Stromspitzen bei den erneuerbaren Energien stellen die Stromnetze vor Herausforderungen. Ein neuer Ansatz nutzt nun stillgelegte Öl- und Gasbohrlöcher als thermische Großspeicher für überschüssigen Strom aus Photovoltaikanlagen. Das Verfahren soll ungenutzte Infrastrukturen in regulierbare grüne Leistung für Zeiten hoher Nachfrage umwandeln.  Eine Analyse von Phil Cruver, Chef des US-Unternehmens Geo2Watts, beleuchte das Potenzial sogenannter Bohrloch-Batterien […]

Der Beitrag Alte Öllöcher als Akku: Bohrloch-Batterie soll Energie speichern erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

Stromspitzen bei den erneuerbaren Energien stellen die Stromnetze vor Herausforderungen. Ein neuer Ansatz nutzt nun stillgelegte Öl- und Gasbohrlöcher als thermische Großspeicher für überschüssigen Strom aus Photovoltaikanlagen. Das Verfahren soll ungenutzte Infrastrukturen in regulierbare grüne Leistung für Zeiten hoher Nachfrage umwandeln.  Eine Analyse von Phil Cruver, Chef des US-Unternehmens Geo2Watts, beleuchte das Potenzial sogenannter Bohrloch-Batterien […]

Der Beitrag Alte Öllöcher als Akku: Bohrloch-Batterie soll Energie speichern erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

Stromspitzen bei den erneuerbaren Energien stellen die Stromnetze vor Herausforderungen. Ein neuer Ansatz nutzt nun stillgelegte Öl- und Gasbohrlöcher als thermische Großspeicher für überschüssigen Strom aus Photovoltaikanlagen. Das Verfahren soll ungenutzte Infrastrukturen in regulierbare grüne Leistung für Zeiten hoher Nachfrage umwandeln.  Eine Analyse von Phil Cruver, Chef des US-Unternehmens Geo2Watts, beleuchte das Potenzial sogenannter Bohrloch-Batterien […]

Der Beitrag Alte Öllöcher als Akku: Bohrloch-Batterie soll Energie speichern erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

A double free vulnerability has been reported in the Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) service. The vulnerability is due to an error when processing fragments.

An unauthenticated, remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted packets to the target server. Successful exploitation could result in a crash of the IKEEXT service, or potentially arbitrary code execution.

The Vulnerability

Microsoft Windows is an operating system which includes both server and desktop components along with an easy-to-use GUI. All currently supported versions of Windows include Internet Key Exchange Protocol Extensions to support the Virtual Private Network (VPN) feature.

The VPN feature of Windows encrypts communication between hosts. ISAKMP is a negotiation protocol used by IPsec-enabled hosts to build a security association. It uses the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol in order to negotiate keys for encrypted communication. IKE has two versions: IKEv1 and IKEv2. IKE version 1 (IKEv1) and version 2 (IKEv2) messages have the following general format:

The type of payload is determined by the Next Payload header of the previous payload, or the Next Payload field in the header (in the case of the first payload).

IKEv2 supports message fragmentation as defined in RFC 7383. When IKEv2 messages exceed the path MTU, they may be split into multiple Encrypted Fragment payloads. Of interest to this report is the Encrypted Fragment (SKF) payload (type 0x35). The SKF payload format is defined as:

When an IKEv2 implementation receives fragments, it inserts each fragment into an ordered list and reassembles them once all fragments have been received. In the Windows implementation, the function IkeReinjectReassembledPacket() performs this reassembly.

A double-free vulnerability has been reported in the Windows IKE Extension library (ikeext.dll). The vulnerability is due to improper ownership handling of a heap-allocated blob pointer during IKEv2 fragment reassembly. During the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, a Security Realm Vendor ID payload causes IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId() to allocate a blob and store it in the MMSA (Main Mode Security Association) structure at offset 0x208. When a fragmented IKE_AUTH message is fully reassembled, IkeReinjectReassembledPacket copies MMSA fields at offsets 0x178 through 0x21F - including the blob pointer at 0x208 - into a local stack struct. This struct is then passed to IkeQueueRecvRequest, which shallow-copies it into a heap-allocated work item. While IkeQueueRecvRequest deep-copies the reassembly buffer at offset 0x10 in the struct, the Security Realm blob pointer at offset 0xC8 remains a shallow copy, aliasing the original at MMSA+0x208.

