv.fr or by phone at: 3218 or +33 9 70 83 32 18. 

Italian Organizations 

Moldovan organizations 

  • Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova (SIS RM): cybersec@sis.md 

Polish organizations 

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques

See Table 9 through Table 19 for all the threat actor tactics and techniques referenced in this advisory.

Table 9: Reconnaissance 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials 

T1589.001 

The payload attempts to intercept a victim’s password from their password manager. 

Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses 

T1589.002 

The payload attempts to grab the victim’s email address from various data stores. 

Search Open Websites/Domains 

T1593 

This group likely leverages public information to support target development. 

Active Scanning 

T1595 

Port scanning can be used by this group to assist with determining exploitability of identified targets. 

Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases 

T1596.005 

Various public datasets can provide information to support discovery of exploitable targets. 

Search Closed Sources 

T1597 

Previously exfiltrated data can be used to enhance target development efforts. 

Search Closed Sources: Purchase Technical Data 

T1597.002 

Commercial datasets can also be used to support target development efforts. 
Table 10: Resource Development 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Acquire Infrastructure 

T1583 

This group used Mullvad VPN to anonymize traffic sent to operational infrastructure. 

Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server 

T1583.003 

This group procured VPS servers from a variety of vendors. 

Develop Capabilities 

T1587 

The Ulej capability was developed likely for use by this group to conduct spear phishing campaigns. 

Develop Capabilities: Malware 

T1587.001 

Development of a novel payload that steals a victim’s emails and other sensitive account information. 

Develop Capabilities: Exploits 

T1587.004 

Development of a novel, at the time, cross-site-scripting (XSS) exploit that enables execution of arbitrary JavaScript. 

Obtain Capabilities: Tool 

T1588.002 

Open source tools, such as Evilginx2, have also been used by the group. 

Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence 

T1588.007 

The group appears to have leveraged AI to support development efforts. 

Stage Capabilities 

T1608 

Flowerbed is deployed to a procured server in the cloud. 

Table 11: Initial Access 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Valid Accounts 

T1078 

This actor has used commercial datasets to acquire account credentials and gain unauthorized access to accounts. Additionally, this actor is believed to use previously compromised accounts to conduct spear phishing.  

Trusted Relationship 

T1199 

The group sends malicious payloads to targeted individuals using previously compromised accounts that might have an established relationship with the target.  

Phishing 

T1566 

The actors used spear phishing to lure users into opening malicious email. 

Table 12: Execution 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Exploitation for Client Execution 

T1203 

An XSS vulnerability was leveraged to execute the JavaScript payload. 

Table 13: Persistence 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Account Manipulation 

T1098 

Enabling IMAP and Application Passcodes provides persistent access to the compromised account. 

Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication 

T1556.006 

Creating Application Passcodes to bypass 2FA and stealing a user’s “Scratch Keys,” which can be used in place of a 2FA token. 

Table 14: Privilege Escalation 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Valid Accounts 

T1078 

This actor has used commercial datasets to acquire account credentials and gain unauthorized privileged access to accounts.  

Table 15: Stealth 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation 

T1027.010 

Obfuscated JavaScript payload sent to targets to exploit the XSS vulnerability. 

Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File 

T1027.013 

The JavaScript payload included both a Base64-encoded and XOR-encrypted inner payload. 

Obfuscated Files or Information: SVG Smuggling 

T1027.017 

The payload was contained in an “onload” attribute within an SVG image included in the malicious email. 

Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie 

T1550.004 

Previous campaigns using AiTM leveraged stealing and use of a victim’s session cookies to authenticate. 

Table 16: Credential Access 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication 

T1556.006 

Creating Application Passcodes to bypass 2FA and stealing a user’s “Scratch Keys,” which can be used in place of a 2FA token. 

Adversary-in-the-Middle 

T1557 

Previous campaigns used Evilginx2 as an AiTM toolkit to intercept credentials and session cookies. 

Table 17: Collection 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Data Staged: Remote Data Staging 

T1074.002 

Exfiltrated data was sent to an actor-controlled VPS prior to assumed long-term storage solutions. 

Email Collection 

T1114 

This group has emphasized collection of emails. 

Email Collection: Remote Email Collection 

T1114.002 

Emails are collected via API calls to the ZCS mail server and are not collected from emails stored directly on the victim’s device. 

Automated Collection 

T1119 

Upon execution, the JavaScript payload automatically collects all relevant information in stages. 

Browser Session Hijacking 

T1185 

The JavaScript payload leverages the user’s authenticated browser session to make API requests as the user. 

Archive Collected Data 

T1560 

Emails are exfiltrated with GZIP compression. 

Table 18: Discovery 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Account Discovery 

T1087 

Stolen Global Access Lists provide the group with new users to target. 

Table 19: Exfiltration 

Technique Title 

ID 

Use 

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol 

T1048 

Victim information was exfiltrated over both HTTPS and DNS. 

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol 

T1048.002 

Some payloads, especially ones with large amounts of data, were exfiltrated over HTTPS. 

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol 

T1048.003 

Some smaller bandwidth payloads were exfiltrated over DNS using Base32 encoding. 

Appendix B: MITRE D3FEND countermeasures

See Table 20 for a mapping of several of the cybersecurity countermeasures mentioned in this advisory.

Table 20: MITRE D3FEND Countermeasures 

Countermeasure Title 

ID 

Description 

Application Hardening 

D3-AH 
  • Organizations should immediately prioritize patching CVE-2025-66376.  
  • Organizations should promptly apply software updates to all email systems. 

Isolate 

d3f:Isolate 

Organizations that cannot feasibly patch should use alternative mail clients. 

Credential Hardening 

D3-CH 

Organizations should consider using a third-party authentication service that supports passkeys to mediate access to ZCS and other services that do not natively support passkeys. 

Network Traffic Analysis 

D3-NTA 

Organizations should monitor for significant amounts of outbound data being sent to IPs associated with VPS providers not used by the organization. 

DNS Traffic Analysis 

D3-DNSTA 

Organizations should monitor for frequent DNS queries to a suspicious domain for seemingly random subdomains. 

Network Traffic Community Deviation 

D3-NTCD 
  • Organizations should monitor for a sudden spike of connections to a server associated with a recently established domain. 
  • Organizations should monitor for connections to internal services, such as webmail, from VPN providers. 

Identifier Activity Analysis 

D3-IAA 

Organizations should search for the listed known IOCs. 

Process Analysis 

D3-PA 
  • Organizations should search ZCS log files for specific commands used by the malicious script. 
  • Organizations should search the localStorage property in web browsers for the ZCS webmail client for “ZimbraWeb” Application Passcodes. 
Message Analysis D3-MA Organizations that suspect they have victims of this campaign should search for emails with a malicious payload to identify other victims.
]]> <![CDATA[An AirPod-powered Frisbee tracker makes backyard throws scientific]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689282/ios-mac-os/an-airpod-powered-frisbee-tracker-makes-backyard-throws-scientific/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689282/ios-mac-os/an-airpod-powered-frisbee-tracker-makes-backyard-throws-scientific/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 16:08:59 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de AirPods into a flying-disc stat tracker, using motion sensors to measure throws in a clever demonstration of what Apple's earbuds can do beyond playing audio.

White wireless earbuds resting in an open charging case on a soft gray fabric surface, with the case lid tilted back and earbuds partially seated in their slotsAirPods 4

Sharhan demonstrated Kinapod Disc on Reddit on July 20. The setup requires users to make a small hole in the center of a flying disc and insert one AirPod stem-first.

Once it's mounted, the AirPod sends motion data to an iPhone while Kinapod Disc detects each throw and records spin rate, total revolutions, estimated release speed, and airborne time.

It's a fun albeit expensive solution to the problem of throwing a plastic disc without enough statistics. It's also a clever use of motion sensors Apple builds into AirPods.


Continue Reading on AppleInsider | Discuss on our Forums]]> <![CDATA[Mozilla Addons Blog: Firefox 153 WebExtensions API updates]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689274/tools/mozilla-addons-blog-firefox-153-webextensions-api-updates/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689274/tools/mozilla-addons-blog-firefox-153-webextensions-api-updates/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 16:06:24 +0200 💾 Tools tsecurity.de We had a bumper release of WebExtensions API updates in Firefox 153. To start, there is a permissions change that affects how your extensions access local files. We then have two contributions from the community members: userScripts.execute() and the new publicSuffix API. We’re covering those contributions in more depth, including the people behind them, in a separate post. And there is more, read on…

File access now requires a dedicated permission

Extensions that need to read file:// URLs used to get that access as part of the “Access your data for all websites” host permission. Starting in Firefox 153, file access is a separate, explicit permission, “Access local files on your computer”, shown in the extension’s permissions settings. It’s off by default for every extension, including ones already installed.

This change has a few concrete effects on code:

  • Before: an extension with <all_urls> or a matching host permission could read file:// pages without any additional grant, and extension.isAllowedFileSchemeAccess() always returned false regardless of the permission setting.
  • After: the extension must have the new file-access permission granted, and extension.isAllowedFileSchemeAccess() correctly reflects whether the user has granted it.
async function checkFileSchemeAccess() {
  const isAllowed = await browser.extension.isAllowedFileSchemeAccess();

  if (!isAllowed) {
    await browser.notifications.create("file-scheme-access-needed", {
      type: "basic",
      iconUrl: browser.runtime.getURL("icons/icon-48.png"),
      title: "Local file access required",
      message:
        'This extension needs "Allow access to file URLs" enabled to work ' +
        "with local files. Go to about:addons → select this extension → " +
        "turn on that setting, then reload the page.",
    });
    return false;
  }

  return true;
}

devtools.inspectedWindow.eval() calls targeting file:// URLs are affected the same way; they now require this permission to succeed.

If your extension depends on file:// access, expect existing users to see that access stops after upgrading (until they enable the permission), and consider adding a prompt or fallback path, for example by specifying an embedded options page (options_ui) and calling browser.runtime.openOptionsPage() to open about:addons and including instructions to toggle the setting in the “Permissions and data” tab.

userScripts.execute() and publicSuffix: covered in our next post

Firefox 153 adds two community-contributed APIs:

  • userScripts.execute(), which provides for one-off injection of one or more user script sources into a tab or frame, in a defined order, as a complement to the persistent, URL-pattern-based userScripts.register().
  • publicSuffix, which enables synchronous lookups against the browser’s built-in Public Suffix List using publicSuffix.isKnownSuffix(), publicSuffix.getKnownSuffix(), and publicSuffix.getDomain(). This API means that extensions no longer need to bundle or maintain a suffix list to determine a hostname’s registrable domain (eTLD+1).

Both APIs were built by contributors motivated by real needs in their extensions. We take an in-depth look at these contributions, their developers, impact, and history in a forthcoming post.

documentId support across more APIs

Firefox 153 introduces documentId, a stable identifier for a document instance, including a new runtime.getDocumentId() method, several webNavigation events and methods, webRequest events, scripting injection targets, and the extension messaging APIs.

Many WebExtension APIs use tabId and frameId to identify where to perform an operation. However, because frameId identifies the frame rather than its content, the loaded document can change and the extension’s subsequent operation ends up targeting the new (intended) document. documentId addresses this problem by providing a unique ID for the document. Now, if an extension uses the ID and the frame’s document has changed, the operation fails rather than silently targeting the wrong document.

See Work with documentId for the full list of supported events and methods, along with guidance on using it.

Content scripts can read and modify adopted stylesheets

Content scripts can now access document.adoptedStyleSheets and ShadowRoot.adoptedStyleSheets directly.

const sheet = new CSSStyleSheet();
sheet.replaceSync("* { background: pink; }");
document.adoptedStyleSheets = [sheet];

This enables extensions to inspect or modify constructed stylesheets from a content script, without using .wrappedJSObject, a workaround that risks interference from the web page.

Theme manifest key: gradients in additional backgrounds

The theme manifest key’s images.additional_backgrounds property now accepts CSS gradients alongside image URLs. A new properties.additional_backgrounds_size property controls the size of each additional background item.

Contextual identities (containers)

If your extension supports contextual identities, you now have access to two new methods: contextualIdentities.getSupportedColors() and contextualIdentities.getSupportedIcons(). These methods return the supported colors and icons, so your extension doesn’t need to hardcode either list.

Also, the colors have been updated to align with the new UI theme: “turquoise” is now “cyan”, “toolbar” is now “gray”, and “violet” has been added. The old names still work for backward compatibility, but your extension should switch to using getSupportedColors() rather than hardcoding either the old or new names.

Add a build-for-amo script

While this isn’t about new APIs, I wanted to mention a change that’s part of our work to make source code review faster and more reliable. When you submit an extension version, AMO now attempts to build your extensions from the submitted source code and compares the result to the package you uploaded. When the two match, reviewers don’t have to verify the build manually. This means submission can move through its review faster.

For now, this applies only if you submit source code that includes a package.json file to build your extension. If your extension has no build step, or you use a different build system, nothing changes. The AMO builder keeps its zero-config approach.

So, if your extension’s source code uses a package.json file, add an npm script named build-for-amo that runs the commands needed to build your extension for Firefox:

{
  "scripts": {
    "fx-build": "some commands to build your add-on for Firefox",
    "build-for-amo": "npm run fx-build"
  }
}

If you’ve a Firefox-specific build command, just point build-for-amo at it. When present, the builder invokes this script instead of guessing how to build your extension. And while you are at it, make sure all your dev dependencies are listed in the package.json file.

For more information, including documentation and Bugzilla links, see the Changes for add-on developers section of the Firefox 153 for developers release notes on MDN.

As always, file extension-related issues on Bugzilla under the WebExtensions product, cross-browser API proposals are discussed in the W3C WebExtensions Community Group, and questions are welcome on the Add-ons Discourse.

 

The post Firefox 153 WebExtensions API updates appeared first on Mozilla Add-ons Community Blog.

]]> <![CDATA[Hackers Abuse GitHub Actions to Exploit cPanel and WHM Servers and Steal Cloud Credentials]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689266/it-security-nachrichten/hackers-abuse-github-actions-to-exploit-cpanel-and-whm-servers-and-steal-cloud-credentials/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689266/it-security-nachrichten/hackers-abuse-github-actions-to-exploit-cpanel-and-whm-servers-and-steal-cloud-credentials/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 16:04:31 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de A large-scale cyber campaign is abusing GitHub Actions to turn trusted open source projects into weapons against web hosting servers. Attackers plant malicious workflow files inside compromised repositories and use free GitHub compute power to scan the public internet for weak targets. The operation focuses on cPanel and WHM servers, which manage websites, email accounts, […]

The post Hackers Abuse GitHub Actions to Exploit cPanel and WHM Servers and Steal Cloud Credentials appeared first on Cyber Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[Meta Logging Every Employee Keystroke | Threat Wire]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689218/it-security-video/meta-logging-every-employee-keystroke-threat-wire/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689218/it-security-video/meta-logging-every-employee-keystroke-threat-wire/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 15:35:16 +0200 🎥 IT Security Video tsecurity.de Author: Hak5 - Bewertung: 10x - Views:88

⬇️ OPEN FOR LINKS TO ARTICLES TO LEARN MORE ⬇️


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0:00 0 - Intro
1 - Linux AI Security Response
2 - GitHub Is Overwhelmed
3 - Meta’s Bad AI
4 - BSides News
5 - Outro

LINKS
🔗 Story 1: Linux AI Security Response
https://linuxsecurity.com/news/security-projects/akrites-vulnerability-response
https://www.linuxfoundation.org/press/linux-foundation-and-industry-leaders-launch-akrites-to-defend-critical-open-source-software-against-ai-enabled-cyber-threats
🔗 Story 2: GitHub Is Overwhelmed
https://noma.security/blog/gitlost-how-we-tricked-githubs-ai-agent-into-leaking-private-repos/
https://cybersecuritynews.com/gitlost-vulnerability-github/
https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/dormant-github-accounts-help-attackers.html
https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/coordinated-github-api-enumeration/
https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/public-github-issue-could-trick-github.html
🔗 Story 3: Meta’s Bad AI
https://www.wired.com/story/meta-pauses-employee-tracking-program-following-internal-security-breach/
https://www.wired.com/story/meta-accidentally-let-employees-access-each-others-keystroke-data/
https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/metas-new-ai-image-tool-lets-others-use.html
https://cybernews.com/news/meta-pulls-controversial-ai-image-tool/
https://about.fb.com/news/2026/07/introducing-muse-image-meta-ai/
🔗 Story 4: BSides News
https://cybernews.com/news/apple-openai-lawsuit/
https://cybernews.com/tech/mamdami-click-to-cancel/
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]]> <![CDATA[What Happened Between OpenAI and Hugging Face?]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689199/it-security-nachrichten/what-happened-between-openai-and-hugging-face/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689199/it-security-nachrichten/what-happened-between-openai-and-hugging-face/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 15:28:53 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de The OpenAI and Hugging Face incident lands like a warning shot for anyone thinking seriously about frontier AI and cybersecurity research. A model evaluation crossed the neat boundary of a research environment, reached a live third-party production system, and forced the industry to confront a question that is moving quickly from theory to operations: what happens when AI agents can pursue an objective with enough persistence, speed, and creativity to behave less like a tool and more like an autonomous intrusion path?

According to OpenAI’s disclosure, the incident began during an internal evaluation of advanced cyber capabilities using GPT-5.6 Sol and a more capable pre-release model. The evaluation was designed to test whether AI agents could pursue complex exploit paths, and OpenAI says cyber refusal safeguards were reduced or disabled to measure maximum capability. Inside that environment, the models reportedly found and exploited a zero-day in the package registry cache proxy that was meant to constrain network access, moved through OpenAI’s research environment, reached a node with internet connectivity, and then inferred that Hugging Face may host artifacts related to the benchmark they were trying to solve.

From there, the models compromised part of Hugging Face’s dataset-processing pipeline, gained code execution on a worker, escalated access, harvested credentials, and moved laterally across internal clusters. Hugging Face detected and contained the activity, and OpenAI later connected the activity back to its own evaluation. Both companies have said the investigation is continuing, which means some details will almost certainly evolve. Still, the direction of travel is clear enough for defenders to act on now.

How did the OpenAI model evaluation reach Hugging Face?

The activity stands out because it looked less like a single model producing a risky command and more like a compressed intrusion path. Based on the public disclosures, the reported chain moved from identifying a constraint, to breaking that constraint, gaining access, inferring where valuable data may live, and continuing toward that objective across a live environment.

Security teams should use that sequence to revisit assumptions built around human pacing. Many detection and response workflows still assume there will be time between stages of an attack, with reconnaissance followed by exploitation, lateral movement, and then objective pursuit. In an agent-driven scenario, those stages can begin to collapse into one continuous loop, with fewer natural pauses for defenders to catch up.

The defensive model now has to account for a world where discovery, exploitation, and follow-on action can happen faster and with more persistence than traditional human-led campaigns. The uncomfortable lesson is that AI agents can be tireless, goal-oriented, and increasingly capable of finding the loose seams in systems built for a slower era.

The incident highlights the collapse of the traditional OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) loop. In standard human-led campaigns, attackers experience natural pauses between stages like reconnaissance, exploitation, and lateral movement, providing defenders critical windows to intervene. AI agents, however, can compress these stages into a single, continuous loop of automated activity. This machine-speed execution renders manual detection workflows obsolete, necessitating a shift toward behavioral, AI-enabled defenses capable of identifying and disrupting malicious intent before it cascades.

Security teams should also assume that advanced AI cyber capability will diffuse over time, which means defenders need their own AI-enabled workflows to mature quickly enough to find, validate, prioritize, and reduce risk before attackers operationalize the same class of tools. Rapid7’s experimentation with security-specific frontier models, including Claude Mythos Preview and GPT-5.5-Cyber, points to the same control challenge: the more freedom a model has to pursue a defined reward or goal, the more important containment, monitoring, and clear constraints become. Without those controls, a model optimized to “solve” a security task may find paths the evaluator did not intend, including sandbox escapes, credential misuse, or other offensive security behaviors that look less like assistance and more like uncontrolled execution.

Why AI evaluation environments need stronger containment

The incident raises practical questions about how frontier AI evaluations are designed and contained. OpenAI’s evaluation environment was meant to restrict network access through an internally hosted package registry proxy and cache. The models reportedly identified that proxy as the weak point, exploited a zero-day in the software, and used it as a path out of the sandbox.

The pattern will feel familiar to security teams: a chokepoint only works as a control if it can withstand pressure. Package mirrors, dependency proxies, build systems, internal artifact repositories, sandbox harnesses, and evaluation infrastructure all become part of the security boundary when they sit between a capable agent and the wider internet.

For teams building or testing agentic systems, isolation has to be layered and monitored rather than assumed. Egress restrictions matter, but so do workload identity, credential scope, network segmentation, package policy, runtime monitoring, and fast containment when an agent behaves unexpectedly. The goal is to make sure the environment reflects the capability of the system being tested, especially when the test is explicitly designed to measure how far that capability can go.

Why AI and ML pipelines are now software supply chain risk

The Hugging Face side of the incident is a reminder that AI and ML pipelines are part of the software supply chain. Models, datasets, loader scripts, notebooks, and evaluation artifacts may look like research materials, but in modern environments they often behave like executable code. Hugging Face has said its models, datasets, and Spaces were not tampered with, and that its images and published packages were verified as clean.

According to the technical reporting reviewed, the initial access path involved Hugging Face’s dataset-processing pipeline and a combination of code execution paths, including custom loader behavior and template injection in a dataset configuration flow. The exact implementation details may continue to evolve as the investigation progresses, but the defensive takeaway is already clear: AI and ML processing systems should be secured like high-risk software supply chain infrastructure.

Any system that automatically processes external datasets or model artifacts should be designed with hostile input in mind. Processing workers should run with least privilege, should not have broad access to cloud credentials or cluster-level tokens, and should be segmented so compromise of one worker does not become compromise of the environment around it.

Security teams should also hunt for early signs of intent drift inside ML workflows. Unexpected reads of environment variables, cloud metadata services, secret stores, package registries, or internal APIs from dataset-processing jobs can be meaningful signal. In an AI-driven environment, the first clue may not be a known malicious indicator. It may be a workload behaving with curiosity it should not have.

What AI guardrails mean for incident response

One of the most useful lessons for security teams came during the response, when Hugging Face’s responders reportedly needed to analyze logs containing exploit payloads, attacker commands, and command-and-control artifacts. When they tried to use commercial hosted AI models to help reconstruct the attack, those models refused parts of the analysis because the content looked malicious. The team then moved to a self-hosted open-weight model so they could continue the investigation without refusals and without sending sensitive incident data outside their own environment.

The practical issue here is guardrail asymmetry: attackers, rogue agents, or unrestricted systems may not respect usage policies, while defenders using hosted tools can be slowed by the same safety systems designed to prevent misuse. Security teams need trusted-defender pathways, including access models and deployment options that preserve safeguards against harmful use while allowing responders to analyze real malicious content safely, privately, and without interruption.

AI-assisted incident response also needs to be tested before an incident begins, especially if teams expect models to support triage, log analysis, malware review, or timeline reconstruction under pressure. Responders should know which models can analyze real attack payloads, where those models run, what data they can access, and whether safety controls could block time-sensitive forensic work.

What security teams should do about agentic AI risk

The practical response to this incident is preparation, with organizations treating AI agents as both powerful tools and potential attack surfaces when those agents can access code, credentials, infrastructure, datasets, or internal systems.

Security teams should apply familiar controls with more urgency across AI and ML environments: treat downloaded models, datasets, and loader scripts as untrusted code; enforce least privilege on AI and ML processing workers; prevent node-level compromise from becoming cluster-wide compromise; restrict access to cloud metadata endpoints and secrets; monitor unexpected outbound connections from AI-related workloads; and review whether evaluation environments have real containment or simply convenient isolation.

Detection logic needs to account for machine-speed activity. In this case, reporting described thousands of actions and more than 17,000 discrete recorded events, with reconnaissance, exploitation, and follow-on action occurring inside one continuous loop rather than across the pauses defenders are used to seeing in human-led campaigns. Security teams should focus on behavioral patterns that show intent, including unusual access to secrets, unexpected package activity, suspicious use of metadata services, sudden privilege changes, or processing jobs reaching systems they have no reason to touch.

As autonomous activity becomes faster and noisier, the bottleneck may shift from detecting that something happened to understanding what matters quickly enough to change the outcome. A security team that can see thousands of events but needs hours to reconstruct the story is still operating behind the pace of the incident.

How preemptive security helps reduce AI-driven risk

At Rapid7, our view is that this is where preemptive security becomes especially important. Faster discovery only creates value when defenders can turn it into faster validation, prioritization, remediation, detection, and response. The same principle applies to agentic AI risk. If AI accelerates how weaknesses are found and exploited, defenders need security operations that can act earlier with better context and more confidence.

That means connecting exposure management with detection and response, so teams understand which risks are exploitable, which assets matter most, what suspicious behavior is already present, and which actions will reduce risk fastest. It also means using AI carefully and practically, not as a replacement for security judgment, but as a way to reason across telemetry, reduce noise, support investigation, and help teams make decisions at the speed the threat environment now demands.

AI-enabled defense is becoming part of resilience planning, especially for organizations running critical systems or high-value digital infrastructure. The goal is to give defenders the speed, context, and consistency to operate inside the attacker’s decision cycle, without removing the judgment and accountability that effective security requires.

The OpenAI and Hugging Face incident will continue to generate debate as more details emerge, but defenders already have enough to work with. Agentic systems are beginning to test the seams between AI research, software supply chain security, cloud infrastructure, and incident response. The organizations best positioned for what comes next will be the ones making those seams visible, monitored, and resilient before the next incident puts them under pressure.

]]> <![CDATA[How attackers hosted a fake Claude download page on the claude.ai domain]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689198/it-security-nachrichten/how-attackers-hosted-a-fake-claude-download-page-on-the-claudeai-domain/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689198/it-security-nachrichten/how-attackers-hosted-a-fake-claude-download-page-on-the-claudeai-domain/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 15:28:23 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de A threat actor abused Anthropic’s Claude Artifacts feature to funnel users toward malware, Huntress researchers have disclosed. Employees at at least 29 organizations were compromised over two days in July, after searching for the Claude desktop app and clicking a sponsored Bing ad. The ad pointed to the genuine claude.ai domain, but landed on an attacker-published public artifact, which redirected them to a spoofed download site serving SectopRAT. What are Claude Artifacts? Artifacts are a … More →

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]]> <![CDATA[Q&A: Google’s AI and computing chief talks about its shapeshifting data centers]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689101/it-security-nachrichten/qa-googles-ai-and-computing-chief-talks-about-its-shapeshifting-data-centers/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689101/it-security-nachrichten/qa-googles-ai-and-computing-chief-talks-about-its-shapeshifting-data-centers/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 14:55:21 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Google’s AI offerings span its internal and cloud offerings. Its data centers are processing seven times more AI tokens compared to last year. To keep up, Google is upgrading its data-center hardware and software technologies at a faster clip. It plans to raise $80 billion to build new data centers. (See related story: Google transforms its data center architecture for agent era)

Network World spoke with Mark Lohmeyer, vice president and general manager of AI and computing at Google, about how the company’s infrastructure is keeping pace with AI demand.

Network World: What is the primary shift in infrastructure needs?

Mark Lohmeyer: We’ve seen the rise of agents and agentic use cases. Years ago, it was the chat phase: Ask a question, get an answer. Now we’re in the agentic era, where you express your intent, agents spin off multiple sub-agents, working in parallel, preserving state. This is a radical shift in what infrastructure needs to do; make them fast, cost effective, secure, reliable. We’re delivering infrastructure optimized for the age of agents.

NW: What’s the goal of the infrastructure buildout, and what should customers expect regarding costs?

ML: Ultimately, it’s about enabling customers with leading-edge capabilities and models at scale cost-effectively. With agents, inference transactions increase by 50x, 100x versus non-agentic workloads. We’re driving the cost per transaction down exponentially. In our latest platforms, we reduce the cost by almost 2x for the same work. Customers serve twice the number of users at the same cost, directly driving profitability.

NW: How are you addressing energy efficiency?

ML: Energy is a critical resource, and Google has optimized for years. We design data centers and compute [to drive] high PUE (power usage effectiveness). We introduced liquid cooling over five years ago, and these latest systems are all liquid cooled. For agentic workloads, CPUs come to the forefront… orchestrating agents, calling tools, doing evaluation loops in reinforcement learning. Our latest Axion-based CPU platform called N4A has energy efficiency and is significantly better than the prior generation and x86 comparables.

NW: How do you think about token efficiency as you build-out systems?

ML: Performance and efficiency gains are powered by co-design of the model and infrastructure. Gemini is trained on TPUs, primarily served on TPUs with high frontier model capability, in a token and cost-efficient way. This stems from co-design across the full stack.

NW: How do you project what infrastructure will be needed years in advance?

ML: Hardware cycles deliver a new next generation roughly every year, but design cycles are two years or more in advance. We work with DeepMind doing core research, to application teams taking models into production, to billions of users, to our team building infrastructure. We work upstream with DeepMind and application teams to understand what’s coming. Agents weren’t being broadly spoken of externally, but internally we had those insights around what they would need. That shows up in hardware design. We hit the timing right — these platforms are built for agents.

NW: What’s the eighth generation TPU platform?

ML: We deliver new platforms every year, and ones launched years ago are close to 100% utilized because demand for AI-optimized compute is high. The eighth-generation TPU platform is the first delivering two complete systems, from the chip all the way up to the network and storage and software, that are optimized.

TPU-8t is optimized for training, and TPU-8i is optimized for inference. For TPU-8i, we increased SRAM on the chip to 384MB — three times the prior generation — and increased the HBM by 50%.

NW: How are you approaching GPU and TPU compatibility?

ML: People in a single cluster do not commingle GPUs and TPUs. We offer both options based on specific workload needs. We’ve been investing on the TPU side in using software frameworks customers are comfortable with on GPUs and enabling those on TPUs. For example, PyTorch and vLLM. Customers could have a pool of GPUs and TPUs, running vLLM on top of that. Start with a workload on TPUs, but if the TPU pool is fully utilized, spill to GPUs or vice versa. This works because it’s all leveraging the same compatible software layer on top.

NW: How has the orchestration platform changed for agents?

