The post FAIRChem v2 UMA for Multidomain Atomistic Simulation across Molecules, Catalysts, Materials, Vibrations, and Molecular Dynamics appeared first on MarkTechPost.

Stromspitzen bei den erneuerbaren Energien stellen die Stromnetze vor Herausforderungen. Ein neuer Ansatz nutzt nun stillgelegte Öl- und Gasbohrlöcher als thermische Großspeicher für überschüssigen Strom aus Photovoltaikanlagen. Das Verfahren soll ungenutzte Infrastrukturen in regulierbare grüne Leistung für Zeiten hoher Nachfrage umwandeln.  Eine Analyse von Phil Cruver, Chef des US-Unternehmens Geo2Watts, beleuchte das Potenzial sogenannter Bohrloch-Batterien […]

Der Beitrag Alte Öllöcher als Akku: Bohrloch-Batterie soll Energie speichern erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

Stromspitzen bei den erneuerbaren Energien stellen die Stromnetze vor Herausforderungen. Ein neuer Ansatz nutzt nun stillgelegte Öl- und Gasbohrlöcher als thermische Großspeicher für überschüssigen Strom aus Photovoltaikanlagen. Das Verfahren soll ungenutzte Infrastrukturen in regulierbare grüne Leistung für Zeiten hoher Nachfrage umwandeln.  Eine Analyse von Phil Cruver, Chef des US-Unternehmens Geo2Watts, beleuchte das Potenzial sogenannter Bohrloch-Batterien […]

Der Beitrag Alte Öllöcher als Akku: Bohrloch-Batterie soll Energie speichern erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

Stromspitzen bei den erneuerbaren Energien stellen die Stromnetze vor Herausforderungen. Ein neuer Ansatz nutzt nun stillgelegte Öl- und Gasbohrlöcher als thermische Großspeicher für überschüssigen Strom aus Photovoltaikanlagen. Das Verfahren soll ungenutzte Infrastrukturen in regulierbare grüne Leistung für Zeiten hoher Nachfrage umwandeln.  Eine Analyse von Phil Cruver, Chef des US-Unternehmens Geo2Watts, beleuchte das Potenzial sogenannter Bohrloch-Batterien […]

Der Beitrag Alte Öllöcher als Akku: Bohrloch-Batterie soll Energie speichern erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

Adobe Patches for May 2026

For May, Adobe released 10 bulletins addressing 52 unique CVEs in Adobe Commerce, After Effects, Adobe Connect, Illustrator, Media Encoder, Premiere Pro, Substance 3D Painter, Substance 3D Sampler, Content Authenticity SDK, and the Adobe Substance 3D Designer. Here’s this month’s overview table:

The obvious priority this month is the patch for Commerce, with its 15 bugs and deployment priority of 2. The Connect fix should also rank up there since both of its CVEs are CVSS 9s. Beyond those, it’s a pretty typical month for Adobe, with most of the bugs either being cross-site scripting (XSS) or open-and-own code executions.

Microsoft Patches for May 2026

This month, Microsoft released a whopping 138 new CVEs in Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Azure, .NET and Visual Studio, Copilot Chat, Github Copilot, M365 Copilot, SQL Server, TCP/IP, and the Telnet Client – yes, the Telnet client. Two of these bugs were reported through the TrendAI ZDI program. 30 of these bugs are rated Critical, three are rated as Moderate, one is rated Low, and the rest are rated Important in severity.

This large volume of fixes follows the largest monthly release in Microsoft’s history and reflects the trend across the industry of a high number of submissions. While not all of these bugs were found by AI, it’s likely they had an AI-related component – even if it was just AI writing the submission. I should also point out the Pwn2Own Berlin occurs in just a few days, and it’s typical for vendors to patch as much as they can before the event.

None of the bugs patched by Microsoft this month are listed as publicly known or under active attack at the time of release, so we’ve got that going for us. Let’s take a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with a nasty-looking bug in DNS:

-    CVE-2026-41096 - Windows DNS Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This patch fixes a heap-based buffer overflow in the DNS Client triggered by a malicious DNS response. No authentication or user interaction needed, and since the DNS Client runs on virtually every Windows machine, the attack surface is enormous. An attacker with a position to influence DNS responses (MitM, rogue server) could achieve unauthenticated RCE across your enterprise.

-    CVE-2026-41089 - Windows Netlogon Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This update covers another CVSS 9.8 bug, which is a stack-based buffer overflow that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker execute code on a domain controller by sending a specially crafted network request — no credentials, no user interaction required. Yup – that makes it wormable. This is the highest-impact bug that requires immediate patching: a compromised domain controller is a compromised domain.

-    CVE-2026-42898 - Microsoft Dynamics 365 On-Premises Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This bug rates a CVSS 9.9(!) and represents a code injection in Dynamics 365. It allows any authenticated user to execute code with a scope change, meaning exploitation can break out and affect resources beyond the vulnerable component itself. Scope changes are pretty rare, so if you’re running Dynamics 365 On-Prem, definitely test and deploy this patch quickly.

-    CVE-2026-40415 - Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This bug in the TCP/IP stack results from a use-after-free (UAF) and could allow a remote, unauthenticated threat actor to execute code without user interaction. That makes this another wormable bug. However, this one is much less likely to be exploited. The target needs to be under sustained low-memory (memory pressure) conditions, which is pretty rare. Still, no need to tempt fate here. Test and deploy this one quickly.

Here’s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for May 2026:

* Indicates this CVE had been released by a third party and is now being included in Microsoft releases.

† Indicates further administrative actions are required to fully address the vulnerability.

Looking at the other Critical-rated bugs in this month’s release, there are quite a few scary-looking bugs (including a CVSS 10!), but there’s no action for the end user as Microsoft has already mitigated these bugs and is just now documenting them. There’s also this month’s crop of Office bugs where the Preview Pane is an attack vector. However, the bug in Office for Android does not have the Preview Pane vector; it’s simple open and own. The bug in the WiFi driver needs a network adjacent attacker. The SharePoint bug requires authentication, but anyone with site privileges has the authentication needed. The bug in SSO Plugin for Jira & Confluence should really be called an authentication bypass, since it allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain access to a system.

Looking at the other code execution bugs, most are of the open and own variety as expected. The bug in Dynamic 365 (On Prem) requires high privileges. The Message Queueing bug requires an adjacent attacker. The bug in SQL Server requires authentication, but as usual, patching won’t be straightforward. Finally, there’s a bug in the kernel that leads to code execution. Most kernel bugs are privilege escalations, but this one could allow code execution if an attacker sends specially crafted NVMe over Fabrics (NVMe‑oF) response messages during the connection handshake process that contains an invalid header length value. Neat.

As usual, the vast majority of the Microsoft release fixes Elevation of Privilege (EoP) bugs. Also as usual, most simply lead to local attackers executing their code at SYSTEM-level privileges or administrative privileges, so there’s not much to add without further technical details about the bugs themselves. There are also a few bugs that just state the attacker could “gain ELEVATED privileges.” How obtuse. The bugs in Azure allow an attacker to access data otherwise hidden from them. The Edge bug allows threat actors to elevate to the privileges of the running application. The bug in Visual Studio allows attackers to get permissions associated with the MCP Server’s managed identity. Finally, there are a couple of sandbox escapes, too, which are always useful.

This month's update includes six Security Feature Bypass vulnerabilities. The most severe is in the Azure SDK for Java (CVSS 9.1). An attacker over the network can bypass the integrity protection provided by authentication tags on encrypted data, effectively manipulating encrypted input in a way that slips past integrity checks during decryption. Close behind is the bypass affecting the GitHub Copilot integration in Visual Studio Code (CWE-74). This one requires a user interaction, but it allows an attacker to circumvent the path validation safeguards that normally control which files Copilot is permitted to modify. The other Visual Studio Code bypass involves cross-site scripting, improper link resolution, and information exposure triggered when a user opens or views a maliciously crafted notebook. On the Windows networking side there are two bypasses. The first hits the Windows TCP/IP driver via an authentication bypass using an alternate channel. The other impacts the Windows Filtering Platform through improper access control, allowing a local, low-privileged attacker to bypass FQDN-based network security rules. Finally, there’s a Secure Boot bypass that, you guessed it, bypasses secure boot features.

Moving on to the Information Disclosure bugs fixed this month, we have 15 different CVEs. As usual, the majority of these simply result in info leaks consisting of unspecified memory contents or memory addresses. The bug in Power Automate could expose data marked “Sensitive” within Power Automate Desktop flows. One of the Word bugs could disclose NLTM hashes. The bug in Edge could disclose your cookies, which seems rude. The bug in Visual Studio could expose file path information. Finally, there’s a bug in Telnet for Windows 11 that leaks information being used by Telnet at the time. I didn’t even realize Windows 11 still had a telnet client.

The May release contains 10 spoofing bugs (plus the ones already addressed by Microsoft). The bug in Azure Machine Learning Notebooks vulnerability requires user interaction, but it could expose info through the Azure ML web interface to the attacker. There’s a cluster of fixes for Microsoft's mobile Office suite on Android. Excel, Word, and PowerPoint for Android all carry spoofing flaws rooted in improper access control. Two Copilot products are also affected by spoofing vulns. The M365 Copilot for Desktop has no details provided. The M365 Copilot for Android variant requires low privileges and producing only limited impact on confidentiality and integrity. Microsoft Teams for Android rounds out the mobile app spoofing bugs. Three Edge bugs close things out, all involving misrepresentation of information in the browser UI.

There are two Tampering bugs in this month’s release. The one in .NET Core allows threat actors to write files to an affected system. The other is in Outlook for iOS and manifests as a command injection bug.

There are eight DoS bugs in the May release, but as always, Microsoft provides little to no actionable information about the vulnerabilities. The most interesting from a practical standpoint are two TCP/IP bugs that allow a low-privilege Hyper-V guest to crash the host. Both are triggered from the adjacent network. On the broader network-exposure side, the ASP.NET Core bug is a straightforward infinite loop condition — an unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted request over the network and the server stops responding.

No new advisories are being released this month.

Looking Ahead

Assuming I survive Pwn2Own Berlin (which is looking iffy at the moment), I’ll return on June 9th on what will hopefully be a smaller release than this one. Until then, stay safe, happy patching, and may all your reboots be smooth and clean!

In wenigen Minuten Strom für Hunderte Kilometer Reichweite oder einen Lkw während der Pause voll laden: Das soll das sogenannte Megawattladen möglich machen. 2025 eröffneten die ersten Stationen in Europa. Wir verraten dir, wie die Technologie funktioniert.  Elektrofahrzeuge schneller laden zu können, bringt für Pkw mehr Reisekomfort und mehr Wirtschaftlichkeit für Lkw im Fernverkehr. Um […]

Der Beitrag Schnell wie ein Toilettengang: Wie funktioniert Megawattladen? erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

Wer ein Restaurant oder Hotel auf Google Maps sucht, orientiert sich an den Sternebewertungen. Doch eine dpa-Stichprobe zeigt, dass allein in Hessen 17 Prozent der Gastbetriebe bereits Rezensionen haben löschen lassen – in Frankfurt sogar fast jeder Dritte. Der Grund: Was als Schutz vor Diffamierung gedacht war, ist längst zu einem Reputationswerkzeug verkommen. Seit April […]

Der Beitrag Krieg der Sterne: Wie Hotels und Restaurants ihre Google-Bewertungen frisieren erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

Anthropic hat eine neue Funktion für Claude Cowork vorgestellt: Record a Skill, zu Deutsch: einen Skill aufzeichnen. Nutzer können sich dabei selbst beim Arbeiten aufzeichnen. Claude lernt dann daraus eine wiederholbare Fähigkeit, um Aufgaben für dich zu erledigen. Die Reaktionen reichen von Begeisterung bis zu Jobsorgen.  So schnell wie KI-Anwendungen neue Funktionen bekommen, können Nutzer […]

Der Beitrag Claude Cowork kann dich beim arbeiten beobachten – um deinen Job zu erledigen erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

OpenAI hat einen „beispiellosen Cybervorfall“ eingeräumt. KI-Modelle des Unternehmens sollen eigenständig aus einer Testumgebung ausgebrochen sein und sich Zugang zum offenen Internet verschafft haben. Anschließend hackten sie ein anderes Unternehmen. Politik, Wirtschaft und KI-Szene zeigen sich schockiert. Der Fall offenbart große Risiken durch autonome KI-Agenten, dürfte aber auch Teil eines geschickten PR-Manövers sein. Denn: OpenAI […]

Der Beitrag OpenAI verliert Kontrolle über seine KI – und macht einen PR-Stunt draus erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

Executive summary 

A group of Russian state-supported cyber actors has been targeting and compromising various Western government and commercial organizations using the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) software since at least July 2025. The Russian state-supported advanced persistent threat (APT) group’s activity is tracked in the cybersecurity community under several names (see Cybersecurity industry tracking), primarily as “LAUNDRY BEAR,” a name initially coined by the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) [1].

LAUNDRY BEAR’s targeting is almost certainly to gather sensitive information for the Russian Federation, with these actors primarily focusing on the covert acquisition of email data. Previous campaigns indicated LAUNDRY BEAR relied on unsophisticated initial access techniques—including password spraying, phishing, and pass-the-cookie—allowing the group to successfully run high-volume operations. The latest campaign targeting ZCS uses a novel exploit that was a zero-day vulnerability when first exploited and continues to be successfully exploited. The vulnerability, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2025-66376, was patched in November 2025. This demonstrates LAUNDRY BEAR’s intent and ability to deploy increasingly sophisticated technical capabilities.

Unlike traditional phishing campaigns that persuade a user into taking an action, such as clicking a link or opening a file, LAUNDRY BEAR’s latest campaign leverages a view-based exploit that only requires a user to view a malicious email within a vulnerable version of the webmail service. Once viewed, the exploit attempts to exfiltrate the victim’s last 90 days of email communications, the organization email directory (i.e., Global Address List [GAL]), and other sensitive information to servers controlled by LAUNDRY BEAR. The exploit also attempts to establish persistent access to victim accounts through a variety of means as detailed in the Persistence and credential access section.

This Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) warns of this ongoing malicious threat activity and urges organizations to update their vulnerable software and implement additional mitigations to thwart these Russian state-supported actors’ continued success. The CSA is being released by the following authoring and co-sealing agencies:

• United States National Security Agency (NSA)
• United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD)
• Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)
• United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
• United States Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA)
• United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
• United States Department of the Treasury
• United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)
• Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
• Communications Security Establishment Canada’s (CSE’s) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
• New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
• United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
• Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)¹
• Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS)²
• Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS)³
• Finnish Defence Intelligence (FDI)⁴
• Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO)⁵
• French General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI)⁶
• French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI)⁷
• Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE)⁸
• Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI)⁹
• Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova (SIS RM)¹⁰
• Polish Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW)¹¹
• The Military Counterintelligence Service of Poland (SKW)¹²
• Spain National Intelligence Centre (CNI)¹³
• Sweden National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-SE)¹⁴

The authoring agencies urge any organizations using ZCS to implement the recommendations listed within the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the risk associated with this activity. This CSA also includes specific remediations for organizations to implement if they discover the presence of the listed Indicators of compromise (IOCs).  