When the thread pool processes the queued work item, IkeDestroyPacketContext checks the blob pointer at offset 0xC8 and calls WfpMemFree to release it (first free). The MMSA structure still holds the original pointer to the same allocation at offset 0x208. When the MMSA is subsequently cleaned up through IkeCleanupMMNegotiation, the SA reference count is decremented via IkeDerefMMSA, eventually triggering IkeFreeMMSA, which frees the blob pointer at MMSA offset 0x208 - the same allocation already freed by IkeDestroyPacketContext (second free).

A remote, unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted IKE_SA_INIT message followed by two or more Encrypted Fragment (SKF) payloads containing an invalid IKE_AUTH message to the target server. The fragment reassembly path will shallow-copy the blob pointers, and the subsequent MMSA cleanup will trigger the double free. Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution under the security context of the IKEEXT service (SYSTEM).

Source Code Walkthrough

The following code snippets were taken from IKEEXT.DLL file version 10.0.20348.2849 and decompiled with IDA Pro version 8.3. Comments added by TrendAI have been highlighted.

Detection Guidance

To detect an attack exploiting this vulnerability, the detection device must monitor and parse traffic on UDP ports 500 and 4500. The IKE general format, Payloads field, and the Encrypted Fragment (SKF) payload format can be seen above.

The detection device should monitor all incoming IKE traffic. Detection requires correlating two packets within the same IKE session: an IKE_SA_INIT request carrying the Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID, followed by a fragmented IKE_AUTH request. Neither packet alone is malicious; both must be observed in sequence from the same source.

IKE_SA_INIT

At byte offset 17 of the UDP payload, the device should check for the three-byte sequence 20 22 08, which corresponds to the IKEv2 version identifier (0x20), the IKE_SA_INIT exchange type (0x22), and the Initiator flag (0x08). The device should then scan the remainder of the packet for the 16-byte sequence 68 6a 8c bd fe 63 4b 40 51 46 fb 2b af 33 e9 e8, which is the Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID. If both conditions are met, the device should follow the guidance below.

IKE_AUTH

For subsequent packets from the same source, the device should check bytes at offset 16 through 23 of the UDP payload. At offset 16, the four-byte sequence 35 20 23 08 identifies an Encrypted Fragment payload (SKF, type 0x35), IKEv2 version (0x20), IKE_AUTH exchange type (0x23), and Initiator flag (0x08). If found, the detection device should inspect offset 20 and search for the four-byte sequence00 00 00 01. If found the traffic should be considered malicious; an attack exploiting this vulnerability is likely underway.

Notes
• All multi-byte values should be treated as big endian.
• When detecting traffic on port 4500, IKE packets are prepended by a 4-byte non-ESP marker (\x00\x00\x00\x00), shifting all IKE header content offsets by 4.

Conclusion

This vulnerability was patched by Microsoft in the April 2026 release cycle. They do note two mitigations that could prevent exploitation while the patch is being tested and deployed. 

·      Block inbound traffic on UDP ports 500 and 4500 for systems that do not use IKE.

·      For systems that require IKE, configure firewall rules to allow inbound traffic on UDP ports 500 and 4500 only from known peer addresses.

These mitigations may be removed once the security patch is applied. The only way to fully remediate the vulnerability is to apply the update from the vendor.

Special thanks to Richard Chen and Lucas Miller of the TrendAI Research team for providing such a thorough analysis of this vulnerability. For an overview of TrendAI Research services please visit https://go.trendmicro.com/tis/vulnerabilities.html.

The threat research team will be back with other great vulnerability analysis reports in the future. Until then, follow the team on Twitter, Mastodon, LinkedIn, or Bluesky for the latest in exploit techniques and security patches.