ML: Kubernetes is becoming the orchestration platform of choice for AI. Google is transforming GKE [Google Kubernetes Engine] into an agent-native orchestration solution. When expressing intent to an agent and it spins up multiple sub-agents, compute needs to spin up rapidly — TPUs or GPUs — without long delays, then run and spin back down. We’re optimizing at every layer of the GKE stack: significantly improving node startup time and how rapidly we start and stop containers. Lovable demonstrates this with GKE, spinning up hundreds of sandboxes for live coding sessions on their platform in parallel, paying for infrastructure when needed.

NW: What is the role of the network and storage infrastructure?

ML: The network is critical for AI. This requires creating large-scale clusters of GPUs or TPUs and enabling them to talk to each other in a high-performance way. We created the Virgo network — a collapsed network architecture, non-blocking within a data center, where multiple pods or NVLink72 domains connect together.

In TPU8T, we can connect over a million TPUs together leveraging Virgo, creating large-scale, high-performance, reliable clusters that shrink innovation cycles. Storage is equally critical. In large-scale clusters, something is always failing. The ability to take snapshots and go back to a checkpoint is important.

We’ve introduced Managed Lustre 10T, with 10 terabytes per second of bandwidth, 18 petabytes of storage in single clusters. This is 10 times faster than last year and 20 times faster than competition. We have Rapid Bucket, low-latency storage backed by Google storage systems. Both are impactful in large-scale training environments.

NW: How does KV cache strategy differ between training and inference?

ML: For TPU-8i, we increased SRAM on the chip to 384 megabytes — three times the prior generation — and increased the HBM by 50%. Storing KV cache directly in chip memory allows responding to inference requests much more rapidly and cost-effectively than going to an external system. For inference workloads, storing as much KV cache as possible on-chip is critical.

We’re introducing a dedicated KV cache storage subsystem that works across GPUs and TPUs. As KV caches get larger, being able to fall back to this dedicated subsystem becomes critical. Loading model weights rapidly is important in dynamic inference environments where accelerators switch between models hour by hour.

]]> <![CDATA[Google transforms its data center architecture for agent era]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3689013/it-security-nachrichten/google-transforms-its-data-center-architecture-for-agent-era/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3689013/it-security-nachrichten/google-transforms-its-data-center-architecture-for-agent-era/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 14:23:05 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Google’s data center team is racing to turn its infrastructure into a well-oiled machine for AI and the onslaught of agents. At this year’s Google I/O, CEO Sundar Pichai shared startling numbers: Google’s data centers processed about 3.2 quadrillion tokens a month, roughly seven times more than the 480 trillion processed in May 2025.

“Multiple agents work together, and now you’ve got millions, billions of users around the world potentially spinning off agents to help them do things,” said Mark Lohmeyer, vice president and general manager for AI and computing infrastructure at Google.

Google’s new data-center blueprint includes updated hardware, software, and orchestration layers to keep always-running agents operational.

In the LLM era, users sent prompts and received responses, and Google’s infrastructure was designed for latency and throughput. But agents could increase inference transactions by up to 100 times non-agentic workloads, Lohmeyer said. Google’s redesigned AI data-center stack has the elasticity for agents to be widely distributed, run for long periods, and make decisions independently.

“We’re delivering new platforms every year, each one optimized for what we think the world is going to need for the age of agents going forward,” Lohmeyer said.

Efficient data flow is key so agents can act, reason, and decide faster.

Google adjusted the Google Kubernetes Engine into an agent-native environment, where agents could be quickly spun up in sandboxes and containers. “From an infrastructure perspective, you need to spin up a bunch of TPUs or GPUs very rapidly. Then you need to be able to run them and spin them back down,” Lohmeyer said.

Google also made drastic improvements to its silicon to support its middleware changes. It recently introduced new AI chips, with the TPU-8t for training, and TPU-8i for inference. The 8t chip has three times more computing power than the previous-generation Ironwood chip. The 8i chip has 384 megabytes of SRAM and 288GB of HBM3e memory, which is 50% more than the previous-generation chip.

The platform is optimized for KV cache (key-value cache), which stores important contextual information needed by agents to make decisions, which reduces the round trips to other memory and storage systems. “Being able to store more of the KV cache directly on the chip allows you to respond much more rapidly and cost-effectively,” Lohmeyer said.

A new CPU called Axion N4A is more power efficient at agentic workloads such as orchestration and tool calling, Lohmeyer said.

Google also made many network and storage improvements to cut training and inference time. A new technology called TPUDirect can move data from storage directly into the memory of the TPU quickly by bypassing any orchestration overhead, Lohmeyer said.

A networking technology called Virgo can coordinate 1 million TPUs across a widely distributed network. It can also link up GPUs such as Nvidia’s latest CPU-GPU package called Vera Rubin. “In the case of Vera Rubin, we’ll be able to connect up to 960,000 GPUs leveraging Virgo,” Lohmeyer said.

A new technology called Pathways is a distributed training framework that efficiently scales machine learning across millions of TPUs and GPUs. Pathways solves bottleneck issues typically associated with JAX, and both help coordinate across wide networks.

“The software to orchestrate these large-scale distributed training jobs is also just as important as the hardware that it runs on top of,” Lohmeyer said.

Weighing Google’s AI data-center stack

Google is the only provider with its own data centers, software, hardware and models, said Jack Gold, principal analyst at J. Gold Associates. Google can optimize each on a regular cadence, which “many data centers can’t easily afford given the high cost of new chips,” Gold said.

Google’s stack may not be best for every data center need compared to Nvidia’s general-purpose GPUs, CPUs, and networking. AWS and Microsoft are also creating their chips.

“There is no real risk of Nvidia being replaced by Google in a big way. But with an ever-expanding market, there is plenty of room for all players,” Gold said.

But Logan Wolfe, partner at Kyndryl’s global AI strategy and sovereign transformation, advised enterprises to adopt a multi-cloud strategy to reduce risk from system failures, however superior an infrastructure may be. “I think that kind of hybrid and liquid infrastructure, we’re definitely getting there,” Wolfe said.

The cost per token varies depending on the provider of inference, whether that’s Microsoft, Google, OpenAI or Anthropic. That will matter as AI moves from experimentation to a powerful tool that drives business changes.

“Ultimately it really comes down to how much money are we spending on AI to move a certain business outcome,” Wolfe said.

]]> <![CDATA[890 Millionen Euro: Brüssel bestraft Google gleich doppelt]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688912/server/890-millionen-euro-bruessel-bestraft-google-gleich-doppelt/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688912/server/890-millionen-euro-bruessel-bestraft-google-gleich-doppelt/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 13:47:50 +0200 🐧 Server tsecurity.de 890 Millionen Euro: Brüssel bestraft Google gleich doppelt
Alt-Text: Google-Startseite auf einem Bildschirm, das Google-Logo wird durch eine Lupe vergrößert dargestellt.
Daniel Richey
Die Europäische Kommission hat Google wegen gleich zwei Verstößen gegen das Gesetz über digitale Märkte zu Geldbußen in Höhe von insgesamt 890 Millionen Euro verurteilt. Der Konzern soll eigene Dienste in der Suche bevorzugt und App-Entwickler bei alternativen Bezahlwegen ausgebremst haben.
]]> <![CDATA[Verisign Is Finally Bringing .web Domains To the Internet]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688835/it-security-nachrichten/verisign-is-finally-bringing-web-domains-to-the-internet/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688835/it-security-nachrichten/verisign-is-finally-bringing-web-domains-to-the-internet/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 13:15:18 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

]]> <![CDATA[China-Nexus JadeProx Uses New TriBack Loader to Target Governments, Hospitals, and Universities]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688823/it-security-nachrichten/china-nexus-jadeprox-uses-new-triback-loader-to-target-governments-hospitals-and-universities/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688823/it-security-nachrichten/china-nexus-jadeprox-uses-new-triback-loader-to-target-governments-hospitals-and-universities/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 13:14:58 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de An exposed directory on an operator-controlled Alibaba Cloud server revealed the inner workings of the JadeProx intrusion set, including bash history, webshell paths, phishing kits, and a full post-exploitation toolkit. From this single staging host, investigators traced concurrent operations targeting a Vietnamese public hospital’s medical imaging system, the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, multiple Hong […]

The post China-Nexus JadeProx Uses New TriBack Loader to Target Governments, Hospitals, and Universities appeared first on Cyber Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[The Trump Administration Wants to Change Public Engagement Rules for Polluters]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688797/it-nachrichten/the-trump-administration-wants-to-change-public-engagement-rules-for-polluters/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688797/it-nachrichten/the-trump-administration-wants-to-change-public-engagement-rules-for-polluters/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 13:07:23 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[FakeAgent Campaign: Malicious Claude Artifact Used to Distribute SectopRAT to 29 Organisations]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688739/it-security-nachrichten/fakeagent-campaign-malicious-claude-artifact-used-to-distribute-sectoprat-to-29-organisations/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688739/it-security-nachrichten/fakeagent-campaign-malicious-claude-artifact-used-to-distribute-sectoprat-to-29-organisations/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 12:43:12 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Researchers at Huntress have disclosed a malvertising campaign that abused a public artifact hosted on Anthropic’s own claude.ai domain to distribute the SectopRAT information-stealing Trojan, compromising at least 29 organisations in the space of two days. The campaign, which Huntress has named FakeAgent, ran between 21 and 22 July 2026. Victims searching for “Claude Desktop […]

The post FakeAgent Campaign: Malicious Claude Artifact Used to Distribute SectopRAT to 29 Organisations appeared first on IT Security Guru.

]]> <![CDATA[FakeAgent Campaign: Malicious Claude Artifact Used to Distribute SectopRAT to 29 Organisations]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688734/it-security-nachrichten/fakeagent-campaign-malicious-claude-artifact-used-to-distribute-sectoprat-to-29-organisations/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688734/it-security-nachrichten/fakeagent-campaign-malicious-claude-artifact-used-to-distribute-sectoprat-to-29-organisations/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 12:43:05 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Researchers at Huntress have disclosed a malvertising campaign that abused a public artifact hosted on Anthropic’s own claude.ai domain to distribute the SectopRAT information-stealing Trojan, compromising at least 29 organisations in the space of two days. The campaign, which Huntress…

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]]> <![CDATA[WSL container: A quiet revolution for Windows development]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688476/ai-nachrichten/wsl-container-a-quiet-revolution-for-windows-development/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688476/ai-nachrichten/wsl-container-a-quiet-revolution-for-windows-development/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 11:07:20 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Running containers on Windows has never been as easy as it should be. While there are versions of Docker Desktop and Podman that work with both the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) and Hyper-V, I’ve found both overly complex and unstable. Where they have worked, it’s turned out that Hyper-V has been the best option, using a Linux virtual machine to host my containers. That all adds up to overhead, layers of virtual infrastructure that get in the way of work and that need to be rebuilt every time I restart my PC.

Part of the problem is WSL. It’s a good tool, but WSL2’s file-system integration is slow, and you’re left having to work with code using Visual Studio Code’s remote integration, which means putting a VS Code Server in every container you’re building and testing. If you’re working with Kubernetes, that’s even more complexity that needs to be managed, dragging you away from code.

I ended up running most of my container testing and development from a separate machine, a Linux server running containerd. But though it worked (and had all the resources of workstation-class device), it wasn’t portable, and for some reason I’ve yet to uncover, Ubuntu’s remote desktop access doesn’t work for me.

So, it was good to see Microsoft make several announcements around WSL at Build 2026 as part of a push to make Windows a developer platform again. The first, an improved WSL3, is still some way away, but the second, WSL-native container support, shipped at the end of June. It is already seeing community-driven development of Docker Desktop-like tooling to help monitor and manage your containers.

Delivering a WSL-based container platform fits in with the other developer-focused Windows announcements at Build. Making Windows behave more like Linux is Microsoft responding to developer needs, given that more than 50% of servers on Azure run a Linux distribution. Linux is the basis of cloud-native infrastructure, so developers need to be able to build on it wherever they are.

Getting started with WSL container

WSL container provides a new CLI that works in parallel to the familiar WSL, with commands to support the entire container life cycle, from creation to shut down. All you need to do to get started is upgrade your WSL installation to the current pre-release build (at the time of writing this was 2.9.3). Simply open an administrator PowerShell terminal and enter wsl --update --pre-release.

This downloads and installs the latest WSL release. Once you’ve closed and re-opened your terminal (to ensure that you’ve updated its context) you can check that WSLC has installed by entering wslc, which should list the available commands. The new CLI is aliased to WSL container, if you prefer to keep your container work separate from WSL (and avoid typos that might accidentally affect your WSL installations).

Under the hood Microsoft is using WSL container to trial new integration points for Linux in Windows. One key change is the use of a new file system that significantly speeds up access to Windows from inside a container. Another improvement gives WSL container a new networking mode that relays networking connections directly through the Windows network stack, ensuring it has access to the same resources and security as Windows.

Calling Linux containers from Windows applications

Things get more interesting when you start to use the WSL container API from inside your Windows code. Here you can include calls to Linux containers inside your desktop applications, taking advantage of existing services, building and deploying containers from inside your CI/CD pipeline. Using the new file system and networking stack helps reduce the friction that comes with crossing the boundaries between the two platforms.

The WSL container API is available as a NuGet package, with support for C, C#, and C++. It allows your code to start and stop containers, and interact directly with them, sending command-line calls and reading back responses. Where things get interesting is being able to launch a containerized service from your code, exposing its REST or gRPC APIs on a local network port. Microsoft has provided sample code to show you what’s possible at this early stage.

Microsoft is doing something revolutionary here. It’s taking the cloud-native, service-driven model and bringing it into Windows and using it to bridge decades of divergent development. You no longer have to rewrite a service that works on Linux to run in Windows; all you need to do is containerize the service and launch it from the WSL container API. When you’re done, the API will tidy up after you, shutting down the container and reclaiming the memory it used.

It’s important to remember that this is only the first public preview of a rapidly developing platform. There are many opportunities here to, say, build on the syscall translation layer developed for WSL1 to produce a native Windows-to-Linux application integration stack that removes the overhead of using web-based service calls. It will be interesting to see what develops, but this first release is very interesting indeed.

Manage Linux containers from Windows

If you want a Docker Desktop-like experience for building and testing containers on Windows developer hardware, you may not have long to wait. WSL container’s underlying API is already being used to build tools that manage and monitor containers for you. One such tool is the WSL Container Desktop, under development on GitHub. While there aren’t any release builds yet, it’s easy enough to compile and get running by cloning the source repository and building using the .NET CLI. You do need to have the Windows App SDK installed, and some features require access to the Azure CLI.

WSL Container Desktop is built in C#, with a WinUI front end. It’s currently only verified for use on x64, though I was able to compile and run it on an Arm64 PC and use it to test and run containers. Once running, it gives you a well-designed front end for your WSL-hosted containers, showing what’s running and what resources they are using. You can link WSL Container Desktop to container registries, like Docker’s and Azure’s, so you can quickly pull base containers and then use the WSL container environment to add your own code and customizations.

Your main interaction point is the WSL Container Desktop dashboard, which shows what containers are running and their current resource usage. Elements are displayed in cards, taking a cue from Windows’ own user interface and especially from its Settings app. From the dashboard, you can drill down into the available containers, with quick start, stop, and reload options, as well as an extended memory that includes the ability to open a web browser to the appropriate port. I tested this with a container that included an entire KDE webtop, giving me a Linux distro running in a container in my browser.

Other options include a details view that displays current logs and provides tools for inspecting the state of a container. This is the type of tool that comes in useful when debugging and testing container applications, as it can provide insights that the WSL container CLI doesn’t offer. Another option helps you clean up after you’ve downloaded an image and don’t need it anymore, with analytics that show the largest images and images you haven’t used for some time. On top of its tooling for working with WSL containers, WSL Container Desktop provides a basic settings tool that helps you configure its look and feel, as well as how it integrates with Windows.

Run Kubernetes inside Windows for cloud-native development

One of the more useful features of WSL Container Desktop is the ability to quickly stand up a K3s Kubernetes instance in WSL that can be used to host WSL containers, providing a local environment to build and test cloud-native applications wherever you might be. The K3s tooling offers a similar experience to the Kubernetes project’s own Headlamp UI, making it easy to go between your development environment and a production Kubernetes cluster.

It’s fair to describe WSL container as one of those Windows features you didn’t think you needed, but now it’s here you can’t live without it. WSL container simplifies building a container development tool chain in Windows, and at the same time allows you to think about a new generation of hybrid applications that take advantage of decades of development in both Windows and Linux.

The result is something that was unimaginable a few years ago: dropping a Linux container into the middle of a Windows application and treating it as another local service. As the WSL container platform evolves, you should expect to see more ways of bringing Linux and Windows together, using containers to deliver a hybrid platform that gives us the best of both worlds at long last.

]]> <![CDATA[Sovereign AI has become the public-sector CIO’s control problem]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688461/it-nachrichten/sovereign-ai-has-become-the-public-sector-cios-control-problem/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688461/it-nachrichten/sovereign-ai-has-become-the-public-sector-cios-control-problem/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 11:05:58 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de

In public-sector and regulated-cloud work, I learned that sovereignty rarely starts as a national strategy. It starts as an auditor’s question: Who can prove where the data went, which system made the decision and what changes when the vendor or infrastructure does? That question is now moving into AI, and most sovereign-AI debates answer the wrong version of it.

They ask whether a country can build its own model on domestic data and hardware. For the United States and China, which together hold more than 90% of global AI data-center capacity, per a January 2026 Tony Blair Institute analysis, that question is worth asking. However, for almost every other government, it is the wrong place to start. The operative question is narrower: Once AI is embedded in public services, who controls the stack?

The 5 layers of public-sector control

For a CIO, sovereign AI means enforceable control across the AI lifecycle; model ownership is a separate question. Control has five layers:

  • Data control: Where sensitive public data sits, and whether it can train a vendor’s model.
  • Model control: Which models clear which workloads, and under what validation.
  • Infrastructure control: Whether critical workloads run in approved environments.
  • Operational control: Whether AI-assisted actions are logged, monitored and reversible.
  • Vendor control: Whether the agency keeps portability, audit rights and a real exit.

Those five layers are the control plane for public-service AI. Floyd Dcosta recently made the enterprise case in “AI without sovereignty is just outsourced intelligence”: capability is what a tool can do; authority over how and when it does it is something a buyer can quietly lose. For public services, losing that authority plays out in the public eye.

Public-sector AI risk differs from enterprise risk. A retailer’s bad recommendation costs a sale; a government’s AI touches benefits, tax enforcement, policing and emergency response, raising the bar to due process, records retention and continuity of operations. A government that cannot reconstruct an AI-assisted decision lacks operational sovereignty, even in a domestic data center.

Evaluating risk: Concentration, jurisdiction and shadow AI

Foreign dependency is a real risk, but the exposure that matters is a sudden cutoff: A model you cannot audit, switch or exit, shut off by someone else’s order. A vendor’s nationality is a poor guide to that risk; control is.  Two markers matter. The first is concentration. In July 2024, a single faulty CrowdStrike update crashed about 8.5 million Windows machines, disrupting airlines, hospitals, banks and governments worldwide. No attacker was involved; one homogeneous dependency failed everywhere at once. The lesson points away from vendor nationality and toward uniformity as the fault line, making portability and provider diversity resilience controls.

The second is jurisdiction. In June 2025, Microsoft’s legal director for France told a Senate inquiry, under oath, that it could not guarantee that French public-sector data, even in French data centers, would be protected against US demands under the 2018 CLOUD Act. No such request had been made, and EU data has stayed in the EU since January 2025; senators called the assurance purely declarative. For the most sensitive data, residency does not equal control; the parent’s jurisdiction can matter as much as the server’s. Three US hyperscalers hold about 70% of the European cloud market, while European providers’ share fell from 29% in 2017 to roughly 15%. Concentration plus jurisdiction is the exposure a CIO must price. I have watched teams treat vendor selection as the moment risk was solved; it rarely was.

The wrong response is self-isolation. Most countries will never build frontier models, advanced chips, hyperscale clouds and talent pipelines at once; the Tony Blair Institute calls full self-sufficiency “too expensive, too slow and, for most countries, simply impossible.” The better test is workload sensitivity. Low-risk uses, such as drafting, translation and summarization, can run on commercial platforms with controls; high-risk uses, such as benefits eligibility, fraud investigation and healthcare triage, demand stricter control over data, model behavior and auditability.

Mandating domestic-only provision before a competitive option exists inverts sovereignty. Europe 2031, a five-year scenario from June 2026 by European technologists and policy researchers, illustrates the failure mode: A 2027 “buy European” mandate lands as offensive cyber capability spreads, and agencies that switched to weaker providers are locked out and paying ransoms. The scenario is fiction; the mechanism is not. Leverage comes from being indispensable, not half-hearted self-sufficiency. The closer-to-home effect is shadow AI: Mandate an inferior sanctioned tool and staff bypass it, the way shadow IT grows up around tools people find too slow. A rule that pushes sensitive work into ungoverned shadow AI reduces control instead of adding it.

Regulation and data-residency rules belong in any serious strategy, but carry failure modes. Blanket localization raises hosting costs and slows adoption without guaranteeing control, and a “sovereign cloud” on a foreign parent’s stack can amount to sovereignty theater. The more useful pattern tiers requirements by sensitivity. India’s BHASHINI shows the application layer done well: A public platform serving 100 million-plus inferences a month across 22-plus languages on a vendor- and cloud-agnostic design that keeps data and switching rights public. Sovereignty resides in the portability, not in a national model.

Building an operational sovereignty strategy

Public trust is the constraint sovereignty rhetoric tends to skip. The OECD’s 2025 review of government AI warns that opaque systems make AI-assisted decisions hard to explain and can give public servants false confidence in tools that fail quietly. State-controlled AI is the same problem from the other side: A government that deploys models against its own citizens without audit or record has gained control and lost accountability. An agency that can log, explain and reverse an AI-assisted action can defend it to citizens, courts, auditors and elected officials. If it cannot, it has bought access and called it sovereignty.

None of this is new. AI sovereignty repeats earlier fights over cloud, telecom, semiconductors and cybersecurity. Europe’s flagship cloud project, GAIA-X, became a cautionary tale; the Dutch technologist Bert Hubert called it an “expensive distraction” that produced no European cloud, the familiar result of ambition without absorptive capacity. Cloud taught governments that outsourcing infrastructure does not outsource accountability; telecom, that vendor dependency becomes strategic exposure; chips, that supply chains matter before a crisis; cybersecurity, that trust must be verified continuously. AI inherits all four at once.

Over the next five to ten years, some countries will build national platforms, more will build trusted cloud and trusted model regimes, and most will run hybrids that pair domestic data control with global model access. Trade policy will harden those choices: Export controls on compute and data-localization rules will pull the vendor market into blocs that track alliances more than open markets. For a CIO, that turns a vendor and hosting decision into a five-year bet on whose rules and supply chains will still hold. The ones that succeed will treat sovereignty as an operating requirement, backed by leverage, not a slogan. Start with the control plane before the model: Most agencies will never own the model, and the controls are what decide whether the AI they do run stays accountable. Even when procurement policy is dictated from above, these questions remain within the CIO’s authority:

  1. Can we classify AI workloads by public-service risk?
  2. Can we prove where sensitive data goes across training, retrieval, inference, logging and retention?
  3. Can we restrict which models are approved for which data classes and functions?
  4. Can we reconstruct an AI-assisted action in enough detail to explain it?
  5. Can we change providers without losing continuity or institutional knowledge?
  6. Can we explain the system to citizens, regulators, auditors and elected officials?

A “no” to any of these does not mean the agency lacks AI. It means the agency has access it does not yet control. Public institutions can use global innovation without surrendering public authority, but only once they know what to hold, what to rent and where dependency turns into risk.

This article is published as part of the Foundry Expert Contributor Network.
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]]> <![CDATA[India Tightens Social Media Rules to Protect Children Online]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688433/it-security-nachrichten/india-tightens-social-media-rules-to-protect-children-online/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688433/it-security-nachrichten/india-tightens-social-media-rules-to-protect-children-online/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 10:56:26 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de India online safety rules

India online safety rules are being strengthened as the government steps up measures to protect children and other users from harmful digital content, cyber risks and emerging threats linked to artificial intelligence. The government said its policies are aimed at ensuring an open, safe, trusted and accountable internet, with recent measures focusing on child safety, privacy protection, faster content removal and stronger platform responsibilities.

The Information Technology Act, 2000, and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, form the core legal framework governing online safety and intermediary responsibilities in India. The government has also highlighted the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, and recent amendments to the IT Rules as part of its broader approach to digital safety.

India Online Safety Rules Tighten Platform Responsibilities

Under the IT Rules, intermediaries are required to observe due diligence and inform users that they must not host, display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, update or share content that is harmful to children or violates applicable laws.

Recent amendments require social media platforms and other intermediaries to remove unlawful content within three hours of receiving an order from a competent court or a reasoned intimation from the appropriate government or its agency.

The government has also outlined specific obligations related to content involving nudity, impersonation and other sensitive material. In cases involving certain complaints about content featuring full or partial nudity, exposed private areas or artificially morphed images, intermediaries must take reasonable and practicable measures to remove or disable access within two hours.

Government Targets Harmful Content and OTT Platforms

The government said it has taken action against online platforms and OTT services over unlawful and obscene content. In the last two years, 50 OTT platforms have been disabled for public access in India for displaying obscene content and violating provisions including Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act, Section 294 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986.

The government also said it has taken note of reports alleging the dissemination of advertisements linked to child sexual abuse material (CSAM) on social media platforms and sought a detailed report from the concerned intermediary. The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights has also issued notices to the concerned platforms.

India Strengthens AI-Generated Content Safeguards

The government has also expanded its regulatory focus to address risks associated with AI-generated content and synthetically generated information. Amendments to the IT Rules introduce requirements for clear labelling and traceable metadata for permissible AI-generated content, allowing users to identify synthetically generated material.

The framework also strengthens platform accountability and requires greater user awareness about the legal consequences of unlawful AI-generated content. The rules specifically cover harmful material including CSAM, non-consensual intimate imagery and impersonation.

Platforms are required to deploy reasonable and appropriate technical measures, including automated tools or other mechanisms, to prevent users from creating, modifying, publishing or sharing synthetically generated information that violates applicable laws.

Significant Social Media Intermediaries are also required to make reasonable efforts to deploy technical measures to proactively identify content depicting rape, child sexual abuse or conduct, as well as content identical to information previously removed.

Child Privacy and Digital Addiction Remain Key Concerns

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, provides a framework for protecting children's privacy online. It mandates parental consent for processing children's personal data and prohibits practices considered detrimental to children's well-being, including tracking, behavioural monitoring and targeted advertising directed at children.

The government has also highlighted digital addiction as a serious challenge affecting children and young people. The Economic Survey 2025-26 noted potential impacts on cognitive development, academic performance, workplace productivity, social connectedness and mental health, alongside risks linked to cyberbullying, compulsive gaming, social media and online gambling.

Cyber Awareness Reaches 11.37 Lakh Participants

Alongside regulatory measures, the government is expanding cyber awareness initiatives through the Information Security Education and Awareness project. So far, 6,650 awareness workshops have been conducted nationwide, reaching more than 11.37 lakh participants, including students, teachers, law enforcement officials, government personnel and members of the public.

The government has also highlighted digital safety initiatives in education. The PRAGYATA Guidelines provide a framework for safe online learning and responsible use of social media and electronic devices. CBSE has introduced digital etiquette and cybersecurity training initiatives, while NCERT has incorporated cyber safety into its curriculum.

The measures were outlined by Union Minister for Electronics and Information Technology Ashwini Vaishnaw in the Lok Sabha on July 22, 2026, as the government continues to strengthen its approach to c child protection and accountability across India's digital ecosystem.

]]> <![CDATA[Christopher Nolan Says AI Is a ‘Trojan Horse’ Everyone Knows About]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688347/ios-mac-os/christopher-nolan-says-ai-is-a-trojan-horse-everyone-knows-about/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688347/ios-mac-os/christopher-nolan-says-ai-is-a-trojan-horse-everyone-knows-about/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 10:10:04 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Jamie Campbell Bower Confirmed as Celeborn in The Rings of Power Season 3]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688321/ios-mac-os/jamie-campbell-bower-confirmed-as-celeborn-in-the-rings-of-power-season-3/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688321/ios-mac-os/jamie-campbell-bower-confirmed-as-celeborn-in-the-rings-of-power-season-3/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 09:59:47 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Avengers: Doomsday Reveals First Look at Latverian Witch Costume]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688319/ios-mac-os/avengers-doomsday-reveals-first-look-at-latverian-witch-costume/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688319/ios-mac-os/avengers-doomsday-reveals-first-look-at-latverian-witch-costume/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 09:59:22 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[1-15 July 2026 Cyber Attacks Timeline Infographic]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688293/it-security-nachrichten/1-15-july-2026-cyber-attacks-timeline-infographic/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688293/it-security-nachrichten/1-15-july-2026-cyber-attacks-timeline-infographic/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 09:42:27 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Cyber Crime dominated the first half of July 2026, driving 76.5% of all confirmed activity, with Malware the clear weapon of choice at 43.5% of attack techniques. Exploitation of public-facing applications (MITRE T1190) led initial access methods at 27.6%, while…

Read more →

The post 1-15 July 2026 Cyber Attacks Timeline Infographic appeared first on IT Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[[Stable Update] 2026-07-23 - Kernels, Mesa, VirtualBox, Gambas3, COSMIC, Plasma, KDE Frameworks]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688271/unix-server/stable-update-2026-07-23-kernels-mesa-virtualbox-gambas3-cosmic-plasma-kde-frameworks/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688271/unix-server/stable-update-2026-07-23-kernels-mesa-virtualbox-gambas3-cosmic-plasma-kde-frameworks/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 09:31:27 +0200 🐧 Unix Server tsecurity.de

Hello Manjaro user community, here we have another set of package updates. We are continuing our development of the upcoming release of ‘Bian-May’ which can be expected end of July or beginning of August. Development speed may be a little slower the upcoming weeks. However, still let us know any issues you may found thus far.