As more organizations update their ZCS software based on this CSA, LAUNDRY BEAR may discontinue the current campaign exploiting this vulnerability; however, based on the success of this and previous campaigns, it is very likely that the group will continue to target ZCS and other email systems used by organizations in Western countries. The actors will almost certainly continue to rely on email to engage potential victims by exploiting novel vulnerabilities and, when necessary, use social engineering techniques to assist with their efforts. The authoring agencies recommend organizations regularly update their mail service software and continuously monitor their email systems and emails for malicious activity.

For a downloadable list of IOCs, see:

• AA26-204A.stix.xml (STIX XML)
• AA26-204A.stix.json (STIX JSON)

Cybersecurity industry tracking

The cybersecurity industry provides overlapping cyber threat intelligence, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and mitigation recommendations related to these Russian state-supported cyber actors. While not exhaustive, the following are threat group names commonly used for these actors within the cybersecurity community:

• LAUNDRY BEAR
• Void Blizzard [2]
• CL-STA-1114 [3]
• TA488 (formerly UNK_PitStop) [4]

Note: Cybersecurity companies have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this may not be a 1:1 correlation to the U.S. government’s understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

Background

Public advisories from Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), and Microsoft highlighted these Russian state-supported advanced persistent threat (APT) actors in May 2025, calling them LAUNDRY BEAR and Void Blizzard respectively [1] [2]. Both advisories assessed that the group was engaged in malicious cyber activity as early as April 2024.  

The May 2025 advisories highlighted a cluster of activity targeting cloud-based email environments, including Microsoft Exchange in particular, and abusing legitimate APIs to perform data exfiltration in bulk [T1114.002]. The group relied on unsophisticated means of initial access, including procuring stolen credentials on criminal marketplaces [T1078], and using social engineering techniques to lure targets into interacting with a malicious site masquerading as a legitimate one. As of April 2025, one of these sites resembled a European Defence & Security Summit registration portal that required registrants to sign in to their Microsoft account to view. Once a user entered their Microsoft credentials into this malicious site, LAUNDRY BEAR’s modified version of the open source adversary emulation toolkit, Evilginx, intercepted the user’s credentials. LAUNDRY BEAR then used this authentication data, including passwords and session tokens, to access the compromised account and conduct mass email exfiltration, as well as harvest other information. This method of compromise is commonly known as an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique [T1557].  

Beginning around July 2025, LAUNDRY BEAR shifted toward a more technical method of email compromise, highlighting their continued efforts to covertly acquire email communications from a variety of Western organizations of interest and deliver them to the Russian Federation. Using a custom-developed capability [T1587.001] named “Улей” or “Ulej” (Russian for beehive), LAUNDRY BEAR successfully targeted and exfiltrated sensitive user information from organizations who use the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) product [T1114]. Data LAUNDRY BEAR attempted to exfiltrate from compromised accounts included:

• Last 90 days of emails,
• Email address,
• Password [T1589.001],
• Global Address List (GAL) [T1087],
• Two-factor authentication (2FA) tokens, and
• Newly-created Application Passcode [T1098].

The covert and persistent nature of this activity, along with the absence of any known financial extortion, almost certainly indicates this group’s involvement in espionage activities with Russian government backing. Additionally, extensive Ukrainian targeting, prior to use against U.S. and other NATO allies, outlines an increasing trend within Russian cyber threat groups to target Ukrainian users first—both as a priority target and as a testbench for malicious cyber techniques before broader global deployment.

Targeting details

LAUNDRY BEAR has targeted and compromised users in various organizations, including those associated with:

• the Defense Industrial Base (DIB),  
• the federal and local government,
• education,
• energy,
• law enforcement,  
• media,  
• non-governmental organizations, and
• technology.

Technical details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 19. This advisory also uses MITRE D3FEND^TM version 1.4.0¹⁵. See Appendix A and Appendix B for tables of the activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK and D3FEND tactics, techniques, and countermeasures.

Ulej is a novel data exfiltration and aggregation capability, that currently (as of the publication of this report) supports a campaign specifically targeting users of ZCS webmail servers. This capability is used to exploit CVE-2025-66376 [Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')], but likely could be adapted to exploit other vulnerabilities. It exfiltrates emails and other sensitive user data from a victim’s system immediately after exploitation and stores the data in an actor-controlled unattributable virtual private server (VPS) [T1074.002] running LAUNDRY BEAR’s “Flowerbed” collection framework. The collected data is almost certainly further exfiltrated to internal network resources for review and long-term retention.

Reconnaissance

LAUNDRY BEAR uses the Ulej capability to exploit the CVE-2025-66376 vulnerability in organizations using ZCS. This campaign’s targeted victimology and limited exploitation capabilities likely indicate this group manually identifies and targets the victim organizations. LAUNDRY BEAR likely identifies organizations with public-facing Zimbra infrastructure by port scanning [T1595] and fingerprinting datasets easily procured through various commercial vendors [T1596.005].  

After identifying a target organization, the group likely compiles email addresses for individual users to target with the exploit [T1589.002] from datasets offered by commercial vendors [T1597.002], open source intelligence [T1593], or previously exfiltrated data [T1597].  

Resource development

The actors procure VPSs from a variety of providers [T1583.003], including those with Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements, and often use fabricated identities. LAUNDRY BEAR primarily uses Mullvad VPN [T1583] when interacting with these servers, further demonstrating the group’s intent to mask their identity and maintain operations security (OPSEC). After the server is provisioned, an automated process deploys the Docker containers necessary for Ulej’s Flowerbed framework [T1608], which then receives and aggregates the data Ulej exfiltrates. These servers are typically only used for 7-60 days before moving to new infrastructure.

Flowerbed framework

Flowerbed is a Python project that uses Docker for containerization. The project includes four different Docker containers:

• Catcher,
• Certbot,
• Nginx, and
• Gardener.

Catcher acts as both a DNS and HTTP server to receive and aggregate exfiltrated victim information [T1048]. For additional information on Catcher, refer to the Exfiltration section of this advisory. Flowerbed’s next container, Certbot, is based on one of the official Certbot containers, which allows for automated generation of Let’s Encrypt certificates using DNS challenges through Cloudflare. This certificate can then be used by the Nginx container, which serves as an HTTPS reverse proxy for Catcher, enabling Flowerbed to disguise some of its exfiltration activity through an encrypted communications channel [T1048.002]. The Nginx reverse proxy also validates that the Server Name Indicator (SNI) value contains “*.i.*” prior to forwarding the traffic to Catcher. If the SNI does not contain that string, the Nginx server returns a 444 error to the client. This is likely an attempt to reject non-Ulej connections. Finally, the Gardener container functions as a health check for the Catcher service. Gardener is a simple Python script that validates Catcher correctly receives and processes data.

The simplistic Flowerbed codebase has indications that artificial intelligence (AI) played a role in its development. This highlights how AI is increasingly being used to develop malicious capabilities [T1588.007]. The dependence on AI for a simple capability, such as Flowerbed, alongside a previous reliance on open source capabilities, such as Evilginx2 [T1588.002], likely indicates a lack of advanced technical knowledge within LAUNDRY BEAR, especially in relation to true software development capabilities.

Initial access

To gain initial access, LAUNDRY BEAR sends an email containing a malicious JavaScript payload to the target [T1566]. Through exploitation of CVE-2025-66376, this JavaScript payload is immediately executed once the user views the malicious email [T1203], such as the one shown in Figure 1, in the ZCS webmail platform. Since at least November 2025, LAUNDRY BEAR began sending these phishing emails from victim infrastructure through compromised accounts [T1199], as shown in the email metadata in Figure 2. These compromised accounts were likely previous victims of this, or another LAUNDRY BEAR, campaign and their use is intended to further obfuscate and frustrate anti-phishing tools and training.

According to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), CVE-2025-66376 was initially published on 5 January 2026. This vulnerability allows for execution of a JavaScript payload included in email content due to improper sanitization of Cascading Style Sheet’s (CSS) @import directives within an email [5]. Because the activity attributed to this campaign began in July 2025—months before Synacor released a patch and the CVE was published—the payload initially exploited a zero-day vulnerability at that time [T1587.004].  

Utilization of a zero-day exploit within this campaign demonstrates the ability for even emerging threat groups like LAUNDRY BEAR to operationalize novel exploits into a highly successful capability.

Hidden in LAUNDRY BEAR’s email is a Base64 encoded payload within the “onload” field of a Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) element [T1027.017], as shown in Figure 3. Leading up to the inclusion of this payload in the SVG element are various instances of @import directives, as required to leverage CVE-2025-66376. This payload includes an XOR encrypted final script encoded in a Base64 inner payload (see Figure 3) [T1027.013]. The outer payload decodes and decrypts the inner payload using an XOR function and a hardcoded key and then executes the script contained within the inner payload containing the collection and exfiltration logic. By changing the key used for the XOR encryption of the inner payload or adding additional @import directives with non-functional code [T1027.010], LAUNDRY BEAR can easily generate new payloads that bypass basic threat detection signatures. This malicious payload attempts to collect and exfiltrate information in 12 asynchronous stages [T1119]. The stages in order of appearance within the payload are as follows:

1. sendStartPing,
2. gather_email,
3. gather_environment,
4. gather_2fa_codes,
5. gather_app_password,
6. gather_device_status,
7. gather_oauth_consumers,
8. gather_autocomplete_password,
9. enable_mail_protocols,
10. gather_gal,
11. sendArchives, and
12. sendFinishPing. 

Use of a zero-day exploit within this campaign demonstrates the ability for even emerging threat groups like LAUNDRY BEAR to operationalize novel exploits into a highly successful capability [T1587].

Persistence and credential access

To establish sustained persistence into the victim’s email account, the script attempts to modify account preferences and collect authentication information. Any collected credentials are later exfiltrated, as further described in the Exfiltration section below. Other campaigns attributed to LAUNDRY BEAR also demonstrated the group’s ability to circumvent multi-factor authentication through session token replay [T1550.004], and the Zimbra campaign follows a similar trend.

The script used in this campaign tries to discover the victim’s email address during the gather_email stage [T1087]. The script searches for this email address in two ways. First, it examines the batchInfoResponse variable, which an HTML script element on the webpage can define, for an email address. Even if the script finds an email address there, it also checks whether it acquired a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) token as described later in the Collection section of this advisory. If so, the script uses the “GetIdentitiesRequest” Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace to determine the victim’s email address [T1185] and then exfiltrates it. However, if the script does not have a CSRF token or the SOAP request fails, the script exfiltrates the email value recovered from the first method instead. If both attempts fail to capture the victim’s email, the script sends a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) payload with a key of “email” and value of null over HTTPS and does not attempt DNS exfiltration.

During the gather_autocomplete_password stage, the script attempts to collect the victim’s saved password via the autocomplete feature of the victim’s password manager. The script injects two HTML div elements requesting login credentials onto the page outside of the victim’s view, as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. After waiting five seconds, the script then attempts to extract the password provided automatically by the password manager from the input element shown in Figure 4. If there is no value in that input field, it checks the password input field shown in Figure 5. If neither input field contains a value, a JSON payload with a key of “autocomplete_password” and value of null is sent over HTTPS and DNS exfiltration is not attempted.

LAUNDRY BEAR almost certainly relies on a mail client using the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) for persistent access to the victim’s mailbox. During the enable_mail_protocols stage, a SOAP request leveraging the “ModifyPrefsRequest” command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace is sent. This request attempts to set the “zimbraPrefImapEnabled” preference to TRUE. While the default setting for “zimbraPrefImapEnabled” is not well documented, this action is almost certainly intended to ensure that IMAP access to the victim’s mailbox is enabled.

ZCS does not support 2FA for some mail clients, including IMAP. To support users who rely on IMAP clients, ZCS allows for the generation of Application Passcodes. Application Passcodes are randomly generated passwords that can be used for clients that cannot support the normal 2FA process to authenticate. During the gather_app_password stage, the script makes a SOAP request using the “CreateAppSpecificPasswordRequest” command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace to create a new Application Passcode [T1556.006]. The SOAP request uses “ZimbraWeb” as the name of the application.

Additionally, the script also attempts to collect 2FA tokens. During the gather_2fa_codes stage, the script makes a SOAP request using the “GetScratchCodesRequest” command under the “ZimbraAccount” namespace. The script then attempts to exfiltrate any non-null 2FA codes collected this way. The number of codes can vary, and each code is exfiltrated to Flowerbed individually.

Collection

As demonstrated in the Persistence and credential access section, this script relies heavily on SOAP requests to collect victim information. To make these requests, the script aims to acquire the victim’s current CSRF token, which it attempts to access within the webpage’s local storage using localStorage.getItem("csrfToken"). If the script is unable to acquire this CSRF token, it will be unable to make any SOAP requests. In addition to the SOAP commands documented in the Persistence and credential access section, other SOAP commands executed to collect victim information are shown in Table 1.

The script attempts to collect the victim’s GAL through brute force by searching for each two-character combination from a character set of “abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890.-_”. These queries are conducted using 20 batches of SOAP requests with 77 “SearchGalRequest” SOAP commands in each batch except for the last request containing only 58.

During the gather_environment stage, the script attempts to determine which type of ZCS webmail client the victim is using. The script checks the user’s current URL to determine the client type being used, checking for certain indicators (shown in Table 2) to determine the client type. The corresponding value is then used as the payload when exfiltrating the client type.

As part of collection, the script attempts to harvest any emails not marked as “junk” from the last 90 days from the victim’s account. Emails are collected daily by an HTTP GET request to the URL path, “/home/~/?fmt=tgz&meta=0&query=date:-{DAY_OFFSET}d AND (not in:junk)”. The {DAY_OFFSET} value would be between 0 and 89 representing how many days ago the email was sent or received. To prevent redundant collection and exfiltration of emails, a variable with a name based on the email date being queried, using a format of zd_comp_YYYY-MM-DD, and value of true, is saved to the window.top.localStorage property. This variable is saved regardless of whether the email is successfully exfiltrated.  

According to Mozilla documentation, if the user is not in a private browsing session, any data stored to localStorage does not typically expire. This means that if the user happens to execute the script again from the same computer, the script avoids attempting to re-exfiltrate previously captured emails. However, the script always attempts to pull any emails with a {DAY_OFFSET} of zero. In other words, the script always pulls emails sent or received the same day it is run. After email results are returned from the query for each day of email activity, those results are then passed to Flowerbed as described in the Exfiltration section.