A command injection vulnerability has been reported in Arista NG Firewall. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of user data in the diagnostics component.

A remote, authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted requests to the target server. Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary command execution under the security context of the root user.

The Vulnerability

Arista NG Firewall is an open-source firewall appliance. It was originally developed under the name Untangle. Some features of Arista Firewall include spam blocking, bandwidth control, and IPS, etc. NG Firewall can be managed through a web user interface, or a JSON-RPC API using HTTP.

HTTP is a request/response protocol described in RFCs 7230 - 7237 and other RFCs. A request is sent by a client to a server, which in turn sends a response back to the client. An HTTP request consists of a request line, various headers, an empty line, and an optional message body

where CRLF represents the new line sequence Carriage Return (CR) followed by Line Feed (LF). SP represents a space character. Parameters can be passed from the client to the server as name-value pairs in either the Request-URI, or in the message-body, depending on the Method used and Content-Type header. For example, a simple HTTP request passing a parameter named “param” with value “1”, using the GET method might look like:

A corresponding HTTP request using the POST method might look like:

If there is more than one parameter/value pair, they are encoded as '&'-delimited name=value pairs:

          var1=value1&var2=value2&var3=value3...

The component relevant to this report is the JSON-RPC endpoint. A JSON object has the following syntax:

•            An object is enclosed in curly braces {}.
•            An object consists of zero or more items delimited by a comma (",") character.
•            An item consists of a key and a value. A key is delimited from its value by a colon (":") character.
•            A key must be a string (enclosed in quotes).
•            A value must be a valid type. Valid types include string, number, JSON object, array, Boolean, or null.
•            An array is an object enclosed in square braces []. An array consists of zero or more string, number, JSON object, array, Boolean or null type-objects delimited by a comma (",") character.

An example JSON object is as follows:

The following is an example of a JSON-RPC request to the runTroubleshooting() method that is relevant to this report:

A command injection vulnerability has been reported in Arista NG Firewall. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of user data that is used in a command line. The runTroubleshooting() method of the class NetworkManagerImpl will be used to handle JSON-RPC requests to the runTroubleshooting method. The command parameter passed to the method will be the first element in the params JSON array in the body of the request. This value must be one of the strings in the TroubleshootingCommands enum defined in the NetworkManager class. The second parameter of the method will contain additional arguments passed to the JSON-RPC call.

The method will first iterate through each of the additional arguments and combine each key value pair into a single string, separated by a "=" character that will later be used as an environment variable. Next, a switch case statement is used to ensure the provided command is one of the values in TroubleshootingCommands. Each command value will be processed using the same code.

The method will next iterate through each environment variable, and inspect it for the following common command injection strings:

          ; & | > $(

If any are found, the request will be rejected, and an exception is thrown. If each environment variable is valid, the method execEvil() is called to create and execute a command line for the network-troubleshooting.sh script, with the environment variables passed as a parameter. The execEvil() method in turn will call Runtime.getRuntime().exec() to run the script, with the second parameter passing the environment variables that will be used by the script. Each command value will have a function in network-troubleshooting.sh, such as run_dns() for the “DNS” command value. Each function will follow a similar structure, by creating a CMD string using the environment variables passed by exec() and then calling eval to execute it.

However, the values of the parameters passed to the runTroubleshooting JSON-RPC method are not completely sanitized before it is used in the command line. While the parameters passed to the endpoint are inspected for some shell metacharacters, the list is incomplete. For example, the backtick character (`) is not included in the check and may be used to inject a command.

For example:

The example above will write and execute a python script on the server to achieve code execution without using any restricted characters.

A remote, authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a JSON-RPC request to the runTroubleshooting method containing a crafted “HOST” or “URL” parameter containing shell metacharacters not present in the runTroubleshooting() check. Successful exploitation in the worst case will result in arbitrary command execution under the security context of the root user.

Detection Guidance

To detect an attack exploiting this vulnerability, the detection device must monitor and parse traffic on the following ports:
          - HTTP, over port 80/TCP
          - HTTPS, over port 443/TCP

Traffic to Arista NG Firewall may be encrypted and must be decrypted prior to applying this guidance.