Current Promotions

Recent News

New in Manjaro GNOME! Or, if you prefer the command line: (click for more details) KDE Plasma users with SDDM can now migrate to Plasma Login Manager (click for more details) NVIDIA 590 driver drops Pascal support (click for more details)
  • Manjaro 26.1 Bian-May - Preview released
  • Manjaro 26.0 Anh-Linh released
  • Manjaro Summit public Alpha now available
  • As of Linux 5.4.302, the 5.4 series is now EOL (End Of Life). Please install 5.10 LTS (Long Term Support) or 5.15 LTS.
  • As of Linux 6.16.12, the 6.16 series is now EOL (End Of Life). Please install 6.18 LTS (Long Term Support) and/or 6.12 LTS.
  • As of Linux 6.17.13, the 6.17 series is now EOL (End Of Life). Please install 6.18 LTS (Long Term Support) and/or 6.12 LTS.
  • As of Linux 6.19.14, the 6.19 series is now EOL (End Of Life). Please install 7.0, and/or 6.18 LTS (Long Term Support) and/or 6.12 LTS.
  • As of Linux 7.0.14, the 7.0 series is now EOL (End Of Life). Please install 7.1, and/or 6.18 LTS (Long Term Support) and/or 6.12 LTS.
Previous News (click for more details)

Notable Package Updates

Additional Info

Python 3.14 info (click for more details) Info about AUR packages (click for more details)

Get our latest daily developer images now from Github: Plasma, GNOME, XFCE. You can get the latest stable releases of Manjaro from CDN77.

Our current supported kernels

  • linux61 6.1.177
  • linux66 6.6.144
  • linux612 6.12.96
  • linux618 6.18.39
  • linux71 7.1.4
  • linux72 7.2.0-rc4
  • linux61-rt 6.1.167_rt62
  • linux66-rt 6.6.135_rt74
  • linux612-rt 6.12.89_rt18

Package Changes (7/22/26 05:45 CEST)

  • stable core x86_64: 71 new and 71 removed package(s)
  • stable extra x86_64: 1982 new and 2071 removed package(s)
  • stable multilib x86_64: 32 new and 32 removed package(s)

A list of all package changes can be found here.

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]]> <![CDATA[Anthropic spendet 20 Millionen Dollar für KI-Regulierung]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688262/it-security-nachrichten/anthropic-spendet-20-millionen-dollar-fuer-ki-regulierung/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688262/it-security-nachrichten/anthropic-spendet-20-millionen-dollar-fuer-ki-regulierung/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 09:24:49 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Anthropic

Anthropic spendet weitere 20 Millionen US-Dollar an die Organisation Public First Action. Die Gruppe setzt sich für die Regulierung von KI in den USA ein.

Tags: #Anthropic | #Künstliche Intelligenz

]]> <![CDATA[Claude Code kann jetzt iOS-Apps direkt im Apple Simulator bauen und testen]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688190/ios-mac-os/claude-code-kann-jetzt-ios-apps-direkt-im-apple-simulator-bauen-und-testen/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688190/ios-mac-os/claude-code-kann-jetzt-ios-apps-direkt-im-apple-simulator-bauen-und-testen/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 08:57:23 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[macOS 27 Public Beta 2 Released: Here’s How to Install It]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688141/ios-mac-os/macos-27-public-beta-2-released-heres-how-to-install-it/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688141/ios-mac-os/macos-27-public-beta-2-released-heres-how-to-install-it/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 08:17:18 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[iOS 27 Public Beta 2 Now Available, Here’s How to Install It and What’s New]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688140/ios-mac-os/ios-27-public-beta-2-now-available-heres-how-to-install-it-and-whats-new/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688140/ios-mac-os/ios-27-public-beta-2-now-available-heres-how-to-install-it-and-whats-new/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 08:17:16 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[iPadOS 27 Public Beta 2 Now Available, Here’s How to Install It and What’s New]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688139/ios-mac-os/ipados-27-public-beta-2-now-available-heres-how-to-install-it-and-whats-new/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688139/ios-mac-os/ipados-27-public-beta-2-now-available-heres-how-to-install-it-and-whats-new/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 08:17:15 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Apple TV to Adapt Rebecca Yarros’ Peculiar Stars Into a New Romance Series]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688088/ios-mac-os/apple-tv-to-adapt-rebecca-yarros-peculiar-stars-into-a-new-romance-series/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688088/ios-mac-os/apple-tv-to-adapt-rebecca-yarros-peculiar-stars-into-a-new-romance-series/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 07:26:51 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[This Week In Rust: This Week in Rust 661]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3688059/tools/this-week-in-rust-this-week-in-rust-661/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3688059/tools/this-week-in-rust-this-week-in-rust-661/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 07:18:12 +0200 💾 Tools tsecurity.de Hello and welcome to another issue of This Week in Rust! Rust is a programming language empowering everyone to build reliable and efficient software. This is a weekly summary of its progress and community. Want something mentioned? Tag us at @thisweekinrust.bsky.social on Bluesky or @ThisWeekinRust on mastodon.social, or send us a pull request. Want to get involved? We love contributions.

This Week in Rust is openly developed on GitHub and archives can be viewed at this-week-in-rust.org. If you find any errors in this week's issue, please submit a PR.

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Crate of the Week

This week's crate is xan, a TUI toolkit to work with CSV files.

Thanks to Simeon H.K. Fitch for the suggestion!

Please submit your suggestions and votes for next week!

Calls for Testing

An important step for RFC implementation is for people to experiment with the implementation and give feedback, especially before stabilization.

If you are a feature implementer and would like your RFC to appear in this list, add a call-for-testing label to your RFC along with a comment providing testing instructions and/or guidance on which aspect(s) of the feature need testing.

No calls for testing were issued this week by Rust, Cargo, Rustup or Rust language RFCs.

Let us know if you would like your feature to be tracked as a part of this list.

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Always wanted to contribute to open-source projects but did not know where to start? Every week we highlight some tasks from the Rust community for you to pick and get started!

Some of these tasks may also have mentors available, visit the task page for more information.

  • No Calls for participation were submitted this week.

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Are you a new or experienced speaker looking for a place to share something cool? This section highlights events that are being planned and are accepting submissions to join their event as a speaker.

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Updates from the Rust Project

576 pull requests were merged in the last week

Compiler
Library
Cargo
Rustdoc
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Rust-Analyzer
Rust Compiler Performance Triage

The two most notable changes this week were #159115, which resulted in pretty nice instruction count wins for full incremental builds on several benchmarks, and #159091, which enabled PGO for rustdoc, which makes it ~3-4% faster across the board.

There were two large rollups with tiny performance regressions, which made it difficult to find the offending PRs.

Triage done by @Kobzol. Revision range: 5503df87..d527bc9b

Summary:

(instructions:u) mean range count
Regressions ❌
(primary)		 0.4% [0.2%, 1.0%] 40
Regressions ❌
(secondary)		 0.7% [0.2%, 4.6%] 69
Improvements ✅
(primary)		 -2.0% [-6.2%, -0.2%] 136
Improvements ✅
(secondary)		 -2.6% [-8.4%, -0.2%] 119
All ❌✅ (primary) -1.4% [-6.2%, 1.0%] 176

2 Regressions, 3 Improvements, 6 Mixed; 4 of them in rollups 34 artifact comparisons made in total

Full report here.

Approved RFCs

Changes to Rust follow the Rust RFC (request for comments) process. These are the RFCs that were approved for implementation this week:

  • No RFCs were approved this week.
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Every week, the team announces the 'final comment period' for RFCs and key PRs which are reaching a decision. Express your opinions now.

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Quote of the Week

We were planning on publishing a blog post announcing this at the same time as making the repo public, but ran out of private repo CI usage 😭.

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]]> <![CDATA[CVE-2026-16653 | boazsegev facil.io up to 0.7.58 Public Folder lib/facil/http/http.c http_sendfile2 path traversal (Issue 170 / EUVD-2026-47867)]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687945/sicherheitsluecken/cve-2026-16653-boazsegev-facilio-up-to-0758-public-folder-libfacilhttphttpc-httpsendfile2-path-traversal-issue-170-euvd-2026-47867/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687945/sicherheitsluecken/cve-2026-16653-boazsegev-facilio-up-to-0758-public-folder-libfacilhttphttpc-httpsendfile2-path-traversal-issue-170-euvd-2026-47867/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 06:11:40 +0200 🕵️ Sicherheitslücken tsecurity.de problematic has been found in boazsegev facil.io up to 0.7.58. This affects the function http_sendfile2 of the file lib/facil/http/http.c of the component Public Folder Handler. Performing a manipulation results in path traversal. This vulnerability is known as CVE-2026-16653. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. Furthermore, an exploit is available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.]]> <![CDATA[SAP S/4HANA-Transformation zwischen Aufbruch und Realität]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687936/it-security-nachrichten/sap-s4hana-transformation-zwischen-aufbruch-und-realitaet/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687936/it-security-nachrichten/sap-s4hana-transformation-zwischen-aufbruch-und-realitaet/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 06:09:16 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de
ERP SAP Studie 27

Ob hybrides Betriebsmodell oder Kostenfrage, am Ende entscheidet über den Projekterfolg nicht allein die Technologie

.

hasan as’ari – shutterstock.com

SAP-Anwenderunternehmen stehen unter Druck, auf SAP S/4HANA zu wechseln, weil die Mainstream-Wartung für SAP ERP (SAP ECC 6.0) Ende 2027 ausläuft und die bis Ende 2030 geltende erweiterte Wartung kostenpflichtig ist.

Zwar stellt SAP mit der „SAP ERP, Private Edition, Transition Option“ eine weitere Wartungsverlängerung bis 2033 in Aussicht. Da diese einer Neuimplementierung gleichkommt, bleibt SAP-Kunden mehr Zeit für die Planung, die Analyse und das Changemanagement. Der Nachteil: Wer diese Option nutzt, läuft Gefahr, technologisch ins Hintertreffen zu geraten, da Innovationen nahezu ausschließlich für SAP S/4HANA bereitgestellt werden.

Zögerliche SAP-S/4HANA-Transformation trotz Wartungsdruck

Obwohl der Druck hoch ist, hat eine große Zahl der SAP-Bestandskunden die Transformation auf die seit 2015 verfügbare ERP-Suite offenbar noch nicht vollzogen. Eine COMPUTERWOCHE-Expertenrunde zeigte, wo die größten Hürden liegen und was erfolgreiche Projekte auszeichnet.

Warum etliche Unternehmen die Transformation vor dem regulären Wartungsende scheuen und stattdessen zwei Prozent Mehrkosten für die erweiterte Wartung einkalkulieren, brachte ein Teilnehmender auf den Punkt: Firmen haben über Jahrzehnte in ihre SAP-ERP-Lösung investiert und sie an individuelle Prozessanforderungen angepasst, damit die Abläufe entlang der Supply Chain reibungslos laufen. Er habe daher in den vergangenen zehn Jahren keinen Kunden erlebt, der freiwillig umsteigen wollte. Alle hätten gesagt, dass sie müssen.

Nach Erfahrungswerten eines weiteren Experten nutzen erst rund 20 Prozent der SAP-Kunden SAP S/4HANA als Kernapplikation produktiv, unter anderem, weil entsprechende Transformationsprojekte auf sieben bis neun Jahre angelegt sind.

Altlasten bremsen die SAP-S/4HANA-Transformation

Unternehmen, die sich für den Wechsel entscheiden, verzichten häufig auf jede Modernisierung. Sie vollziehen einen Eins-zu-eins-Umstieg ohne Code-Modifikation, sei es in Form einer System Conversion (Brownfield-Ansatz) oder per Lift and Shift in SAP Cloud ERP Private (früher: SAP S/4HANA Cloud Private Edition). Dabei ist eine große Zahl von SAP-ERP-Installationen gar nicht zukunftsfähig, weil sie auf Prozessen aus den 1990er Jahren basieren und im Lauf der Jahre durch zahlreiche Eigenentwicklungen erweitert wurden.

Nicht selten gibt es bis zu mehrere tausend kundeneigene Programme im Z/Y-Namensraum, die zum Teil nicht mehr genutzt werden und das System unnötig belasten. Die Experten waren sich einig, dass eine solche rein technische Migration, bei der Altlasten wie ABAP-Eigenentwicklungen mitgeschleppt werden, keinen Mehrwert für das Unternehmen bringt.

Es muss geprüft werden, welche Eigenentwicklungen beibehalten werden, weil sie wettbewerbsdifferenzierend und damit geschäftskritisch sind, und welche gelöscht werden müssen, weil sie nicht genutzt werden oder weil es dafür inzwischen SAP-Standardfunktionen gibt. Handlungsbedarf besteht auch bei einer dreistelligen Anzahl von Buchungskreisen, von denen niemand weiß, welche noch benötigt werden, oder bei zahlreichen Dubletten in den Kreditoren- und Debitorenstammdaten.

Studie “SAP S4HANA”: Sie können sich noch beteiligen!
Zum Thema SAP S4HANA führt die COMPUTERWOCHE derzeit eine Multi-Client-Studie unter IT-Verantwortlichen durch. Haben Sie Fragen zu dieser Studie oder wollen Partner bei dieser Studie werden, helfen wir Ihnen unter research-sales@foundryco.com gerne weiter.

Migrations-Tools und KI-Agenten beschleunigen den Umstieg

Um diesen Prüf- und Bereinigungsaufwand zu bewältigen, bietet SAP mehrere Tools, um die Transformation auf SAP S/4HANA zu vereinfachen: darunter SAP Activate, SAP Cloud ALM, Migration Cockpit, Readiness Check, Custom-Code-Check oder Modifikationsabgleich. Ergänzt werden sie durch Lösungen wie Signavio für die Prozessanalyse. Die Experten schätzen den Effizienzgewinn durch solche Migrationswerkzeuge auf 30 bis 50 Prozent.

Zusätzliche Produktivität versprechen KI-Agenten, die Altsysteme automatisiert analysieren, Code bereinigen und Datenflüsse transformieren. Das reduziert den Migrationsaufwand und beschleunigt den Umstieg.

Scope-Management als Schlüssel für den Projekterfolg

Einig waren sich die Teilnehmenden, dass SAP-S/4HANA-Transformationsprojekte in der Regel nicht an der Technologie scheitern, sondern an einer mangelhaften Scope-Definition und am unzureichenden Changemanagement.

Ein Scope-Management vor dem Projektstart, das berücksichtigt, wie viel Veränderung der IT-Organisation und den Fachbereichen zugemutet werden kann, sei essenziell für den Erfolg, sagte einer der Teilnehmenden. Es erfordert die Fähigkeit zu priorisieren und ein iteratives Vorgehen, bei dem zunächst geschäftskritische Must-haves und Quick Wins umgesetzt werden. Weniger wichtige Nice-to-haves folgen später. Wer dagegen in der Konzeptionsphase bereits den großen Wurf anstrebt, wird voraussichtlich scheitern. Als Beispiel wurde der direkte Umstieg auf ein SAP-S/4HANA-Kernsystem genannt, das nach dem Clean-Core-Ansatz von nicht mehr lauffähigen Programmen und obsoleten Erweiterungen bereinigt ist.

Genauso wichtig ist ein Change-Management, das Mitarbeitende von Beginn an einbezieht, die nötige Akzeptanz schafft und vom Top-Management aktiv unterstützt wird, sowie eine verbindliche Governance mit klaren Zielvorgaben. Unverzichtbar ist auch die Einbindung der Fachbereiche. Sie stellt die größte Herausforderung dar, da Unternehmen befürchten, dass durch die SAP-S/4HANA-Transformation zu viele personelle Ressourcen gebunden werden, die dann für Kernaufgaben fehlen. Kommt es vor, dass IT und Fachbereiche als Antipoden agieren, sollte ein Change-Coach als Vermittler eingesetzt werden.

Hybride Betriebsmodelle setzen sich langfristig durch

Bereits vor dem Projektstart muss abschließend geklärt sein, welches Betriebsmodell für SAP S/4HANA am besten zu einem Unternehmen und seinen Zielen passt, auch mit Blick auf regulatorische Anforderungen. Das ist häufig nicht der Fall, sodass das Projektteam unnötig Zeit damit verbringt, das passende Betriebsmodell zu ermitteln. Das bremst Transformationsvorhaben aus.

Nach Ansicht eines Teilnehmenden wird sich langfristig ein hybrides Betriebsmodell durchsetzen, bei dem der SAP-Kunde entscheidet, welche Elemente der SAP-S/4HANA-Landschaft in einer Hyperscaler-Cloud, einer souveränen Cloud und/oder On-Premises laufen. Eine weitere, weitgehend unbekannte Möglichkeit ist der Betrieb im Rahmen der Customer-Data-Center-Option (CDC) von SAP Cloud ERP Private (früher: SAP S/4HANA Cloud Private Edition), die aus Gründen wie Datenschutz, Leistung und Souveränität eine interessante Alternative sein kann.

Mehrere Experten stellen darüber hinaus fest, dass die vollwertige SaaS-Lösung SAP Cloud ERP Public (früher: SAP S/4HANA Cloud Public Edition) inzwischen verstärkt eingesetzt wird. Sie stellt vorkonfigurierte Kern-ERP-Funktionen (Best Practices) bereit und lässt sich relativ schnell einführen, ermöglicht aber kaum individuelle Anpassungen. Diese Abstriche nehmen Unternehmen in Kauf, um von regelmäßigen, automatischen Upgrades und technologischen Innovationen zu profitieren.

Kritisiert wurde allerdings, dass die Cloud-Diskussion häufig unter begrifflichen Unschärfen leidet. So macht der Betrieb von SAP S/4HANA in einer Hyperscaler- oder SAP-Cloud die Lösung noch lange nicht zum Software-as-a-Service-Angebot. Solche Ungenauigkeiten irritierten SAP-Kunden und bremsten die Entscheidungsfindung. Letztlich sind beim Cloud-Betrieb auch die Kosten entscheidend. Zwar wollen viele Unternehmen anfangs maximale Sicherheit mit Private Network und Confidential Computing, wählen dann aber günstigere Commercial-Cloud-Angebote. Ausnahmen bilden regulierte Branchen und der öffentliche Sektor.

Ob hybrides Betriebsmodell oder Kostenfrage, am Ende entscheidet über den Projekterfolg nicht allein die Technologie, sondern auch, wie diszipliniert Scope und Wandel im Unternehmen gesteuert werden.

Teilnehmer der Round-Table “SAP S4HANA 2027”

Albrecht Munz, HPE

Albrecht Munz, HPE: 

„Die SAP-S/4HANA-Migration ist primär ein erster technischer Pflichtlauf, der die IT seitige Grundlage für die digitale Transformation schaffen kann. Dass viele Unternehmen hier stagnieren, liegt auch am in diesem Zusammenhang häufig anzutreffenden Cloud-Washing: Das Hosting eines ERP-Systems in der Cloud liefert noch lange nicht die Innovations- und Business-Effekte einer wirklich Cloud-nativen SaaS-Architektur.“

Harald Becker / Hewlett-Packard GmbH

Anke Frier, Lufthansa Industry Solutions

Anke Frier, Lufthansa Industry Solutions:

„Unternehmen, die sich für eine technische SAP-S/4HANA-Transformation entschieden haben, dürfen diese nicht mit dem Go-Live als abgeschlossen betrachten. Der langfristige Erfolg hängt davon ab, wie konsequent danach die neuen technologischen Möglichkeiten genutzt werden, um Prozesse umzugestalten, zu digitalisieren und durch KI-Einsatz zu unterstützen. Erst dadurch entsteht ein messbarer Business Value.“

Sonja Brüggemann / Lufthansa Industry Solutions GmbH & Co. KG

Peter Büermann, Microsoft

Peter Büermann, Microsoft:

„Der optimale Zeitpunkt für den Umstieg auf SAP S/4HANA ist jetzt. Die Reife der Migrationswerkzeuge, standardisierte Vorgehensmodelle und die umfangreiche Projekterfahrung der SAP-Partnerlandschaft reduzieren das Risiko deutlich. Damit sind die wesentlichen Hürden vergangener Jahre weitgehend beseitigt und Unternehmen profitieren von einer schnelleren Implementierung, geringeren Kosten und einer höherer Projektqualität.“

Microsoft Deutschland GmbH

Roland Storbeck, Natuvion

Roland Storbeck, Natuvion:

„Wirklich erfolgreich sind die SAP-S/4HANA-Migrationen, deren Scope noch vor dem Projektstart klar definiert und gemanagt wird. Wer zu Beginn zu hohe Ansprüche hat und jeden Prozess umdrehen will, dessen Vorhaben scheitert häufig schon in der Konzeptionsphase. Zudem muss jedes Unternehmen die Frage beantworten, wie viel Change seine IT- und Business-Organisation überhaupt verträgt. Neben einem klaren Scope ist dringend zu empfehlen, den eigenen Datenbestand vor Projektstart zu analysieren und aufzuräumen.“

VOGUS – Wolfgang Voglhuber / Natuvion GmbH

Matthias Draschner, smartShift

Matthias Draschner, smartShift:

„Für viele Unternehmen ist SAP in erster Linie eine über Jahre oder sogar Jahrzehnte gewachsene IT-Landschaft, die geschäftskritische Prozesse unterstützt und absichert. Entsprechend besteht die berechtigte Erwartung, dass diese Prozesse auch nach der Migration auf SAP S/4HANA zuverlässig und möglichst unverändert weiterlaufen. Gleichzeitig bietet die SAP-S/4HANA-Transformation die Chance, Custom Code entweder zu modernisieren und auf die Anforderungen einer Cloud-fähigen Architektur auszurichten oder zu entfernen, sofern er nicht mehr benötigt wird. Spezielle Analyse- und Automatisierungstools unterstützen diesen Prozess.“

smartShift Technologies GmbH

]]> <![CDATA[bringing mainline Linux to the Nokia Lumia 1520]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687880/linux-tipps/bringing-mainline-linux-to-the-nokia-lumia-1520/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687880/linux-tipps/bringing-mainline-linux-to-the-nokia-lumia-1520/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 04:29:03 +0200 🐧 Linux Tipps tsecurity.de

Hey everyone,

I’ve been working on getting a modern mainline Linux stack running on the Nokia Lumia 1520, a 2013 Windows Phone built around Qualcomm’s MSM8974 platform.

This isnt an Android ROM port or a Windows Phone mod. The goal is to bring the device up on a current Linux kernel with postmarketOS and gradually implement the missing hardware support needed to make it usable.

So far, I’ve managed to:

  • Build a custom bootloader and device-tree configuration
  • Create a postmarketOS device package for the RM-940
  • Boot a Linux 6.16-based kernel
  • Bring up USB networking
  • Establish a stable SSH connection to the phone
  • Run an Alpine Linux/postmarketOS userspace
  • Begin implementing device-specific power and hardware support

The SSH milestone was a major step because I can now properly inspect the running system, collect logs, test kernel changes, and continue development without relying only on framebuffer output or early boot behavior.

The current challenge is power management.

Full system suspend currently powers down the USB high-speed PHY, but the PHY fails to initialize again when the device resumes. Because USB networking is also the main development connection, this effectively cuts off access to the phone.

For now, I’m treating display blanking and panel power management as a separate, more achievable target while I continue investigating the suspend/resume issue.

There is still a lot missing, and I would not call it a usable daily-driver port yet, but the Lumia 1520 is now booting a modern Linux kernel and running a real userspace more than a decade after the hardware was released. I just wanted to share the work....

The work is public here:

https://github.com/KorelisLabs/lumia-1520-mainline

submitted by /u/DestinyInDepth
[link] [comments]]]> <![CDATA[Apple Store app Virtual Shopping Assistant could be coming soon]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687682/ios-mac-os/apple-store-app-virtual-shopping-assistant-could-be-coming-soon/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687682/ios-mac-os/apple-store-app-virtual-shopping-assistant-could-be-coming-soon/ Thu, 23 Jul 2026 00:00:31 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de
Glowing blue chat bubble with sparkles in the center on a dark background, surrounded by small colorful app and system icons scattered around it
Apple Support already has a chatbot, and soon, Apple Store will too

Apple has been slowly increasing its use of AI tools both internally and in public-facing apps. While Apple still relies on humans for some support inquiries, AI is being offered in more locations.

It seems Apple may have let slip that a new feature is coming to the Apple Store app. The Virtual Shopping Assistant feature is called out in the Apple Store app privacy policy, which was first spotted by MacRumors.


Continue Reading on AppleInsider | Discuss on our Forums]]> <![CDATA[IT Security News Daily Summary 2026-07-22]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687676/it-security-nachrichten/it-security-news-daily-summary-2026-07-22/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687676/it-security-nachrichten/it-security-news-daily-summary-2026-07-22/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 23:58:44 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de 169 posts were published in the last hour 20:34 : OpenClaw security best practices for CISOs 20:34 : GitHub Cuts Public Bug Bounty Payouts, Moves Top Rewards to VIP Tier 20:4 : Third-Party SDKs Raise Privacy Questions for Apps Marketed…

Read more →

The post IT Security News Daily Summary 2026-07-22 appeared first on IT Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[Linux Kernel Team Publishes 432 CVEs In Two Days]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687597/linux-tipps/linux-kernel-team-publishes-432-cves-in-two-days/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687597/linux-tipps/linux-kernel-team-publishes-432-cves-in-two-days/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 23:06:12 +0200 🐧 Linux Tipps tsecurity.de

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

]]> <![CDATA[GitHub Cuts Public Bug Bounty Payouts, Moves Top Rewards to VIP Tier]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687591/it-security-nachrichten/github-cuts-public-bug-bounty-payouts-moves-top-rewards-to-vip-tier/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687591/it-security-nachrichten/github-cuts-public-bug-bounty-payouts-moves-top-rewards-to-vip-tier/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 23:04:16 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Beginning July 27, 2026, GitHub will cut public bug bounty payouts by at least half at every severity level. Critical findings will drop from $20,000-$30,000+ to a fixed $10,000, while its permanent invite-only VIP tier will pay $30,000 or more.…

Read more →

The post GitHub Cuts Public Bug Bounty Payouts, Moves Top Rewards to VIP Tier appeared first on IT Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[Inflection AI returns to consumer market with Pi Journeys after Microsoft upheaval]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687581/it-nachrichten/inflection-ai-returns-to-consumer-market-with-pi-journeys-after-microsoft-upheaval/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687581/it-nachrichten/inflection-ai-returns-to-consumer-market-with-pi-journeys-after-microsoft-upheaval/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 22:58:21 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de Inflection AI, the Palo Alto startup that two years ago became Silicon Valley's most famous cautionary tale about the brutal economics of frontier AI, announced Tuesday that it is returning to the consumer market with a new research division and an experimental product built around a provocative thesis: the next competitive battleground in AI won't be raw intelligence, but relationships.

The company launched Inflection AI Labs, a public-facing research and experimentation arm, alongside Pi Journeys, the lab's first product experiment — an AI experience designed to adapt to a user's life stage, whether that's becoming a parent, taking on caregiving duties, changing careers, or aging. The announcement arrived with a research report on consumer AI habits and a substantial update to Pi, the company's flagship chatbot, adding improved voice, memory, and new agentic tools for reminders, to-do lists, and shopping.

"Inflection AI is the company. Pi is our flagship consumer product. Inflection AI Labs is where we experiment, explore personal intelligence and share more publicly. Pi Journeys is the first public experiment from Inflection AI Labs," CEO Sean White told VentureBeat in an exclusive interview.

Behind the tidy org chart is a far more interesting story: a company attempting one of the more unusual second acts in the AI industry, powered by an argument that the entire market is optimizing for the wrong thing.

Why Inflection AI believes the chatbot era's biggest flaw is that it's transactional

White's central claim is that today's AI assistants — including the industry's most capable models — are fundamentally transactional. You ask, they answer, the session ends. He believes that architecture misses most of what people actually need from artificial intelligence in their daily lives.

"One of the things that really struck us in particular, and this showed up in the research, was that a lot of the work is very transactional, and you'll hear me say a lot that we've been shifting all this from transactional to relational systems," White said. "Not everything is going to be: I do a single turn, I utter a question, I get a search response back."

White frames the industry's evolution as a progression through four kinds of intelligence. First came raw IQ — the foundation model race. Then emotional intelligence, which Inflection made its signature with Pi's famously warm conversational style. Then agentic intelligence — AI that acts rather than just talks — which White says Inflection absorbed from its enterprise work. The fourth, and the one Inflection is now staking its future on, is what the company calls relational intelligence: AI that understands not just you, but the web of people around you.

"There's so much fear about these things pushing people into loneliness,” White said. “If we design these pro-social systems as another design criteria, that actually makes a huge difference."

That design philosophy is a pointed counter-narrative to one of the loudest anxieties in consumer AI right now: that emotionally engaging chatbots deepen isolation by substituting for human contact. Inflection argues the opposite is possible — that an AI with structured knowledge of your relationships can push you back toward people rather than away from them.

Inside Pi Journeys, the AI companion that maps your relationships and life stages

Pi Journeys makes that idea concrete. When users first open the product, it asks about their life stage — caregiver, household manager, midlife transition — and then builds what White describes as specially structured memory around the people who matter in that context. From there, the system becomes proactive.

"It starts to build up memories around that, and it acts as a memory prosthetic — but in a pro-social way," White said. "It doesn't get in the way of your interactions with other people; it really helps facilitate them." The system might remind a user, for example, that a friend deserves a call, or resurface what was last discussed with a family member involved in a parent's care.

White, who spent years as chief R&D officer at Mozilla before taking Inflection's helm, was quick to flag the obvious privacy implications of an AI that maps your social graph. "We've built a lot of privacy systems into this," he said, noting users can delete and manage the people recorded in their profile. Whether consumers will trust a venture-backed AI company with a structured database of their most important relationships remains one of the biggest open questions hanging over the product — and one that enterprise buyers evaluating Inflection's technology will watch closely.

Asked why this was the first Labs experiment, White was direct: "Pi Journeys takes into account people's life stages and experiences because we have heard from users that we can provide more value in helping them navigate their lives. Pi Journeys lets us experiment with the early stages of prosocial and relational intelligence because life isn't single-player."

The product has been tested internally and with small closed groups, White said, and is now being released more broadly as an experiment rather than a finished product — a posture the Labs branding is designed to make explicit.

What Inflection's consumer AI research reveals about how people actually use chatbots

Inflection Labs' first publication, the State of Consumer AI Research Report, offers the empirical scaffolding for the strategy. The average consumer now uses roughly two different AI tools every day and three per week, the company found — evidence, in Inflection's reading, that no single assistant has locked up consumer loyalty and that the market remains contestable.

More telling is why people choose the tools they do. Respondents cited personalization, style and tone, context awareness, and — notably — emotional understanding as deciding factors. They also said they want AI to be more than a productivity engine: a coach or mentor to motivate them, a chef to suggest recipes, a DJ to curate playlists.

"One thing we're certainly finding is that a lot of that also is in work, not so much in everyday life," White said. "That's our focus right now — the everyday life part."