The script also provides LAUNDRY BEAR with telemetry on any errors that occur during the collection process. This is accomplished by executing any collection or exfiltration code through helper functions that contain error handling logic. If an error occurs, a payload containing information on the error itself, the context of the error happening, and the stage in which the error occurred is sent to Flowerbed as described in the Exfiltration section below. For cases where the error occurs within a SOAP request, “:api” is concatenated to the stage value in the payload. If an error occurs during the batch SOAP requests that occur when collecting the GAL of the victim, the stage value will use a format of gather_gal:{VAL}:api. The {VAL} placeholder indicates which batch request, a number from 0 to 19, the error occurred in. Errors that occur during the password autocomplete interception process will use “gather_autocomplete_password:dom” for the stage value. Finally, if an error occurs when attempting to collect or exfiltrate a specific day’s emails, the stage will include which day the error occurred on, using the previously defined placeholder {DAY_OFFSET}, with a format of sendArchive:day-{DAY_OFFSET}.

Exfiltration

At the end of each stage in the collection process, the script attempts to exfiltrate acquired information to Flowerbed. The script primarily relies on two forms of data exfiltration: DNS [T1048.003] and HTTPS. Some information is exfiltrated over both the DNS and HTTPS channels.

Prior to exfiltration, a randomized 10- or 11-character alphanumeric string is generated as an identifier for the victim. This identifier is included in the URL of both the DNS- and HTTPS-based exfiltration.  

DNS exfiltration

DNS exfiltration occurs through DNS A record queries. To ensure data exfiltrated through DNS is not corrupted when traversing through non-actor-controlled DNS infrastructure, Ulej maintains compliance with RFC 1035, Domain Names - Implementation and Specification, specifically accounting for the case insensitivity and subdomain length requirements. Base32 encoding is used to create a case-insensitive payload. Once the payload is encoded, a period (“.”) is added every 60 characters to ensure each subdomain is under 63 characters long. The script then creates a new image object sourced from a URL with the scheme defined in Figure 6. Any traffic involving DNS exfiltration will have “d-“ prefixing the victim identifier, and the subdomain immediately following indicates the type of information being exfiltrated.

When the script generates an image object, the browser tries to retrieve the complete domain of the URL specified as the source of the image. This triggers a DNS request sent to the actor-controlled server and processed by Flowerbed. Table 3 lists both the information exfiltrated via DNS and their corresponding data type identifiers in the DNS queries.  

HTTPS exfiltration

Any information exfiltrated via DNS is also exfiltrated through HTTPS, as well as additional data including email content, contacts, attachments, and error logging information. By using Let’s Encrypt certificates, this group can quickly deploy new infrastructure and leverage encrypted HTTPS communications with valid server certificates when exfiltrating information from the victim’s environment. The HTTPS exfiltration capability only uses two HTTP content types, defined in Table 4. Traffic associated with HTTPS exfiltration will use the URL scheme shown in Figure 7.  

Some of the data transmitted via HTTPS uses the standard JSON content type format. The script includes the information in a POST request to actor-controlled infrastructure.  

Table 5 provides a summary of the JSON-based exfiltration.

The script transmits all HTTPS exfiltration not identified in Table 5 using the Octet-Stream content type as binary data. The POST requests for this method include a filename in the “X-Filename” header. Traditionally, developers use headers prefixed with “X-” to denote custom headers that do not follow a defined standard. The purpose of including this header remains unclear since the Catcher capability ignores the provided filename when saving the data. Table 6 summarizes the data exfiltrated in this format.

The script sends all exfiltrated data identified in Table 6 to the Catcher service exactly as received from the SOAP request in a JSON payload, except for email exfiltration. For email exfiltration, the script sends it as a GZIP compressed archive [T1560]. Although most of the exfiltration consists of valid JSON, the script still attempts to exfiltrate all information identified in Table 6 using the application/octet-stream content typing rather than application/json.

At the beginning and end of the collection and exfiltration activity, during the sendStartPing and sendFinishPing stages respectively, the script submits a POST request with a JSON payload to indicate that the script is starting or finishing execution. Throughout execution, the script also logs error events and send the logs using similar JSON payloads. The script sends the JSON in a POST request to the URL documented in Figure 2, using a URL path of “/v/p” and with a “subtype” key that shows which type of action it logged (start, finish, or error).  

Catcher

Ulej exfiltrates information to Flowerbed to be handled by a service named Catcher. Catcher is a containerized Python application, running in Docker as part of Flowerbed, which is detailed in the Resource development section. It receives exfiltrated data and temporarily stores it, enabling its eventual transfer to infrastructure designed for long-term, secure storage.

Catcher acts as an HTTP server over port 8000 and a DNS server on port 53. As described in the Resource development section, the Flowerbed project uses an additional Docker container running an Nginx reverse proxy to enable HTTPS support. This reverse proxy uses a certificate generated by Let’s Encrypt and forwards all traffic with an SNI containing “*.i.*” to port 8000 within the Catcher container.

The DNS service can accept A, AAAA, MX, TXT, and CAA queries. For any MX, AAAA, or CAA queries, the server will always provide an empty response. The system only supports TXT records as needed to process Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) requests, which enable the assignment of Let’s Encrypt certificates. If the server receives an A query, Catcher will always respond with the public IP address of the Flowerbed server.  

However, if a query includes a domain formatted as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, the service saves a log file in JSON format to disk containing the following details of the DNS query:

• Time of query,
• Source IP address for query,
• Queried domain, and
• Type of query.

The HTTP server typically responds with OK, except in cases where the path is “pixel.gif” when the response contains a 1x1 gif image with a SHA-256 hash of ef1955ae757c8b966c83248350331bd3a30f658ced11f387f8ebf05ab3368629. Like the DNS service, the HTTP service will only log entries when the domain found in the host header of the request follows the expected formatting as seen in Figure 6 and Figure 7. As the HTTPS exfiltration uses non-standardized binary and JSON-formatted payloads when exfiltrating to Catcher, Catcher will check the content type of the request. If the content type is set to “application/json”, Catcher encodes the data in Base64 and includes it in the JSON log entry written to disk. If the content type is set to any other value, Catcher leaves the Base64 payload in the JSON log entry blank and saves the payload to a separate file with the same filename as the JSON log entry with a “.bin” file extension. An HTTPS exfiltration event causes Catcher to save a JSON formatted log file to disk containing the following information from the HTTP request:

• Time,
• Source IP address,
• Request method,
• Host,
• Path,
• Query string,
• Headers, and
• Base64 payload.

These JSON event log files and binary output files are then initially saved to the directory /root/hits/tmp and later moved to the /root/hits/ready directory once processed. This prevents incomplete files, which are still being uploaded to Catcher, from premature exfiltration from the server. Approximately every 60 seconds, a likely automated workflow establishes a Secure Shell (SSH) connection with the server hosting Flowerbed for a few seconds, almost certainly exfiltrating the data processed by Catcher to non-public-facing infrastructure. The command in Figure 8 also executes hourly to remove all files last modified at least two days ago from the /root/hits/ready directory.

Response strategies

Mitigations

In many cases, by the time an organization identifies a compromise related to this campaign, numerous sensitive and proprietary emails have already been exfiltrated. The significant risk posed by this cyber threat emphasizes the importance for organizations that use ZCS and other similar webmail solutions to take proactive steps to mitigate this risk.

All organizations that use the ZCS webmail service should immediately prioritize ensuring that their ZCS is not running a vulnerable version. A patch for CVE-2025-66376 was released for both 10.1.13 and 10.0.18 versions of ZCS [D3-AH]. If immediate patching is not feasible, organizations should advise employees to use alternative mail clients to access email and avoid using the Classic ZCS webmail client until ZCS is updated to a non-vulnerable version [d3f:Isolate].

System administrators should closely monitor any Internet-connected ZCS or other email systems and the workstations that access those systems and promptly apply available software updates [D3-AH]. Administrators can maintain awareness of active vulnerability exploitation by referencing open source resources, including CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog and NCSC-UK’s Responding to active exploitation of vulnerabilities guidance.

Organizations should consider using a third-party authentication service that supports passkeys for authentication to mediate access to ZCS and other services that do not natively support passkeys. By doing so, organizations can work to eliminate the possibility of automated password collection from autocomplete or password reuse [D3-CH]. However, Application Passcodes may still be necessary and should be monitored closely.  

Organizations should implement network monitoring capabilities with collection and short-term retention of packet capture or NetFlow data and maintain log collection and storage [CPG 3.Q]. This will allow organizations to monitor for and identify suspicious network activity [CPG 4.B], such as:

• Significant amounts of outbound data being sent to IPs associated with VPS providers not used by the organization [D3-NTA];
• Frequent DNS queries for a suspicious domain with seemingly random subdomains [D3-DNSTA];
• A sudden spike of connections to a server associated with a recently established domain [D3-NTCD]; and  
• Connections to internal services, such as webmail, from VPN providers frequently leveraged by this group for nefarious activity, such as Mullvad VPN [D3-NTCD].

Additionally, for organizations that can inspect the content of outbound HTTPS connections via break-and-inspect infrastructure, security teams should identify traffic matching the characteristics described in the Exfiltration section of this advisory.

Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

Flowerbed infrastructure

The following indicators have been attributed to use by LAUNDRY BEAR for their campaign targeting ZCS’s webmail service as of the publication of this advisory. (Disclaimer: Due to the frequency of operational structure changes by this group, these indicators are intended solely for historic attribution purposes. Some indicators, such as IPs, compromised emails, and domains, may be outdated, so organizations should check for current activity before acting on these IOCs.) Table 7 provides details about the server infrastructure used to host Flowerbed, and Table 8 lists the corresponding SHA-1 hash values for the Let’s Encrypt certificates used by that infrastructure [D3-IAA].

LAUNDRY BEAR has used the following email addresses to procure resources used for this campaign:

• ivanka.zurabishvili@proton[.]me,
• zmul1@buildandconsulting[.]com,
• garrysmithme@pinmx[.]net, and
• hostingclient@pinmx[.]net.

Phishing distribution

LAUNDRY BEAR primarily relied on ProtonMail for distribution of malicious email. However, as stated above, LAUNDRY BEAR’s more recent efforts likely have shifted to distributing the payload through previous victims.  

The following email addresses have distributed payloads attributed to this campaign:

• c.laurent.ejfa@proton[.]me,
• j.moreau.epsc@proton[.]me,
• liberty.insights@proton[.]me,
• certain email addresses (presumably compromised) at the isofts.kiev[.]ua domain (i.e., ending with @isofts.kiev[.]ua), and
• certain email addresses (presumably compromised) at the navs.edu[.]ua domain (i.e., ending with @navs.edu[.]ua).

Additionally, the following are SHA-256 hashes of email samples containing the malicious payload attributed to this campaign:

• 98df604ecc57f884a2e6ce3266a0013ad64455cac48442c2312cfa4765007aaf,
• 60db9abae75cd8ccc49dd7ea5feb41677566dcd442f12ebc5745ffd2810fb874,
• b1f5beb1175fc5c7d1806a2f0d900eb124c54f0286c5c52b66eea7a6633adb1d, and
• 1517b3caa495f6c4e832df9c75fc94667e3c233773f7fa4e056d5e30e5ead760.

Post-compromise artifacts

Currently, the script does not remove artifacts. This leaves additional opportunities to identify victims of this activity. While emphasis should always be placed on consistent monitoring of network traffic and endpoint activity, there are a variety of persistent artifacts described below that can be used to identify victims of this campaign.

This Ulej capability relies on creating a significant number of SOAP requests to collect account information for exfiltration. ZCS logs from these requests are stored, by default, in the /opt/zimbra/log/mailbox.log file [D3-PA]. A significant amount of SOAP request activity that aligns with what was described in the Persistence and credential access and Collection sections of this advisory could indicate a potential compromise. Specific examples of high-risk SOAP request activity might include:

• Many SearchGalRequest command requests from a single user over a short period of time;
• Use of the CreateAppSpecificPasswordRequest command, especially in cases where it is creating an Application Passcode named “ZimbraWeb”; and
• Use of the GetScratchCodesRequest command.

While LAUNDRY BEAR uses the localStorage property to track what days had emails previously exfiltrated, defenders can use this property to identify victims of this campaign and determine the scope of exfiltrated information [D3-PA]. Review of the items stored in that property for an organization’s ZCS webmail client page on an endpoint device could indicate compromise if there are items named with a format of zd_comp_YYYY-MM-DD, as explained in the Collection section of this advisory.

While Application Passcodes have non-malicious purposes, in this case instances of these passcodes with the name “ZimbraWeb” are almost certainly malicious. The ZCS webmail application can support 2FA natively and does not require the use of an Application Passcode, so there is no reason that there should be one named “ZimbraWeb.”

In instances where organizations identify victims of this campaign, they should also examine the inbox of the suspected victim for the original phishing email [D3-MA]. If an email that has a payload exploiting CVE-2025-66376 is discovered, steps should be taken immediately to identify and quarantine other instances of emails with similar body content, senders, and subject lines to prevent further exploitation and exfiltration.  

Remediation

In the event an organization identifies activity associated with this campaign, that organization should take steps to minimize further exploitation. The organization should consider requesting that employees minimize use of the ZCS webmail client until the organization updates to a patched version that is not vulnerable to CVE-2025-66376.

Organizations should use identifiers from the IOCs section of this report to identify any individuals compromised by this campaign and record the date(s) of compromise(s) to determine the scale and scope of emails exfiltrated.

All users from the organization should have all Application Passcodes and 2FA scratch keys revoked. Affected organizations should require all employees to change passwords in line with establishing minimum password strength requirements [CPG 3.B] and creating unique credentials [CPG 3.C], specifically noting that compromised employees might have had any password stored in a password manager exfiltrated.

Works cited

[1] Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD). AIVD and MIVD identify a new Russian cyber threat actor. 2025. https://www.aivd.nl/site/binaries/site-content/collections/documents/2025/05/27/aivd-en-mivd-onderkennen-nieuwe-russische-cyberactor/Advisory+AIVD+en+MIVD+Public+report+on+new+cyber+actor.pdf

[2] Microsoft Corporation. New Russia-affiliated actor Void Blizzard targets critical sectors for espionage. 2025. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/27/new-russia-affiliated-actor-void-blizzard-targets-critical-sectors-for-espionage/

[3] Palo Alto Networks Unit 42. Russian Global Webmail Espionage. 2026. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/russian-webmail-espionage/ 

[4] Proofpoint. TA488 Targets Zimbra Mailservers with Half-Click Exploits. 2026. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta488-zcs-exploit

[5] Seqrite. Operation GhostMail: Russian APT exploits Zimbra Webmail to Target Ukraine State Agency. 2026. https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-ghostmail-zimbra-xss-russian-apt-ukraine/  

Footnotes

¹ Národní úřad pro kybernetickou a informační bezpečnost
² Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste
³ Välisluureamet
⁴ Sotilastiedustelu
⁵  Suojelupoliisi
⁶ Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure
⁷ Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information
⁸ Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Esterna
⁹ Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna
¹⁰ Serviciul de Informații și Securitate al Republicii Moldova
¹¹ Agencja Wywiadu
¹² Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego
¹³ Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
¹⁴ Nationellt Cybersäkerhetscenter
¹⁵ MITRE and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE D3FEND is a trademark of The MITRE Corporation.

Acknowledgements

The authoring agencies acknowledge the contributions to this advisory from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 and Proofpoint.