The detection device must search for HTTP POST requests made to the request-URI /admin/JSON-RPC. If found, the body of the request must be parsed as JSON. The JSON object in the body must be inspected for a method key, and its value must be inspected to contain the substring runTroubleshooting. If found, the object must also be inspected for the JSON key "params", with a value containing a JSON array. The first entry in the JSON array must be inspected for any of the following strings:

If found, the second entry in the array must be inspected for a JSON object, and inspected for any of the following keys:

If either is found, the corresponding value to the key must be inspected for any of the following command injection characters:

If found, the traffic should be treated as suspicious; an attack exploiting this vulnerability is likely underway.

The following regular expression can be applied to find malicious requests:

          /\x22(HOST|URL)\x22\s*:\s*\x22(?:[^\x22\\]|\\.)*?[\x60\x27\x24\x3c]/

Notes:

• String matching on the request-URI and all JSON strings should be done in a case sensitive manner.
• The JSON strings may be encoded and must be decoded prior to applying this guidance.
• The request-URI may be URL-encoded and must be decoded before applying this guidance.

Conclusion

This vulnerability has been addressed by Arista with their Security Advisory 0123. They note that the Arista Edge Threat Management - Arista Next Generation Firewall (Formerly Untangle) is affected by this bug, but other product versions are not. They also state the following mitigation can be applied:

Do not allow non-authorized administrative access or access to the administrative browser.

However, the more appropriate action is to apply the provided vendor security patch by upgrading to version 17.4 or higher.

Special thanks to Jonathan Lein and Simon Humbert of the TrendAI Research team for providing such a thorough analysis of this vulnerability. For an overview of TrendAI Research services, please visit https://go.trendmicro.com/tis/vulnerabilities.html.

The threat research team will be back with other great vulnerability analysis reports in the future. Until then, follow the team on Twitter, Mastodon, LinkedIn, or Bluesky for the latest in exploit techniques and security patches.

Tags: #EU | #Google | #USA

Add Laguna XS 2, XS 2.1, and S 2.1 support to the MLX model and create paths.

Read the source config to apply one quantization policy across dense and routed MoE layers. Keep the tied output head and router at source precision, quantize supported attention and expert projections, selectively promote sensitive expert down projections, and emit per-tensor metadata for mixed quantization blobs.

Correct dense expert loading, BF16 source-layout handling, expert global-scale shapes and dtypes, routing-score scaling, and mixed-precision expert dispatch. Gate/up and down projections select quantized or dense execution independently so promoted BF16 down projections do not force quantized gate/up weights through the dense fallback.

Optimize the forward pass with compatible gate/up fusion, sorted standard GatherMM and GatherQMM operations for larger prefills, model-local mlx.Compile closures for elementwise MoE work, and cache-backed 512-token prefill chunks. This keeps the implementation on maintained MLX operations without custom kernels.

Add focused tests for Laguna configuration variants, quantization policy and metadata, dense and routed expert loading, mixed-precision dispatch, compiled-versus-eager parity, fused projections, routing, and prefill chunking.

• review comments and S 2.1 performance fixes

Address renderer/parser selection and mixed-precision expert quantization review feedback.

Keep Laguna weights resident on Metal to prevent repeated paging of its large, sparsely accessed expert buffers. Scope this policy to Laguna GPU execution.

Remove obsolete 512-token prefill chunking now that the runner's 2048-token path is faster.

• review comments addressed

• fix create

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory is being published as an addition to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) May 6, 2025, joint fact sheet Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology and European Cybercrime Centre’s (EC3) Operation Eastwood, in which CISA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and EC3 shared information about cyber incidents affecting the operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) of critical infrastructure entities in the United States and globally.