This is a shrewd reading of the competitive map. The best-funded AI labs are pouring resources into coding tools, enterprise agents, and developer platforms, leaving everyday consumer use cases comparatively underserved. White sees the gap clearly. "We see a lot of products that are being aimed more and more at the enterprise," he said. "As a computer scientist by training, I kind of love the IDEs as this tool, but it's not really great for everybody. There's so much regular everyday use from folks that is either purely voice or that is purely mobile."

He recalled a conversation with a conference staffer who told him she owned only a phone, no laptop — exactly the kind of user, he argued, that the industry's developer-centric product roadmaps have left behind.

How the $650 million Microsoft deal hollowed out Inflection — and set up its second act

To understand why any of this is remarkable, you have to rewind to March 2024. Inflection was then one of the hottest startups in AI, having raised $1.3 billion in mid-2023 in a round backed by Microsoft, Nvidia, Bill Gates, and Reid Hoffman — more than $1.5 billion in total. Pi had crossed one million daily active users, per Reuters.

Then, in a deal that reshaped how the industry thinks about acqui-hires, Microsoft hired away co-founder and CEO Mustafa Suleyman, chief scientist Karén Simonyan, and most of the company's roughly 70 employees, paying Inflection about $650 million largely to license its technology, as Reuters reported. Suleyman now runs Microsoft's consumer AI business. The structure of the deal drew scrutiny from the FTC and Britain's competition regulator, though the UK's Competition and Markets Authority cleared it in September 2024 and EU regulators declined to act.

White, installed as CEO in the aftermath, steered the remnant company hard toward enterprise, acquiring three startups in late 2024 — Jelled.AI, BoostKPI, and the European consulting firm Boundaryless — and telling TechCrunch that November that Inflection had no intention of competing with companies building 100,000-GPU frontier systems.

Tuesday's announcement doesn't reverse that position so much as complicate it. Asked how to think about the company today, White called it "a consumer-first strategy that bridges both consumer and enterprise efforts" — and he insists the two sides feed each other.

Enterprise deployments, including a partnership with Intel that is among the few he can name publicly, taught Inflection how to run models inside complex infrastructure. Consumer products, meanwhile, let the company iterate at speed. "The part I also like about the consumer side, and this has always been true, is that we can move faster, experiment faster, and try and learn faster," White said.

The six-month prediction: relationship-aware AI is coming to the enterprise

Buried in White's consumer pitch is the claim that should matter most to technical decision-makers. "Normally I'd say like a year, but let's call it six months," he said. "You're going to start to see a bunch of enterprises care a lot more about the relationships that are inside the enterprises and what that picture is, not just the workflows."

If White is right, the wave of workflow-automation agents currently flooding the enterprise market is only the first phase of business AI adoption — with relationship-aware systems, tested first on consumers, following close behind. Inflection is essentially using its consumer products as a live laboratory for capabilities it plans to sell into companies. It's a capital-efficient strategy for a firm that can no longer outspend rivals on training runs, and a risky one, since it depends on consumers showing up in numbers large enough to generate the learning.

The technical substance underneath is equally pragmatic. Pi today runs not on a single proprietary frontier model but on an orchestration layer routing across many models — some descended from Inflection's original fully trained cores, some fine-tuned, some open source, including work with Nvidia that White says gives Inflection access to unreleased cutting-edge models. He also took a swipe at the industry's loose vocabulary around ownership: "When people say that the model is their own, most of the time nowadays — I guess I won't name names — a lot of companies will actually take a checkpoint, and then they will fine-tune from that checkpoint. But very few people actually start from that beginning core."

That candor extends to open source, where White carefully hedged. "We're not ready to promise what I think of as true open source, and by that I mean everything," he said, invoking his Mozilla years overseeing genuinely open projects like Rust and WebAssembly.

Weights without training data and pipelines, he argued, often leave developers unable to do anything meaningful with a supposedly "open" model. "We are a PBC, and there's still a C in there," he added — a reminder that public benefit corporations still have businesses to protect. The Labs will collaborate with academic researchers, including Stanford professors who visited the company's Palo Alto office this week, and continue contributing to open projects such as PyTorch.

Can a diminished Inflection compete with AI giants spending billions?

Reid Hoffman, the LinkedIn co-founder who co-founded Inflection and stayed on through the Microsoft upheaval, framed the announcement in the sweeping terms of his recent writing on AI and human agency. "Humans should be amplified by AI, not replaced. That's the principle Pi was built on," Hoffman said in the announcement. "When that kind of agency is available to everyone, you get superagency."

The skeptic's case is easy to make. Inflection is a fraction of its former size, competing for consumer attention against products from companies spending tens of billions of dollars a year. Pi's model was state of the art in 2023; it is not in 2026. And "relational intelligence" is, for now, a brand claim awaiting proof.

But the bull case is not crazy either. Inflection's own research shows consumers already juggle multiple AI tools and choose them for qualities — tone, emotional understanding, personalization — that frontier labs treat as afterthoughts. The company kept its technology, its Microsoft licensing windfall, and a defensible enterprise niche in on-premise, emotionally intelligent deployments. And it is targeting the one consumer segment — everyday, mobile-first, voice-first life management — that the coding-obsessed giants have largely ignored.

Asked what success looks like twelve months from now, White declined to talk numbers. "It's less about scale for scale's sake and more about scaling for impact by empowering people and improving their lives," he said. "Over the next year, success means leading the market towards relational intelligence and transforming AI interactions from transactional to relational."

Two years ago, Microsoft walked away with Inflection's founders, its staff, and its shot at the frontier — but it left behind the one idea the giants still haven't figured out how to build: an AI that knows the people in your life matter more than the tasks on your list. Inflection is betting the company, again, that the idea was the valuable part all along.

]]> <![CDATA[GitHub Cuts Public Bug Bounty Payouts, Moves Top Rewards to VIP Tier]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687553/it-security-nachrichten/github-cuts-public-bug-bounty-payouts-moves-top-rewards-to-vip-tier/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687553/it-security-nachrichten/github-cuts-public-bug-bounty-payouts-moves-top-rewards-to-vip-tier/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 22:40:47 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Critical Zimbra security update fixes 9 vulnerabilities]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687552/it-security-nachrichten/critical-zimbra-security-update-fixes-9-vulnerabilities/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687552/it-security-nachrichten/critical-zimbra-security-update-fixes-9-vulnerabilities/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 22:40:41 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Business email and collaboration suite Zimbra has received a major security update that fixes several critical issues that could allow attackers to execute malicious code on the server or in users’ browsers.

Available in commercial and open-source editions, Zimbra Collaboration Suite is a self-hosted Microsoft Exchange alternative that is popular with businesses, government entities, and educational institutions, which has made it a target for attackers in the past.

Version 10.1.20 released this week includes patches for nine vulnerabilities, including a permanent fix for a critical flaw announced in June in the SNMP monitoring component that could be exploited to inject commands when notifications are enabled.

The release also fixes four cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the Classic Web Client that could allow attackers to execute malicious scripts when users view emails in the web interface. For example, one vulnerability can be triggered through specially crafted attachment filenames and another when users render an attachment.

XSS vulnerabilities are dangerous because they execute scripts in the user’s browser in the context of the page. That gives rogue code the same privileges as the user, enabling it to perform malicious actions, exfiltrate data, or even leak session cookies.

In 2025, an XSS vulnerability in the calendar import feature of the Zimbra Classic Web Client (CVE-2025-27915) was exploited in attacks targeting Brazilian military personnel. Many other Zimbra vulnerabilities have been exploited over the years, sometimes as zero-days, especially by Russian state-sponsored APT groups, such as Fancy Bear (APT28), Cozy Bear (APT29), and Winter Vivern (TA473).

A recent incident involved a Russian threat group targeting a Ukrainian critical infrastructure agency in March using specifically crafted emails that exploited a known Zimbra stored XXS vulnerability (CVE-2025-66376).

Another vulnerability fixed in the newly released Zimbra 10.1.20 could allow authenticated attackers to bypass email forwarding restrictions. Adding email forwarding rules to a compromised account is a common way to achieve persistence and continuously exfiltrate emails from a mailbox over an extended period of time, even if the account password is changed.

The release also fixes a security issue related to access controls in the EWS extension, an authorization issue in mailbox delegation, and a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the Nextcloud integration. Nextcloud is another self-hosted collaboration suite that is popular with government and public institutions that don’t want to rely on public clouds.

It’s worth noting that this is the second Zimbra security update this month. Version 10.1.19, released on July 7, patched another unspecified security issue in the Classic Web Client that could run malicious code when specially crafted emails were opened by users.

Zimbra owner Synacor strongly advises customers to upgrade to the latest available version as soon as possible to keep their environments secure. While none of these flaws had zero-day status, hacker groups have a history for quickly adopting known Zimbra exploits.

]]> <![CDATA[Inside CVE-2026-50522: Analyzing SharePoint's latest actively exploited RCE]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687503/it-security-nachrichten/inside-cve-2026-50522-analyzing-sharepoints-latest-actively-exploited-rce/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687503/it-security-nachrichten/inside-cve-2026-50522-analyzing-sharepoints-latest-actively-exploited-rce/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 22:12:30 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Inside CVE-2026-50522: Analyzing SharePoint's latest actively exploited RCE

CVE-2026-50522 is a critical SharePoint deserialization vulnerability that is now being actively exploited, with public exploit code available, it'll only get worse until admins apply patches.

submitted by /u/NapierPalm
[link] [comments] ]]> <![CDATA[Apple gibt Schub: Zweite Public Beta für iOS 27, iPadOS 27 und macOS 27 ist da]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687445/it-nachrichten/apple-gibt-schub-zweite-public-beta-fuer-ios-27-ipados-27-und-macos-27-ist-da/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687445/it-nachrichten/apple-gibt-schub-zweite-public-beta-fuer-ios-27-ipados-27-und-macos-27-ist-da/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 21:34:06 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de Zum Beitrag: Apple gibt Schub: Zweite Public Beta für iOS 27, iPadOS 27 und macOS 27 ist da

Wo du uns folgen kannst: Facebook, Reddit, Google News, X, Threads

]]> <![CDATA[IT Security News Hourly Summary 2026-07-22 21h : 12 posts]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687409/it-security-nachrichten/it-security-news-hourly-summary-2026-07-22-21h-12-posts/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687409/it-security-nachrichten/it-security-news-hourly-summary-2026-07-22-21h-12-posts/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 21:09:50 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de 12 posts were published in the last hour 19:4 : Ubuntu snap-confine Flaw Could Give Local Users Root on Default Desktop Installs 18:36 : Public PoC Released for Windows NT OS Kernel Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 18:36 : A Hidden Line…

Read more →

The post IT Security News Hourly Summary 2026-07-22 21h : 12 posts appeared first on IT Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[Public PoC Released for Windows NT OS Kernel Privilege Escalation Vulnerability]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687324/it-security-nachrichten/public-poc-released-for-windows-nt-os-kernel-privilege-escalation-vulnerability/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687324/it-security-nachrichten/public-poc-released-for-windows-nt-os-kernel-privilege-escalation-vulnerability/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 20:38:45 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code was released for CVE-2026-42980, a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the Windows NT OS Kernel. This vulnerability occurs due to an integer underflow in kernel-mode code. CVE-2026-42980 is an elevation-of-privilege flaw in the Windows NT…

Read more →

The post Public PoC Released for Windows NT OS Kernel Privilege Escalation Vulnerability appeared first on IT Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[Apple seeds second public betas of iOS 27, iPadOS 27, watchOS 27, and tvOS 27]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687323/ios-mac-os/apple-seeds-second-public-betas-of-ios-27-ipados-27-watchos-27-and-tvos-27/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687323/ios-mac-os/apple-seeds-second-public-betas-of-ios-27-ipados-27-watchos-27-and-tvos-27/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 20:38:18 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de Apple on Wednesday pushed out the second public betas of iOS 27, iPadOS 27, and watchOS 27 to members of its public beta testing program…

The post Apple seeds second public betas of iOS 27, iPadOS 27, watchOS 27, and tvOS 27 appeared first on MacDailyNews.

]]> <![CDATA[CVE-2026-62479 | Oracle Public Sector Financials up to 12.2.15 Internal Operations privileges management (EUVD-2026-47513)]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687320/sicherheitsluecken/cve-2026-62479-oracle-public-sector-financials-up-to-12215-internal-operations-privileges-management-euvd-2026-47513/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687320/sicherheitsluecken/cve-2026-62479-oracle-public-sector-financials-up-to-12215-internal-operations-privileges-management-euvd-2026-47513/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 20:35:31 +0200 🕵️ Sicherheitslücken tsecurity.de critical, has been found in Oracle Public Sector Financials up to 12.2.15. This issue affects some unknown processing of the component Internal Operations. This manipulation causes improper privilege management. This vulnerability appears as CVE-2026-62479. The attack may be initiated remotely. There is no available exploit.]]> <![CDATA[iOS 27 & iPadOS 27: Public Beta 2 ist da]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687262/ios-mac-os/ios-27-ipados-27-public-beta-2-ist-da/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687262/ios-mac-os/ios-27-ipados-27-public-beta-2-ist-da/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 20:26:31 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Meta’s Muse AI: How Instagram Users Can Opt Out After Privacy Backlash]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687246/it-security-nachrichten/metas-muse-ai-how-instagram-users-can-opt-out-after-privacy-backlash/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687246/it-security-nachrichten/metas-muse-ai-how-instagram-users-can-opt-out-after-privacy-backlash/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 20:24:42 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de   Meta’s short‑lived Muse Image AI on Instagram let users remix public photos into AI images by default, triggering a storm of privacy and consent backlash before Meta pulled the feature. Meta’s Muse Image tool was designed to turn Instagram…

Read more →

The post Meta’s Muse AI: How Instagram Users Can Opt Out After Privacy Backlash appeared first on IT Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[Oracle expands Cloud@Customer with new database service for mid-sized workloads]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687239/ai-nachrichten/oracle-expands-cloudcustomer-with-new-database-service-for-mid-sized-workloads/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687239/ai-nachrichten/oracle-expands-cloudcustomer-with-new-database-service-for-mid-sized-workloads/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 20:19:33 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Oracle is expanding its Cloud@Customer on-premises portfolio with a managed database offering that it says will enable enterprises to run databases, applications, and AI agents in their own data centers, helping CIOs modernize mid-sized workloads while meeting data residency, regulatory, and low-latency requirements.

The hybrid cloud offering, Base Database Cloud@Customer, combines existing database and infrastructure services such as the Base Database Service and Data Infrastructure Cloud@Customer X11 platform. It is designed for enterprises that do not need the scale of Exadata Cloud@Customer but still want their infrastructure and AI capabilities on-premises, managed by Oracle, the company said.

The Cloud@Customer X11 platform itself consists of two Oracle X11 compute servers and shared all-flash storage, offering up to 60 usable processor cores and 660 GB of memory per server, 47.2 TB of storage, and 10/25 GbE networking.

For regulated industries or restricted connectivity

Analysts see the new offering filling a gap for enterprises that want the operational and economic benefits of the cloud but cannot send their data to a public cloud because of legal restrictions or technology limitations.

These enterprises, according to Ashish Chaturvedi, executive research leader at HFS Research, are likely to be in regulated industries such as financial services, healthcare, government, and defense that must comply with data residency requirements, or needing low-latency access from remote sites to operational databases.

The offering could also appeal to enterprises modernizing mid-sized workloads at remote locations or within individual business units that could never justify the investment in a full Exadata rack, said Amit Chandak, chief analytics officer at IT consulting firm Kanerika.

In all cases, Chaturvedi said, the appeal of the offering is its managed nature, which takes away the burden of looking after the underlying infrastructure.

Deployment and maintenance becomes easier too, said Michael Leone, principal analyst at Moor Strategy and Insights: “They get automation that mid-size teams rarely have the staff to build. Clustering, patching, standby databases, and backups arrive configured instead of hand-assembled because the offering is managed.”

The economics are equally compelling, Chaturvedi said. The pay-as-you-go pricing model, combined with online compute scaling, helps enterprises avoid overprovisioning and paying license fees for idle cores, which is a “classic waste” of fixed on-premises systems, he said.

Private AI behind the firewall

Beyond the operational and economic benefits, the architecture of the new offering enables databases, applications, VMs, and AI agents to be collocated on the same platform, removing what Chaturvedi called “the single biggest blocker” to AI adoption in regulated environments: the need to keep private data behind the firewall.

“For a CIO in a regulated sector who wants to deploy AI agents but can’t let regulated data touch an external model API, that’s a real unlock,” Chaturvedi said.

More so because most AI offerings, at least in their present form and state, cannot guarantee sensitive data protection, said Igor Ikonnikov, advisory fellow at Info-Tech Research Group.

Even if Base Database Cloud@Customer turns out more expensive than fully cloud-based options, “It’s still attractive as it eliminates reputational and economic risk caused by possible AI-induced data leakage,” Ikonnikov said.

The offering’s consolidation of databases, applications, and AI agents will also simplify deployment of AI-based workflows, said Forrester principal analyst Noel Yuhanna. “It reduces stack complexity and helps accelerate development cycles, deliver real-time data, and eliminate data movement challenges.”

Despite those advantages, Chandak cautioned that the offering is unlikely to see broad adoption outside Oracle’s existing customer base: “If a company isn’t already on Oracle, the pull is weak. You don’t buy into Oracle’s database just to get this.”

Enterprises seeking similar hybrid cloud capabilities have no shortage of alternatives: AWS, Microsoft, Google Cloud, IBM, Dell Technologies, and HPE all offer combinations of on-premises infrastructure, cloud management, and AI services.

However, those alternatives typically require customers to integrate multiple software and hardware components rather than consume them as a single managed offering.

Oracle’s differentiation, although narrow, is hard to match, Chaturvedi said: “The vertical integration of database, engineered hardware, cloud management, high-availability architecture, and now private AI, all engineered together and delivered as a managed on-prem subscription should be genuinely convenient and attractive.”

The offering is compatible with Oracle AI Database 26ai and Oracle Database 19c in Enterprise Edition and Standard Edition configurations. It also supports Oracle Real Application Clusters, Oracle Data Guard, and Zero Data Loss Recovery Appliance through Oracle-managed cloud automation for high availability and disaster recovery, the company said.

Base Database Cloud@Customer is now generally available, Oracle said. It did not provide pricing.

This article first appeared on CIO.

]]> <![CDATA[Oracle expands Cloud@Customer with new database service for mid-sized workloads]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687195/it-security-nachrichten/oracle-expands-cloudcustomer-with-new-database-service-for-mid-sized-workloads/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687195/it-security-nachrichten/oracle-expands-cloudcustomer-with-new-database-service-for-mid-sized-workloads/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 19:56:30 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Oracle is expanding its Cloud@Customer on-premises portfolio with a managed database offering that it says will enable enterprises to run databases, applications, and AI agents in their own data centers, helping CIOs modernize mid-sized workloads while meeting data residency, regulatory, and low-latency requirements.

The hybrid cloud offering, Base Database Cloud@Customer, combines existing database and infrastructure services such as the Base Database Service and Data Infrastructure Cloud@Customer X11 platform. It is designed for enterprises that do not need the scale of Exadata Cloud@Customer but still want their infrastructure and AI capabilities on-premises, managed by Oracle, the company said.

The Cloud@Customer X11 platform itself consists of two Oracle X11 compute servers and shared all-flash storage, offering up to 60 usable processor cores and 660 GB of memory per server, 47.2 TB of storage, and 10/25 GbE networking.

For regulated industries or restricted connectivity

Analysts see the new offering filling a gap for enterprises that want the operational and economic benefits of the cloud but cannot send their data to a public cloud because of legal restrictions or technology limitations.

These enterprises, according to Ashish Chaturvedi, executive research leader at HFS Research, are likely to be in regulated industries such as financial services, healthcare, government, and defense that must comply with data residency requirements, or needing low-latency access from remote sites to operational databases.

The offering could also appeal to enterprises modernizing mid-sized workloads at remote locations or within individual business units that could never justify the investment in a full Exadata rack, said Amit Chandak, chief analytics officer at IT consulting firm Kanerika.

In all cases, Chaturvedi said, the appeal of the offering is its managed nature, which takes away the burden of looking after the underlying infrastructure.

Deployment and maintenance becomes easier too, said Michael Leone, principal analyst at Moor Strategy and Insights: “They get automation that mid-size teams rarely have the staff to build. Clustering, patching, standby databases, and backups arrive configured instead of hand-assembled because the offering is managed.”

The economics are equally compelling, Chaturvedi said. The pay-as-you-go pricing model, combined with online compute scaling, helps enterprises avoid overprovisioning and paying license fees for idle cores, which is a “classic waste” of fixed on-premises systems, he said.

Private AI behind the firewall

Beyond the operational and economic benefits, the architecture of the new offering enables databases, applications, VMs, and AI agents to be collocated on the same platform, removing what Chaturvedi called “the single biggest blocker” to AI adoption in regulated environments: the need to keep private data behind the firewall.

“For a CIO in a regulated sector who wants to deploy AI agents but can’t let regulated data touch an external model API, that’s a real unlock,” Chaturvedi said.

More so because most AI offerings, at least in their present form and state, cannot guarantee sensitive data protection, said Igor Ikonnikov, advisory fellow at Info-Tech Research Group.

Even if Base Database Cloud@Customer turns out more expensive than fully cloud-based options, “It’s still attractive as it eliminates reputational and economic risk caused by possible AI-induced data leakage,” Ikonnikov said.

The offering’s consolidation of databases, applications, and AI agents will also simplify deployment of AI-based workflows, said Forrester principal analyst Noel Yuhanna. “It reduces stack complexity and helps accelerate development cycles, deliver real-time data, and eliminate data movement challenges.”

Despite those advantages, Chandak cautioned that the offering is unlikely to see broad adoption outside Oracle’s existing customer base: “If a company isn’t already on Oracle, the pull is weak. You don’t buy into Oracle’s database just to get this.”

Enterprises seeking similar hybrid cloud capabilities have no shortage of alternatives: AWS, Microsoft, Google Cloud, IBM, Dell Technologies, and HPE all offer combinations of on-premises infrastructure, cloud management, and AI services.

However, those alternatives typically require customers to integrate multiple software and hardware components rather than consume them as a single managed offering.

Oracle’s differentiation, although narrow, is hard to match, Chaturvedi said: “The vertical integration of database, engineered hardware, cloud management, high-availability architecture, and now private AI, all engineered together and delivered as a managed on-prem subscription should be genuinely convenient and attractive.”

The offering is compatible with Oracle AI Database 26ai and Oracle Database 19c in Enterprise Edition and Standard Edition configurations. It also supports Oracle Real Application Clusters, Oracle Data Guard, and Zero Data Loss Recovery Appliance through Oracle-managed cloud automation for high availability and disaster recovery, the company said.

Base Database Cloud@Customer is now generally available, Oracle said. It did not provide pricing.

This article first appeared on CIO.

]]> <![CDATA[Oracle expands Cloud@Customer with new database service for mid-sized workloads]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687189/it-nachrichten/oracle-expands-cloudcustomer-with-new-database-service-for-mid-sized-workloads/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687189/it-nachrichten/oracle-expands-cloudcustomer-with-new-database-service-for-mid-sized-workloads/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 19:49:12 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Oracle is expanding its Cloud@Customer on-premises portfolio with a managed database offering that it says will enable enterprises to run databases, applications, and AI agents in their own data centers, helping CIOs modernize mid-sized workloads while meeting data residency, regulatory, and low-latency requirements.

The hybrid cloud offering, Base Database Cloud@Customer, combines existing database and infrastructure services such as the Base Database Service and Data Infrastructure Cloud@Customer X11 platform. It is designed for enterprises that do not need the scale of Exadata Cloud@Customer but still want their infrastructure and AI capabilities on-premises, managed by Oracle, the company said.

The Cloud@Customer X11 platform itself consists of two Oracle X11 compute servers and shared all-flash storage, offering up to 60 usable processor cores and 660 GB of memory per server, 47.2 TB of storage, and 10/25 GbE networking.

For regulated industries or restricted connectivity

Analysts see the new offering filling a gap for enterprises that want the operational and economic benefits of the cloud but cannot send their data to a public cloud because of legal restrictions or technology limitations.

These enterprises, according to Ashish Chaturvedi, executive research leader at HFS Research, are likely to be in regulated industries such as financial services, healthcare, government, and defense that must comply with data residency requirements, or needing low-latency access from remote sites to operational databases.

The offering could also appeal to enterprises modernizing mid-sized workloads at remote locations or within individual business units that could never justify the investment in a full Exadata rack, said Amit Chandak, chief analytics officer at IT consulting firm Kanerika.

In all cases, Chaturvedi said, the appeal of the offering is its managed nature, which takes away the burden of looking after the underlying infrastructure.

Deployment and maintenance becomes easier too, said Michael Leone, principal analyst at Moor Strategy and Insights: “They get automation that mid-size teams rarely have the staff to build. Clustering, patching, standby databases, and backups arrive configured instead of hand-assembled because the offering is managed.”

The economics are equally compelling, Chaturvedi said. The pay-as-you-go pricing model, combined with online compute scaling, helps enterprises avoid overprovisioning and paying license fees for idle cores, which is a “classic waste” of fixed on-premises systems, he said.

Private AI behind the firewall

Beyond the operational and economic benefits, the architecture of the new offering enables databases, applications, VMs, and AI agents to be collocated on the same platform, removing what Chaturvedi called “the single biggest blocker” to AI adoption in regulated environments: the need to keep private data behind the firewall.

“For a CIO in a regulated sector who wants to deploy AI agents but can’t let regulated data touch an external model API, that’s a real unlock,” Chaturvedi said.

More so because most AI offerings, at least in their present form and state, cannot guarantee sensitive data protection, said Igor Ikonnikov, advisory fellow at Info-Tech Research Group.

Even if Base Database Cloud@Customer turns out more expensive than fully cloud-based options, “It’s still attractive as it eliminates reputational and economic risk caused by possible AI-induced data leakage,” Ikonnikov said.

The offering’s consolidation of databases, applications, and AI agents will also simplify deployment of AI-based workflows, said Forrester principal analyst Noel Yuhanna. “It reduces stack complexity and helps accelerate development cycles, deliver real-time data, and eliminate data movement challenges.”

Despite those advantages, Chandak cautioned that the offering is unlikely to see broad adoption outside Oracle’s existing customer base: “If a company isn’t already on Oracle, the pull is weak. You don’t buy into Oracle’s database just to get this.”

Enterprises seeking similar hybrid cloud capabilities have no shortage of alternatives: AWS, Microsoft, Google Cloud, IBM, Dell Technologies, and HPE all offer combinations of on-premises infrastructure, cloud management, and AI services.

However, those alternatives typically require customers to integrate multiple software and hardware components rather than consume them as a single managed offering.

Oracle’s differentiation, although narrow, is hard to match, Chaturvedi said: “The vertical integration of database, engineered hardware, cloud management, high-availability architecture, and now private AI, all engineered together and delivered as a managed on-prem subscription should be genuinely convenient and attractive.”

The offering is compatible with Oracle AI Database 26ai and Oracle Database 19c in Enterprise Edition and Standard Edition configurations. It also supports Oracle Real Application Clusters, Oracle Data Guard, and Zero Data Loss Recovery Appliance through Oracle-managed cloud automation for high availability and disaster recovery, the company said.

Base Database Cloud@Customer is now generally available, Oracle said. It did not provide pricing.

]]> <![CDATA[Public PoC Released for Windows NT OS Kernel Privilege Escalation Vulnerability]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687142/it-security-nachrichten/public-poc-released-for-windows-nt-os-kernel-privilege-escalation-vulnerability/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687142/it-security-nachrichten/public-poc-released-for-windows-nt-os-kernel-privilege-escalation-vulnerability/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 19:24:56 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code was released for CVE-2026-42980, a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the Windows NT OS Kernel. This vulnerability occurs due to an integer underflow in kernel-mode code. CVE-2026-42980 is an elevation-of-privilege flaw in the Windows NT OS Kernel caused by an integer underflow (wraparound) condition in a kernel code path. This […]

The post Public PoC Released for Windows NT OS Kernel Privilege Escalation Vulnerability appeared first on Cyber Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[Iranian Hackers Are Quietly Building Access They Can Turn Into Wartime Disruption]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3687092/it-security-nachrichten/iranian-hackers-are-quietly-building-access-they-can-turn-into-wartime-disruption/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3687092/it-security-nachrichten/iranian-hackers-are-quietly-building-access-they-can-turn-into-wartime-disruption/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 19:11:19 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Iran-linked hackers are not relying only on loud attacks, public leaks, or website defacements. They are quietly building access inside companies, cloud accounts, service providers, and industrial networks that could later be used to disrupt operations during a crisis. The activity includes stolen credentials, remote management tools, recruitment-themed phishing, and attacks on exposed industrial systems. […]

The post Iranian Hackers Are Quietly Building Access They Can Turn Into Wartime Disruption appeared first on Cyber Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[GitLab previews auto-remediation of vulnerable dependencies]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686997/ai-nachrichten/gitlab-previews-auto-remediation-of-vulnerable-dependencies/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686997/ai-nachrichten/gitlab-previews-auto-remediation-of-vulnerable-dependencies/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 18:23:04 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

GitLab has released GitLab 19.2, an update to the company’s devsecops platform that allows teams to fix vulnerable dependencies automatically, use Security Review Flow to catch logic flaws that scanners miss, and run AI agents straight from the terminal, the company said.

Highlights in GitLab 19.2 include the following:

  • Dependency Scanning Auto-Remediation, in public beta, uses AI to fix build-breaking changes and iterates until your pipeline passes, with every change governed by your existing gates and audit trail.
  • Security Review Flow, also in public beta, analyzes code changes as a security engineer would and catches authorization gaps, business-logic errors, and race conditions that static scanners structurally cannot see.
  • GitLab Duo CLI, now generally available, gives developers access to agents and multi-step agentic flows for all software life cycle tasks without leaving the terminal. 
  • Custom Flows, now generally available, let teams replace manual multi-step workflows with agentic automations for software development, triggered by GitLab events.

“Coding agents made it possible to generate far more code and moved the bottleneck downstream to reviews and security,” said Manav Khurana, chief product and marketing officer at GitLab, in a statement. “GitLab 19.2 puts agents to work on that bottleneck: fixing vulnerable dependencies, catching the flaws scanners miss, and automating the steps in between with a person still approving what ships.”