Disclaimer of endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Organizations have no obligation to respond or provide information back to the authoring organizations in response to this joint advisory. If, after reviewing the information provided, an organization decides to provide information to the authoring organizations, reporting must be consistent with all applicable laws and policies.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring agencies’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

Contact

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques

See Table 9 through Table 19 for all the threat actor tactics and techniques referenced in this advisory.

Appendix B: MITRE D3FEND countermeasures

See Table 20 for a mapping of several of the cybersecurity countermeasures mentioned in this advisory.

The post Vulnerability Scanning with OpenVAS 9 part 1: Installation & Setup appeared first on Hacking Tutorials.

New users can save on the latest language-learning tech with a one-year subscription to Rosetta Stone Sapphire at a big discount.

(via Cult of Mac - Your source for the latest Apple news, rumors, analysis, reviews, how-tos and deals.)

While app performance is often equated with a smooth UI and fast start times, memory serves as the silent foundation upon which these visible metrics are built. It's no secret that we're seeing a shift where device memory is more important than ever. Not only have we made strides in Android memory optimizations with Android 17, we're providing the tooling and API support to help you stay ahead of stricter memory requirements later this year.

To ensure device stability, starting in Android 17, the system will begin enforcing app memory limits based on the device's total RAM. If an app exceeds those limits, Android will kill the process with no associated stack trace.

Optimize image loading

Detect and fix memory leaks with Android Studio

Memory leaks in Android occur when your code holds onto an object's reference long after its lifecycle has ended. This prevents the Garbage Collector (GC) from reclaiming that memory, eventually leading to sluggish performance or OutOfMemoryError (OOM).

Android Studio Panda 3 features a dedicated LeakCanary profiler task, allowing developers to analyze real-time memory leaks and map traces within the IDE.

The LeakCanary profiler task in Android Studio actively moves the memory leak analysis from your device to your development machine, resulting in a significant performance boost during the leak analysis phase as compared to on-device leak analysis.

Additionally, the leak analysis is now contextualized within the IDE and fully integrated with your source code, providing features like go to declaration and other helpful code connections that drastically reduce the friction and time required to investigate and fix memory leaks.

Trim memory when app leaves visible state

Android can reclaim memory from your app or stop your app entirely if necessary to free up memory for critical tasks, as explained in Overview of memory management. Android will usually reclaim memory from your app when it’s not visible to the user, such as by discarding some of your app’s code and data pages in memory or compressing your heap allocations. When the user resumes your app and your app tries to access some memory that’s been reclaimed, the OS will swap that memory back in on demand. This swapping behavior can be slow, and cause unexpected jank or stutters in your app.

If you leave it to the OS to decide what memory to reclaim from your app, you may find that the OS reclaimed memory that you’ll need shortly after resuming your app. Instead, your app can voluntarily discard memory allocations that it can regenerate later, on demand and at a low cost. To do so, you can implement the ComponentCallbacks2 interface. You can implement onTrimMemory in your Activity, Fragment, Service, or even your custom Application class. Using it in the Application class is highly effective for global cache management.

The provided onTrimMemory() callback method notifies your app of lifecycle or memory-related events that present a good opportunity for your app to voluntarily reduce its memory usage.

In terms of memory lifecycle management, your implementation should focus exclusively on TRIM_MEMORY_UI_HIDDEN and TRIM_MEMORY_BACKGROUND. Since Android 14, the system has ceased delivering notifications for other legacy constants, which were formally deprecated in Android 15.

TRIM_MEMORY_UI_HIDDEN: This signal indicates that your application's UI has transitioned out of the user's view. This provides an opportunity to release substantial memory allocations tied strictly to the interface—such as Bitmaps, video playback buffers, or complex animation resources.

TRIM_MEMORY_BACKGROUND: At this level, your process is residing in the background and is now a candidate for termination to satisfy the system's global memory needs. To extend the duration your process remains in the cached state, and reduce the number of app cold starts, you should aggressively release any resources that can be easily reconstructed once the user resumes their session.

import android.content.ComponentCallbacks2
// Other import statements.

class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity(), ComponentCallbacks2 {

    /**
     * Release memory when the UI becomes hidden or when system resources become low.
     * @param level the memory-related event that is raised.
     */
    override fun onTrimMemory(level: Int) {

        if (level >= ComponentCallbacks2.TRIM_MEMORY_UI_HIDDEN) {
            // Release memory related to UI elements, such as bitmap caches.
        }

        if (level >= ComponentCallbacks2.TRIM_MEMORY_BACKGROUND) {
            // Release memory related to background processing, such as by
            // closing a database connection.
        }
    }
}

Note: The onTrimMemory integration may depend on SDK support. For instance, certain games rely on their game engine to enable this capability. Please check out the game memory optimization documents.

Advanced memory observability with ProfilingManager

To catch and diagnose memory issues in the field that cannot be reproduced locally, you should leverage the ProfilingManager API. Introduced in Android 15, this advanced observability API allows you to programmatically collect real-user Perfetto profiles.

For teams that lack a dedicated infrastructure to manage and host performance artifacts, Crashlytics is exploring a specialized solution to streamline this workflow. They are inviting developers to provide feedback.

Android 17 introduces new event-driven triggers, most notably TRIGGER_TYPE_OOM and TRIGGER_TYPE_ANOMALY:

• The OOM trigger automatically collects a Java heap dump at the exact moment an OutOfMemoryError crash occurs, providing precise allocation states. A collected OOM profile is provided the next time the app starts and registers the registerForAllProfilingResults callback.
• The Anomaly trigger detects severe performance issues, such as excessive binder spam or breached memory thresholds. The memory anomaly delivers a heap dump just prior to the system terminating the app.

  val profilingManager = 
applicationContext.getSystemService(ProfilingManager::class.java)
    val triggers = ArrayList()  


    triggers.add(ProfilingTrigger.Builder(
                 ProfilingTrigger.TRIGGER_TYPE_ANOMALY))
    val mainExecutor: Executor = Executors.newSingleThreadExecutor()
    val resultCallback = Consumer { profilingResult ->
        if (profilingResult.errorCode != ProfilingResult.ERROR_NONE) {
            // upload profile result to server for further analysis          
            setupProfileUploadWorker(profilingResult.resultFilePath)
        } 

    profilingManager.registerForAllProfilingResults(mainExecutor, resultCallback)
    profilingManager.addProfilingTriggers(triggers)

Once you’ve collected the heap dump, you can download the profile from the server, or locally via adb pull and drag and drop the file into the Perfetto UI. To streamline your memory debugging workflow, use the Heap Dump Explorer, this is the new default view for heap dumps in Perfetto UI. This tool provides an intuitive interface for inspecting Java heap dumps, allowing you to visualize object allocation hierarchies, compute retained memory sizes, and identify the shortest path from garbage collection root. By leveraging the Heap Dump Explorer, you can rapidly pinpoint memory leaks, bloated retained objects such as excessive bitmap allocations, and analyze heap object allocations all in one place.

Conclusion

Optimizing bytecode with R8, adopting image loading best practices, and resolving memory leaks are critical steps toward delivering a high-quality user experience while managing resources effectively under pressure. Adopting these proactive measures helps maintain app stability and performance, preventing unexpected terminations while safeguarding user context. To further your performance expertise, explore our revised memory guidance.

Posted by Ben Weiss, Senior Developer Relations Engineer, Android Developer Relations

Welcome back to the blog post series "Build intelligent Android apps" where we take a basic Android app and transform it into a personalized, intelligent, and agentic experience. In our previous post, we explored how to leverage Firebase AI Logic to build cloud-hosted and hybrid AI features.

In this article, we'll show you how we designed and integrated these capabilities into our travel planning app, JetPacker, using Android AppFunctions. We'll explore the rationale behind our feature choices, discuss the specialized tooling we used to accelerate development, and dive into the code that makes it all work.

Designing AI-ready features: making choices that matter for your users

To select which features to provide to the intelligence system, we looked for tasks where a voice or text command is objectively faster than tapping through screens. In this side-by-side screen recording you can see this contrast perfectly: on the left, a user tapping through multiple screens to log an expense; on the right, the same task completed instantly in the background via a privileged agent.

Our first choice was expense tracking. Logging a coffee expense during a trip usually takes quite a few taps—unlocking the phone, opening the app, finding the active trip, navigating to the expenses tab, tapping the add button, taking a picture of the receipt, and checking the result. By providing the addExpense and getExpenses features as AppFunctions, the system agent handles the heavy lifting. When the user says, "Add a five-dollar coffee expense to my Paris trip," the agent automatically searches for the correct trip ID in the background and inserts the expense, skipping the manual UI flow entirely.

We also prioritized itinerary management. Finding what activity is next on a busy trip itinerary usually requires scrolling through a dense timeline view. By providing getItinerary and addItineraryEvent to the system, the user can simply ask, "What am I doing next in Paris?" and get an immediate answer.

Finally, we focused on hands-free note capturing. Typing out reminders or notes while walking down a busy street is difficult and unsafe. Exposing a voice note capability allows the user to say, "The flight was amazing, I saw a beautiful sunset and managed to sleep well," and the privileged agent automatically transcribes and saves it directly into the travel database  using the addVoiceNote AppFunction.

Android MCP powered by AppFunctions

This entire experience is built on Android MCP. Under this design, the app acts as a local MCP server. Rather than remote APIs, you provide your app features directly to the on-device intelligence system.

Android AppFunctions is the API that brings this concept to life. It reads annotated Kotlin functions and compiles them into type-safe, sandboxed tool definitions that the privileged agent can discover and invoke locally on the device.

Diagram highlighting our apps, the android platform, and system agents coordinate AppFunctions.

Under the Android MCP model, your app acts as a local MCP server that exposes structured tools, while the Android platform serves as the central tool registry. On the MCP client side, agent apps are registered with the intelligence system after being granted system-privileged permissions to access the registry.

When a user interacts with a registered agent, its LLM determines if the request can be handled by an AppFunction, queries the platform's metadata, and executes the appropriate registered functions in the background. This local MCP client-server design gives you full control: you choose exactly which features are accessible to the agent, keeping the rest of your app's data private.

How we accelerated development with Android skills

To streamline the integration process, we leveraged the AppFunctions development skill. The AppFunctions development skill is a complete development companion. It guided us through the entire lifecycle: mapping Kotlin data classes to serialize parameters, generating the necessary Service entry points, refining our KDoc documentation to ensure the LLM understands parameter boundaries, and setting up automated testing using ADB.

Providing app features to the intelligence system

Enough with the theory, let's dive into the implementation.

Configuration and dependency setup

We begin by adding the AppFunctions dependencies. One for the API and one for the Kotlin Symbol Processing compiler.

implementation("androidx.appfunctions:appfunctions:1.0.0-alpha10")
ksp("androidx.appfunctions:appfunctions-compiler:1.0.0-alpha10")

Modeling custom data types

Any custom object exchanged with the agent must be annotated with @AppFunctionSerializable. In our TripSerializable.kt file, we define our trip data model:

@AppFunctionSerializable(isDescribedByKDoc = true)
data class TripSerializable(
    /** The trip's unique identifier. */
    val id: String,
    /** The trip's title. */
    val title: String,
    /** The trip's destination location. */
    val location: String,
    /** The trip's start date in milliseconds. */
    val startDate: Long,
    /** The trip's end date in milliseconds. */
    val endDate: Long,
    /** A list of participants. */
    val participants: List<String>,
)

Providing features using the @AppFunction annotation

Next, the skill wrote the Kotlin functions that perform the database queries and annotate them with @AppFunction. We can view this in searchTrip:

/**
 * Looks for trips based on optional filters like id, title (name), location, and dates.
 *
 * @param id The unique identifier of the trip.
 * @param title The title or name of the trip.
 * @param location The destination location.
 * @param startDate The minimum start date in milliseconds.
 * @param endDate The maximum end date in milliseconds.
 * @return A list of trips matching the filters.
 */
@AppFunction(isDescribedByKDoc = true)
suspend fun searchTrip(
    id: String? = null,
    title: String? = null,
    location: String? = null,
    startDate: Long? = null,
    endDate: Long? = null
): List<TripSerializable> {
    return withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
    // implementation
}

Since AppFunctions run on the UI thread by default, we use withContext(Dispatchers.IO) to switch to a background dispatcher. Additionally, we refine our KDoc to use clear, imperative verbs and specify parameter constraints. This documentation compiles directly into the tool's schema, which the privileged agent uses to resolve parameters and handle runtime errors.

The service entry point and Hilt integration

To register these features with the intelligence system, we create an abstract base class that extends AppFunctionService. We annotate it with @AppFunctionServiceEntryPoint:

@RequiresApi(36)
@AndroidEntryPoint
@AppFunctionServiceEntryPoint(
    serviceName = "JetPackerAppFunctionService",
    appFunctionXmlFileName = "jetpacker_app_function_service"
)
abstract class BaseJetPackerAppFunctionService : AppFunctionService() {
    @Inject internal lateinit var tripDao: TripDao
    // DAOs and database references are injected here...
}

During compilation, KSP generates the final concrete service subclass, JetPackerAppFunctionService, as declared with the serviceName parameter. We also register app_metadata.xml in the app's manifest. This file provides global operational rules for JetPacker's declared AppFunctions.

Testing and verifying your AppFunctions

Once implemented, you should verify that your AppFunctions are registered and working correctly.

Running devices or emulators with Android 17 or newer, you can use ADB commands from your terminal to list and invoke your functions. Running adb shell cmd app_function list-app-functions displays all registered functions for your package. You can then execute a specific function and test its database integration by running adb shell cmd app_function execute-app-function while passing a raw JSON parameters string.

Instead of these ADB commands, you can also use the AppFunctions Testing Agent to inspect your configuration, list and execute AppFunctions, and even see how your AppFunctions behave in a real conversational flow.

Wrapping it up

When thinking about app features that can be contributed to the intelligence system using AppFunctions requires a slight shift in how we think about code and documentation. AppFunctions enable you to use this new interaction model for apps, which allows using an agent to access app features..

First, the AppFunctions development skill is an essential lifecycle tool, helping you discover features, implement and refine AppFunctions for your apps. Second, KDoc comments are a compiled API asset; clear parameter descriptions directly impact the execution accuracy of the system agent. Finally, Android MCP provides local-first execution allowing apps to safely collaborate with AI agents.

Contributing app features through AppFunctions makes your application ready for the intelligence system. Let us know how you are adapting your apps for the agentic era!

Learn more

Check out the other parts of this blog post series:
Part 1: Introduction of the app and a high-level overview.
Part 2: On-device intelligence. Deep-dive into ML Kit’s GenAI APIs and Gemini Nano to build privacy-first features like itinerary summarization, receipt parsing, and local audio processing.
Part 3: Hybrid and cloud reasoning. Explore how to use Firebase AI Logic to ground LLM answers in real-world data like Google Maps and web context.
Part 4 (this post!): System integration. Integrating with the Android intelligence system using AppFunctions.
Part 5 (coming soon): In-app agentic workflows. Extend the app with an end-to-end booking assistant powered by A2UI and ADK.