FBI, CISA, National Security Agency (NSA), and the following partners—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are releasing this joint advisory on the targeting of critical infrastructure by pro-Russia hacktivists:

• U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
• U.S. Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
• Europol European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)
• EUROJUST – European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation
• Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
• Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
• Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
• Czech Republic Military Intelligence (VZ)
• Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)
• Czech Republic National Centre Against Terrorism, Extremism, and Cyber Crime (NCTEKK)
• French National Cybercrime Unit – Gendarmerie Nationale (UNC)
• French National Jurisdiction for the Fight Against Organized Crime (JUNALCO)
• German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
• Italian State Police (PS)
• Latvian State Police (VP)
• Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau (LKPB)
• New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
• Romanian National Police (PR)
• Spanish Civil Guard (GC)
• Spanish National Police (CNP)
• Swedish Polisen (SC3)
• United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)

The authoring organizations assess pro-Russia hacktivist groups are conducting less sophisticated, lower-impact attacks against critical infrastructure entities, compared to advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. These attacks use minimally secured, internet-facing virtual network computing (VNC) connections to infiltrate (or gain access to) OT control devices within critical infrastructure systems. Pro-Russia hacktivist groups—Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR), Z-Pentest, NoName057(16), Sector16, and affiliated groups—are capitalizing on the widespread prevalence of accessible VNC devices to execute attacks against critical infrastructure entities, resulting in varying degrees of impact, including physical damage. Targeted sectors include Water and Wastewater Systems, Food and Agriculture, and Energy.

The authoring organizations encourage critical infrastructure organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the likelihood and impact of pro-Russia hacktivist-related incidents. For additional information on Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Russia Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.

Download the PDF version of this report:

Background and Development of Pro-Russia Hacktivist Groups

Over the past several years, the authoring organizations have observed pro-Russia hacktivist groups conducting cyber operations against numerous organizations and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide. The escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 significantly increased the number of these pro-Russia groups. Consisting of individuals who support Russia’s agenda but lack direct governmental ties, most of these groups target Ukrainian and allied infrastructure. However, among the increasing number of groups, some appear to have associations with the Russian state through direct or indirect support.

Cyber Army of Russia Reborn

The authoring organizations assess that the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455—tracked in the cybersecurity community under several names (see Appendix B: Additional Designators Used for Cited Groups)—is likely responsible for supporting the creation of CARR —also known as “The People’s Cyber Army of Russia”—in late February or early March of 2022. Actors suspected to be from GRU unit 74455 likely funded the tools CARR threat actors used to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks through at least September 2024.

In April 2022, the group began using a new Telegram channel featuring the name “CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn” to organize and plan group actions. The channel creators recruited actors to use CARR as an unattributable platform for conducting cyber activities beneath the level of an APT, aimed at deterring anti-Russia rhetoric. CARR threat actors presented themselves as a group of pro-Russia hacktivists supporting Russia’s stance on the Ukrainian conflict, and they soon began claiming responsibility for DDoS attacks against the U.S. and Europe for supporting Ukraine.

CARR documented these actions through embellished images and videos shared on their social media channels, promoting Russian ideology, disseminating talking points, and publicizing leaked information from hacks attributed to Russian state threat actors.

In late 2023, CARR expanded their operations to include attacks on industrial control systems (ICS), claiming an intrusion against a European wastewater treatment facility in October 2023. In November 2023, CARR targeted human-machine interface (HMI) devices, claiming intrusions at two U.S. dairy farms.

The authoring organizations assess that by late September 2024, CARR channel administrators became dissatisfied with the level of support and funding provided by the GRU. This dissatisfaction led CARR administrators and an administrator from another hacktivist group, NoName057(16), to create the Z-Pentest group, employing the same tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as CARR but separate from GRU involvement.

NoName057(16)

The authoring organizations assess that the Center for the Study and Network Monitoring of the Youth Environment (CISM), established on behalf of the Kremlin, created NoName057(16) as a covert project within the organization. Senior executives and employees within CISM developed and customized the NoName057(16) proprietary DDoS tool DDoSia, paid for the group’s network infrastructure, served as administrators on NoName057(16) Telegram channels, and selected DDoS targets.

Active since March 2022, NoName057(16) has conducted frequent DDoS attacks against government and private sector entities in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states and other European countries perceived as hostile to Russian geopolitical interests. The group operates primarily through Telegram channels and used GitHub, alongside various websites and repositories, to host DDoSia and share materials and TTPs with their followers. 