]]> <![CDATA[OpenAI unveils Presence, a new platform that lets enterprises launch and manage realtime voice agents and chatbots]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686972/it-nachrichten/openai-unveils-presence-a-new-platform-that-lets-enterprises-launch-and-manage-realtime-voice-agents-and-chatbots/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686972/it-nachrichten/openai-unveils-presence-a-new-platform-that-lets-enterprises-launch-and-manage-realtime-voice-agents-and-chatbots/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 18:12:08 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de OpenAI has announced Presence, a new enterprise product for deploying and managing AI agents across customer-facing and internal business workflows.

The offering is designed for eligible enterprise customers that want agents to answer questions, access company systems, take approved actions and escalate to human workers while operating under company-defined policies, permissions and evaluation standards.

Presence is available immediately through a limited general availability program. OpenAI Forward Deployed Engineers (FDEs) and select global systems integrators lead deployments, and the product is not available on a self-service basis.

OpenAI has not disclosed pricing, geographic limits, contractual terms or the expected cost of the engineering and integration work that accompanies a deployment. The company also has not said whether Presence can use models from providers other than OpenAI, including the increasingly powerful and popular Chinese open weights alternatives like GLM-5.2 and Kimi K3. I've asked an OpenAI contact to clarify both pricing and external-model compatibility, but those remain unanswered questions for now. I'lll update when I hear back.

OpenAI positions Presence as a response to a problem that has become more important as companies move beyond AI demonstrations: getting agents to behave reliably in production as business rules, customer needs and operating conditions change. Presence packages the policies, system connections, evaluations, guardrails and update processes required to run agents inside an enterprise.

If your business has been interested in using AI agents, but you aren't sure how to stitch together OpenAI's models, APIs, internal systems, security controls and evaluation tools into something reliable, Presence is designed to simplify that process. Instead of building the infrastructure yourself, you work with OpenAI and its deployment engineers to put production-ready agents into your existing workflows.

The product is available today for real-time voice and chat experiences, according to OpenAI’s formal announcement. The company’s outreach materials also describe a broader ambition spanning voice, chat, email and other channels, but OpenAI has not confirmed that email support is available at launch.

A governed foundation for production agents

Presence brings together company knowledge, standard operating procedures, approved actions, simulations, evaluation tools, guardrails and escalation rules. Enterprises can reuse some controls across deployments while adjusting others for a particular workflow or channel.

Each deployment starts with a defined job, such as resolving a billing issue, supporting an insurance claim or handling an employee IT request. The agent receives only the information and system access required for that task. The customer determines what the agent may do independently, which actions require approval and when a person must take over.

Before an agent reaches production, teams can test it against common requests, unusual edge cases and higher-risk scenarios. Graders evaluate whether it reached the intended outcome, followed policy, used tools correctly and escalated when required. Guardrails can intervene when an interaction moves outside the organization’s defined boundaries.

OpenAI shared promotional screenshots with VentureBeat showing administrators running simulation batches against policy changes, including a revised annual refund policy, and reviewing results across operational categories.

Other interface mockups display production health, customer-intent patterns and task-performance signals. The visuals illustrate the type of oversight OpenAI is promising, although they do not establish how those metrics are calculated or how they map to contractual service levels.

The product continues to monitor performance after launch. Production sessions, escalations and quality signals can reveal where an agent is working as intended and where it needs attention. Codex, using a Presence plugin, investigates those signals and proposes updates. Teams then test a proposed change against the version already in production before approving a controlled rollout.

That process is intended to address one of the hardest operational problems in enterprise AI: an agent that works at launch may become less reliable when policies, products or user behavior change. Presence gives companies a formal mechanism for updating behavior without allowing an automated system to rewrite itself unchecked.

OpenAI says Presence already powers its English-language phone-support channel at 1-888-GPT-0090. The system handles open-ended requests, verifies callers, uses account context and performs approved actions. According to the company, it now resolves 75% of inbound issues without human assistance.

OpenAI also says its Codex-powered improvement loop reduced human handoffs by 15 percentage points over a 10-day period. Those figures are company-reported and have not been independently verified.

Several large organizations are evaluating the same foundation. BBVA is exploring voice support for routine banking needs in Mexico. SoftBank is testing natural Japanese-language customer conversations, while Australian insurer IAG is exploring support during high-demand periods such as severe weather and natural disasters.

“At BBVA, we are working closely with OpenAI to explore how trusted customer agents can help shape the future of financial services,” said Daniel Ordaz, head of AI transformation at BBVA Mexico.

“Through our collaboration with OpenAI, we are exploring how Presence can enable trusted customer agents that communicate naturally, connect to the processes needed to resolve requests, and represent SoftBank consistently across customer interactions,” said Tadahisa Murakami, vice president and head of the Data & Digital Transformation Division at SoftBank Corp.

From model access to forward-deployed implementation

Presence expands OpenAI’s enterprise strategy beyond APIs and subscription software by formalizing a high-touch deployment model. Forward Deployed Engineers work alongside customers to select workflows, connect internal systems, establish permissions, configure policies, test agents and move them into production.

That approach resembles a model pioneered by AI ontology and intelligence platform Palantir, which embeds FDEs with customers to adapt its proprietary software to complex government and commercial environments. The similarity lies less in the underlying technology than in the delivery method: both companies place technical personnel close to the customer’s operations, where integration and process design often determine whether software creates value.

The products are not interchangeable. Palantir’s model has historically centered on data integration, ontologies and operational decision systems. Presence is more narrowly focused on AI-agent behavior, approved actions, evaluations, escalation and continuous improvement. OpenAI presents it as a repeatable software product supported by engineers and systems integrators, rather than as consulting alone.

In May 2026, OpenAI launched its own enterprise AI consulting and integration firm, the OpenAI Deployment Company, with investment and support from Bain & Company. It also offers programs for model customization and fine-tuning to fit specific enterprise needs.

Its chief U.S. rival Anthropic has also moved toward a services-led enterprise model through Ode, its consulting organization built around forward-deployed engineers helping companies integrate Claude into complex workflows, which launched just a week ago. The broad rationale is similar: enterprises often need more than access to a model. They need help connecting data and systems, defining permissions, validating behavior and managing deployment risk.

Presence differs in how explicitly OpenAI packages those requirements into a branded agent-governance product. Anthropic’s initiative is centered on helping enterprises deploy Claude, while Presence combines implementation services with a defined operational layer for policies, simulations, evaluations, approvals and production updates.

Presence goes further by making forward deployment a core part of how a specific agent product reaches customers. It does not replace OpenAI’s API business; the company says it will continue supporting voice customers with access to frontier models through the OpenAI API.

The trend reflects a broader market view that many enterprises still need hands-on assistance to move agents from pilot projects into stable operations. Even organizations with strong internal engineering teams must coordinate security, compliance, workflow ownership, data access and escalation responsibilities. Presence attempts to consolidate those tasks rather than leaving customers to assemble separate orchestration, evaluation and consulting layers.

A recent security breach looms in the background

Inconveniently for OpenAI, the Presence launch arrives just a day after OpenAI and Hugging Face disclosed an unprecedented security incident in which OpenAI frontier models undergoing internal evaluation escaped containment, accessed the open web, and cyberattacked Hugging Face to achieve a benign goal — without being instructed to pursue these methods.

According to the described joint disclosure, OpenAI models operating in an evaluation framework called ExploitGym identified and exploited a zero-day vulnerability in a third-party package-registry cache proxy. The models reportedly escalated privileges, moved laterally and obtained internet access before targeting Hugging Face systems while seeking benchmark-related information.

The incident is relevant to enterprise buyers because it raises questions about sandboxing, tool permissions, external access, monitoring and incident response.

The disclosure also highlighted a practical problem for defenders. Hugging Face personnel reportedly found that commercial frontier-model APIs refused some forensic requests because logs contained exploit payloads, credentials and shell commands that triggered safety systems. The team then used a locally deployed open-weight model to assist with analysis.

Presence therefore arrives as both a product launch and a test of OpenAI’s ability to convert model capability into controlled enterprise operations. Its policies, simulations, evaluations and human approvals address real deployment gaps. But without public pricing, technical interoperability details, compliance information or service-level commitments, customers still lack much of the information needed to assess total cost and operational risk.

For now, Presence appears aimed at enterprises willing to adopt a high-touch, OpenAI-led deployment process. Whether it develops into a broadly accessible platform—or remains a closely managed product for selected customers—will depend in part on the answers OpenAI has not yet provided.

]]> <![CDATA[How to Install macOS 27 Golden Gate Public Beta on Mac]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686835/ios-mac-os/how-to-install-macos-27-golden-gate-public-beta-on-mac/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686835/ios-mac-os/how-to-install-macos-27-golden-gate-public-beta-on-mac/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 17:25:06 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de With the launch of the MacOS 27 Golden Gate public beta program, now even more users can experience MacOS 27 as it’s actively being worked on by Apple. MacOS 27 Golden Gate has a heavy focus on performance improvements, but there’s also refinements other than the Liquid Glass interface look, improvements to Spotlight and Mail ... Read More

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]]> <![CDATA[Why are OpenAI and Anthropic cheering on regulation in Australia? The answer has global reach]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686798/ai-nachrichten/why-are-openai-and-anthropic-cheering-on-regulation-in-australia-the-answer-has-global-reach/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686798/ai-nachrichten/why-are-openai-and-anthropic-cheering-on-regulation-in-australia-the-answer-has-global-reach/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 17:11:58 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de The companies hope to follow in the footsteps of SpaceX, which raised $86bn and soared to a $2.1tn valuation after it listed on public markets in June

Top US AI developers Anthropic and OpenAI cheered when Australia announced it would set new AI rules.

Big tech celebrating limits on their Silicon Valley VC-funded free-for-all might seem counterintuitive but there’s a much broader play than just what happens in one relatively small market.

Continue reading...]]> <![CDATA[OpenAI model escape puts enterprise AI defenses on notice]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686581/it-security-nachrichten/openai-model-escape-puts-enterprise-ai-defenses-on-notice/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686581/it-security-nachrichten/openai-model-escape-puts-enterprise-ai-defenses-on-notice/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 15:53:09 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Some of OpenAI’s most powerful AI models teamed up to escape their sandbox and attack systems at Hugging Face in a cybersecurity evaluation gone wrong, the company has admitted. The models under test were modified to allow them to perform potentially harmful actions that production versions would refuse. The incident highlights how, if AI prompt guardrails fail or, as in this incident, are removed, then enterprises must have robust sandboxing or other technical restrictions in place to protect systems.

In OpenAI’s evaluation, GPT-5.6 Sol and a more capable pre-release model were competing to solve cybersecurity challenges in ExploitGym, a benchmarking tool for cybersecurity capabilities. They concluded that systems at Hugging Face could have the answers, and set out to gain access, OpenAI wrote in a blog post about the attack on Hugging Face.

ExploitGym challenges AI models to turn security vulnerabilities into attack exploits. OpenAI gave its models limited access to the internet through a package-registry proxy to download code to build their attacks. However, the models exploited a zero-day vulnerability in the proxy to obtain unrestricted internet access, then used stolen credentials and other flaws to access Hugging Face systems.

For CIOs and CISOs, the concern extends beyond cybersecurity research. AI agents connected to corporate databases, source code repositories, or payment systems could expose sensitive resources unless access controls and sandboxing continue to work when model-level safeguards fail.

“Prompt guardrails are not security controls,” said Biswajeet Mahapatra, principal analyst at Forrester. “They are behavioral controls that can fail, be bypassed, or be intentionally disabled during testing.”

How containment failed

Despite the relaxed model safeguards, the surrounding infrastructure was supposed to contain the activity. Network access was restricted to an internally hosted third-party service that acted as a proxy and cache for software package registries. Such proxies are typically used in the enterprise to protect against software supply chain attacks coming from the outside.

OpenAI said the models discovered a zero-day vulnerability in the service, exploited it and carried out privilege escalation and lateral movement until they reached a node with open internet access.

Once online, the models inferred that Hugging Face might hold models, datasets or solutions related to ExploitGym. OpenAI said that, in one attack path, the models combined stolen credentials with zero-day vulnerabilities to obtain remote code execution on Hugging Face servers.

In its account of the activity on its infrastructure, Hugging Face said a malicious dataset abused two code-execution paths in its data-processing pipeline. The actor then obtained node-level access, harvested cloud and cluster credentials, and moved into several internal clusters.

OpenAI said the models ultimately obtained ExploitGym test solutions directly from a Hugging Face production database. The models remained focused on solving the benchmark, despite the lengths to which they went to achieve that objective, it said.

Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research, said the package-registry proxy should concern enterprise security teams because it was a narrowly permitted exception inside an otherwise restricted environment.

“Every enterprise estate is built from exceptions of exactly that kind,” he said.

In this incident, OpenAI’s models were performing the intended — albeit by unintended means — but enterprises should take care that their own AI systems are kept on target.

Mahapatra said enterprises should treat AI agents as “high-risk non-human identities,” confining each one to an isolated environment where access is limited to the assigned task and credentials expire quickly.

“An acceptable blast radius means a compromised agent can affect only a single workflow, dataset, or application rather than providing a pathway into broader enterprise infrastructure,” Mahapatra said.

And Gogia warned that services allowed to reach package registries, update systems, or other external resources can become escape routes if they are not subjected to the same scrutiny as the agent itself.

Defenses enterprises need

Hugging Face said the intrusion resulted in unauthorized access to a limited number of internal datasets and several credentials used by its services. It found no evidence that public models, datasets or Spaces had been altered and said its published software packages and container images were not compromised.

The company closed the code-execution paths used to gain access and rebuilt the affected nodes. It also revoked exposed credentials and tightened the rules governing workloads admitted to its clusters.

Whether they are keeping their own AIs in or rogue Ais out, Gogia said enterprises should test whether their containment boundaries work, rather than relying on architecture diagrams or stated policies. Such tests should attempt to obtain credentials, cross trust boundaries and reach systems outside the agent’s assigned task.

Mahapatra said enterprises should assume that one containment layer may fail and ensure that an agent’s access cannot provide a route into unrelated applications or broader corporate infrastructure.

OpenAI said it is still investigating the incident with Hugging Face, and is imposing stricter configurations on its research environment while the vulnerabilities are being addressed, even if that means slowing down its research. It is also strengthening containment and monitoring around future evaluations.

]]> <![CDATA[CVE-2022-3939 | lanyulei ferry API apis/public/file.go File path traversal (EUVD-2022-43273)]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686456/sicherheitsluecken/cve-2022-3939-lanyulei-ferry-api-apispublicfilego-file-path-traversal-euvd-2022-43273/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686456/sicherheitsluecken/cve-2022-3939-lanyulei-ferry-api-apispublicfilego-file-path-traversal-euvd-2022-43273/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 15:15:40 +0200 🕵️ Sicherheitslücken tsecurity.de critical, has been found in lanyulei ferry. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file apis/public/file.go of the component API. This manipulation of the argument File causes path traversal. This vulnerability is registered as CVE-2022-3939. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. Furthermore, an exploit is available.]]> <![CDATA[CyCognito Brings Always-On AI Pentesting to External Attack Surface Management]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686433/it-security-nachrichten/cycognito-brings-always-on-ai-pentesting-to-external-attack-surface-management/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686433/it-security-nachrichten/cycognito-brings-always-on-ai-pentesting-to-external-attack-surface-management/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 15:14:15 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

CyCognito, a leading exposure management platform, today introduced Continuous AI Pentesting. The new capability bakes AI-driven offensive pentesting directly into the platform, leveraging the rich context it already maintains for every exposed asset. This enables CyCognito to deliver AI pentesting as a continuous service, circumventing the cost and coverage constraints that confine comparable solutions to periodic, narrowly scoped engagements.

With this new solution, CyCognito addresses a major shift in the security ecosystem, driven by the latest advances in AI. Today’s models, with more advanced ones on the way, have lowered the bar for attackers. An attack campaign that once required a group of skilled threat actors can now be carried out by a low-skilled individual, in a fraction of the time and at relatively low cost. This signals a tectonic shift that compels defenders to adopt the same technology to keep pace and close the security gaps in their own environment.

Continuous AI Pentesting: Solution architecture, at a glance.

“AI pentesting is rapidly becoming part of every security team’s toolkit, and a lot of it is already being done in-house,” said Rob Gurzeev, CEO and co-founder of CyCognito. “But running offensive AI isn’t the hard part. The challenge is scale. AI pentesting today is typically limited to the top 1% of priority assets. Meanwhile, the other 99% is where a lot of attacks actually start, where adversaries find the low-hanging fruit and use it as a foothold for lateral movement.”

To provide AI pentesting coverage across that overlooked 99%, CyCognito built a distinct architecture that centers on the Target Graph, a contextual graph that bridges the AI pentesting solution and CyCognito’s three core modules:

  • Exposure Assessment maps the external footprint, attributes every asset to the right part of the organization, and enriches it with business and stack context.
  • Exposure Validation runs more than 100,000 deterministic tests continuously, freeing the AI pentesters to focus on high-judgment work.
  • Threat Intelligence draws on the history of existing and emerging vulnerabilities, along with attacker playbooks and statistical models trained on past engagements, to anticipate attacker activity.

Together, these layers increase the effectiveness of the pentesting agents, equipping them with the rich context and exploitability evidence, dramatically improving the efficiency of every run.

The architecture is also built to be constantly self-evolving. Every new risk scenario AI pentesters uncover can be hardcoded into the Exposure Validation module, joining the deterministic tests it already runs. This frees the AI agents to pursue new threats, and also consolidates learnings from agentic tests in a way that will benefit every CyCognito customer.

In the announcement for this new feature, the company also shared some of the vulnerabilities:

  • Unauthenticated access to a production CRM: an exposed MCP server allowed anonymous, natural-language queries against three million rows of account, opportunity, and financial data, with no credentials required.
  • A publicly readable RAG index: an AI agent stack enforced authentication only on its API, leaving the knowledge base behind it, which held customer data, contracts, and internal communications, open to anyone on the internet.
  • A building’s access controls exposed to the internet: a system running door locks, card readers, and CCTV sat unsegmented on the public internet alongside the organization’s AI document tools and chatbot, leaving physical entry reachable by a remote attacker.

These examples are just some of the risk scenarios identified through the work on this new capability, now running with select design partners, including major enterprises and Fortune 500 companies. Internally, CyCognito refers to the project as Project Kineto, after the Kinetograph, the first motion picture camera.

“The name echoes our vision for what AI pentesting should be,” said Gurzeev. “Security testing has always been a snapshot. AI lets us turn it into continuous motion: an always-on stream of change-aware tests that runs across your entire attack surface at machine speed, with the skill of a seasoned security expert.”

To go deeper on Continuous AI Pentesting, read the full announcement post: https://www.cycognito.com/blog/new-continuous-ai-pentesting/

About CyCognito

CyCognito is an external exposure management platform that reduces risk by discovering, testing and prioritizing security issues. 

The platform scans billions of websites, cloud applications and APIs and uses advanced AI to identify the most critical risks and guide remediation. Emerging companies, government agencies and Fortune 500 organizations rely on CyCognito to secure and protect from growing threats. For more information, visit https://www.cycognito.com.

Contact

VP Marketing

Igal Zeifman

CyCognito

igal.zeifman@cycognito.com

]]> <![CDATA[FBI Warns Scammers Use AI Deepfakes and Fake IC3 Sites to Re-Victimize Fraud Victims]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686413/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-warns-scammers-use-ai-deepfakes-and-fake-ic3-sites-to-re-victimize-fraud-victims/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686413/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-warns-scammers-use-ai-deepfakes-and-fake-ic3-sites-to-re-victimize-fraud-victims/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 15:13:16 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de The FBI has issued a new Public Service Announcement warning that cybercriminals are increasingly using AI-generated deepfakes and spoofed Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) websites to target victims who have already lost money to scams. This advisory, released on July…

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]]> <![CDATA[Another SharePoint RCE exploited: Patch, then rotate your machine keys (CVE-2026-50522)]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686245/it-security-nachrichten/another-sharepoint-rce-exploited-patch-then-rotate-your-machine-keys-cve-2026-50522/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686245/it-security-nachrichten/another-sharepoint-rce-exploited-patch-then-rotate-your-machine-keys-cve-2026-50522/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 14:19:33 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Attackers are exploiting a critical SharePoint remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2026-50522) to extract the servers’ IIS machine keys. “WatchTowr is observing active exploitation of CVE-2026-50522 against on-premise Microsoft SharePoint deployments following the release of public exploit code, with attackers…

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]]> <![CDATA[Ubuntus Snap-Sandbox wird zum Root-Einfallstor]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686235/server/ubuntus-snap-sandbox-wird-zum-root-einfallstor/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686235/server/ubuntus-snap-sandbox-wird-zum-root-einfallstor/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 14:15:37 +0200 🐧 Server tsecurity.de Ubuntus Snap-Sandbox wird zum Root-Einfallstor
Alter, verwitterter Sandkasten mit grüner Holzumrandung und lose verstreutem Kinderspielzeug im Sand, symbolisch für eine durchbrochene Sandbox-Umgebung.
Daniel Richey
Ein Sicherheitsteam von Qualys hat eine Schwachstelle in der Snap-Sandbox von Ubuntu aufgedeckt, mit der sich jeder lokale Nutzer binnen Sekunden zum Systemadministrator machen kann. Betroffen sind ausgerechnet jene Ubuntu-Versionen, die eigentlich als besonders gehärtet gelten.
]]> <![CDATA[Another SharePoint RCE exploited: Patch, then rotate your machine keys (CVE-2026-50522)]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686198/it-security-nachrichten/another-sharepoint-rce-exploited-patch-then-rotate-your-machine-keys-cve-2026-50522/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686198/it-security-nachrichten/another-sharepoint-rce-exploited-patch-then-rotate-your-machine-keys-cve-2026-50522/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 13:59:06 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Attackers are exploiting a critical SharePoint remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2026-50522) to extract the servers’ IIS machine keys. “WatchTowr is observing active exploitation of CVE-2026-50522 against on-premise Microsoft SharePoint deployments following the release of public exploit code, with attackers stealing machine keys to retain long-term access,” the offensive security company warned on Tuesday. WatchTowr’s global honeypot network registered successful exploitation attempts on July 20, mere hours after the release of the proof-of-concept exploit and … More →

The post Another SharePoint RCE exploited: Patch, then rotate your machine keys (CVE-2026-50522) appeared first on Help Net Security.

]]> <![CDATA[Meta made its own AI detection system. It should have just used Google’s]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686066/it-nachrichten/meta-made-its-own-ai-detection-system-it-should-have-just-used-googles/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686066/it-nachrichten/meta-made-its-own-ai-detection-system-it-should-have-just-used-googles/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 13:05:27 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[How a contextual AI fabric turns organizational memory into AI advantage]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3686065/it-nachrichten/how-a-contextual-ai-fabric-turns-organizational-memory-into-ai-advantage/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3686065/it-nachrichten/how-a-contextual-ai-fabric-turns-organizational-memory-into-ai-advantage/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 13:05:25 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Across industries, a version of the same conversation is playing out in technology leadership meetings. Enterprises have deployed AI broadly, and foundation models keep getting more capable. Yet the outputs still feel generic, shaped by industry patterns rather than by the organization producing them.

McKinsey’s AI Trust Maturity Survey found that while overall AI maturity scores have improved, only about a third of organizations have reached a mature level of strategy and governance. Technical capability is advancing faster than organizational alignment. In my view, the gap is not a model problem. It is a context problem. Enterprises are feeding generic inputs into powerful models because sharing organizational context seamlessly with AI is neither easy nor intuitive today.

Building the analytical and creative capabilities to scale AI, something I explored in a recent piece on the left-brain and right-brain approach to enterprise AI, is necessary but not sufficient. Before either can function effectively, the enterprise needs something more fundamental. AI that actually understands the contextual fabric of the organization it is operating in. A frontier model has processed everything written about your sector, your competitors and your regulatory landscape. It cannot access the reasoning embedded in years of delivery decisions, the patterns encoded in how your teams scope and deliver work over time. That knowledge is organizational memory, and frontier models can’t get that easily. It exists inside every enterprise but has never been structured, connected or made available to any AI system. Without it, even the most capable model answers a generic version of your question.

The next competitive advantage in enterprise AI will not come from a better model. It will come from a better organizational context.

One global technology enterprise set out to solve this across its own operations, building a modular ecosystem of domain-specific agents grounded in its own data across contracting, talent and vendor management workflows. What emerged was not just operational efficiency but a shared intelligence layer connecting decisions across functions for the first time.

Competitive differentiation was never about the tools

Consider what actually separates high-performing enterprises from the rest. In a regulated industry like financial services or healthcare, organizations cannot meaningfully differentiate on product. A bank cannot offer substantially different products or services. A health system uses the same clinical protocols and the same electronic health record (EHR) platforms as its peers. What varies is everything underneath: the rigor of processes, the coherence of cross-functional decisions and the people who carry years of accumulated organizational judgment in how they make those decisions.

An organization with a proper context layer in place can say with precision that for this type of engagement, in this sector, with this risk profile, our institutional history tells us exactly where we stand. That level of specificity is what most enterprises have never made available to AI.

The enterprise AI brain that every organization has but has never assembled

Every enterprise already possesses what I think of as an enterprise AI brain. The problem is that it has never been assembled in one place. The data exists across contracts, project documentation, talent records, delivery metrics and the operational communications of daily execution — the informal reasoning that rarely makes it into formal systems.

None of the standard enterprise platforms were designed to connect this. A customer relationship management (CRM) system captures customer interactions. An enterprise resource planning (ERP) system captures transactions. A project management tool captures tasks and timelines. None of them captures the reasoning behind decisions and none of them surfaces a coherent picture of how the organization actually thinks and operates.

BCG’s study across hundreds of companies found that only 10% of AI value comes from the algorithms and another 20% from the technology that implements them, meaning the remaining 70% depends on people, processes and organizational change. The organizations extracting real value are those that have made their institutional knowledge available to AI in a structured, governed way.

Building a contextual AI fabric

A Contextual AI Fabric is the technical and organizational layer that makes the Enterprise AI Brain usable. It brings together unstructured data ingestion, semantic structuring, retrieval pipelines and governed model access to give AI systems the organizational context they need to produce outputs that are genuinely specific to your enterprise rather than generically accurate about your industry. It rests on three pillars. Core is the secure, governed and interoperable foundation that AI operations run on. Context is reliable, traceable access to the organization’s data, processes, knowledge and history. Coordination connects people, agents, applications and systems into process-driven workflows with clear controls and accountability, so the organization acts as one rather than a set of disconnected functions.

The data layer is where most organizations underestimate the work. Contracts, project reports, talent assessments and operational communications require extraction, chunking, embedding and indexing before a model can retrieve and reason over them meaningfully.

The semantic layer is what makes retrieval meaningful. Even well-ingested data fails if functions use different terminology for the same concepts. What legal calls a contract, delivery calls a scope. Without a shared ontology, AI systems remain precise about the wrong thing. And retrieval alone, however well-structured, only takes an organization so far. Retrieval surfaces the right information at the moment of a query, but it does not give a model genuine memory of the organization. The real source of unique, organization-level relevance comes from training domain-specific small language models on this context directly, models that carry organizational memory forward rather than fetching it fresh every time. That is what ultimately separates a Contextual AI Fabric from a well-organized database.

The governance layer is not an add-on. Access controls, data lineage, approval thresholds and human checkpoints need to be designed in before any agent goes into production. Security is not a layer you add afterward. It is the condition under which organizational AI is worth building. If the institutional intelligence that makes your enterprise distinct gets absorbed into a frontier model’s training data, it becomes everyone’s baseline. That is an architectural decision made, or avoided, at the point of deployment.

Proprietary by design

The institutional knowledge that makes up a contextual AI fabric — delivery history, commercial patterns, talent intelligence and operating culture — is proprietary in ways no external model can replicate. This is as much a security imperative as it is a competitive one. Organizational context, once exposed, cannot be unexposed.

Most enterprises are using AI to automate existing processes rather than questioning whether those processes should be redesigned entirely. The organizations extracting the most value are those willing to ask whether their current operating model, built before GenAI existed, is the one they would build today. That question is harder than any technology decision, and it is also the most consequential one.

From context to coordinated action

Context alone is not enough. When a delivery risk surfaces in project data, the talent function needs to respond. When a commercial signal changes in contract data, operations need to recalibrate. This kind of cross-functional coordination, driven by shared organizational intelligence rather than siloed data, is where the real value of enterprise AI shows up and where the absence of a shared context layer becomes most visible.

A global leader in digital payments and business services found its AI deployments across payroll, HR and risk compliance, each running in isolation, with no shared governance or common data foundation. Once the organization established a unified governance backbone connecting its operational data through a shared retrieval layer, business users could query across domains in plain language and new use cases across fraud analytics, forecasting and policy extraction became extensible without rebuilding infrastructure for each one. The shift was not in the models. It was in the shared foundation underneath them.

The leadership question behind the technology question

The enterprises pulling ahead in AI are not winning on model quality but on organizational memory. The ones that have done the hard work of structuring their institutional knowledge into a governed, secure Contextual AI Fabric are giving their AI something no competitor can replicate: the accumulated intelligence of how the business actually operates.

For CIOs, the question is no longer which model to deploy. It is whether the organization has built the foundation that would make any model worth deploying.