Interested in more on Android Development? Follow Android Developers on YouTube or LinkedIn!

All code snippets in this blog post follow the following copyright notice:

Copyright 2026 Google LLC.
SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

Welcome back to the blog post series "Build intelligent Android apps" where we take a basic Android app and transform it into a personalized, intelligent, and agentic experience. In our previous post we explored how to build intelligent on-device features using Gemini Nano through ML Kit's Prompt API.

In this post, we will look at how you can leverage Firebase AI Logic to build cloud-hosted and hybrid AI features: 

• Grounding answers in real-world context
• Routing requests dynamically between cloud and local execution using hybrid inference
• Translating content with custom routing systems

Sometimes a use case requires AI models with greater world knowledge, a much larger context window, or the ability to handle complex queries. In those scenarios, we can leverage cloud models. 

Other times, you want the best of both worlds: using hybrid inference to run on-device when available to lower costs, while falling back to the cloud to ensure compatibility for all devices.

Cloud and hybrid features in Jetpacker: Museum assistant with web grounding, hybrid restaurant review drafting, and  support chat featuring custom-routed live translation.

Let’s look at how we implemented three cloud and hybrid features in Jetpacker:

• a museum assistant with web grounding
• hybrid restaurant review drafting
• hotel support chat featuring custom-routed live translation.

Use LLM grounding for up-to-date informationMuseum assistant chatbot with LLM grounding

The Museum assistant is an interactive chatbot designed to help users plan their museum visits. It provides visitors with up-to-date details regarding specific exhibits, current opening hours, ticket pricing, and more.

Museum assistant is a chatbot that answers questions, such as 

When building AI features, getting the model to answer with fresh, accurate, and specific real-world information is a common challenge. While cloud models possess massive amounts of world knowledge, they might not know about seasonal exhibits or the current day’s opening hours. 

Grounding data is added to the context window to enable the model

To bridge this gap, we can use grounding techniques to add extra context to the model’s context window. The Firebase AI Logic SDK supports three types of grounding:

• URL grounding: Grounding responses using content from a specific webpage (e.g. current ticket prices or museum rules).
• Google Search grounding: Letting the model query the real-time Google search index for up-to-date details.
• Maps grounding: Using Google Maps location data.

In Jetpacker, we dynamically construct the available tools based on enabled feature flags and initialize the generative model using the Firebase AI SDK:

// implementation("com.google.firebase:firebase-ai-logic")

private var toolList = mutableListOf<Tool>()

init {
    if (ENABLE_SEARCH_GROUNDING) {
        toolList.add(Tool.googleSearch())
    }
    if (ENABLE_URL_GROUNDING) {
        toolList.add(Tool.urlContext())
    }
}

private val generativeModel = Firebase.ai(backend = GenerativeBackend.googleAI())
    .generativeModel(
        modelName = "gemini-3-flash",
        systemInstruction = content {
            text("You are a helpful museum assistant answering questions about a museum. Use plain text.")
        },
        tools = toolList
    )

When the user queries the assistant, if URL grounding is enabled, we append the specific museum resource URLs directly into the prompt:

val groundingText = if (FeatureFlags.ENABLE_URL_GROUNDING) {
    "\n If the following message above is about the rules and terms to visit Le Louvre, " +
    "if needed answer this urls ${urlList.joinToString()}"
} else {
    ""
}

val prompt = "$text $groundingText"

var response = chat.sendMessage(prompt)

Hybrid inference: On-device review generation with Maps deep link

Not every AI task requires a cloud-based model, and not every device is online. To help developers balance latency, cost, and offline availability, we recently introduced the Firebase API for Hybrid Inference.

In Jetpacker, the restaurant review feature lets users review select topics and automatically drafts a review. To enable this for all users, we prioritize local execution with Gemini Nano, and fall back to cloud models on devices that don’t support Gemini Nano. 

// implementation("com.google.firebase:firebase-ai-logic")
// implementation("com.google.firebase:firebase-ai-ondevice:16.0.0-beta03")


// Initialize the model with hybrid routing configuration
val reviewModel = Firebase.ai.generativeModel(
    modelName = "gemini-3.1-flash-lite",
    onDeviceConfig = OnDeviceConfig(
        inferenceMode = InferenceMode.PREFER_ON_DEVICE
    )
)

The Hybrid Inference API supports four distinct routing modes:

• PREFER_ON_DEVICE: Prioritizes local execution and falls back to cloud if Gemini Nano is unavailable.
• PREFER_IN_CLOUD: Prioritizes cloud execution and falls back to on-device if the device goes offline.
• ONLY_ON_DEVICE: Restricts execution strictly to the device.
• ONLY_IN_CLOUD: Restricts execution strictly to the cloud.

Once the review is generated, we copy it to the clipboard and use an intent to open Google Maps directly to the restaurant's review page, providing a seamless user experience:

private fun copyAndOpenMapsReview(context: Context, reviewText: String, placeId: String) {
    val clipboard = context.getSystemService(Context.CLIPBOARD_SERVICE) as ClipboardManager
    val clip = ClipData.newPlainText("User Review", reviewText)
    clipboard.setPrimaryClip(clip)

    val uri = Uri.parse("https://search.google.com/local/writereview/mobile?placeid=$placeId")
    val intent = Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW, uri).apply {
        setPackage("com.google.android.apps.maps")
    }
    context.startActivity(intent)
}

Custom hybrid routing: Hotel support chat translation with simulated personas

The hotel support chat was built to let users finalize logistics and check on hotel details. This feature uses system instructions to configure a localized receptionist assistant. By passing specific information—such as the preferred language and hotel information—in the instructions, we can set up a conversational persona representing a specific hotel.

private val generativeModel = Firebase.ai(backend = GenerativeBackend.googleAI())
    .generativeModel(
        systemInstruction = content {
            text("""
              You are a helpful hotel receptionist at $hotelName only speaking $language. 
              Answer politely in $language. The bar closes at 10pm and breakfast is from 7am to 10am.
              There's someone at the desk 24/7. You can retrieve your luggage from the storage room 
              at the back of the lobby at any time.
              """)
        },
        modelName = "gemini-3-flash-preview"
    )

Because receptionist responses are in the hotel's local language (for example, French for Hotel Le Meurice in Paris), we need to translate messages to the user’s preferred language. 

Hotel support chat messages are automatically translated to the user’s preferred language 

While hybrid models can configure simple routing preferences, complex scenarios require custom routing logic. In Jetpacker, we implement a custom routing stack that takes into account:

• Language identification: Using the on-device ML Kit Language Identification API, we can detect the incoming message language.
• On-device translation (Gemini Nano): ML Kit’s Prompt API lets us translate common language pairs directly on the device, saving bandwidth and cloud cost.
• Cloud translation (Gemini 3 Flash): For more complex languages, we use Gemini Flash 3 to get a higher quality translation.

// implementation("com.google.android.gms:play-services-mlkit-language-id:17.0.0") 

// ML Kit for Language Identification (powered by Google Play Services)
private val languageIdentifier = LanguageIdentification.getClient()

// On-device translator model (prefer Gemini Nano) for translating common language pairs
private val hybridTranslationModel = Firebase.ai(backend = GenerativeBackend.googleAI())
    .generativeModel(
        modelName = "gemini-3-flash",
        onDeviceConfig = OnDeviceConfig(mode = InferenceMode.PREFER_ON_DEVICE)
    )

// Cloud translator model for more complex language pairs
private val cloudTranslationModel = Firebase.ai(backend = GenerativeBackend.googleAI())
    .generativeModel(
        modelName = "gemini-3-flash"
    )

When a message needs to be translated, we identify the source language and apply our custom routing logic, executing either on-device or cloud translation:

fun translateMessage(message: SupportChatMessage) {
    viewModelScope.launch {
        // 1. Detect language using ML Kit Language Identification
        val sourceLang = try {
            Tasks.await(languageIdentifier.identifyLanguage(message.text))
        } catch (e: Exception) {
            "Undefined"
        }

        // 2. Custom routing: we've verified the translation quality for English and Korean with Gemini Nano, and will translate message on-device for those two languages
        val routeToCloud = sourceLang != "en" && sourceLang != "kr"

        val prompt = "Translate the following text to $selectedLanguage. Just return the translated sentence: ${message.text}."

        val (translatedText, routePrefix) = if (routeToCloud) {
            val result = cloudTranslationModel.generateContent(prompt)
            result.text to "[Cloud]"
        } else {
            val result = hybridTranslationModel.generateContent(prompt)
            result.text to "[On-Device]"
        }

        if (translatedText != null) {
            _translations.update { current ->
                current + (message.id to "$routePrefix: $translatedText")
            }
        }
    }
}

In this example, the custom routing logic only takes into consideration the translation’s source and target language. However, based on your app’s use case, you can expand the routing logic to include other factors such as the on-device model version, network connectivity, battery status, and more.

Securing the AI Pipelines: Firebase App Check

Lastly, using AI in the cloud opens up possibilities of API key abuse or unauthorized billing. To secure API calls, we integrated Firebase App Check using both Play Integrity (production) and the local Debug Provider (for local development or emulators).

In the JetPackerApplication.kt file, we install the debug provider at startup and trigger anonymous authentication to establish a secure user session:

//  implementation("com.google.firebase:firebase-appcheck-playintegrity") 
//  implementation("com.google.firebase:firebase-appcheck-debug")  
//  implementation("com.google.firebase:firebase-auth") 

override fun onCreate() {
    super.onCreate()
    Firebase.initialize(context = this)
    Firebase.appCheck.installAppCheckProviderFactory(
        DebugAppCheckProviderFactory.getInstance()
    )
    Firebase.auth.signInAnonymously()
}

When building locally on an emulator, App Check prints a local token secret to logcat:

Enter this debug secret into the allow list in the Firebase Console: a8c2dd4c-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-ef6c114ba27e

Once registered in the Firebase console, local requests are fully verified and authenticated by App Check, protecting our backend while letting us test the app locally.

Conclusion

By combining cloud model capabilities (grounding, system instructions) with on-device capabilities (hybrid routing, translation, security app checks), we created a travel app that is smart, secure, and available offline.

Check out the full source code for Jetpacker on GitHub, and explore the Firebase documentation to get started:

Firebase AI Logic Documentation
Firebase Hybrid Inference API

Learn more

Check out the other parts of this blog post series:

Part 1: Introduction of the app and a high-level overview.
Part 2: On-device intelligence. Deep-dive into ML Kit’s GenAI APIs and Gemini Nano to build privacy-first features like itinerary summarization, receipt parsing, and local audio processing.
Part 3 (this post!): Hybrid and cloud reasoning. Explore how to use Firebase AI Logic to ground LLM answers in real-world data like Google Maps and web context.
Part 4: System integration. Integrating with the Android intelligence system using AppFunctions. 
Part 5 (coming soon): In-app agentic workflows. Extend the app with an end-to-end booking assistant powered by A2UI and ADK.

Interested in more on Android Development? Follow Android Developers on YouTube or LinkedIn!

All code snippets in this blog post follow the following copyright notice:

Copyright 2026 Google LLC.
SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory is being published as an addition to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) May 6, 2025, joint fact sheet Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology and European Cybercrime Centre’s (EC3) Operation Eastwood, in which CISA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and EC3 shared information about cyber incidents affecting the operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) of critical infrastructure entities in the United States and globally.

FBI, CISA, National Security Agency (NSA), and the following partners—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are releasing this joint advisory on the targeting of critical infrastructure by pro-Russia hacktivists:

• U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
• U.S. Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
• Europol European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)
• EUROJUST – European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation
• Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
• Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
• Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
• Czech Republic Military Intelligence (VZ)
• Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)
• Czech Republic National Centre Against Terrorism, Extremism, and Cyber Crime (NCTEKK)
• French National Cybercrime Unit – Gendarmerie Nationale (UNC)
• French National Jurisdiction for the Fight Against Organized Crime (JUNALCO)
• German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
• Italian State Police (PS)
• Latvian State Police (VP)
• Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau (LKPB)
• New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
• Romanian National Police (PR)
• Spanish Civil Guard (GC)
• Spanish National Police (CNP)
• Swedish Polisen (SC3)
• United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)

The authoring organizations assess pro-Russia hacktivist groups are conducting less sophisticated, lower-impact attacks against critical infrastructure entities, compared to advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. These attacks use minimally secured, internet-facing virtual network computing (VNC) connections to infiltrate (or gain access to) OT control devices within critical infrastructure systems. Pro-Russia hacktivist groups—Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR), Z-Pentest, NoName057(16), Sector16, and affiliated groups—are capitalizing on the widespread prevalence of accessible VNC devices to execute attacks against critical infrastructure entities, resulting in varying degrees of impact, including physical damage. Targeted sectors include Water and Wastewater Systems, Food and Agriculture, and Energy.

The authoring organizations encourage critical infrastructure organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the likelihood and impact of pro-Russia hacktivist-related incidents. For additional information on Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Russia Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.

Download the PDF version of this report:

Background and Development of Pro-Russia Hacktivist Groups

Over the past several years, the authoring organizations have observed pro-Russia hacktivist groups conducting cyber operations against numerous organizations and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide. The escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 significantly increased the number of these pro-Russia groups. Consisting of individuals who support Russia’s agenda but lack direct governmental ties, most of these groups target Ukrainian and allied infrastructure. However, among the increasing number of groups, some appear to have associations with the Russian state through direct or indirect support.

Cyber Army of Russia Reborn

The authoring organizations assess that the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455—tracked in the cybersecurity community under several names (see Appendix B: Additional Designators Used for Cited Groups)—is likely responsible for supporting the creation of CARR —also known as “The People’s Cyber Army of Russia”—in late February or early March of 2022. Actors suspected to be from GRU unit 74455 likely funded the tools CARR threat actors used to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks through at least September 2024.

In April 2022, the group began using a new Telegram channel featuring the name “CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn” to organize and plan group actions. The channel creators recruited actors to use CARR as an unattributable platform for conducting cyber activities beneath the level of an APT, aimed at deterring anti-Russia rhetoric. CARR threat actors presented themselves as a group of pro-Russia hacktivists supporting Russia’s stance on the Ukrainian conflict, and they soon began claiming responsibility for DDoS attacks against the U.S. and Europe for supporting Ukraine.

CARR documented these actions through embellished images and videos shared on their social media channels, promoting Russian ideology, disseminating talking points, and publicizing leaked information from hacks attributed to Russian state threat actors.

In late 2023, CARR expanded their operations to include attacks on industrial control systems (ICS), claiming an intrusion against a European wastewater treatment facility in October 2023. In November 2023, CARR targeted human-machine interface (HMI) devices, claiming intrusions at two U.S. dairy farms.

The authoring organizations assess that by late September 2024, CARR channel administrators became dissatisfied with the level of support and funding provided by the GRU. This dissatisfaction led CARR administrators and an administrator from another hacktivist group, NoName057(16), to create the Z-Pentest group, employing the same tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as CARR but separate from GRU involvement.