In 2024, NoName057(16) began collaborating closely with other pro-Russia hacktivist groups, operating a joint chat with CARR by mid-2024. In July 2024, NoName057(16) jointly claimed responsibility with CARR for an alleged intrusion against OT assets in the U.S. The high degree of cooperation with CARR likely contributed to the formation of Z-Pentest, which is composed of actors and administrators from both teams, in September 2024.

Z-Pentest

Established in September 2024, Z-Pentest is composed of members from CARR and NoName057(16). The group specializes in OT intrusion operations targeting globally dispersed critical infrastructure entities. Additionally, the group uses “hack and leak” operations and defacement attacks to draw attention to their pro-Russia messaging. Unlike other pro-Russia hacktivist groups, Z-Pentest largely avoids DDoS activities, claiming OT intrusions as attempts to garner more attention from the media.

Shortly after Z-Pentest’s inception, the group announced alliances with CARR and NoName057(16), possibly to leverage the other groups’ subscribers to grow the new channel. In March 2025, Z-Pentest posted evidence claiming OT device intrusions to their channel using a NoName057(16) cyberattack campaign hashtag. Similarly, in April 2025, Z-Pentest shared a video purporting defacement of an HMI by changing system names to NoName057(16) and CARR references. Z-Pentest continues to create new alliances with other groups, like Sector16, to continue growing their subscriber base and incidentally propagate TTPs with new partners.

Sector16

Formed in January 2025, Sector16 is a novice pro-Russia hacktivist group that emerged through collaboration with Z-Pentest. Sector16 actively maintains an online presence, including a public Telegram channel where they share videos, statements, and claims of compromising U.S. energy infrastructure. These communications often align with pro-Russia narratives and reflect their self-proclaimed support for Russian geopolitical objectives.

Members of Sector16 may have received indirect support from the Russian government in exchange for conducting specific cyber operations that further Russian strategic goals. This aligns with broader Russian cyber strategies that involve leveraging non-state threat actors for certain cyber activities, adding a layer of deniability.

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK^® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 18. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.

TTP Overview

Pro-Russia hacktivist groups employ easily disseminated and replicated TTPs across various entities, increasing the likelihood of widespread adoption and escalating the frequency of intrusions. These groups have limited capabilities, frequently misunderstanding the processes they aim to disrupt. Their apparent low level of technical knowledge results in haphazard attacks where actors intend to cause physical damage but cannot accurately anticipate actual impact. Despite these limitations, the authoring organizations have observed these groups willfully cause actual harm to vulnerable critical infrastructure.

Pro-Russia hacktivist groups use the TTPs in this Cybersecurity Advisory to target virtual network computing (VNC)-connected HMI devices. These groups are primarily seeking notoriety with their actions. While they have caused damage in some instances, they regularly make false or exaggerated claims about their attacks on critical infrastructure to garner more attention. They frequently misrepresent their capabilities and the impacts of their actions, portraying minor incursions as significant breaches, but such incursions can still lead to lost time and resources for operators remediating systems.

Additionally, pro-Russia hacktivists use an opportunistic targeting methodology. They leverage superficial criteria, such as victim availability and existing vulnerabilities, rather than focusing on strategically significant entities. Their lack of strategic focus can lead to a broad array of targets, ranging from water treatment facilities to oil well systems. Pro-Russia hacktivists have demonstrated a pattern of frequently taking advantage of the widespread availability of vulnerable VNC connections. While system owners typically use VNC connections for legitimate remote system access functions, threat actors can maliciously use these connections to broadly target numerous platforms and services. Consequently, these groups can indiscriminately compromise critical infrastructure entities, including those in the Water and Wastewater, Food and Agriculture, and Energy Sectors.