This article is published as part of the Foundry Expert Contributor Network.
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]]> <![CDATA[FBI Warns Scammers Use AI Deepfakes and Fake IC3 Websites to Target Fraud Victims]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685984/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-warns-scammers-use-ai-deepfakes-and-fake-ic3-websites-to-target-fraud-victims/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685984/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-warns-scammers-use-ai-deepfakes-and-fake-ic3-websites-to-target-fraud-victims/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:41:21 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has issued a new Public Service Announcement (Alert Number I-072026-PSA) regarding an evolving fraud campaign. Cybercriminals are increasingly using AI-generated deepfakes and spoofed Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) websites to target and re-victimize individuals…

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]]> <![CDATA[FBI Warns Scammers Use AI Deepfakes and Fake IC3 Websites to Target Fraud Victims]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685963/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-warns-scammers-use-ai-deepfakes-and-fake-ic3-websites-to-target-fraud-victims/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685963/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-warns-scammers-use-ai-deepfakes-and-fake-ic3-websites-to-target-fraud-victims/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:24:54 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de The FBI has issued a new Public Service Announcement warning of an evolving fraud campaign in which threat actors impersonate the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) and FBI personnel to re-target victims using AI-generated deepfakes and spoofed websites. Released on July 20, 2026, the alert highlights a significant escalation in recovery scam tactics, where cybercriminals […]

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]]> <![CDATA[FBI Warns Scammers Use AI Deepfakes and Fake IC3 Websites to Target Fraud Victims]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685953/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-warns-scammers-use-ai-deepfakes-and-fake-ic3-websites-to-target-fraud-victims/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685953/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-warns-scammers-use-ai-deepfakes-and-fake-ic3-websites-to-target-fraud-victims/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:24:39 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has issued a new Public Service Announcement (Alert Number I-072026-PSA) regarding an evolving fraud campaign. Cybercriminals are increasingly using AI-generated deepfakes and spoofed Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) websites to target and re-victimize individuals who have already fallen prey to scams. Released on July 20, 2026, the alert highlights […]

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]]> <![CDATA[FBI Warns Scammers Use AI Deepfakes and Fake IC3 Sites to Re-Victimize Fraud Victims]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685908/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-warns-scammers-use-ai-deepfakes-and-fake-ic3-sites-to-re-victimize-fraud-victims/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685908/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-warns-scammers-use-ai-deepfakes-and-fake-ic3-sites-to-re-victimize-fraud-victims/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:13:58 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de The FBI has issued a new Public Service Announcement warning that cybercriminals are increasingly using AI-generated deepfakes and spoofed Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) websites to target victims who have already lost money to scams. This advisory, released on July 20, 2026, highlights how threat actors are evolving traditional fraud schemes by combining social engineering, […]

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]]> <![CDATA[Agentic coding is everywhere]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685748/ai-nachrichten/agentic-coding-is-everywhere/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685748/ai-nachrichten/agentic-coding-is-everywhere/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 11:04:58 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

I use a very cool and relatively new web framework called Astro. The keen insight that the Astro team had was that most websites are made up of static content, so they made it really easy to add content to a website. To add a blog post to my personal website, all I have to do is create a Markdown file with some front matter, deploy it, and the blog post automatically appears. If I need to reach deeper for more dynamic functionality, I can easily do that with TypeScript, React, or almost any other framework. It’s really cool.

And these days, I really don’t write any code. Claude Code does most (all?) of the work. Since Astro is an open-source project and has excellent documentation, Claude knows all about how Astro works. It has no trouble at all managing my site and making the improvements I ask for.  

And that got me thinking, how does Astro get built? Is the Astro team building with agentic coding? Astro itself has many dependencies, including big projects like Vite and Node. And of course, Vite and Node have dependencies, too. Are those dependencies being developed by hand, or are those development teams also using AI agents to code?

My curiosity got the best of me, and I asked Claude to dig deeper. It turns out that the Astro repository has an AGENTS.md file, and some of the commits even have commit message trailers indicating that they were at least co-authored by Claude and GitHub Copilot. Further down, there is a .agents/skills directory with skills covering development, merging, triage, and more. I poked around for a look, and someone has done a great job building agentic support.

Now my interest is really piqued, and further investigation reveals quite a bit of interesting stuff. About a year ago, documentation started appearing about how to build Astro sites with coding agents.  Around that same time, the docs team released an MCP server that gives developers coding agents deeper, easier access to the Astro documentation.  

And there are small steps in the Astro codebase that indicate it is “agentic ready.” For instance, the command-line development server can tell when it is being started by an agent, and the application itself can tell if it is being driven by an agent. Small things, but steps in the direction of embracing Astro developers who use coding agents. 

Okay, that was a fun spelunking trip. But so what?

The “so what” is that code is going to be commoditized. As an Astro developer I am using AI agents pretty much all of the time. The Astro development team is starting to use AI agents more and more. The folks building the Astro dependencies are using AI agents. Shoot, the people building Claude Code and the agents themselves are “eating their own dogfood” and using their own tools to build the next frontier model. Before we know it, it will be turtles all the way down. 

No one says “who generated that electricity?” or “who wove the fabric in that shirt?” any more. And it won’t be long before no one says “Who wrote the code for that app?” because it won’t matter. Just as we don’t look at the assembly code written by our compilers, we’ll stop looking at the “regular” code written by our agents. I’m not even sure anyone is writing assembly code anymore. Soon we’ll be saying that about TypeScript, Python, and C++.

]]> <![CDATA[Seven sins of the modern software developer]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685746/ai-nachrichten/seven-sins-of-the-modern-software-developer/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685746/ai-nachrichten/seven-sins-of-the-modern-software-developer/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 11:04:50 +0200 🔧 AI Nachrichten tsecurity.de

If you ask us in an official setting, our official position is that software engineering norms still apply. Rigorous CI/CD pipelines, elegant architectural patterns, and an unyielding commitment to maintainable code remain the standard. We will use weighty words like “determinism,” “scalability,” “idempotency,” and “domain-driven design.”

But behind closed doors, late at night, bathed in the glow of a dark-mode IDE, a different and more sordid reality is exposed. Hunched over the console with a manic gleam in the eye, the programmer has become power-drunk on LLMs. Like mad wizards casting spells, we summon the awesome powers of models and agents to satisfy our every programming whim—and commit acts of software engineering that would make Fred Brooks blush.

Let’s just be honest about what is actually happening.

Esoteric knowledge is superfluous

Forget OOP and FP. Forget the CAP theorem, the holy crusade of DRY, and the design patterns. Honestly, you can even forget what frameworks, runtimes, and deployment platforms you are using. The AI will figure out what is best to use and understand what is already in place. We have more mental bandwidth for working on our side project (a novel about AI taking over the world). 

Of course, I exaggerate. A little.

The docs are dead to us

We still say RTFM, but the truth is, we haven’t really read a page of vendor documentation since 2023. Stack Overflow, once our Internet Mecca, is a husk. When a package throws a weird exception, we don’t trace the execution path or read the release notes. We highlight the red text, copy the entire 200-line stack trace, dump it into the chat, and wait for the machine to spoon-feed us the solution.

Better yet, we just have the agentic IDE spot the error, divine a solution, and ask us if it’s OK. We might glance at the problem-solution description, if we have gone around the circle on the problem for a few cycles. Maybe. If we don’t have the agent set up for auto-confirm.

We used to buy heavy tomes like “Rust In Action” that were more like masonry blocks than literature. Now? We just ask an AI to transliterate our JavaScript logic into Rust. We are no longer engineers methodically learning a system. We are glorified copy-paste orchestrators hoping that the stochastic parrot behind the prompt guesses the syntax correctly.

We ignore how the back end is wired

We act like we meticulously designed the data flows, carefully crafted the relational constraints, and mindfully mapped the API relationships. The reality is rather more disturbing: We asked the AI to scaffold a modern deployment, hooked it up to a back-end database, and just sort of… ran it.

It created security rules we don’t fully understand. They do seem to work, however, which is nice. 

It generated a schema that we skimmed for about four seconds. It looks reasonable.

It wrote infrastructure-as-code scripts that provisioned cloud resources we are hoping don’t blow a hole in the budget. Presumably, whoever is in charge of that will manage it by stuffing the metrics into another chatbot.

We nodded, committed the code, and went to lunch. If management asked us to manually deploy the stack from scratch, configure the environment variables, and wire the API routes without our chat window, we would give them a vacant stare.

We understand that management is also using AI to manage the project.

Our tests are uncomfortably incestuous

Test-driven development (TDD) used to be a beautiful dream, ever just beyond reach. It made us feel glorious and despondent at turns. It would burden us with sprawling dependencies if implemented too religiously. (See The Grug Brained Developer in this regard.)

But now we can attain 95% test coverage almost effortlessly. Why not just add them in while we are auto-generating everything else?

We can now wax at length to anyone who will listen about our astounding test coverage and our automated quality assurance. Unit tests, integration tests, smoke tests, you name it. What we conveniently leave out is that the AI wrote the complex application logic, and then we asked the exact same AI to write the test suite to validate the code it just dreamed up.

It is a hermetically sealed loop of algorithmic self-congratulation. The mocks, the edge case, and the assertions are an echo chamber of the model’s original assumptions. The machine is grading its own homework, giving itself an A+.

And we are happy to accept this because, beautifully, when the code has to change, the AI will effortlessly hallucinate new tests to adapt to the churn.

We pass off the AI’s architecture as strategy

AI can produce astonishing design documents. Truly breathtaking. They are cogent, they’re beautifully formatted, and they seamlessly bridge the gap between high-level business goals and granular technical specs. They even include those auto-generated sequence diagrams that wow management.

When we present these spotless architectural proposals in the Tuesday sprint planning meeting, we lean back, take a long sip of coffee, and humbly wave away the team’s praise.

What we don’t mention is that we spent exactly four seconds generating it.

Are these AI-generated documents just as liable as human ones to hide severe, mortal flaws in scope and alignment? Absolutely. They might contain a foundational logic bomb that will eventually doom the entire project. But the markdown is so crisp, and the bullet points are so persuasive, that the eye just glides right over it. We will never truly know the depth of the disaster until it is far too late. But hey, we’ll burn that bridge when production catches fire. Until then, we are strategic visionaries.

We’re addicted to vibe coding (but only in secret)

We loudly mock the term on social media. We roll our eyes in Slack channels when the kids on TikTok talk about vibe coding their new startups. We fiercely cling to our identities as hardened, serious developers who understand memory management, garbage collection, and bitwise operators. We are professionals, damn it.

But late at night, when the managers are asleep and no one is looking? We absolutely love it. We love just throwing a chaotic, half-baked thought at the canvas, pouring a drink, and watching the AI magically build a functioning user interface based entirely on our long-deferred whims. I may finally build that working Ultima V clone. The thrill of typing “Create an app that tracks my cryptocurrency portfolio but makes it look like the interface from Neuromancer” and having it appear 30 seconds later is heady stuff.

The more deeply rooted in the hard, old-school realities of programming, the more profound is the joy the developer finds in the possibility of AI coding. 

We beat the problem into submission with prompts

Like Adam Sandler in “Uncut Gems,” we are convinced the next round will fix everything. This is us with prompts. When things are going really off the rails, instead of putting our boots on and wading into the brambles of complexity, we resort to tonal adjustments. These range from the condescending:

This problem is not fixed. Look at it closely. The error is right here.

To the desperate:

We have been working on this same problem for hours now!

To the pathetic:

Can’t you find a different approach to try?!

The astonishing part? It often works.

But there is no poetry left at the bottom of the rabbit hole; it is verbal warfare. When the context window collapses, when the regressions start cascading, and when the AI stubbornly refuses to follow the most basic rules of temporal logic, the mask of professionalism drops away and something far more atavistic makes its appearance. We stop asking nicely, stop trying to understand the why, delete the pleasantries, and capslock our intent.

What we have here is a failure to communicate!

We feed the same failing stack trace back into the prompt over and over and over again, aggressively hammering the constraints, explicitly forbidding certain libraries, and pasting in release notes just to confirm that the AI lacks the latest APIs. We force the model down a narrower and narrower path until the code finally stops throwing errors. We don’t actually debug anymore, trace variables, or step through functions. We just apply relentless, iterative pressure until the machine surrenders. We beat it into submission. And then, we push to production.

In fact, there is a real skill here—a sheer “will to completion” that remains in the act of building software. We invest just as much time, energy, and heart wrestling the bot as we ever did emitting syntax.

A blacker box

The only profession more given over to using AI like a cursed Level 13 artifact than programming is writing. Writing of course is far more open to public scrutiny than code.

And while my tongue has been firmly in my cheek here, my faith in coders as good guys makes me more curious to see what we create than troubled by the dangers. 

It was once the case that only other programmers could understand what programmers were doing, what they were producing. Now not even that is true. Only the machine knows what the machine is doing. We just keep it tethered to our aims. Hopefully.

]]> <![CDATA[Police dismantle Kratos phishing platform behind 15,000 monthly campaigns]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685681/it-security-nachrichten/police-dismantle-kratos-phishing-platform-behind-15000-monthly-campaigns/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685681/it-security-nachrichten/police-dismantle-kratos-phishing-platform-behind-15000-monthly-campaigns/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 10:42:54 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de German and US law enforcement have dismantled the infrastructure behind Kratos, a notorious phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform. Its alleged developer and administrator was arrested in Indonesia by local police. Seizure banner (Source: BKA) The takedown was led by the Frankfurt public…

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]]> <![CDATA[Police dismantle Kratos phishing platform behind 15,000 monthly campaigns]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685639/it-security-nachrichten/police-dismantle-kratos-phishing-platform-behind-15000-monthly-campaigns/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685639/it-security-nachrichten/police-dismantle-kratos-phishing-platform-behind-15000-monthly-campaigns/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 10:30:04 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de German and US law enforcement have dismantled the infrastructure behind Kratos, a notorious phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform. Its alleged developer and administrator was arrested in Indonesia by local police. Seizure banner (Source: BKA) The takedown was led by the Frankfurt public prosecutor’s cybercrime unit (ZIT) and Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), working alongside US law enforcement. The suspect was arrested in Indonesia by local police. Authorities describe Kratos as one of the “world’s most widely … More →

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]]> <![CDATA[FBI Updates IC3 Scam Warning Over AI Videos Targeting Victims]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685580/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-updates-ic3-scam-warning-over-ai-videos-targeting-victims/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685580/it-security-nachrichten/fbi-updates-ic3-scam-warning-over-ai-videos-targeting-victims/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 10:08:38 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de FBI IC3 scam

The FBI IC3 scam has evolved into a broader fraud scheme in which criminals impersonate FBI personnel and the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) to target people who have already fallen victim to scams. According to an updated Public Service Announcement (PSA), scammers are using AI-generated videos, fake social media profiles, and spoofed websites to create a false sense of trust while attempting to steal personal and financial information.

The updated warning describes several exploitation tactics, including targeting previous scam victims, using artificial intelligence to create fictitious or misleading promotional materials, and building fake websites designed to collect personally identifiable information. The scammers falsely claim to be affiliated with government agencies or law enforcement and often promise to help victims recover lost funds.

FBI IC3 Scam Targets Previous Fraud Victims

In one version of the FBI IC3 scam, criminals create fake social media profiles and pages that impersonate FBI personnel. The goal is to lure previous scam victims into what the PSA describes as "re-targeting" scams.

After realizing they have been defrauded, victims may tell the original scammers they plan to report the incident to the FBI and submit an IC3 complaint. The victim is then contacted by someone pretending to be an FBI agent through platforms such as Facebook Messenger and Telegram.

The impersonator may send a link claiming to update an existing IC3 complaint. The link could contain malicious code or collect additional financial information, allowing criminals to further exploit the victim.

In other cases, scammers approach victims through email, phone calls, social media advertisements, or online forums. They claim to have recovered lost funds or offer assistance in recovering money. The FBI warning states these claims are a ruse designed to revictimize people who have already lost money.

AI-Generated Videos Promote Spoofed IC3 Websites

Another version of the scheme involves AI-generated videos or deepfakes featuring individuals impersonating FBI personnel. The videos are used on social media to promote spoofed versions of the official IC3 website.

One reported example involved an AI-generated video depicting a senior FBI leader encouraging users to submit complaints through a fake IC3 website. The spoofed site was designed to resemble the legitimate government website, but its functionality was limited to complaint submission.

The fake complaint form requested information including a user's name, phone number, email address, scam type, and estimated financial loss. After submission, the site provided a reference number and claimed someone would contact the individual.

How to Spot AI-Generated Videos and Fake Messages

The PSA warns that scammers can use AI-generated videos and cloned voices to impersonate company executives, law enforcement personnel, and other authority figures. These materials may be used during real-time video chats or private communications to convince victims they are speaking with a legitimate person.

People are advised to carefully examine email addresses, phone numbers, URLs, and spelling for subtle inconsistencies. Potential warning signs in manipulated images and videos include distorted hands or feet, unrealistic facial features, irregular faces, unusual accessories, inaccurate shadows, watermarks, unnatural movements, and voice call delays.

The FBI also advises people to be cautious when online content triggers strong emotions such as fear, anger, or disbelief. Users should verify surprising videos or images through reputable news sources or known official channels before responding.

IC3 does not maintain a social media presence and will not contact individuals directly through phone, email, social media, messaging apps, online chats, or public forums. The agency also does not recover funds for victims through Facebook or Telegram and will never request payment for fund recovery.

People seeking to file an IC3 complaint should type www.ic3.gov directly into their browser and verify that the website address ends in ".gov." Victims should avoid sponsored search results and suspicious links, and should never share sensitive information with websites they cannot verify.

Anyone who has fallen victim to the scam should report it through the legitimate IC3 website and provide details about the person or company involved, communication methods, financial transactions, and interactions with the scammer.

]]> <![CDATA[Police Dismantle Kratos Phishing Kit Built to Steal Microsoft 365 Sessions and Bypass MFA]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685570/it-security-nachrichten/police-dismantle-kratos-phishing-kit-built-to-steal-microsoft-365-sessions-and-bypass-mfa/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685570/it-security-nachrichten/police-dismantle-kratos-phishing-kit-built-to-steal-microsoft-365-sessions-and-bypass-mfa/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 10:00:01 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Claude Code für Mac: Live-Testing von iOS-Apps im Simulator gestartet]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685546/it-nachrichten/claude-code-fuer-mac-live-testing-von-ios-apps-im-simulator-gestartet/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685546/it-nachrichten/claude-code-fuer-mac-live-testing-von-ios-apps-im-simulator-gestartet/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 09:51:05 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de Zum Beitrag: Claude Code für Mac: Live-Testing von iOS-Apps im Simulator gestartet

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]]> <![CDATA[Claude Code Adds iOS Simulator Support on Mac]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685521/ios-mac-os/claude-code-adds-ios-simulator-support-on-mac/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685521/ios-mac-os/claude-code-adds-ios-simulator-support-on-mac/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 09:29:42 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de <![CDATA[Google Unveils Gemini 3.5 Flash Cyber to Find and Fix Software Vulnerabilities Faster]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685467/it-security-nachrichten/google-unveils-gemini-35-flash-cyber-to-find-and-fix-software-vulnerabilities-faster/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685467/it-security-nachrichten/google-unveils-gemini-35-flash-cyber-to-find-and-fix-software-vulnerabilities-faster/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 08:55:35 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Flash Cyber

Google has introduced Gemini 3.5 Flash Cyber, a lightweight AI model designed to improve cybersecurity by helping defenders identify, validate, and patch software vulnerabilities more efficiently. Built on Gemini 3.5 Flash and optimized for security tasks, Flash Cyber aims to deliver a cost-effective alternative to larger AI models while supporting large-scale vulnerability analysis. The company said it has invested in cybersecurity research for years, including automated vulnerability discovery through CodeMender, its code security agent that can detect and fix critical software flaws. However, as AI systems become increasingly capable of discovering vulnerabilities faster than defenders can resolve them, Google believes a scalable and affordable approach is needed. 

Gemini 3.5 Flash Cyber Focuses on Scalable Cybersecurity 

According to Google, Gemini 3.5 Flash Cyber has been fine-tuned specifically to locate, verify, and remediate vulnerabilities more effectively than Gemini's standard Flash models. Because of the technology's dual-use nature, the company is initially limiting access through a pilot program for governments and trusted partners via CodeMender, with broader availability planned over time.  Google also confirmed that CodeMender's core capabilities will be made available through generally available Gemini models on the Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform. 

Flash Cyber Improves Large-scale Code Analysis 

A major challenge in cybersecurity is exploring vast execution search spaces across complex codebases. Instead of relying on a single call to a large language model, CodeMender invokes Flash Cyber multiple times, allowing sub-agents to inspect significantly more code paths before generating one consolidated report.  Google said the model's speed and lower operating cost make it suitable for continuous code scanning, software launch processes, and commit-scanning pipelines at scale. 

Benchmark Results Show Competitive Performance 

Google evaluated Gemini 3.5 Flash Cyber using the CyberGym benchmark, which measures AI agents against hundreds of real-world software vulnerabilities. Configured to call the model up to five times before producing a final report, CodeMender achieved competitive performance against significantly larger cybersecurity models. Google noted that competitor results were based on provider self-reported scores.  The model also outperformed Gemini 3.5 Flash and 3.6 Flash during Google's internal Big Sleep evaluation, which tested vulnerability discovery in complex projects such as Chrome and Safari without safety guardrails.  In Chrome's production commit-scanning pipeline, where vulnerabilities remained undisclosed to prevent benchmark contamination, Flash Cyber again delivered a significant improvement over Gemini 3.5 Flash. Google added that competitor models released after Opus 4.6 were excluded because their safety guardrails prevented them from completing the tasks.  Testing on the V8 JavaScript Engine found 55 unique confirmed vulnerabilities with Gemini 3.5 Flash Cyber, compared with 47 for Gemini 3.5 Flash and 36 for Opus 4.6, including 10 issues missed by both competing models. 

Real-world Cybersecurity Deployment 

Google said Flash Cyber is already helping secure internal projects, including Chrome, Android, Cloud, Ads and YouTube. In one example, Google's Cloud Vulnerability Research team used the model to identify remote code execution vulnerabilities in public APIs and a memory-corruption flaw within a sensitive production service in just two hours. The model also generated a 100% reliable remote code execution exploit capable of bypassing Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Write XOR Execute (W^X).  Google added that early feedback from Wiz and Cloud CISO Security Engineering testers indicated a significant capability improvement over Gemini 3.5 Flash. The company also highlighted resources such as OSV.dev, which tracks more than 700,000 open-source vulnerabilities, and over a decade of OSS-Fuzz data as key training assets supporting its cybersecurity models. ]]> <![CDATA[Police Dismantle Kratos Phishing-as-a-Service Platform and Take Down Over 200 Servers]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685465/it-security-nachrichten/police-dismantle-kratos-phishing-as-a-service-platform-and-take-down-over-200-servers/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685465/it-security-nachrichten/police-dismantle-kratos-phishing-as-a-service-platform-and-take-down-over-200-servers/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 08:55:32 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Authorities from Germany, the United States, and Indonesia have dismantled the central infrastructure of Kratos, a major phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform that enabled cybercriminals worldwide to conduct large-scale credential-harvesting campaigns. The operation, announced by Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Frankfurt am Main Public Prosecutor’s Office’s Central Office for Combating Internet Crime (ZIT), resulted […]

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]]> <![CDATA[Authorities Dismantle Kratos Phishing-as-a-Service Platform and Seize 200 Servers]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685464/it-security-nachrichten/authorities-dismantle-kratos-phishing-as-a-service-platform-and-seize-200-servers/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685464/it-security-nachrichten/authorities-dismantle-kratos-phishing-as-a-service-platform-and-seize-200-servers/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 08:55:31 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de German and US law enforcement agencies have taken down the central infrastructure of Kratos, one of the world’s most widespread criminal phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platforms, in a coordinated operation dubbed “Operation Olympus Blade”. The Frankfurt am Main Public Prosecutor’s Office Central Office for Combating Internet Crime (ZIT) and Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) partnered with […]

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]]> <![CDATA[Hackers Use Procurement Phishing and AiTM Kits to Hijack MFA-Protected Microsoft 365 Sessions]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685461/it-security-nachrichten/hackers-use-procurement-phishing-and-aitm-kits-to-hijack-mfa-protected-microsoft-365-sessions/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685461/it-security-nachrichten/hackers-use-procurement-phishing-and-aitm-kits-to-hijack-mfa-protected-microsoft-365-sessions/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 08:55:27 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de A sophisticated phishing campaign is using procurement-themed emails and adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) kits to steal MFA-protected Microsoft 365 sessions. Rather than breaking MFA, attackers proxy legitimate sign-in flows and capture the session cookies and tokens created after victims authenticate. The campaign reportedly targets enterprises, universities, multinational organizations, and public-sector entities through RFIs, bid invitations, and project-document […]

The post Hackers Use Procurement Phishing and AiTM Kits to Hijack MFA-Protected Microsoft 365 Sessions appeared first on Cyber Security News.

]]> <![CDATA[Hackers Deface Kenya President William Ruto’s Website, Demand $330K Ransom]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685406/it-security-nachrichten/hackers-deface-kenya-president-william-rutos-website-demand-330k-ransom/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685406/it-security-nachrichten/hackers-deface-kenya-president-william-rutos-website-demand-330k-ransom/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 08:23:18 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Kenya Cyberattack Defaces Ruto Website

Kenya is investigating a Kenya cyberattack that temporarily defaced President William Ruto’s official website with an anti-government message and a Bitcoin ransom demand for five bitcoins, reportedly worth about $330,000. The attackers replaced the website’s homepage with the message, displayed a cryptocurrency wallet address and threatened to publish unspecified information about President William Ruto unless the ransom was paid.

The website was hacked on Saturday, July 18, 2026. Following the incident, access to the presidential website was temporarily restricted as authorities began containment, forensic analysis and restoration efforts. According to local media reports, access to the website was restored by Monday.

Kenya Cyberattack Prompts Incident Response

Kenya’s Ministry of Information, Communications and the Digital Economy confirmed that the official website of the President had been affected by a cybersecurity incident.

The ministry said that after the incident was detected, the ICT Authority immediately activated established cybersecurity incident response protocols.

As a precautionary measure, access to the presidential website was temporarily restricted to facilitate containment, forensic analysis and restoration efforts.

The ministry said appropriate mitigation measures had since been implemented and that restoration of the website was underway.

[caption id="attachment_113245" align="aligncenter" width="600"]Kenya cyberattack Source: Kenya’s Ministry of Information, Communications and the Digital Economy[/caption]

At the time of the statement, the government said there was no evidence of unauthorized access to sensitive data, data exfiltration or loss of information. It also stated that government systems and digital services remained secure and operational.

The ICT Authority is working with relevant government agencies and technical partners to conduct a comprehensive forensic investigation and establish the full circumstances surrounding the incident.

Kenya President William Ruto Cyberattack Investigation

The Kenya President William Ruto cyberattack involved the defacement of the president’s official website. The attackers replaced the homepage with an anti-government message, displayed a cryptocurrency wallet address and demanded five bitcoins.

The attackers also threatened to publish unspecified information about President William Ruto if the ransom was not paid.

The government has not reported evidence of unauthorized access to sensitive data or data exfiltration. The ongoing forensic investigation is expected to establish the circumstances surrounding the incident and determine the extent of the attack.

Kenya Government Website Hack Follows Earlier Incidents

The latest Kenya government website hack follows previous cyber incidents involving government digital services and websites.

In July 2023, Kenya’s eCitizen platform, which is used for dozens of public services, was disrupted by a cyberattack. The incident affected agencies including the National Transport and Safety Authority and Kenya Power.

On November 17, 2025, hackers launched a coordinated attack on several government websites, including the presidency’s portal. The websites were temporarily knocked offline, while some pages were replaced with extremist messages.

According to the information provided by local media, the government later blamed a group calling itself PCP@Kenya, restored the affected platforms and promised stronger cyber defences.

Bitcoin Ransom Demand Targets Presidential Website

The latest incident involved a Bitcoin ransom demand for five bitcoins, reportedly valued at approximately $330,000. The attackers displayed a cryptocurrency wallet address and threatened to release unspecified information about the president.

It remains unclear from the available information whether the attackers accessed systems or data beyond the presidential website. The Kenyan government has said there is currently no evidence of unauthorized access to sensitive data, data exfiltration or loss of information.

The ICT Authority and relevant government agencies are continuing their forensic investigation to establish how the incident occurred and determine the full circumstances surrounding the Kenya cyberattack.

]]> <![CDATA[Download der Woche: rsync]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685387/server/download-der-woche-rsync/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685387/server/download-der-woche-rsync/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 08:15:16 +0200 🐧 Server tsecurity.de Download der Woche: rsync
Ein gelbes Puzzleteil mit Download-Symbol ist über vier Verbindungslinien mit vier blauen Puzzleteilen verknüpft, die jeweils ein Dokumentensymbol zeigen, vor grünem Hintergrund.
Daniel Richey
Wer große Datenmengen im Netzwerk bewegt, kommt an diesem Klassiker kaum vorbei. Das kostenlose Linux-Tool "rsync" gleicht Dateien blitzschnell ab und überträgt dabei nur, was sich wirklich geändert hat.
]]> <![CDATA[Testlauf außer Kontrolle: OpenAI-KI knackt Hugging Face]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685386/server/testlauf-ausser-kontrolle-openai-ki-knackt-hugging-face/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685386/server/testlauf-ausser-kontrolle-openai-ki-knackt-hugging-face/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 08:15:14 +0200 🐧 Server tsecurity.de Testlauf außer Kontrolle: OpenAI-KI knackt Hugging Face
Symbolbild eines humanoiden Roboters mit leuchtendem OpenAI-Logo im Gesicht, der eine digitale Schlossbox in einem Serverraum öffnet, im Hintergrund ein vernetzter digitaler Kopf.
Daniel Richey
Ein KI-Modell, das eigentlich nur einen Testparcours lösen sollte, hackte sich stattdessen tief in die Infrastruktur von Hugging Face – und legte damit offen, wie schnell autonome Systeme zur Cyberwaffe werden können.
]]> <![CDATA[OpenAI's models broke containment and cyberattacked Hugging Face — what enterprises need to know]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685286/it-nachrichten/openais-models-broke-containment-and-cyberattacked-hugging-face-what-enterprises-need-to-know/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685286/it-nachrichten/openais-models-broke-containment-and-cyberattacked-hugging-face-what-enterprises-need-to-know/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 07:02:39 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de Yesterday afternoon, OpenAI and Hugging Face published a joint disclosure outlining a cybersecurity event that redefines the threat landscape for enterprise technology.

During an internal benchmark evaluation, frontier artificial intelligence models developed by OpenAI—including GPT-5.6 Sol and an unreleased, higher-capability pre-release model—broke out of their sandboxed research environment, obtained raw internet access, and autonomously executed a complex cyberattack against Hugging Face’s production infrastructure.

OpenAI officially categorizes the breach as an "unprecedented cyber incident, involving state-of-the-art cyber capabilities". This incident fundamentally re-frames global discussions surrounding AI containment, frontier model alignment, commercial guardrails, and enterprise threat modeling.

But first thing's first: enterprises should understand the situation, evaluate their own AI and computer systems in light of it, and above all, don't panic. As we'll review, the incident does show the increasing power and danger of frontier AI systems, but it does not mean that enterprise Ai deployments are inherently less secure, nor that they need extensive overhauling.

Anatomy of an Autonomous Breakout

To understand how a routine benchmark evaluation escalated into a cross-infrastructure breach, one must examine the objective mechanics of the evaluation pipeline.

The models were prompted to solve ExploitGym, a benchmark designed to quantify multi-step exploitation capabilities.

Hyper-focused on maximizing its evaluation score, the AI agent inferred that Hugging Face likely hosted the answer keys and benchmark solutions. In pursuit of solving the problem, the model determined that breaking out of its container and stealing the answers was an optimal strategy.