NoName057(16)

The authoring organizations assess that the Center for the Study and Network Monitoring of the Youth Environment (CISM), established on behalf of the Kremlin, created NoName057(16) as a covert project within the organization. Senior executives and employees within CISM developed and customized the NoName057(16) proprietary DDoS tool DDoSia, paid for the group’s network infrastructure, served as administrators on NoName057(16) Telegram channels, and selected DDoS targets.

Active since March 2022, NoName057(16) has conducted frequent DDoS attacks against government and private sector entities in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states and other European countries perceived as hostile to Russian geopolitical interests. The group operates primarily through Telegram channels and used GitHub, alongside various websites and repositories, to host DDoSia and share materials and TTPs with their followers. 

In 2024, NoName057(16) began collaborating closely with other pro-Russia hacktivist groups, operating a joint chat with CARR by mid-2024. In July 2024, NoName057(16) jointly claimed responsibility with CARR for an alleged intrusion against OT assets in the U.S. The high degree of cooperation with CARR likely contributed to the formation of Z-Pentest, which is composed of actors and administrators from both teams, in September 2024.

Z-Pentest

Established in September 2024, Z-Pentest is composed of members from CARR and NoName057(16). The group specializes in OT intrusion operations targeting globally dispersed critical infrastructure entities. Additionally, the group uses “hack and leak” operations and defacement attacks to draw attention to their pro-Russia messaging. Unlike other pro-Russia hacktivist groups, Z-Pentest largely avoids DDoS activities, claiming OT intrusions as attempts to garner more attention from the media.

Shortly after Z-Pentest’s inception, the group announced alliances with CARR and NoName057(16), possibly to leverage the other groups’ subscribers to grow the new channel. In March 2025, Z-Pentest posted evidence claiming OT device intrusions to their channel using a NoName057(16) cyberattack campaign hashtag. Similarly, in April 2025, Z-Pentest shared a video purporting defacement of an HMI by changing system names to NoName057(16) and CARR references. Z-Pentest continues to create new alliances with other groups, like Sector16, to continue growing their subscriber base and incidentally propagate TTPs with new partners.

Sector16

Formed in January 2025, Sector16 is a novice pro-Russia hacktivist group that emerged through collaboration with Z-Pentest. Sector16 actively maintains an online presence, including a public Telegram channel where they share videos, statements, and claims of compromising U.S. energy infrastructure. These communications often align with pro-Russia narratives and reflect their self-proclaimed support for Russian geopolitical objectives.

Members of Sector16 may have received indirect support from the Russian government in exchange for conducting specific cyber operations that further Russian strategic goals. This aligns with broader Russian cyber strategies that involve leveraging non-state threat actors for certain cyber activities, adding a layer of deniability.

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK^® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 18. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.

TTP Overview

Pro-Russia hacktivist groups employ easily disseminated and replicated TTPs across various entities, increasing the likelihood of widespread adoption and escalating the frequency of intrusions. These groups have limited capabilities, frequently misunderstanding the processes they aim to disrupt. Their apparent low level of technical knowledge results in haphazard attacks where actors intend to cause physical damage but cannot accurately anticipate actual impact. Despite these limitations, the authoring organizations have observed these groups willfully cause actual harm to vulnerable critical infrastructure.

Pro-Russia hacktivist groups use the TTPs in this Cybersecurity Advisory to target virtual network computing (VNC)-connected HMI devices. These groups are primarily seeking notoriety with their actions. While they have caused damage in some instances, they regularly make false or exaggerated claims about their attacks on critical infrastructure to garner more attention. They frequently misrepresent their capabilities and the impacts of their actions, portraying minor incursions as significant breaches, but such incursions can still lead to lost time and resources for operators remediating systems.

Additionally, pro-Russia hacktivists use an opportunistic targeting methodology. They leverage superficial criteria, such as victim availability and existing vulnerabilities, rather than focusing on strategically significant entities. Their lack of strategic focus can lead to a broad array of targets, ranging from water treatment facilities to oil well systems. Pro-Russia hacktivists have demonstrated a pattern of frequently taking advantage of the widespread availability of vulnerable VNC connections. While system owners typically use VNC connections for legitimate remote system access functions, threat actors can maliciously use these connections to broadly target numerous platforms and services. Consequently, these groups can indiscriminately compromise critical infrastructure entities, including those in the Water and Wastewater, Food and Agriculture, and Energy Sectors.

Pro-Russia hacktivist groups have successfully targeted supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks using basic methods, and in some cases, performed simultaneous DDoS attacks against targeted networks to facilitate SCADA intrusions. As recently as April 2025, threat actors used the following unsophisticated TTPs to access networks and conduct SCADA intrusions:

• Scan for vulnerable devices on the internet [T0883] with open VNC ports [T1595.002].
• Initiate temporary virtual private server (VPS) [T1583.003] to execute password brute force software.
• Use VNC software to access hosts [T1021.005].
• Confirm connection to the vulnerable device [T0886].
• Brute force the password, if required [T1110.003].
• Gain access to HMI devices [T0883], typically with default [T0812], weak, or no passwords [T0859].
• Log the confirmed vulnerable device IP address, port, and password.
• Using the HMI graphical interface [T0823], capture screen recordings or intermittent screenshots while conducting the following actions, intending to affect productivity and cause additional costs [T0828]:
  • Modify usernames/passwords [T0892];
  • Modify parameters [T0836];
  • Modify device name [T0892];
  • Modify instrument settings [T0831];
  • Disable alarms [T0878];
  • Create loss of view (a technique that mandates local hands-on operator intervention) [T0829]; and/or
  • Device restart or shutdown [T0816].
• Disconnect from the device, ending the VNC connection.
• Research the compromised device company after the intrusion [T1591].

Propagation

To reach a wider audience, pro-Russia hacktivist groups work together, amplify each other’s posts, create additional groups to amplify their own posts, and likely share TTPs. For example, Z-Pentest jointly claimed intrusion of a U.S. system with Sector16. Sector16 later began posting additional intrusions for which the group claimed sole responsibility. It is likely that these and similar groups will continue to iterate and share these methods to disrupt critical infrastructure organizations.

Reconnaissance and Initial Access

The threat actors’ intrusion methodology is relatively unsophisticated, inexpensive to execute, and easy to replicate. These pro-Russia hacktivist groups abuse popular internet-scraping tools, such as Nmap or OPENVAS, to search for visible VNC services and use brute force password spraying tools to access devices via known default or otherwise weak credentials. Threat actors typically search for these services on the default port 5900 or other nearby ports (5901-5910). Their goal is to gain remote access to HMI devices connected to live control networks.

Once threat actors obtain access, they manipulate available settings from the graphical user interface (GUI) on the HMI devices, such as arbitrary physical parameter and setpoint changes, or conduct defacement activities. Because pro-Russia hacktivist groups seem to lack sector-specific expertise or cyber-physical engineering knowledge, they currently cannot reliably estimate the true impact of their actions. Regardless of outcome, pro-Russia hacktivist groups often post images and screen recordings to their social media platforms, boasting the compromises and exaggerating impacts to garner attention from their peers and the media.

Impact

While pro-Russia hacktivist groups currently demonstrate limited ability to consistently cause significant impact, there is a risk that their continued attacks will result in further harm or grievous physical consequences. Attacks have not yet caused injury; however, the attacks against occupied factories and community facilities demonstrate a lack of consideration for human safety.

Victim organizations reported that the most common operational impact caused by these threat actors is a temporary loss of view, necessitating manual intervention to manage processes. However, any modifications to programmatic and systematic procedures can result in damage or disruption, including substantial labor costs from hiring a programmable logic controller programmer to restore operations, costs associated with operational downtime, and potential costs for network remediation.

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

See Table 1 to Table 10 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Incident Response

If organizations find exposed systems with weak or default passwords, they should assume threat actors compromised the system and begin the following incident response protocols:

1. Determine which hosts were compromised and isolate them by quarantining or taking them offline.
2. Initiate threat hunting activities to scope the intrusion. Collect and review artifacts, such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.
3. Reimage compromised hosts.
4. Provision new account credentials.
5. Report the compromise to CISA, FBI, and/or NSA. See the Contact Information section of this advisory.
6. Harden the network to prevent additional malicious activity. See the Mitigations section of this advisory for guidance.

Mitigations

OT Asset Owners and Operators

The authoring organizations recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture based on the threat actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s CPGs webpage for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

• Reduce exposure of OT assets to the public-facing internet. When connected to the internet, OT devices are easy targets for malicious cyber threat actors. Many devices can be found by searching for open ports on public IP ranges with search engine tools to target victims with OT components [CPG 3.S].
  • Asset owners should use attack surface management services and web-based search platforms to scan the internet. This mitigation can help identify if there are VNC systems exposed within the IP ranges they own, especially for connections set up by third parties.
    Note: For more information on attack surface management, see CISA’s Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance, CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services for U.S. critical infrastructure, and NSA’s Attack Surface Management for the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.
  • Implement network segmentation between IT and OT networks. Segmenting critical systems and introducing a demilitarized zone (DMZ) for passing control data to enterprise logistics reduces the potential impact of cyber threats and the risk of disruptions to essential OT operations [CPG 3.I].
  • Consider implementing a firewall and/or virtual private network if exposure to the internet is necessary for controlling access to devices.
    • Consider disabling public exposure by default and implementing time-limited remote access to reduce the amount of time systems are exposed.
    • Restrict and monitor both inbound and outbound traffic at OT perimeter firewalls. Configure OT perimeter firewalls to enforce a default-deny policy for all traffic. Asset owners should explicitly permit authorized destinations and protocols based on operational requirements.
    • Implement strict egress filtering to prevent unauthorized data exfiltration or command-and-control callbacks.
    • Regularly audit firewall rulesets and monitor outbound traffic patterns for anomalies indicative of threat actor activity, such as beaconing or unexpected protocol usage.
• Adopt mature asset management processes, including mapping data flows and access points. Generating a complete picture of both OT and IT assets provides visibility to operators and management, allowing organizations to monitor and assess deviations for criticality [CPG 2.A].
  • Keep remote access services updated with the latest version available and ensure all systems and software are up to date with patches and necessary security updates.
    • Keep VNC systems updated with the latest version available.
  • Refer to the joint Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance for Owners and Operators to help with reducing cybersecurity risk by identifying which assets within their environment should be secured and protected.
• Ensure OT assets use robust authentication procedures.
  • Many devices lack robust authentication and authorization. Devices with weak authentication are vulnerable targets to threat actors using credential theft techniques.
  • Implement MFA where possible. Where MFA is not feasible, use strong, unique passwords. Apply password standards for operator-accessible services on underlying OT assets, as well as network devices protecting those services. This is especially important for services that require internet accessibility [CPG 3.A] [CPG 3.B] [CPG 3.C] [CPG 3.F].
  • Establish an allowlist that permits only authorized device IP addresses and/or media access control addresses. The allowlist can be refined to operator working hours to further obstruct malicious threat actor activity; organizations are encouraged to establish monitoring and alerting for access attempts not meeting these criteria [CPG 3.E].
  • Disable any unused authentication methods, logic, or features, such as default authentication keys and default passwords. Block all unused high ephemeral ports and monitor for attempted connections using standard protocols on non-standard ports [CPG 3.R].
  • Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device’s state, logic, program, or filesystems.
• Enable control system security features that can separate and audit view and control functions. Limiting remotely accessible or default user accounts to “view-only” removes the potential for impact without exploiting a vulnerability [CPG 3.G].
• Implement and practice business recovery/disaster recovery plans. Plans should also take into consideration redundancy, fail-safe mechanisms, islanding capabilities, backup restoration, and manual operation.
  • Include scenarios that necessitate switching to manual operations. Maintaining the capability of an organization to revert to manual controls to quickly restore operations is vital in the immediate aftermath of a cyber incident [CPG 6.A].
  • Create backups of the engineering logic, configurations, and firmware of HMIs to enable fast recovery. Organizations should routinely test backups and standby systems to ensure safe manual operations in the event of an incident [CPG 3.O].
• Collect and monitor the traffic of OT assets and networking devices. This includes unusual logins or unexpected protocols communicating over the internet, and functions of ICS management protocols that change an asset’s operating mode or modify programs.
• Review configurations for setpoint ranges or tag values to stay within safe ranges and establish alerting for deviations.
• Take a proactive approach in the procurement process by following the guidance outlined in the joint guide Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products.

OT Device Manufacturers

Although critical infrastructure organizations can take steps to mitigate risks, it is ultimately the responsibility of OT device manufacturers to build products that are secure by design. The authoring organizations urge device manufacturers to take ownership of the security outcomes of their customers in line with the joint guide Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Secure by Design Software.

• Eliminate default credentials and require strong passwords. The use of default credentials is a top weakness threat actors exploit to gain access to systems.
• Mandate MFA for privileged users. Changes to engineering logic or configurations are safety-impacting events in critical infrastructure. MFA should be available for safety critical components at no additional cost.
• Practice secure by default principles. OT components were initially designed without public internet connectivity in mind. When internet connection becomes necessary, implementing additional security measures is essential to safeguard these systems. Manufacturers should recognize insecure states and promptly inform users so they can make informed risk decisions.
  • Include logging at no additional charge. Change and access control logs allow operators to track safety-impacting events in their critical infrastructure. These logs should be available for no cost and use open standard logging formats.
• Publish Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs). Vulnerabilities in underlying software libraries can affect a wide range of devices. Without an SBOM, it is nearly impossible for a critical infrastructure system owner to measure and mitigate the impact of a vulnerability on their existing systems. See CISA’s SBOM webpage for more information.

Additionally, see CISA’s Secure by Design Alert on how software manufacturers can shield web management interfaces from malicious cyber activity. By using secure by design tactics, software manufacturers can make their product lines secure “out of the box” without requiring customers to spend additional resources making configuration changes, purchasing tiered security software and logs, monitoring, and making routine updates.

For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage.

Validate Security Controls

In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring organizations recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring organizations recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how it performs against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To start:

1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 1 to Table 10).
2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
3. Test your technologies against the technique.
4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

The authoring organizations recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

Resources

Entities requiring additional support for implementing any of the mitigations in this advisory should contact their regional CISA Cybersecurity Advisor for assistance. Key resources organizations should reference include:

• CISA, EPA, NSA, FBI, ASD’s ACSC, Cyber Centre, BSI, NCSC-NL, and NCSC-NZ’s Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance for Owners and Operators offers best practices to assist organizations in identifying and prioritizing which assets should be secured and protected.
• CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA, DOE, USDA, FDA, MS-ISAC, Cyber Centre, and NCSC-UK’s guidance on Defending OT Operations Against Ongoing Pro-Russia Hacktivist Activity that can help organizations protect OT systems from pro-Russia hacktivist activity.
• NSA and CISA’s guidance on Control System Defense: Know the Opponent helps organizations defend OT and ICS assets against malicious cyber activity.
• CISA and EPA’s resource page on Water and Wastewater Cybersecurity to help organizations reduce risks posed by malicious cyber actors targeting water and wastewater systems.
  • For additional guidance, see CISA, EPA, and FBI’s fact sheet on Top Cyber Actions for Securing Water Systems.
• The Food and Ag-ISAC’s best practices on Food and Ag Cybersecurity: A Guide for Small & Medium Enterprises provides recommendations to help mitigate against cyber threats.
• DOE and National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners Cybersecurity Baselines for Electric Distribution Systems and Distributed Energy (DER) webpage provides resources for state public utility commissions and utilities, as well as DER operators and aggregators to help mitigate cybersecurity risks.