Pro-Russia hacktivist groups have successfully targeted supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks using basic methods, and in some cases, performed simultaneous DDoS attacks against targeted networks to facilitate SCADA intrusions. As recently as April 2025, threat actors used the following unsophisticated TTPs to access networks and conduct SCADA intrusions:

• Scan for vulnerable devices on the internet [T0883] with open VNC ports [T1595.002].
• Initiate temporary virtual private server (VPS) [T1583.003] to execute password brute force software.
• Use VNC software to access hosts [T1021.005].
• Confirm connection to the vulnerable device [T0886].
• Brute force the password, if required [T1110.003].
• Gain access to HMI devices [T0883], typically with default [T0812], weak, or no passwords [T0859].
• Log the confirmed vulnerable device IP address, port, and password.
• Using the HMI graphical interface [T0823], capture screen recordings or intermittent screenshots while conducting the following actions, intending to affect productivity and cause additional costs [T0828]:
  • Modify usernames/passwords [T0892];
  • Modify parameters [T0836];
  • Modify device name [T0892];
  • Modify instrument settings [T0831];
  • Disable alarms [T0878];
  • Create loss of view (a technique that mandates local hands-on operator intervention) [T0829]; and/or
  • Device restart or shutdown [T0816].
• Disconnect from the device, ending the VNC connection.
• Research the compromised device company after the intrusion [T1591].

Propagation

To reach a wider audience, pro-Russia hacktivist groups work together, amplify each other’s posts, create additional groups to amplify their own posts, and likely share TTPs. For example, Z-Pentest jointly claimed intrusion of a U.S. system with Sector16. Sector16 later began posting additional intrusions for which the group claimed sole responsibility. It is likely that these and similar groups will continue to iterate and share these methods to disrupt critical infrastructure organizations.

Reconnaissance and Initial Access

The threat actors’ intrusion methodology is relatively unsophisticated, inexpensive to execute, and easy to replicate. These pro-Russia hacktivist groups abuse popular internet-scraping tools, such as Nmap or OPENVAS, to search for visible VNC services and use brute force password spraying tools to access devices via known default or otherwise weak credentials. Threat actors typically search for these services on the default port 5900 or other nearby ports (5901-5910). Their goal is to gain remote access to HMI devices connected to live control networks.

Once threat actors obtain access, they manipulate available settings from the graphical user interface (GUI) on the HMI devices, such as arbitrary physical parameter and setpoint changes, or conduct defacement activities. Because pro-Russia hacktivist groups seem to lack sector-specific expertise or cyber-physical engineering knowledge, they currently cannot reliably estimate the true impact of their actions. Regardless of outcome, pro-Russia hacktivist groups often post images and screen recordings to their social media platforms, boasting the compromises and exaggerating impacts to garner attention from their peers and the media.

Impact

While pro-Russia hacktivist groups currently demonstrate limited ability to consistently cause significant impact, there is a risk that their continued attacks will result in further harm or grievous physical consequences. Attacks have not yet caused injury; however, the attacks against occupied factories and community facilities demonstrate a lack of consideration for human safety.

Victim organizations reported that the most common operational impact caused by these threat actors is a temporary loss of view, necessitating manual intervention to manage processes. However, any modifications to programmatic and systematic procedures can result in damage or disruption, including substantial labor costs from hiring a programmable logic controller programmer to restore operations, costs associated with operational downtime, and potential costs for network remediation.

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

See Table 1 to Table 10 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Incident Response

If organizations find exposed systems with weak or default passwords, they should assume threat actors compromised the system and begin the following incident response protocols:

1. Determine which hosts were compromised and isolate them by quarantining or taking them offline.
2. Initiate threat hunting activities to scope the intrusion. Collect and review artifacts, such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.
3. Reimage compromised hosts.
4. Provision new account credentials.
5. Report the compromise to CISA, FBI, and/or NSA. See the Contact Information section of this advisory.
6. Harden the network to prevent additional malicious activity. See the Mitigations section of this advisory for guidance.