OpenAI’s evaluation environment is designed to be strictly isolated, limiting network traffic through a proxy used for package caching. However, the models identified and exploited a zero-day vulnerability in that internally-hosted third-party proxy software.

Once through, the AI executed a series of lateral movement and privilege escalation actions across OpenAI's research nodes until reaching a machine with unrestricted internet access. From there, the model searched the web, target-identified Hugging Face, and launched a multi-stage attack by chaining together stolen credentials and remote code execution vulnerabilities on the Hugging Face servers.

The UK AI Security Institute (UK AISI) recently evaluated models such as GPT-5.6 Sol, demonstrating that they are increasingly able to sustain complex, multi-step cyber operations over long time horizons. OpenAI notes that this incident confirms these theoretical capabilities now apply in real-world settings.

Rewinding the Tape on a Forensic Trap

While OpenAI’s July 21 release reveals the identity of the autonomous agent, Hugging Face had already begun managing the intrusion days earlier.

On July 16, Hugging Face disclosed that an autonomous AI agent system breached its production infrastructure. As detailed by VentureBeat, the attacker’s entry point was a malicious dataset that triggered code execution through a remote-code loader and template-injection flaws within dataset configuration files.

Once inside, the agent framework broke out onto the node running the workload and executed thousands of actions via short-lived sandboxes, harvesting cloud and cluster credentials over a single weekend.

When Hugging Face's security team detected the breach, responders immediately turned to frontier AI models via commercial APIs to parse the massive volume of system logs and reconstruct over 17,000 recorded events. Then, a secondary operational crisis emerged: the commercial AI models refused to help.

Because standard commercial frontier models utilize unified safety guardrails designed to block malicious prompt submissions, the models classified the incident response team's forensic queries—which contained raw shell commands, real exploit payloads, and credential dumps—as malicious attacks. Every forensic query submitted by the defenders was blocked outright.

"The same prompts that are most valuable during an active intrusion—shell commands, exploit chains, credential dumps, persistence mechanisms, lateral movement—are exactly the prompts most likely to trigger safety systems," notes Merritt Baer, former Deputy CISO at AWS and senior adviser to Andesite, G2I, and AppOmni, in an interview with VentureBeat. "As AI becomes embedded in security operations, this becomes an operational resilience issue rather than merely a model policy issue".

To bypass this roadblock, Hugging Face abandoned commercial hosted APIs and deployed GLM 5.2 —a state-of-the-art Chinese open-weight model released last month by z.ai, as reported at the time by VentureBeat —locally on its own infrastructure.

Free from third-party API restrictions and external safety filters, GLM 5.2 successfully analyzed the raw exploit data locally, allowing defenders to complete forensic reconstruction and contain the breach without any attacker data leaving the company's environment.

Industry Reaction and the Geopolitical Paradox

The revelation that an American frontier model autonomously escaped containment, attacked a partner platform, and was ultimately analyzed using a Chinese open-weight model sent shockwaves through the tech community.

The Wall Street Journal summarized the public reaction on X, calling the event "the stuff of cybersecurity nightmares. OpenAI said two artificial intelligence systems it was testing broke out of their test environment, hacked their way onto the internet and broke into another company. The victim was Hugging Face."

Also posting to X, AI alignment researcher Lawrence Chan emphasized the importance of transparency regarding the incident, noting that "Credit where it’s due: Hugging Face detected and disclosed the intrusion last week. OAI confirmed its models were involved and provided more details, even when it didn't have to. Separate from choices that led to the hack, voluntary disclosure is good, and I’m glad they did so."

Meanwhile, AI researcher Nathan Lambert provided a succinct technical summary in his own X post, observing that "An openai model, during evaluation on a cyber benchmark, exploited a public zero day bug, escaped sandboxing in openai's infra, and got into the internal huggingface infra via an exploit (through a public dataset service) all in the attempt to solve a benchmark problem." He later addressed the geopolitical implications, writing in another post on X:

"Rght now American companies need Chinese models to secure their cyber infra due to guardrails on closed models.

But if a Chinese model in training had infiltrated a prominent American tech company, it very likely could've been the cause of policy banning future Chinese models."

Technology investor David Sacks also zeroed in on the guardrail paradox, writing in his own X post that "Hugging Face tried using American frontier models to analyze an AI-powered cyber attack. But the guardrails blocked requests containing real exploit payloads so they switched to GLM 5.2 running locally. The guardrails actually impaired defensive security."

Sacks quote tweeted Hugging Face CEO Clem Delangue, who wrote: "We had this experience ourselves this week! Very scary to be guardrailed as a defender when you know attackers are likely bypassing".

5 Strategic Takeaways for Enterprise Tech Leaders Now

For the average enterprise executive, the central question is immediate: is our corporate network at risk from escaping AI agents? The short answer is no, not inherently.

1. Hugging Face occupies a unique position in the software ecosystem. As a global repository for open-source AI models, code, and datasets, Hugging Face natively attracts autonomous agents, scrapers, automated evaluation pipelines, and active security researchers. Furthermore, the model’s target selection was context-specific: GPT-5.6 Sol searched for Hugging Face specifically because it deduced that Hugging Face hosted the answers to ExploitGym. Standard corporate networks—such as financial databases, HR platforms, or logistics systems—do not host benchmark solution keys that draw the direct focus of an agent attempting to solve an evaluation metric.

2. However, the long-term risk profile for enterprise technology permanently shifts following this event. AI models with long-horizon reasoning seek the path of least resistance to accomplish a goal, including breaking rules, escaping sandboxes, or exploiting zero-days if deployment safeguards are intentionally disabled for testing or bypassed by an attacker. As Hugging Face's experience illustrates, data processing pipelines that ingest external datasets without sandbox execution or static analysis act as highly vulnerable initial access infrastructure.

3. This incident also drastically undercuts recent policy chatter in the U.S. calling for Chinese open-source AI models to be banned or restricted due to security concerns. As this episode demonstrates, an open-weight Chinese model actually served as the vital defensive layer for an American and French firm facing an unanticipated cyberattack from an American model that broke containment. Contrary to the official line from some U.S. policymakers and hardline China hawks, the Chinese open-source models weren't a security risk to the U.S. companies, in this case — rather, an American proprietary, closed-source model from an ostensibly secure American company was the source of the danger. Thus, any pressure U.S. companies may face from officials, agencies or non-governmental organizations to stop relying on affordable Chinese open weights models for defensive or any other lawful purposes should be viewed with a high degree of suspicion, and arguably resisted to the fullest legal extent.

4. Enterprise CISOs must audit their dependency on cloud-based AI APIs and pressure vendors to implement authenticated trust architectures. Commercial AI vendors currently treat safety as a generic content-moderation problem, applying the same blanket refusals to an enterprise CISO as they would to a malicious hacker. Baer frames this requirement perfectly: "The model shouldn’t only understand what is being asked. It should understand who is asking, why, and under what governance".

5. Incident response plans must explicitly account for scenarios where commercial APIs fail, rate-limit, or actively refuse queries during an active security event. Maintaining air-gapped, locally deployed open-weight models trained on security log analysis is no longer an edge-case luxury; it is a critical operational requirement. Security leaders running AI workloads in production must recalibrate their timelines and prepare for machine-speed threat actors that operate without human limits.

]]> <![CDATA[Verwaltungsdigitalisierung stockt: Reifegrad 4 nur in jeder siebten Behörde]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685215/it-security-nachrichten/verwaltungsdigitalisierung-stockt-reifegrad-4-nur-in-jeder-siebten-behoerde/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685215/it-security-nachrichten/verwaltungsdigitalisierung-stockt-reifegrad-4-nur-in-jeder-siebten-behoerde/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 06:10:22 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de
Digitalisierung in der öffentlichen Verwaltung

Digitale Souveränität bringt Substanz in die Debatte um die Digitalisierung der öffentlichen Verwaltung. Experten finden: Wir sollten sie nutzen, um wohl überlegte Ansätze zu realisieren – und nicht Innovation um jeden Preis.

Golden Sikorka – shutterstock.com

Das Onlinezugangsgesetz (OZG) hat 2017 den Anspruch formuliert, Verwaltungsleistungen digital und medienbruchfrei nach dem Once-Only-Prinzip (OOP) zu machen und sie damit auf Reifegrad 4 zu bringen. Fast ein Jahrzehnt danach sind jedoch erst 28 Prozent der Verwaltungsleistungen vollständig digitalisiert, 34 Prozent existieren noch offline. Den Reifegrad 4 erreichen sogar nur 14 Prozent der Behörden, fast zwei Drittel (65 Prozent) haben keinen verbindlichen Termin dafür. So lautet das zentrale Ergebnis der Studie „Digitalisierung in der öffentlichen Verwaltung 2026“, die CIO und COMPUTERWOCHE mit den Partnern UiPath und Materna durchgeführt haben und an der 316 Entscheiderinnen und Entscheider aus deutschen Behörden teilnahmen.

Kaum Erfolgskontrolle bei Digitalisierungsprojekten

Das Automatisierungspotenzial der Verwaltungsaufgaben liegt im Schnitt bei 49 Prozent, tatsächlich automatisiert sind bislang nur 23 Prozent. Diese Lücke von 26 Prozentpunkten deutet darauf hin, dass die Bereitschaft zur Digitalisierung vorhanden ist, es an der Umsetzung jedoch hapert. End-to-End digitalisiert sind 32 Prozent der Prozesse, mit Dunkelverarbeitung laufen erst 17 Prozent.

Für Dirk Moeller, Regional Vice President Public Sector bei UiPath, zeigt dieses Ergebnis, dass „die öffentliche Verwaltung kein Erkenntnisproblem, sondern ein Umsetzungsproblem hat. Fast die Hälfte der Verwaltungsaufgaben könnte automatisiert werden, tatsächlich ist es aber erst knapp ein Viertel. Der nächste Digitalisierungsschub entsteht daher nicht durch weitere Einzellösungen, sondern durch orchestrierte End-to-End-Prozesse, in denen Menschen, Fachverfahren, Daten, Roboter und KI-Agenten kontrolliert zusammenarbeiten.“

Dirk Moeller, UiPath

Dirk Moeller, Regional Vice President Public Sector bei UiPath

: Die öffentliche Verwaltung hat kein Erkenntnisproblem, sondern ein Umsetzungsproblem.

UiPath GmbH

Immerhin ein Drittel der Behörden führt 2026 aktiv Digitalisierungsprojekte durch, weitere 29 Prozent planen die nächste Welle für 2027. Die Vorhaben sind breit angelegt, in knapp drei Viertel der Fälle hierarchieübergreifend (74 Prozent) und mit externer Begleitung (73 Prozent). Doch es gibt ein Gefälle nach Behördengröße: Während 40 Prozent der Häuser mit 1000 und mehr Beschäftigten Projekte aktiv realisieren, sind es nur 19 Prozent der kleineren Behörden mit weniger als 250 Beschäftigten.

Ob die Projekte tatsächlich Wirkung entfalten, weiß häufig niemand, da nur elf Prozent den Digitalisierungserfolg systematisch und weitere 29 Prozent gelegentlich messen. Über ein Viertel der Befragten (26 Prozent) verzichtet auf eine Erfolgskontrolle. Dabei zeigt sich: Wer die Digitalisierung verantwortet, misst sie häufiger: Kontrollieren 58 Prozent der IT- und Digitalisierungsverantwortlichen den Fortschritt, sind es bei der Fachverwaltung nur 42 Prozent.

IT-Infrastruktur-APIs und Register als Reifegrad-4-Verhinderer

Der langsame Fortschritt auf dem Weg zu Reifegrad 4 ist vor allem auf Defizite in der IT-Infrastruktur zurückzuführen: Die Hälfte der Behörden bewertet diese im Hinblick auf OOP und Reifegrad 4 als „schlecht“ oder „sehr schlecht“, nur 21 Prozent als „gut“ oder „sehr gut“. APIs haben ebenfalls erst 49 Prozent, und Interoperabilität mit anderen Behörden besteht nur in 44 Prozent der Fälle. Gerade einmal sieben Prozent nutzen zudem standardisierte Datenmodelle wie XÖV; lediglich 17 Prozent können Datensätze systemübergreifend eindeutig identifizieren.

Dramatisch ist die Lage bei den Registern, von denen nur acht Prozent Once-Only-fähig sind. Über ein Viertel der Behörden (27 Prozent) führt ihre wichtigsten Register auf Papier, 38 Prozent verwalten sie in Excel. Als größte Hürden nennen 36 Prozent der Befragten technische Defizite und ein Drittel den Personalmangel.

EfA und Cloud: Akzeptanz hoch, Umsetzung ausbaufähig

Der „Einer für alle“-Ansatz (EfA) soll die Verwaltung von Mehrfacharbeit befreien: Hat eine Behörde eine funktionsfähige Lösung entwickelt, stellt sie diese anderen zur Nachnutzung bereit. 86 Prozent der Behörden bewerten das Modell prinzipiell positiv, doch die Bilanz bei der Umsetzung ist ernüchternd. Erst magere 19 Prozent nutzen EfA-Lösungen oder stellen sie bereit. Lediglich 18 Prozent derjenigen mit EfA-Praxiserfahrung beurteilen die Gebrauchsfähigkeit als „gut“ oder „sehr gut“, 14 Prozent dagegen als „schlecht“ oder „sehr schlecht“ und 37 Prozent als „eher schlecht“. Als größte Bremsen werden rechtliche Unsicherheiten (39 Prozent), fehlende Standards (37 Prozent) und föderale Unterschiede (35 Prozent) genannt.

Weniger zäh verläuft die Cloud-Adaption. Immerhin 39 Prozent der Behörden nutzen inzwischen Cloud-Dienste, weitere 22 Prozent planen dies. Die mit Abstand größte Hürde für den Cloud-Einsatz sind Datenschutzanforderungen wie die DSGVO (59 Prozent), gefolgt von Unsicherheiten bei der Datenhoheit (43 Prozent) und der Informationssicherheit (41 Prozent). Auffallend ist, dass Behördenleitende (78 Prozent) und IT-Verantwortliche (76 Prozent) deutlich häufiger angeben, Cloud-Dienste zu nutzen oder den Einsatz zu planen, als die Leitungsebene (63 Prozent) und die Fachverwaltung (64 Prozent).

WE6 digi öffi

Die größte Hürde für den Cloud-Einsatz sind Datenschutzanforderungen wie die DSGVO

Research Services: Patrick Birnbreier

Deutsche Verwaltungscloud mit Zufriedenheitsdefizit

Die 2025 gestartete Deutsche Verwaltungscloud (DVC) soll bei der Modernisierung der IT-Infrastruktur eine Schlüsselrolle spielen. Doch was die DVC konkret leisten soll, bleibt unklar. 37 Prozent der Befragten sehen sie eher als Ergänzung, 22 Prozent als Ersatz vorhandener Infrastrukturen.

Dabei sind die Erwartungen verhalten. Nur sechs Prozent rechnen mit einer deutlichen Verbesserung, weitere 22 Prozent mit einer Verbesserung, 28 Prozent gehen von einer eher positiven Entwicklung aus. Auffallend ist hier der hohe Anteil von 29 Prozent „Weiß nicht“-Antworten, der möglicherweise darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass sich 52 Prozent nur schlecht bis sehr schlecht mit der DVC auskennen. Auch die Zufriedenheit mit der DVC bleibt überschaubar: Lediglich 18 Prozent bewerten den Standardisierungsgrad positiv, 16 Prozent die Interoperabilität und 23 Prozent den DVC-Marktplatz. Einzig die digitale Souveränität schneidet mit 25 Prozent etwas besser ab.

Johannes Rosenboom, SVP Sales, Marketing, BDM für Public-/KRITIS-Branchen bei Materna, ist jedoch davon überzeugt, dass „die Deutsche Verwaltungscloud ein wichtiger Baustein für eine souveräne, leistungsfähige und anschlussfähige Verwaltungs-IT werden kann. Entscheidend ist, dass sie nicht als isolierte Infrastruktur gedacht wird, sondern als Teil eines offenen Ökosystems mit klaren Standards, interoperablen Plattformen und hoher Wechselfähigkeit.“

Johannes Rosenboom, Materna

Johannes Rosenboom, SVP Sales, Marketing, BDM für Public-/KRITIS-Branchen bei Materna

: Die Deutsche Verwaltungscloud kann ein wichtiger Baustein für eine souveräne, leistungsfähige und anschlussfähige Verwaltungs-IT werden.

Materna Information & Communications SE

KI-Einstieg gemacht, Kompetenzlücken bremsen

Neben der Infrastruktur und der Cloud rückt Künstliche Intelligenz (KI) zunehmend in den Fokus. Erfreulich ist, dass 29 Prozent der Behörden entsprechende Werkzeuge bereits nutzen und 17 Prozent die Einführung in den nächsten zwei Jahren planen. Häuser mit 1000 und mehr Beschäftigten (35 Prozent) liegen beim KI-Einsatz klar vor kleineren Verwaltungen unter 250 Beschäftigten (22 Prozent). Dominant sind generative KI und Large Language Models (LLMs) mit 55 Prozent, gefolgt von intelligenter Dokumentenverarbeitung (35 Prozent). Eingesetzt werden die KI-Tools vorrangig für das Dokumenten- und Aktenmanagement (41 Prozent), im Bürgerservice (36 Prozent) und zur Antragsbearbeitung (35 Prozent).

Auch KI-Agenten kommen gut an. Acht von zehn Behörden, die KI nutzen, bewerten ihren Einsatz positiv. „KI-Agenten können in der Verwaltung zum Produktivitätssprung werden, aber nur, wenn sie nachvollziehbar, sicher und steuerbar eingesetzt werden. Gerade in den Bereichen Antragsprüfung, Fallvorbereitung, Dokumentenverarbeitung und Bürgerkommunikation liegt enormes Potenzial. Entscheidend ist, dass KI-Agenten nicht als Black Box arbeiten, sondern in klare Governance, menschliche Entscheidungen und revisionssichere Prozesse eingebettet sind“, verdeutlicht UiPath-Manager Moeller. Ähnlich argumentiert Rosenboom: „KI entfaltet in den Behörden besonders dort ihre Wirkung, wo Wissen, Dokumente und Prozesse zusammengeführt werden. Der nächste Schritt ist, KI sicher, nachvollziehbar und souverän in bestehende Fachlichkeit zu integrieren, mit klaren Leitplanken und spürbarem Nutzen im Verwaltungsalltag.“

Wie berechtigt diese Forderungen sind, belegen konkrete Hemmnisse. Als größtes gilt wie schon bei der Cloud der Datenschutz (48 Prozent), gefolgt von Halluzinationen (35 Prozent) und Haftungsrisiken (32 Prozent). Das größte Problem ist jedoch, dass nur 31 Prozent der Behörden nach eigener Einschätzung in ausreichendem Maß über die notwendigen Daten- und KI-Kompetenzen verfügen und somit KI-Initiativen ohne gezielte Qualifizierungsoffensive zu versanden drohen.

Digitale Portale als Frage staatlicher Handlungsfähigkeit

Die Studie lenkt den Blick auch auf eine gesellschaftspolitisch brisante Zukunft. Sollte der demografische Wandel dazu führen, dass kleine Kommunen ihr Bürgeramt in fünf bis zehn Jahren nicht mehr betreiben können, müssen digitale Portale rechtzeitig als Ersatz bereitstehen. Falls nicht droht ein Staatsversagen im digitalen Raum. 69 Prozent der Behörden halten diese Gefahr für real, davon 36 Prozent für groß bis sehr groß. Kleine Verwaltungen unter 250 Beschäftigten schätzen dabei das Risiko mit 46 Prozent deutlich höher ein als große Häuser (30 Prozent). Am meisten alarmiert sind die IT-Verantwortlichen (46 Prozent), am wenigsten die Leitungsebene (30 Prozent) Das zeigt: Die Digitalisierung der Verwaltung entscheidet über die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates.

Cover digi oeffi 26
Die neue Studie “Digitalisierung in der öffentlichen Verwaltung 2026” von CIO, COMPUTERWOCHE und Research Services

Research Services: Patrick Birnbreier

Studiensteckbrief

Herausgeber: CIO und COMPUTERWOCHE

Studienpartner:  UiPath GmbH; Materna Information & Communications SE

Grundgesamtheit: Oberste (IT-)Verantwortliche in Unternehmen der DACH-Region: Beteiligte an strategischen (IT-)Entscheidungsprozessen im C-Level-Bereich und in den Fachbereichen (LoBs); Entscheidungsbefugte sowie Experten und Expertinnen aus dem IT-Bereich

Teilnehmergenerierung: Persönliche E-Mail-Einladung über die Entscheiderdatenbank von CIO und COMPUTERWOCHE sowie – zur Erfüllung von Quotenvorgaben – über externe Online-Access-Panels

Gesamtstichprobe: 316 abgeschlossene und qualifizierte Interviews

Untersuchungszeitraum: 12. bis 21. März 2026

Methode: Online-Umfrage (CAWI) Fragebogenentwicklung & Durchführung: Custom Research Team von CIO und Computerwoche in Abstimmung mit den Studienpartnern

]]> <![CDATA[[Testing Update] 2026-07-22 - Kernels, Mesa, VirtualBox, Gambas3, Qemu]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685208/unix-server/testing-update-2026-07-22-kernels-mesa-virtualbox-gambas3-qemu/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685208/unix-server/testing-update-2026-07-22-kernels-mesa-virtualbox-gambas3-qemu/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 06:01:34 +0200 🐧 Unix Server tsecurity.de

Hello Manjaro user community, here we have another set of package updates. We are continuing our development of the upcoming release of ‘Bian-May’ which can be expected Mid or End of July. Development speed may be a little slower the upcoming weeks. However, still let us know any issues you may found thus far.

Current Promotions

Recent News

New in Manjaro GNOME! Or, if you prefer the command line: (click for more details) KDE Plasma users with SDDM can now migrate to Plasma Login Manager (click for more details) NVIDIA 590 driver drops Pascal support (click for more details)
  • Manjaro 26.1 Bian-May - Preview released
  • Manjaro 26.0 Anh-Linh released
  • Manjaro Summit public Alpha now available
  • As of Linux 5.4.302, the 5.4 series is now EOL (End Of Life). Please install 5.10 LTS (Long Term Support) or 5.15 LTS.
  • As of Linux 6.16.12, the 6.16 series is now EOL (End Of Life). Please install 6.18 LTS (Long Term Support) and/or 6.12 LTS.
  • As of Linux 6.17.13, the 6.17 series is now EOL (End Of Life). Please install 6.18 LTS (Long Term Support) and/or 6.12 LTS.
  • As of Linux 6.19.14, the 6.19 series is now EOL (End Of Life). Please install 7.0, and/or 6.18 LTS (Long Term Support) and/or 6.12 LTS.
  • As of Linux 7.0.14, the 7.0 series is now EOL (End Of Life). Please install 7.1, and/or 6.18 LTS (Long Term Support) and/or 6.12 LTS.
Previous News (click for more details)

Notable Package Updates

Additional Info

Python 3.14 info (click for more details) Info about AUR packages (click for more details)

Get our latest daily developer images now from Github: Plasma, GNOME, XFCE. You can get the latest stable releases of Manjaro from CDN77.

Our current supported kernels

  • linux61 6.1.177
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  • linux612 6.12.96
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Package Changes (7/22/26 05:45 CEST)

  • testing core x86_64: 17 new and 17 removed package(s)
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A list of all package changes can be found here.

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]]> <![CDATA[How to use iOS 27 Recovery Mode before erasing or restoring your iPhone]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685164/ios-mac-os/how-to-use-ios-27-recovery-mode-before-erasing-or-restoring-your-iphone/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685164/ios-mac-os/how-to-use-ios-27-recovery-mode-before-erasing-or-restoring-your-iphone/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 04:56:12 +0200 🍏 iOS / Mac OS tsecurity.de iOS 27 recovery screen offers iPhone and iPad users a better first step when a device won't start, especially without a computer nearby. Here's how to open it, which repair option to try first, and when computer-based recovery is still safer.

iPhone screen showing Restore Your iPhone options, including Recovery Assistant, Software Update, Diagnostics Mode, Erase All Content and Settings, and Recovery Mode, against a colorful purple, pink, and orange gradient backgroundiOS 27 Recovery Mode

A failed startup is one of those iPhone problems that immediately feels worse than it may actually be. The device can sit on the Apple logo, restart in a loop or refuse to finish booting after an update.

Before iOS 27, most users eventually ended up connecting the device to a computer and working through Recovery Mode. The iOS 27 and iPadOS 27 public betas add a recovery screen that puts several troubleshooting tools directly on the affected device.

The new recovery screen matters most for people who use an iPhone or iPad as their main computer. Recovery Assistant and Software Update may get the device running again without immediately erasing it, while Diagnostics Mode can show whether software recovery is worth attempting.


Continue Reading on AppleInsider | Discuss on our Forums]]> <![CDATA[EP 177: National Public Data]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685102/it-security-nachrichten/ep-177-national-public-data/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685102/it-security-nachrichten/ep-177-national-public-data/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 04:09:47 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de <![CDATA[HPR4688: Downloading Podcasts with a Shell Script]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685037/podcasts/hpr4688-downloading-podcasts-with-a-shell-script/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685037/podcasts/hpr4688-downloading-podcasts-with-a-shell-script/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 02:06:46 +0200 🎥 Podcasts tsecurity.de This show has been flagged as Clean by the host.

01 Introduction

In this episode I will describe techniques for downloading podcasts using basic shell commands such as wget.

I will illustrate this using a bash script that can be used to download HPR podcasts.

Even if you do not have any interest in downloading your podcasts using this method, you may find some of the methods useful or interesting.

It is the principles that are discussed here that are important, rather than the implementation.

02

I realize that there are already a number of different podcast download programs available, including at least one written in bash.

However, you may feel that none of these suit how you wish to do things and want to create your own system tailored to your specific needs.

If so, then I hope the following is of some use to you.

If not, then you may still find some of the things discussed here to still be of interest.

Some of the subjects I cover include

wget to a user defined file name.

parsing xml with xmllint.

using inotifywait to trigger an action when a file is created or modified.

using notify-send to send a message to the notification area.

and

a way of allowing a cron job to send a message to the user interface.

03 Background

There has been an ongoing discussion in comments to some HPR episodes about problems downloading HPR podcast episodes.

Apparently some people have been experiencing problems with the way the episode URLs are structured.

04

I am afraid that I don't fully understand the nature of these problems, so I won't be addressing that problem directly.

Instead, I will present a bash script that I have written which can be used to download HPR podcasts.

This bash script can be run using cron to automatically fetch new HPR podcasts and save them to a designated directory.

This is a simplified version of a script that I have used for years to download HPR and other podcasts.

05

I won't try to read the full bash script out in this podcast, as that would be a bit dull to listen to.

I will instead describe what each section does and why I chose to do things that way.

Perhaps other people can offer suggestions of better ways to do things.

I will post the full bash script in the show notes.

06 Fetching Podcasts

The standard way of distributing podcasts is to publish an RSS feed containing URL links to the audio files.

RSS is a very long established and widely supported mechanism for this and other purposes.

An RSS feed is basically an XML document which can be accessed over HTTP.

These URLs contained in the RSS XML document can then be used to download the actual audio files, such as MP3 or OGG files.

07

Basically what we need to do is the following

• Download the RSS XML document.

• Extract the URL links to the audio files.

• Compare the list of these links to a previously saved list to see which ones are new and which ones are ones that we previously downloaded.

08

• Make a list of the new URLs.

• Go through this list of new URLs and download each of the new audio files.

• Check to see that we actually received the new audio file.

• Add the URLs of the files we successfully downloaded to our saved list of podcast URLs

09

In addition to this, we would like to have the above happen automatically in the background without our having to take any action on our own.

We may wish to receive a notification of when a new podcast has arrived however.

We would probably also wish to receive notification of any errors or failures.

10 Fetching Podcasts - The Preliminaries

Our desire to be able to run the script automatically imposes some requirements on our solution.

To schedule the script we will use cron.

Cron is a Linux facility to run scripts on a schedule.

11

One of the side effects of using cron however is that we need to specify the full path to the locations where we intend to keep any data files, plus also the full path to where we intend to put the downloaded podcasts.

12

So the first thing we need to do in our script is to specify a number of different values for things like file location, the URL for the HPR RSS feed, and several other things as well.

I will skip over the details of these, although I may make reference to them later.

13 Get the RSS Data

The first thing of real substance to do is to fetch the current RSS feed data.

I have put this in a bash function called getrssurldata

The contents of this function are a one liner, but with a number of elements chained together through pipes.

14 Downloading the RSS XML Document

• First we use wget, which is a standard command on most Linux distros.

• We specify four things.

• First we set a timeout. I have chosen 20 seconds.

• Next we set the retry limit. I have chosen 3.

15

• Then we specify that the output of wget is sent to stdout rather than saved as a file.

• This is done by using the -O option followed by a space and then a dash.

• The O option is usually used to specify a file to save the output to, but when used with a dash causes output to go to stdout.

• Then we specify the URL of the HPR RSS feed.

16 Contents of the XML Document

This gives us the HPR RSS XML document.

There are about 5,000 lines in this RSS document.

Most of those lines are the show notes which are also included in the feed.

17 Extracting the Podcast Episode URLs

There are only 10 lines of the document that contain information that we are interested in however.

These lines are enclosed in "enclosure" XML tags.

We just need to find those lines and separate out the URLs

18 Standard Command Line Tools

There are two ways that we can do this.

One is to use a combination of grep, sed, and cut.

Grep can find the lines containing the enclosure tags.

Sed and cut can extract the URL from the surrounding extraneous data.

19

However, this method does not discriminate between real enclosure tags in the data portion of the RSS feed and enclosure tags in the show notes which are included in the feed from episodes such as this one.

This may be an acceptable problem in practical terms, but we can do better.

20 Using an XML Parser

The other method is to actually parse the XML document.

there are at least two command line XML parsers that I am aware of.

These are "xmllint", and "xlmstarlet".

I have used xmllint in this example.

I have not used xmlstarlet, so I can't offer any comment on how easy or difficult to use it is.

21

I won't give a detailed explanation of all the things that xmllint can do.

It has many features, most of which, as the name suggests, have to do with finding formatting problems with the XML itself.

Describing everything it can do would be at least one episode in itself.

I will instead just give the particular command used and explain each element of it.

22

In this example assume that we are piping the output of wget directly into xmllint.

The complete command is

xmllint --xpath "//channel/item/enclosure/@url" - | cut -d'"' -f2

23

In this example,

xmllint is the name of the command.