Additional resources that apply to this advisory include:

• EPA’s Cybersecurity for the Water Sector resource page provides organizations with guidance on implementing basic cyber hygiene practices.
• CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals enables critical infrastructure organizations to reduce the likelihood and impact of known risks and adversary techniques.
• CISA’s Require Strong Passwords webpage supports small and medium-sized businesses mitigating against malicious cyber activity that targets weak passwords.
• CISA, NSA, FBI, EPA, TSA, and international partners’ guidance Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products.
• DOE’s guidance on Cyber-Informed Engineering recommends considering cyber-enabled risks during the conception, design, and development phases when manufacturing physical systems.
• CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services help enable critical infrastructure organizations to reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to monitoring and mitigating attack vectors.
• CISA, NSA, FBI, and international partners’ guidance on Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Secure by Design Software urges software manufacturers to provide customers with products that are safer and more secure.
  • See more information in these Secure by Design Alerts: How Manufacturers Can Protect Customers by Eliminating Default Passwords and How Software Manufacturers Can Shield Web Management Interfaces From Malicious Cyber Activity.

Contact Information

U.S. organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA, FBI, and/or NSA:

• Contact CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at contact@cisa.dhs.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472) or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.
• For NSA cybersecurity guidance inquiries, contact CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov.

Australian organizations: Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.

Canadian organizations: Report incidents by emailing Cyber Centre at contact@cyber.gc.ca.

New Zealand organizations: Report cyber security incidents to incidents@ncsc.govt.nz or call 04 498 7654.

United Kingdom organizations: Report a significant cyber security incident: report.ncsc.gov.uk (monitored 24 hours) or, for urgent assistance, call 03000 200 973.

Disclaimer

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The authoring organizations do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI and co-sealers.

Acknowledgements

Schneider Electric, Nozomi Networks, Eversource Energy, Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Chevron, BP, and Dragos contributed to this advisory.

Version History

December 09, 2025: Initial version.

Appendix A: Targeting Methodologies for Pro-Russia Hacktivist Groups

For further information on targeting methodologies for pro-Russia hacktivist groups, see:

• CISA’s alert Unsophisticated Cyber Threat Actor(s) Targeting Operational Technology;
• The joint fact sheet Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology; and
• CISA’s Russia Cyber Threat webpage.

Appendix B: Additional Designators Used for Cited Groups

The cybersecurity industry and cyber actor groups often use various names to reference actor groups. While not exhaustive, the following are the most notable names used within the cybersecurity community to reference the groups in this advisory.

Note: Cybersecurity organizations have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this may not be a 1:1 correlation to the authoring organizations’ understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

• GRU military unit 74455
  • Sandworm Team
  • Voodoo Bear
  • Seashell Blizzard
  • APT44
• Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR)
  • CyberArmy of Russia
  • Народная CyberАрмия (НКА)
  • People’s CyberArmy of Russia (PCA)
  • Russian CyberArmy Team (RCAT)
• NoName057(16)
  • NoName057(16) Spain
  • NoName057(16) Italy
  • NoName057(16) France
• Z-Pentest
  • Z-Pentest Beograd
  • Z-Pentest Alliance
  • Z-Alliance

Introduction

Note: This advisory was originally published on April 7, 2026, to provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) related to ongoing cyber exploitation of internet-connected operational technology (OT) devices by Iranian-affiliated advanced persistent threat (APT) actors. The authoring agencies updated this advisory on July 22, 2026, to add new guidance on detecting malicious changes in reusable code modules leveraged within Rockwell Automation PLC programs. It also expands the manufacturer scope to include observed targeting of Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other branded/manufactured PLCs, emphasizing the importance of restricting direct internet access and providing best practice resources for secure deployment.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Energy (DOE), United States Cyber Command – Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) (hereafter referred to as the “authoring agencies”) are urgently warning U.S. organizations of ongoing cyber exploitation of internet-connected OT devices—including PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other manufactured PLCs—across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors. As a result of this activity, organizations from multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors experienced disruptions through malicious interactions with PLC project files¹ and the manipulation of data displayed on human machine interface (HMI) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) displays. In a few cases, this activity caused operational disruption and financial loss.

The authoring agencies assess a group of Iranian-affiliated APT actors is conducting this activity to cause disruptive effects within the United States. The group targeted devices spanning multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Services and Facilities (to include local municipalities), Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS), and Energy Sectors. The authoring agencies previously reported on similar activity targeting PLCs by CyberAv3ngers (aka Shahid Kaveh Group)—a cyber threat actor affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cyber Electronic Command (CEC).

Due to the widespread use of these PLCs, and the potential for additional targeting of other branded OT devices across critical infrastructure, the authoring agencies recommend U.S. organizations urgently review the TTPs and IOCs in this advisory for indications of current or historical activity on their networks, and apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the risk of compromise.

If owners and operators discover an affected internet-accessible device in their environment, additional technical measures may be necessary to evaluate the risk of compromise. Please engage your cyber incident response plans and contact the authoring agencies and applicable vendors through existing support channels available to customers and integrators (see Contact Information) to receive support, mitigation, and investigation assistance.

For more information on Iranian malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and the FBI’s Iran Threat and Iran Cyber Threat Overview webpages.

Download the PDF version of this report:

(New, July 22, 2026) For a downloadable copy of July 22, 2026 IOCs, see:

• AA26-097A STIX XML (XML, 29 KB)
• AA26-097A STIX JSON (JSON, 30 KB)

For a downloadable copy of historical April 7, 2026 IOCs, see:

Background Information

Similar Historical Activity Targeting Programmable Logic Controllers

During a similar campaign beginning in November 2023, the IRGC CEC-affiliated cyber threat actors known as "CyberAv3ngers” targeted U.S.-based PLCs and HMIs, causing disruptive effects. Private industry and open sources also refer to this group as Hydro Kitten, Storm-0784, APT Iran, Bauxite, Mr. Soul, Soldiers of Solomon, UNC5691, and the Shahid Kaveh Group. These attacks compromised at least 75 devices, targeting U.S.-based Unitronics PLC devices with an HMI used across multiple critical infrastructure sectors, including the WWS. APT actors developed and deployed custom ladder logic code to these devices, replacing the valid ladder logic with malicious code that continues to be observed to date.

For more information on this group’s activity, see the joint Cybersecurity Advisory IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities.

Ongoing Threat Actor Activity Against U.S.-Based Programmable Logic Controllers

The FBI observed Iranian-affiliated APT actors targeting internet-exposed PLCs with the intent to cause disruptions—including maliciously interacting with project files, and manipulating data displayed on HMI and SCADA displays—to U.S. critical infrastructure organizations. Iranian-affiliated APT targeting campaigns against U.S. critical infrastructure have recently escalated, likely in response to hostilities between Iran, and the United States and Israel.

(New, July 22, 2026) At one U.S. victim, the FBI observed the APT actors download a malicious project file to a targeted PLC using configuration software. Analysis indicated the project file retained ladder logic for downstream function but added logic that overrode specific instruction sets responsible for maintaining safe operating parameters in the victim’s environment.

Since at least March 2026, the authoring agencies identified (through engagements with victim organizations) an Iranian-affiliated APT group disrupted the function of PLCs. Organizations across several U.S. critical infrastructure sectors (including Government Services and Facilities, WWS, and Energy Sectors) deployed these PLCs within a wide variety of industrial automation processes. Some of the victims experienced operational disruption and financial loss.

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK^® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 19. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for tables of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.

Initial Access

(Updated, July 22, 2026) The authoring agencies observed Iranian-affiliated APT actors using several foreign-based IP addresses to access internet-facing PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other manufactured PLCs [T0883]. The actors used leased, third-party hosted infrastructure and manufacturers’ PLC programming software to connect to misconfigured victim PLCs. Inbound malicious traffic has been observed targeting PLC devices on the following ports: 44818, 2222, 102, and 502, as well as targeting modems on port 22. Targeted devices include:

• Rockwell Automation: CompactLogix and Micro850 PLCs
• Schneider Electric: BMX P34/Modicon M340 PLCs
• Siemens: S7-1200 series PLCs

Command and Control

(Updated, July 22, 2026) The targeting of ports [T0885] associated with other OT vendors’ protocols suggests these actors are opportunistically targeting devices manufactured by companies other than Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, including Schneider Electric and Siemens. In one reported instance, the actors utilized Dropbear Secure Shell (SSH) software on victim modems to enable them to gain remote access through port 22 [T1219].

Exfiltration

(New, July 22, 2026) The authoring agencies observed Iranian-affiliated APT actors using configuration software—such as Rockwell Automation’s Studio 5000 Logix Designer, Schneider Electric’s EcoStruxure Control Expert, and Siemens’ Totally Integrated Automation (TIA) Portal—on leased, third-party hosted infrastructure to exfiltrate device project files from PLC devices to threat-actor-controlled infrastructure [T1041].

Impact

(Updated, July 22, 2026) After the actors extracted device project files, the FBI and CISA identified the modification and deletion of project file logic, to include Add-On Instructions (AOIs) and data manipulation on HMI and SCADA displays [T1565]. Additionally, the changes disabled critical shutdown and alarm logic, allowing systems to enter unsafe conditions without notifying operators of the anomalies.

Note: An AOI is analogous to a “Function Block” or “User Defined Function Block” used in other PLC vendor programs.

Indicators of Compromise

See Table 1 and Table 2 for recent IP addresses used by the Iranian-affiliated APT actors to communicate with PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, and Siemens in the United States.

Disclaimer: The FBI observed the threat actors using the IP addresses listed below in the specified time frames. This data is being provided for customers to query against logs for indications of historical targeting by the Iranian-affiliated APT actors. The authoring agencies recommend organizations investigate or vet these IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking.

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

See Table 3 to Table 6 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend organizations review historical TTPs for similar Iranian-affiliated cyber actor activity in IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Mitigations

The authoring agencies recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of the threat actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats and TTPs. Visit CISA’s CPGs webpage for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

Network Defenders

The cyber threat actors accessed PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other branded/manufactured PLCs to cause disruptions to victim systems. To safeguard against this threat and threats to other types of PLCs, the authoring agencies urge organizations to consider the following mitigations.

(Updated, July 22, 2026) In addition to contacting the authoring agencies, organizations and integrators operating PLCs from the manufacturers mentioned in this advisory should review the previously issued guidance to strengthen the security of their OT deployments:

• Rockwell Automation: Contact the Rockwell Automation Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) at PSIRT@rockwellautomation.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents related to Rockwell Automation products.
  
  • Refer to Rockwell Automation Security Advisory SD1771 for recommended PLC hardening measures and configuration guidance.
• Schneider Electric: Contact the Schneider Electric Corporate Product Cyber Emergency Response Team (CPCERT) at cpcert@se.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents related to Schneider Electric products.
  
  • Refer to Schneider Electric’s Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices and Cybersecurity User Guide for Modicon Controller Platform for guidance on securing and configuring PLCs.
• Siemens: Contact Siemens ProductCERT at productcert@siemens.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents and vulnerabilities related to Siemens products.
  
  • Refer to Siemens Security Bulletin 104599 for a list of security measures to harden PLCs and in-depth configuration guides.
  • Siemens users should review the Cybersecurity for Industry Operational Guidelines and implement defense-in-depth controls within their automation systems.

Immediate steps to prevent the attack:

• Disconnect the PLC from the public-facing internet [CPG 3.S]. Follow the joint guidance Secure connectivity principles for OT to safely allow remote access. Specifically, “remove inbound port exposure,” so the OT system is never directly exposed to the internet or external networks, and to ensure all access is mediated, monitored, and controlled. Do this through a secure gateway (jump host) that brokers the connection.
  
  • Ensure cellular modems, used for remote field connectivity and access, are secured with strong authentication and updated.
  • Enable logs for connected modems and regularly review for suspicious activity to detect intrusions and improve incident response speed.
  • (New, July 22, 2026) To mitigate unauthorized access to OT via cellular modems, organizations should consider implementing isolated architectures, such as private Access Point Name (APN), 5G Public Network Integrated Non-Public Network (PNI-NPN), cellular Software-Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN), Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA), or a site-to-site virtual private network (VPN).
• (New, July 22, 2026) Strictly control network access to PLC devices.
  
  • Configure firewall rules or access control list (ACL) security features on PLCs or programmable controllers to allow only authorized communications between expected control system devices. Block access from unauthorized or threat actor-controlled IP addresses, such as those associated with hosting providers.
• For controllers with a physical mode switch, place the physical mode switch into run position to prevent remote modification. Devices should only be in the program or remote position when updating or downloading software online and immediately switched back to the run position when complete. (See Rockwell Automation’s² System Security Design Guidelines for manufacturer’s instructions.)
  
  • (New, July 22, 2026) Prior to switching the device to run mode, review and validate project files, as changing modes will lock in the current project file downloaded to the device.
• For devices that allow software key switching, enable programming protection in PLC configuration software (S7 TIA Portal) to limit who can modify PLCs remotely. (See Siemens’ Cybersecurity for Industry Operational Guidelines for the manufacturer’s instructions.)

Follow-up steps to strengthen security posture:

• (New, July 22, 2026) Review project files running on PLCs for unauthorized changes. Use vendor-provided integrity checking tools and visually compare the running program to known good logic. Ensure reusable logic and input/output configurations are valid. For Rockwell Automation PLCs listed in the Customer Guidance to Disconnect Devices from the Internet, check the AOIs for any anomalous modifications.
  
  • If restoring from backups, verify the backup does not contain malicious logic before deployment.
  • Review logs and configurations on all connected devices, including modems, HMIs, and workstations, to assess potential lateral movement by threat actors. If it appears the actors connected to additional devices, reimage these devices to remove any potential malicious changes or access tools.
• (New, July 22, 2026) Ensure device passwords are changed from their default and are configured to use complex, unique combinations of letters, numbers, and symbols that are not easily guessable. Implementing robust password practices remains a critical security measure that can help prevent unauthorized access and strengthen the overall security posture of OT devices.
• (New, July 22, 2026) Take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation. Conduct comprehensive impact analysis and risk assessments prior to deploying defensive measures.
• Create and test strong backups of the logic and configurations of PLCs. Store backup files offline and secure the physical removal media to enable fast recovery.
• Implement multifactor authentication (MFA) [CPG 3.F] for access to the OT network from an external network.
• If remote access is required, implement a network proxy, gateway, firewall, and/or VPN in front of the PLC to control network access.
  