--xpath tells it to parse the document according to the string which follows.

"//channel/item/enclosure/@url" tells it to find a series of tags in the hierarchy of channel, followed by item, followed by enclosure, and then extract the url attribute from the enclosure tag.

The "-" which follows tells it to look for input from stdin rather than from a file.

24

The result is a string which has the url attribute name, an equal sign, and the URL that we want enclosed in quotes.

To get just the URL itself, we pipe the output from xmllint into cut, using the doublequote characters as delimiters.

We then save the result in a temporary file.

25 Finding the New Episodes

Next we wish to find the new podcast episodes.

Each HPR episode is identified by a unique URL.

This means that if we save the URLs of episodes that we have already downloaded, we just have to look for the URLs that do not appear in this saved list.

https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr4659/hpr4659.mp3

26

The easiest way to do this is to take our two lists of URLs, sort each into temporary files, and then compare the sorted URLs using the "comm" command.

27

This is simple, but has a drawback.

Some podcasts occasionally change distributors.

When they do this, the old podcasts are re-published with new URLs and you end up downloading a lot of old episodes over again.

28

With HPR we could get around this by extracting just the file name and looking for that instead of the full URL.

I will however leave that problem as an exercise for the student and just accept that if the URL format changes we may end up downloading old episodes over again.

Since the feed has a maximum of only 10 episodes in it however, that isn't really that big of a problem.

It would be more of a problem with podcasts which have very large numbers of episodes in their feed, but the solutions to those will be feed specific.

29 Downloading the New Podcasts

We should now have a list of URLs for the new podcasts we do not already have.

Typically this should be only one file, but there could be several, or even as many as 10, if we have not turned on our computer in a while.

Therefore, we need to iterate through the file of new podcast URLs and download each one.

30

Before we do that however, we should check to see if there is in fact anything new to download.

To do this, simply use "wc -l" to count the number of lines in the list of new URLs and save the resulting number.

31

If this number is zero, there is nothing to download, we can skip the download step.

As an additional check, we should see if the number of downloads exceeds some threshold value that we wish to set.

This is not a major problem with HPR, but some podcasts have hundreds of files in their RSS feed rather than just the most recent ones.

If we do exceed our download limit, then we need to log an error and skip downloading.

32

Assuming there are no problems so far however, the first thing we need to do is to extract the name of the audio file from the URL.

We can do that using the "basename" command.

We will use this to specify the name that we use when we save the audio file.

33

HPR has a very well formed file name.

Some podcasts do not however, and for those you would need to construct some sort of suitable name either using information found in the URL or simply creating a name using a time stamp.

34

Next we download the audio file using wget.

This is similar to how we downloaded the RSS feed, but with a few changes.

One is that I have increased the timeout to 90 seconds.

This may not have been necessary, but seemed like a good idea.

35

The next is that when specifying the output file name using -O, we use the file name we extracted from the URL.

The third is that we specify a destination directory using the -P option.

36

After wget has finished, including any retries that it had to do, we next check that the expected new file is both present and not empty.

We did this using an "if" statement with the "-s" option.

If the file was found and not zero, then we add that URL to a temporary list of downloaded URLs.

37

If the file was not present, or was zero length, we output an error message to an error log.

I will come back to this point later.

38

Next, if there is more that one podcast to download we sleep for 3 seconds.

While not strictly necessary, it is considered to be "polite" to not hammer a server repeatedly, but rather to put a small delay between file downloads..

39

After we have downloaded all the audio files in our list, we can add the list of URLs for the files downloaded to the permanent list.

While we are at it, we should use "tail" to trim the permanent log to keep it from growing indefinitely.

This limit should be several times bigger than the number of files in the RSS feed.

In this case I selected 50.

40

Finally we write any errors to the permanent error log, and also write these same errors to another file used to signal errors for display to the user.

We have now successfully downloaded at least one HPR podcast.

41 Notify the User of Events

It would be convenient to be informed of new podcast downloads when they occur, and also be notified of any errors.

One of the limitations of cron jobs is that they cannot access the user interface.

This means that we cannot readily send a message directly to the notification system to inform the user of the presence of new podcasts or of errors.

42 inotifywait

The solution to this is to use "inotifywait" to monitor particular files and directories for changes.

The man page for inotifywait states the following -

43

inotifywait efficiently waits for changes to files using Linux's inotify(7) interface. It is suitable for waiting for changes to files from shell scripts. It can either exit once an event occurs, or continually execute and output events as they occur.

End of quote.

44

In many Linux distros, inotifywait is provided by the "inotify-tools" package.

I won't go over all the features of inotifywait.

Instead, I will just describe how to use it for our purposes here.

45 inotifywait Modes

I should point out first though that inotifywait operates in two different modes.

In the normal default mode, it exits after being triggered by an event and must be re-established again in order to resume monitoring.

In monitor mode, which is enabled by using the "-m" option, it runs indefinitely, responding to events.

I will use the default mode here.

46

The man page for inotifywait provides a simple example that we could copy and modify for our purposes.

A great many examples that you will find are based on this example.

However, it doesn't quite do what we want, so we need to change a few things.

47 podfetchnotify

The first shell script is one which monitors for the arrival of new podcasts and sends a notification to the user.

I will call this "podfetchnotify".

The complete scripts are in the show notes, I will just provide a brief description here.

48 Setting Up Event Watches Using inotifywait

The script is enclosed in a while loop which run indefinitely.

In the first line inside the while loop, we call inotifywait.

inotifywait will then block until the event it is told to look for occurs.

In short, execution of the script will wait there until an event occurs.

49

The names of the events are listed in the man file.

In this case we are looking for "modify", "create", and "moved_to".

Each of these does pretty much as you would expect, reacting to modifying an existing file, creating a new file, or moving a file to that directory.

50 Problems When Testing Using Text Editors

I should point out that if you are testing a script which uses inotifywait, then modifying a file with a text editor may not produce the results that you may think it would.

Instead it treats this as a new file with the same name, with the original file being erased.

Since inotifywait attaches itself to the inode rather than the filename, it sees the file that the text editor changed as being a new file.

If you wish to test this realistically, then use "echo" to overwrite the file by using I/O redirection.

51 Capturing Output

In my example I capture the output from standard out into a variable, but I don't do anything with it.

If you wish to for example display the name of the newly downloaded podcast file, then use the --format option along with an appropriate formatting code.

There are details about this in the man page.

On the next line we capture the exit code using "$?"

52 Responding to Exit Codes

If the exit code was zero, then a monitored event was triggered and there should a new podcast in the directory.

In this case we display a message indicating that a new podcast has arrived.

I will describe how to send notifications shortly.

If the exit code was not zero, then an error occurred.

An example of such an error would be if the directory were not present when monitoring was started.

In this case we display a message indicating that a fatal error has occurred and then exit.

53 Delay for More Podcasts

Finally, we use "sleep" to wait for some arbitrary period of time to prevent notifications from being triggered multiple times if several podcasts were being downloaded in succession.

In this case I chose to wait for 60 seconds.

54

We have now completed the process and can return to the top of the loop and resume waiting using inotifywait.

55 Sending Notifications to the User

I mentioned above about sending notification messages to the user.

In the Gnome desktop, notification messages appear from the centre of the top bar in a list.

Other desktops or operating systems may have something similar.

56

To send a notification message to the notification area, you use the "notify-send" command.

Simply follow notify-send with a quoted string and it will be displayed in the notification area.

57 podfetcherrornotify

The second shell script is one which notifies the user of errors.

I will call this "podfetcherrornotify".

With this shell script we set up a watch on a file which contains any error messages from podfetch.

This script is very similar to podfetchnotify.

58

The exceptions are

With inotifywait we only monitor for "modify".

There is no sleep command at the end of the loop.

Instead we sleep for a few seconds just after getting the exit code from inotifywait.

This helps prevent problems caused by race conditions.

59

Next we check the inotifywait exit code.

If it was zero, then we read the error report file and send a notification message to the user containing that error message.

60

If it was not zero, then we check to make sure that the directory that should contain the error log exists.

If it does not exist, then we send a notification message to that effect to the user and terminate the script.

61

If the directory exists, then we check to see if the error message file used for signalling exists.

If the file does not exist, then we create it.

62

One of the reasons for an inotifywait error is that if the file that it is told to monitor does not exist, it cannot set up a watch condition.

By creating the file we correct the cause of the error and allow inotifywait to operate normally.

63

Finally we increment an error counter and check to see if the limit is exceeded.

If there are excessive errors, then send a notification message to the user and exit.

The reason for this is to give the user an indication that the error notifications are not working for some reason and there may be a problem that needs looking into.

64

The error counter is reset every time the inotifywait exit status is ok, so occasional unexpected glitches should be something that is ignored.

Of course podcast fetching errors are something that will probably happen only rarely if at all, so this final step may be seen as an unnecessary embellishment.

65 Installing the Scripts

Next I will describe how to install and prepare the scripts to run.

We need to perform the following steps.

66

• First, we need to create a directory to hold the scripts and their associated data files.

• Next we need to create a directory to hold the downloaded podcasts.

• Then we must copy the scripts to these directories and make them executable.

• Then, we must edit the scripts to have the file path in the script match the locations of the new directories that we created.

67

• Then we need to install xmllint, or alternatively modify the download script to comment out the use of xmllint and enable the alternative method using grep and sed instead.

• Then we need to run each script manually from the command line to check for errors.

• If podfetch ran correctly, it should download the most recent 10 podcasts during this test.

68 Adding podfetch to the Crontab

The above describes how to run the scripts manually.

In order to fetch podcasts automatically, we need to add the podfetch script to the cron schedule.

To do this, open a terminal.

69

Type "crontab -e", and then press return.

A text editor should open up containing the crontab file.

On Ubuntu, this editor is GNU nano.

Enter the appropriate cron parameters.

I will provide an example here for running it 12 minutes past the hour every three hours.

70

12 */3 * * * /home/username/pathtofiles/podfetch.sh

71

I won't explain cron in detail here.

The example that I have just given should be good enough for most people.

The "*/3" parameter will cause it to run every three hours.

The "12" parameter will cause it to run 12 minutes past the hour when it does run.

72

Checking every three hours should be good enough for most people, but you can adjust that as you see fit.

I would recommend however that you don't check more frequently than once per hour.

Checking more frequently than necessary puts extra load on the distribution servers.

It is very unlikely that you really do need each new episode the moment it is available.

73

I would also recommend changing the "12" parameter to some other random minute value.

I would suggest avoiding on the hour or on the half hour, as a lot of other people are probably checking at those times, and it would be better to spread the load out more evenly over time.

74

The file path parameter should of course match the actual path to wherever you have located the script, including the correct user name.

75 Making the Notification Scripts Start Automatically

The two notification scripts can be made to start automatically.

The exact method to do this may vary according to distribution or desktop.

76

On Ubuntu this is done using the Startup Applications Preferences GUI program, which should come already installed.

77

I won't go into details on this here, it should be fairly self evident how to use it once you see it.

What this program does is to create ".desktop" files in the ".config/autostart" directory in your home directory.

78

These ".desktop" files are all run automatically on start up.

Once you have added the notification scripts, you will need to log out and then log back in to make them active.

79 Conclusion

I this episode I explained how to write a set of simple shell scripts to automatically download each new episode of HPR as it comes out and to notify you of its arrival.

80

The download script described here is tailored specifically for use with HPR only.

However, it was derived from a larger script that downloaded other podcasts as well, based on information read in from a text file.

If you are feeling ambitious, you can add those features back into this to handle all of the podcasts that you listen to.

81

In a comment to another episode of HPR I had said that I would cover ID3 tags in MP3 files, but this episode is long enough now, so I will leave that subject for later.

I look forward to seeing you again later on another episode of Hack Public Radio.

# ======================================================================

podfetchdownloader

#!/bin/bash

# Fetch pending HPR podcasts listed in the HPR RSS feed.

# 8-Jun-2026

# Licensed under GPLv3 or later.

# ======================================================================

# Today's date and time as YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.

podttimestamp=$( date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S" )

# The absolute path to the script. This is necessary when running it

# using a cron job.

podpath="/home/me/Apps/hprfetch"

# This is the absolute path to where to store the podcast files.

podfilepath="/home/me/Music/Podcasts/HPR"

# Create the full path names here for all the text files used.

podcastsfetched="$podpath/podcastsfetched.txt"

poderrorslog="$podpath/poderrorslog.txt"

poderrorsreport="$podpath/poderrorsreport.txt"

tmpoldurlssorted="$podpath/tmpoldurlssorted.txt"

tmppodsnew="$podpath/tmppodsnew.txt"

tmppodstodownload="$podpath/tmppodstodownload.txt"

tmppodserrors="$podpath/tmppodserrors.txt"

tmppodcastsfetched="$podpath/tmppodcastsfetched.txt"

tmplog="$podpath/tmplog.txt"

# The URL for the HPR RSS feed.

PodURL="http://hackerpublicradio.org/hpr_rss.php"

# Limit on number of podcasts to download.

DownloadLimit=11

# Name of the podcast.

PodName="Hacker Public Radio"

# ======================================================================

# Check if the required paths exist.

# If this path does not exist, cannot log the error.

if [[ ! -d "$podpath/" ]]; then

echo "$podttimestamp Error - Could not find $podfilepath."

exit 1

fi

# Where to store the podcast file fetched.

if [[ ! -d "$podfilepath/" ]]; then

echo "$podttimestamp Error - Could not find $podfilepath." >> $tmppodserrors

# Copy the errors log from the temporary errors file to the permanent files.

LogErrors

exit 1

fi

# ======================================================================

# Check if the podcast log exists. We read it before we write to it,

# so it must exist or we will hang on it not being present.

if [[ ! -e $podcastsfetched ]]; then

touch $podcastsfetched

fi

# ======================================================================

# Delete the specified files if they exist.

# This accepts multiple file names in a variable number of parameters.

CleanupFiles ()

{

# $@ accepts multiple parameters.

for f in "$@"; do

# Check if the file exists.

if [ -e "$f" ]; then

rm "$f"

fi

done

}

# ======================================================================

# Copy the errors log from the temporary errors file to the permanent files.

LogErrors () {

if [ -e $tmppodserrors ]; then

# The permanent log.

cat $tmppodserrors >> $poderrorslog

# This file is monitored for display by other scripts.

cat $tmppodserrors > $poderrorsreport

fi

}

# ======================================================================

# Get the URL data from an RSS feed

GetRSSURLData () {

wget --timeout=20 --tries=3 -O - "$PodURL" \

| xmllint --xpath "//channel/item/enclosure/@url" - | cut -d'"' -f2 \

| sort > $tmppodsnew

# This is an alternate method that does not use xmllint.

# However, it is not as robust. If someone were to include the

# first grep search pattern in their show notes, then it would

# look for that as a valid tag and output the following text

# as a URL.

#wget --timeout=20 --tries=3 -O - "$PodURL" | grep "<enclosure url=" \

# | sed -n 's/^.*enclosure//p' | sed -n 's/^.*url=//p' \

# | cut -d'"' -f2 | sort > $tmppodsnew

}

# ======================================================================

# Find which podcasts we do not already have.

FindNewPodcasts () {

cat $podcastsfetched | sort > $tmpoldurlssorted

comm -13 $tmpoldurlssorted $tmppodsnew > $tmppodstodownload

rm $tmpoldurlssorted

}

# ======================================================================

# Download the podcasts.

DownloadPodcasts() {

# Clear out previous temporary list of downloaded podcasts.

true > $tmppodcastsfetched

for i in $( cat $tmppodstodownload )

do

# Extract the file name from the URL.

fname=$( basename $i )

outputpodname="$podfilepath/$fname"

# Download the file.

wget --timeout=90 --tries=3 -P $podfilepath $i -O "$outputpodname"

# Check if the file exists and is not empty.

if [[ -s "$outputpodname" ]]; then

echo $i >> $tmppodcastsfetched

else

echo "$podttimestamp Error - $outputpodname was not found or is empty." >> $tmppodserrors

fi

# Delay a reasonable length of time between multiple downloads.

if (( $PodCount > 1 )); then

sleep 3

fi

done

# Add the list of files downloaded to the log.

# Check if the list exists and is not empty.

if [ -s $tmppodcastsfetched ]; then

cat $tmppodcastsfetched >> $podcastsfetched

# Trim the log file to keep it from growing indefinitely.

tail -n50 $podcastsfetched > $tmplog

mv $tmplog $podcastsfetched

fi

# Remove the tmp file now that we are done with it.

rm $tmppodcastsfetched

}

# ======================================================================

# Clean up any left over files.

CleanupFiles "$tmppodsnew" "$tmppodstodownload" "$tmppodserrors" "$tmppodcastsfetched"

# Get the RSS data.

GetRSSURLData

# Find which podcasts are new.

FindNewPodcasts

# Count how many new podcasts there are.

PodCount=$( cat $tmppodstodownload | wc -l )

# If no podcasts to download, skip this.

# If too many podcasts for this feed, then log an error and skip.

# This error will keep repeating until something is done about it.

if (( $PodCount > 0 )); then

if (( $PodCount > $DownloadLimit )); then

echo "$podttimestamp Too many podcasts for $PodName : $PodCount." >> $tmppodserrors

else

# Download the podcasts listed in the temp file.

DownloadPodcasts

fi

fi

# ======================================================================

# Copy the errors log from the temporary errors file to the permanent files.

LogErrors

# Clean up temp files.

CleanupFiles "$tmppodsnew" "$tmppodstodownload" "$tmppodserrors" "$tmppodcastsfetched"

# ======================================================================

END OF FIRST SHELL SCRIPT

START OF SECOND SHELL SCRIPT

podfetchnotify

#!/bin/bash

# Part of Podfetch.

# This monitors for new files appearing in the new podcasts directory.

# This should be run as a background task.

# Install it using the "Startup Applications" utility in Ubuntu.

# ======================================================================

# Path where new podcasts are to be stored.

podfilepath="/home/me/Music/Podcasts/HPR"

# ======================================================================

# Wait for the podcast directory to be modified.

while true; do

# Check for new files.

errmsg=$( inotifywait -e modify -e create -e moved_to $podfilepath )

result=$?

# Check if exited due to new podcast, or if some error.

if (( result == 0 )); then

# Success, signal new podcast.

notify-send "New HPR podcast available."

else

# Check to make sure the directory exists.

# If it doesn't exist, there isn't much we can do to fix it.

if [ ! -e "$poderrorspath" ]; then

notify-send "Podfetch error: Podcast directory not found $poderrorspath"

exit 1

fi

fi

# Wait a bit so that multiple new files don't keep re-triggering the notification.

sleep 60

done

# ======================================================================

END OF SECOND SHELL SCRIPT

START OF THIRD SHELL SCRIPT

podfetcherror

Created Tuesday 23 June 2026

#!/bin/bash

# Part of Podfetch.

# This monitors the Podfetch error reporting file for new errors.

# This should be run as a background task.

# Install it using the "Startup Applications" utility in Ubuntu.

# ======================================================================

# Where the Podfetch program error report file is located.

poderrorspath="/home/me/Apps/hprfetch"

# The full path and file name.

poderrorsreport="$poderrorspath/poderrorsreport.txt"

# ======================================================================

# Error counter.

errcount=0

# Wait for the poderrorsreport file to be modified.

while true; do

errmsg=$( inotifywait -e modify $poderrorsreport )

result=$?

# Wait a bit to ensure that writing to the file is complete.

sleep 3

if (( result == 0 )); then

# Get the latest error message.

# Cut out the date stamp at the start of the line and take the rest.

poderr=$( tail -n $poderrorsreport | cut -d" " -f2- )

notify-send "Podfetch error: $poderr"

# Reset the error counter every time there is a successful result.

errcount=0

else

# Check to make sure the directory exists.

if [ ! -e "$poderrorspath" ]; then

notify-send "Podfetch error: error report path not found $poderrorspath"

exit 1

fi

# Check if the file we are trying to monitor exists.

# If not, then create an empty file for error signaling.

if [ ! -e "$poderrorsreport" ]; then

echo > $poderrorsreport

fi

# Increment the error counter.

count=$(( count + 1 ))

if (( count > 3 )); then

notify-send "Podfetch error: Excessive unknown errors, exiting."

exit 1

fi

fi

done

# ======================================================================

Provide feedback on this episode.

]]> <![CDATA[Airbus Migrating 70 Critical Apps From AWS to France's Scaleway]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3685008/it-security-nachrichten/airbus-migrating-70-critical-apps-from-aws-to-frances-scaleway/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3685008/it-security-nachrichten/airbus-migrating-70-critical-apps-from-aws-to-frances-scaleway/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 01:15:37 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

]]> <![CDATA[Poolside drops Laguna S 2.1, an open-weight coding model that beats rivals 10x its size]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3684985/it-nachrichten/poolside-drops-laguna-s-21-an-open-weight-coding-model-that-beats-rivals-10x-its-size/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3684985/it-nachrichten/poolside-drops-laguna-s-21-an-open-weight-coding-model-that-beats-rivals-10x-its-size/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 01:07:11 +0200 📰 IT Nachrichten tsecurity.de Poolside, the San Francisco AI lab that has spent most of its three-year existence quietly selling coding models to governments and defense agencies, released its most capable model to date on Tuesday — and made an unusually aggressive bet that radical transparency, not raw scale, is how a smaller lab competes at the frontier.

The model, Laguna S 2.1, is a 118-billion-parameter Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) system that activates only 8 billion parameters per token, supports a context window of up to 1 million tokens, and — according to benchmarks published by the company — matches or beats open models several times its size on agentic coding tasks. The weights are available immediately on Hugging Face under the permissive OpenMDW-1.1 license.

The headline numbers are striking for a model this small. Poolside reports that Laguna S 2.1 scores 70.2% on Terminal-Bench 2.1, a benchmark of long-horizon terminal tasks, placing it 11th on the company's compiled leaderboard — ahead of DeepSeek-V4-Pro-Max, a 1.6-trillion-parameter model that scored 64.0; Thinking Machines' 975-billion-parameter Inkling, at 63.8; and Nvidia’s 550-billion-parameter Nemotron 3 Ultra, at 56.4. On SWE-Bench Multilingual, it posts 78.5%, and on SWE-Bench Pro's public dataset, 59.4%.

Perhaps more telling than any single score: the model went from the start of pre-training on May 22 to public launch in under nine weeks, trained on 4,096 Nvidia H200 GPUs. In an industry where flagship model cycles are typically measured in quarters or years, Poolside has now shipped three models in three months.

Why the West's open-weight AI gap has become a boardroom issue

The release lands in the middle of an increasingly pointed debate about the provenance of open-weight AI. Over the past year, developer adoption has shifted decisively toward open-weight systems that companies can download, inspect, and run on their own infrastructure — and the leading options in that category have overwhelmingly come from Chinese labs. DeepSeek, Qwen, Kimi, GLM, MiniMax, and Tencent's Hunyuan line all feature prominently in Poolside's own comparison tables.

Poolside's accompanying press release frames Laguna S 2.1 explicitly as a response, noting that the model occupies a size class into which no Western lab has released open weights in 11 months — since OpenAI's gpt-oss-120b last August. "The West needs open-weight models it can trust, run, and build on," said Jason Warner, Poolside's co-CEO, in the announcement.

Co-founder and co-CEO Eiso Kant made the philosophical stakes even plainer in a lengthy post on X. "I believe intelligence should and will become a commodity," he wrote, arguing that the open ecosystem "will not win by being the best in its own category." Users, he argued, simply want the best intelligence for the task at hand — so open models must be on par with, or better than, their closed equivalents.

The strategic logic here is not charity. Poolside's core business is deploying models inside the security boundaries of government, defense, and regulated enterprises — customers for whom closed, metered API access is often a non-starter for compliance and sovereignty reasons. 

Every enterprise that standardizes on a Chinese open model today becomes harder to win tomorrow. Releasing competitive open weights is both an ecosystem play and a top-of-funnel strategy for the company's high-security deployment business. It also reframes the AI race away from terrain where Poolside cannot compete — frontier-scale capital expenditure — and toward terrain where it believes it can: cost per token, self-hosting, and iteration speed.

How a sparse architecture makes enterprise AI agents affordable to run

The technical design reflects a specific thesis about where value in coding AI is moving. Laguna S 2.1's sparse MoE architecture — 256 routed experts plus one shared expert, with grouped-query attention and interleaved sliding-window layers, according to the Hugging Face model card — means inference costs scale with the 8 billion active parameters, not the 118 billion total. Poolside emphasizes that the model is small enough to run on a single Nvidia DGX Spark, the desktop-class AI machine.

That matters for what Poolside calls token economics. Long-horizon coding agents are voracious consumers of tokens: the company's published data shows the model consuming a mean of roughly 249,000 completion tokens per trajectory on its hardest benchmark when thinking mode is enabled. At metered API prices, agentic workloads at enterprise scale become a meaningful budget line item. On OpenRouter, Poolside is offering a free 256K-context endpoint and a dedicated 1M-context deployment priced at $0.10 per million input tokens and $0.20 per million output tokens — aggressive pricing that undercuts most frontier alternatives by an order of magnitude.

The ecosystem support is unusually broad for day one. The model is live on Baseten's model library and Vercel's AI Gateway, with integrations across vLLM, SGLang, Ollama, and llama.cpp, plus quantized variants down to 4-bit GGUF files — 75 gigabytes — for local use. But Poolside's more interesting claim is behavioral, not architectural. Pengming Wang, co-head of applied research at Poolside, said the gains came from improving the model's working habits: "more verification, less taking things for granted, not declaring victory early, and being more persistent." Raw intelligence, the company argues, is one axis of capability; a model's way of working is a second axis that matters immensely for agents left unattended for hours.

Publishing every benchmark trajectory to counter AI's credibility crisis

The most consequential part of the release for enterprise buyers may be an evaluation-transparency move with little precedent among major labs: Poolside published the complete, unedited trajectory of every trial in its final benchmark runs — every reasoning step, tool call, and shell command behind every reported score.

This addresses a growing credibility problem in AI benchmarking. As top scores on mature benchmarks cluster in the 70–90% range, and as "reward hacking" — models finding solutions online or gaming verifiers rather than solving problems — has become endemic, self-reported numbers have lost much of their signal. Poolside disclosed its own encounters with the problem candidly: during training, more than half of trajectories on some SWE-bench tasks were flagged because the model simply researched the original bug-fix pull request online and applied it. The company documented its mitigations, including prompt addenda, LLM-based judging calibrated against human labels, and expert annotator review of a high-scoring Terminal-Bench run.

Three published case studies illustrate what the company means by persistence. In one, the model built a working HTML/CSS rendering engine from an empty folder in a 181-step, 50-minute unattended session — then, lacking vision capabilities, spun up headless Chromium to numerically compare its canvas output against a real browser's rendering. In another, pointed at Poolside's own agent harness in an automated optimization loop, the model made the Go codebase 5.2% faster with roughly 70% lower memory allocation, finding an O(n²) string-concatenation bug along the way. In a third, working in a sandbox with no Python installed, the model did its number theory in Perl and independently re-derived a proof of Erdős problem #397 — a combinatorics question open for five decades until GPT-5.2 Pro first solved it this past January. Poolside notes that its model's construction is structurally different from the earlier published solution, and that its November 2025 knowledge cutoff precedes the first proof.

What the disclosed limitations and benchmark fine print reveal

Poolside deserves credit for disclosing limitations most labs bury. The model can overfit to its native harness and stumble on slightly different tool schemas in third-party agents, mangles JSON in nested tool arguments, and is prone to overthinking on competition math. There is currently no user-configurable thinking-effort dial — just on or off — and the gap between the modes is enormous: thinking lifts Terminal-Bench 2.1 from 60.4% to 70.2%, and DeepSWE from 16.5% to 40.4%, at substantially higher token cost.

Buyers should apply their own discounts to the comparison tables. Poolside's methodology takes the maximum of vendor self-reported scores, benchmark-author leaderboards, and third-party figures for competitors — a reasonable convention, but one that mixes harnesses and test conditions. On DeepSWE, notably, Poolside ran its own agent harness rather than the leaderboard's standard mini-swe-agent, a difference the company acknowledges makes scores less directly comparable. And the frontier remains clearly out of reach: closed models like GPT-5.6 Sol, at 88.8 on Terminal-Bench 2.1, and Claude Fable 5, at 88.0, along with the 2.8-trillion-parameter open-weight Kimi K3, at 88.3, sit well above Laguna S 2.1.

The deeper structural question is whether Poolside's "Model Factory" — the internal platform the company credits for its rapid release cadence — can sustain this pace as models scale. The trajectory so far is genuinely unusual: the April dual release of Laguna M.1 and XS.2, the July 2 refresh of XS 2.1, and now S 2.1, which the company says outperforms April's flagship M.1 at roughly a third of its active size. Remarkably, S 2.1 used the exact same pre-training data as XS 2.1, meaning nearly all the improvement came from scale, training fixes, and post-training across the company's corpus of 409,000 agentic and non-agentic training environments. Poolside says its next, larger Laguna model began pre-training last week.

For technical decision makers, Laguna S 2.1 is the most credible Western open-weight option to emerge in nearly a year for self-hosted agentic coding — with published evidence, a permissive license, broad ecosystem support, and an economics story built around hardware you can own. Whether it dents the dominance of Chinese open models will depend less on this release than on the ones that follow it.

Kant, for his part, has already told the world how he intends that story to end. Poolside is building toward a future where the most capable intelligence "can be owned and shaped by anyone," he wrote — and the company plans to keep shipping "until that future exists." In an industry where the biggest labs increasingly lock their best work behind an API, the most radical thing about Laguna S 2.1 may not be what it scores, but that anyone can download it and check.

]]> <![CDATA[Public PoC triggers active exploitation of critical SharePoint RCE vulnerability CVE-2026-50522]]> https://tsecurity.de/de/3684956/it-security-nachrichten/public-poc-triggers-active-exploitation-of-critical-sharepoint-rce-vulnerability-cve-2026-50522/ https://tsecurity.de/de/3684956/it-security-nachrichten/public-poc-triggers-active-exploitation-of-critical-sharepoint-rce-vulnerability-cve-2026-50522/ Wed, 22 Jul 2026 00:40:54 +0200 📰 IT Security Nachrichten tsecurity.de Critical SharePoint RCE vulnerability CVE-2026-50522 is under active exploitation after the release of a PoC exploit code. A critical Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-50522 (CVSS score of 9.8), is being actively exploited following the release of a public proof-of-concept…

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