  • A VPN or gateway device can enable MFA for remote access even if the PLC does not support MFA. Implement security rules on these higher-level network security mechanisms to prevent the type of repeated and sustained login attempts seen during a brute force attack. When possible, implement a device control list for workstations sending messages or connecting to OT components.
  • Use the device control list to monitor for logon activity for unexpected or unusual access to devices from the internet.
• Keep PLC devices updated with the latest software patches issued by the manufacturer. Use established downtime windows to install patches. Known Exploited Vulnerabilities may need to be prioritized outside a downtime window.
• Configure external and internal firewalls to block traffic using common ports associated with network protocols that are unnecessary for the particular network segment.
• Disable any unused authentication methods, logic, or features, such as default authentication keys and passwords, as well as unused or needed services such as Teletype Network (Telnet), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Virtual Network Computing (VNC), and web services.
• Monitor asset management systems for device configuration changes, which can be used to understand expected parameter settings.
• Monitor the content of network traffic for the following:
  
  • Unusual logins to internet-connected devices or unexpected protocols to/from the internet. 
  • Functions of industrial control systems management protocols that change an asset’s operating mode or modify programs.
• (New, July 22, 2026) Ensure service providers are informed of active threats targeting internet-connected PLC devices. Owners and operators should communicate directly with service providers to address risks, especially when remote monitoring or maintenance is involved. Some service providers may rely on internet connectivity essential to monitor and maintain OT/ICS operations but may not be fully aware of active threats.

In addition, the authoring agencies recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques, as well as reduce the impact and risk of compromise by cyber threat actors:

• Reduce risk exposure. CISA offers a range of services at no cost, including scanning and testing, to help organizations reduce exposure to threats via mitigating attack vectors. CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services can help provide additional review of organizations’ internet-accessible assets. 

Device Manufacturers

Note: The following guidance is general in nature and not specific to any OT vendor. Some of the features, settings, and practices may already be offered by certain vendors. The inclusion of this guidance should not be interpreted as an assertion that vendors referenced do not offer such security features. Also, this advisory is not highlighting a new vulnerability in the identified products, but instead discusses opportunistic targeting. Device manufacturers can make opportunistic attacks more difficult at scale by encouraging more secure behavior by default and in operations, as discussed below. 

Although critical infrastructure organizations using PLC devices can take steps to mitigate the risks, it is ultimately the responsibility of the device manufacturer to build products secured by design and default. The authoring agencies urge device manufacturers to take ownership of their customers’ security outcomes by following the principles in the joint guide Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for OT Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products, primarily:

• Change the manufacturers’ default settings to prevent exposing administrative interfaces to the internet.
• Do not charge additional fees for basic security features needed to operate the product securely.
• Support MFA, including via phishing-resistant methods.

By using secure by design tactics, software manufacturers can make product lines secure “out of the box” without requiring customers to spend additional resources making configuration changes, purchasing tiered security software and logs, monitoring, and making routine updates.

For more information on common misconfigurations and guidance on reducing their prevalence, see joint advisory NSA and CISA Red and Blue Teams Share Top Ten Cybersecurity Misconfigurations. For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage and joint guide.

Validate Security Controls

In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 3 to Table 6).
2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
3. Test your technologies against the technique.
4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

The authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

Resources

• Authoring Agencies: IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities
• CISA: Bulletproof Defense: Mitigating Risks From Bulletproof Hosting Providers
• EPA: Cybersecurity for the Water Sector
• CISA: Water and Wastewater Cybersecurity
• CISA: Exploitation of Unitronics PLCs used in Water and Wastewater Systems
• CISA: Iran Threat Overview and Advisories
• FBI: The Iran Threat and Cyber Threat Overview: Iran
• CISA, MITRE: Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
• CISA: Decider Tool
• CISA: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0
• CISA: No-Cost Cybersecurity Services and Tools
• CISA: Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for OT Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products
• NSA, CISA: NSA and CISA Red and Blue Teams Share Top Ten Cybersecurity Misconfigurations
• CISA: Secure by Design
• FBI, CISA: Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology
• United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre: Secure connectivity principles for operational technology

Contact Information

U.S. organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA, the FBI, and/or NSA:

• Contact CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at contact@cisa.dhs.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). File a claim with FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) or contact your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: 
  • Date, time, and location of the incident;
  • Type of activity;
  • Number of people affected;
  • Type of equipment used for the activity; and
  • Name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.
• For NSA cybersecurity guidance inquiries, contact CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov.
• Entities required to report incidents to DOE should follow established reporting requirements, as appropriate. For other energy sector inquiries, contact EnergySRMA@hq.doe.gov.
• Contact the Rockwell Automation PSIRT for questions regarding their guidance or for reporting cyber incidents related to Rockwell Automation products at PSIRT@rockwellautomation.com.
• Contact the Schneider Electric CPCERT at cpcert@se.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents related to Schneider Electric products.
• Contact Siemens ProductCERT for up-to-date information about the security of Siemens products or to report cybersecurity vulnerabilities at productcert@siemens.com. For support with increasing the security of installed Siemens PLCs, contact Siemens Industrial Cybersecurity Services at services.automation@siemens.com. See Siemens ProductCERT and Siemens CERT for more information.

Disclaimer

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and the authoring agencies do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA and the authoring agencies.

Version History

April 7, 2026: Initial version.

July 22, 2026: Update includes new guidance on detecting malicious activity, expanded scope of observed targeting, and best practices for secure PLCs deployment.

Notes

¹Project file refers to the software file that contains ladder logic and configuration settings. On Rockwell Automation devices, it is referred to as an .ACD file.

² See CompactLogix 5370 Controllers (Chapter 5: “Select the Operating Mode of the Controller”) for more information on functions available for the switch.

How To Use Google Bard)(Google Bard Tutorial)

Welcome to our channel where we bring you the latest breakthroughs in AI. From deep learning to robotics, we cover it all. Our videos offer valuable insights and perspectives that will expand your knowledge and understanding of this rapidly evolving field. Be sure to subscribe and stay updated on our latest videos.

All Bard Features
- Bard Can Make Charts - https://www.reddit.com/r/GoogleBard/comments/123s0yt/wow_google_bard_can_make_a_chart_bing_ai_used_to/
- Bard makes very big mistakes https://twitter.com/0xgaut/status/1638287359098716160
- Bard Cannot Help With Coding - https://twitter.com/iamnafets/status/1638232186649477120/photo/1
- Bard Actually has access to recent events
- Bard Cant Access Articles (Sometimes
- Bard Can Rewrite content
- Rewording Questions Helps https://www.reddit.com/r/GoogleBard/comments/11xoaw7/bard_can_actually_answer_code_questions_it_just/
- Bard Can write stories
- Bard is a confusing mix between ChatGPT + Bing
- Bard does have shorter answers
- Bard is quicker

Was there anything we missed?

(For Business Enquiries) contact@theaigrid.com

#LLM #Largelanguagemodel #chatgpt
#AI
#ArtificialIntelligence
#MachineLearning
#DeepLearning
#NeuralNetworks
#Robotics
#DataScience
#IntelligentSystems
#Automation
#TechInnovation

Microsoft Visual ChatGPT - https://github.com/microsoft/visual-chatgpt
Microsoft Visual ChatGPT - https://huggingface.co/spaces/microsoft/visual_chatgpt

Welcome to our channel where we bring you the latest breakthroughs in AI. From deep learning to robotics, we cover it all. Our videos offer valuable insights and perspectives that will expand your knowledge and understanding of this rapidly evolving field. Be sure to subscribe and stay updated on our latest videos.

Was there anything we missed?

(For Business Enquiries) contact@theaigrid.com

#LLM #Largelanguagemodel #chatgpt
#AI
#ArtificialIntelligence
#MachineLearning
#DeepLearning
#NeuralNetworks
#Robotics
#DataScience
#IntelligentSystems
#Automation
#TechInnovation

15 Jaw-Dropping Consequences of the Singularity (AGI IS CLOSER THAN YOU THINK!)

Welcome to our channel where we bring you the latest breakthroughs in AI. From deep learning to robotics, we cover it all. Our videos offer valuable insights and perspectives that will expand your knowledge and understanding of this rapidly evolving field. Be sure to subscribe and stay updated on our latest videos.

- This is artificial intelligence becoming artificial super intelligence, and its mark on man in the form of brain computer interface chip to create a new world order where no one can buy or sell without it.

Deep Learning AI Specialization: https://imp.i384100.net/GET-STARTED
AI Marketplace: https://taimine.com/

Timestamps:
0:00 Intro to AI turned ASI
0:58 The rise of super intelligence
3:40 Brain computer interface mark
5:41 Losing the beast's favor

#ai #future #tech

• The profile backup mechanism has been enabled by default for all desktop platforms in Nightly, as well as Beta! The current plan is to have this ride out to Firefox 151 for Windows, macOS and Linux on May 18th!
  • This feature, when enabled, will create a copy of your profile data in the background and store it in a single file on your file system that you can restore from.
  • You will be able to manage this feature in Settings under Sync (for now)
    • 
  • You can read more about the feature here
• As followups to the recent addition to the WebExtension tabs API to support the new SplitView tabs feature, tabs.group() and tabs.ungroup() have been fixed to work correctly with split view tabs, and fixed split views being prepended instead of appended to tab groups when adopted into a new window – Bug 2029099 / Bug 2029534
• Adaptive autofill has been enabled on Nightly.
  • Previously, autofill only completed domains (e.g. typing red autofilled reddit.com). Now it can also complete full URLs for pages you visit often (e.g. red → reddit.com/r/firefox), learning from what you actually click in the address bar. If a suggestion isn’t helpful, you can now dismiss it so autofill learns what not to show you too.
    • If you run into issues or have feedback, you can file a bug here!
• Markus Stange [:mstange] implemented dynamic toolbar on top in RDM (#1978145), but also implemented some static skeleton UI so it’s closer to what we actually have in Firefox for Android
  • dynamic toolbar is behind a pref: devtools.responsive.dynamicToolbar.enabled
  • it can be put on top by setting devtools.responsive.dynamicToolbar.onTop, otherwise it’s at the bottom
  • 

Friends of the Firefox team

Resolved bugs (excluding employees)

Script to find new contributors from bug list

Volunteers that fixed more than one bug

• Amin Amir
• aoia7rz7l
• Chukwuka Rosemary
• DrSeed
• Frédéric Wang Nélar
• japandi
• John Iweh
• jonathancabera
• Josh Aas
• Keji Bakare
• kofoworola shonuyi
• konyhéa
• liz
• Mathew Hodson
• Okhuomon Ajayi
• Oluwatobi
• ROSHAAN
• Sam Johnson

New contributors (🌟 = first patch)

•  Anthony Mclamb: Disable the legacy Edge migrator
•  Amin Amir
  • 🌟Fix browsingContext.sys.mjs to assign to #contextCreatedHandled instead of contextCreatedHandled
  • Fix missing WITHOUT ROWID SQLite performance optimization in SERPCategorization.sys.mjs
  • 🌟 Amine Zroual: Omitted maxResults property not handled correctly in getRecentlyClosed
• any1here: install_sig_alt_stack incorrectly checks mmap’s return value
• 🌟 Armin Ulrich: Fix MessageHandlerRegistry.sys.mjs calling getExistingMessageHandler with an unused second argument
• japandi
  • Cannot remove amazon.com from top sites list
  • The height of the pinned tabs area should be responsive to the number of pins
  • Use cenum for nsIHelperAppLauncherDialog reason constants to enable better typescript annotations
• Nathan Johnson [:narjoDev]: Remove browser.display.use_system_colors pref
• DrSeed
  • Firefox shows vertical tabs in new windows despite “Hide tabs and sidebar” setting
  • The “Expand sidebar on hover” option is not kept after the vertical tabs are disabled and enabled again
• Keji Bakare:
  • Split view’s focus-outline is clipped on the right side of left tab
  • White space on the right side of left panel in split view
• 🌟 gotyaoi: Reload toolbar button is active on about:newtab
• Itoro James: [A11y][Keyboard Navigation]Cancelling a note via Keyboard Navigation still saves it
• John Iweh: The notification dot is not displayed if the tab is in a Split View
• 🌟 John Iweh: sidebar-shown attribute remains when sidebar.revamp is false
• 🌟 jonathancabera:
  • The Move tab to Split View option is also displayed for the tabs that are within the Split View
  • A Note with long text (1003 characters) is saved by pressing ENTER even if the “Save” button is disabled
  • Tab group guide line becomes disconnected under certain conditions related to split views in vertical tab mode
• Aloys: Remove logic that forces distribution language packs to be reinstalled when upgrading from Firefoxes older than 67
• liz:
  • Create test to ensure maxRenderCountEstimate is never being set to Infinity in virtual-list component in Fx View
  • Button accessible name does not convey its function: missing topic context (Settings dialog > Topics dialog > buttons Following/Unfollow/Blocked/Unblock)
• Mary cathline: Tab Group Label does not respect touch density in vertical tab bar
• 🌟 Brandon Lucier: Popups opened with window.open give window type normal instead of popup
• karan68: [dialog] New Shortcut dialog needs a label/accessible name
• 🌟 Vector: Button does not programmatically indicate that it opens a dialog (Recent activity section > story card > ••• disclosure > Delete from History button)
• 🌟 Osoble: Update font size and weight for synced tabs device name headers in Firefox View
• konyhéa:
  • Add test for sync admin disabled to browser_syncedtabs_errors_firefoxview.js
  • Check all second paramaters for TestUtils.waitForCondition in Fx View test files
  • Recently Closed Tabs, Tabs from Other Devices, and History pages should have Cmd / Ctrl + Click on a link open the link in the new background tab.
• Noble Chinonso: #shouldHandleEvent in SidebarTreeView.js compares event.keyCode to string values, causing Home/End keys to never be handled
• Pranjali Srivastava: Add a test to verify that the space above tabs is consistent across PB, LWT and sizemode (where appropriate)
• Okhuomon Ajayi:
  • More spacing is needed between the tab note icon and the close icon on the tab
  • The tabs in vertical mode collapsed state are positioned differently in Split View
  • Keep vertical split view tabs stacked vertically even when the sidebar is expanded when expand on hover is enabled
  • Vertical split view tabs can be too big or small when tabs are overflowing
• 🌟 Rishan: Fix duplicated arrow function in browser_history_sidebar.js
• Chukwuka Rosemary:
  • “Forget About This Site” context menu option missing from Firefox View history
  • Long strings are not displayed properly on the about:opentabs page search filed
  • Add test for Forget This Site option in Fxview history context menu.
• ROSHAAN:
  • 🌟Tab note background colour is incorrect for default light theme
  •  [win/linux] The splitter between content areas does not match Figma spec
  • Fix typo in OpenInTabsUtils.confirmOpenInTabs()
• Sameeksha: Disclosure button expanded/collapsed state not programmatically defined (Customize button)
• kofoworola shonuyi:
  • 🌟Actually hide or remove sidebar-shown attribute when in fullscreen.
  • Add a test for checking sidebar-shown attribute in fullscreen mode
• 🌟 Sayd Mateen: Page URL is displayed as tab name when page’s contains about:reader?</a></p> <p>