Mitigations

OT Asset Owners and Operators

The authoring organizations recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture based on the threat actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s CPGs webpage for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

• Reduce exposure of OT assets to the public-facing internet. When connected to the internet, OT devices are easy targets for malicious cyber threat actors. Many devices can be found by searching for open ports on public IP ranges with search engine tools to target victims with OT components [CPG 3.S].
  • Asset owners should use attack surface management services and web-based search platforms to scan the internet. This mitigation can help identify if there are VNC systems exposed within the IP ranges they own, especially for connections set up by third parties.
    Note: For more information on attack surface management, see CISA’s Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance, CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services for U.S. critical infrastructure, and NSA’s Attack Surface Management for the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.
  • Implement network segmentation between IT and OT networks. Segmenting critical systems and introducing a demilitarized zone (DMZ) for passing control data to enterprise logistics reduces the potential impact of cyber threats and the risk of disruptions to essential OT operations [CPG 3.I].
  • Consider implementing a firewall and/or virtual private network if exposure to the internet is necessary for controlling access to devices.
    • Consider disabling public exposure by default and implementing time-limited remote access to reduce the amount of time systems are exposed.
    • Restrict and monitor both inbound and outbound traffic at OT perimeter firewalls. Configure OT perimeter firewalls to enforce a default-deny policy for all traffic. Asset owners should explicitly permit authorized destinations and protocols based on operational requirements.
    • Implement strict egress filtering to prevent unauthorized data exfiltration or command-and-control callbacks.
    • Regularly audit firewall rulesets and monitor outbound traffic patterns for anomalies indicative of threat actor activity, such as beaconing or unexpected protocol usage.
• Adopt mature asset management processes, including mapping data flows and access points. Generating a complete picture of both OT and IT assets provides visibility to operators and management, allowing organizations to monitor and assess deviations for criticality [CPG 2.A].
  • Keep remote access services updated with the latest version available and ensure all systems and software are up to date with patches and necessary security updates.
    • Keep VNC systems updated with the latest version available.
  • Refer to the joint Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance for Owners and Operators to help with reducing cybersecurity risk by identifying which assets within their environment should be secured and protected.
• Ensure OT assets use robust authentication procedures.
  • Many devices lack robust authentication and authorization. Devices with weak authentication are vulnerable targets to threat actors using credential theft techniques.
  • Implement MFA where possible. Where MFA is not feasible, use strong, unique passwords. Apply password standards for operator-accessible services on underlying OT assets, as well as network devices protecting those services. This is especially important for services that require internet accessibility [CPG 3.A] [CPG 3.B] [CPG 3.C] [CPG 3.F].
  • Establish an allowlist that permits only authorized device IP addresses and/or media access control addresses. The allowlist can be refined to operator working hours to further obstruct malicious threat actor activity; organizations are encouraged to establish monitoring and alerting for access attempts not meeting these criteria [CPG 3.E].
  • Disable any unused authentication methods, logic, or features, such as default authentication keys and default passwords. Block all unused high ephemeral ports and monitor for attempted connections using standard protocols on non-standard ports [CPG 3.R].
  • Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device’s state, logic, program, or filesystems.
• Enable control system security features that can separate and audit view and control functions. Limiting remotely accessible or default user accounts to “view-only” removes the potential for impact without exploiting a vulnerability [CPG 3.G].
• Implement and practice business recovery/disaster recovery plans. Plans should also take into consideration redundancy, fail-safe mechanisms, islanding capabilities, backup restoration, and manual operation.
  • Include scenarios that necessitate switching to manual operations. Maintaining the capability of an organization to revert to manual controls to quickly restore operations is vital in the immediate aftermath of a cyber incident [CPG 6.A].
  • Create backups of the engineering logic, configurations, and firmware of HMIs to enable fast recovery. Organizations should routinely test backups and standby systems to ensure safe manual operations in the event of an incident [CPG 3.O].
• Collect and monitor the traffic of OT assets and networking devices. This includes unusual logins or unexpected protocols communicating over the internet, and functions of ICS management protocols that change an asset’s operating mode or modify programs.
• Review configurations for setpoint ranges or tag values to stay within safe ranges and establish alerting for deviations.
• Take a proactive approach in the procurement process by following the guidance outlined in the joint guide Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products.

OT Device Manufacturers

Although critical infrastructure organizations can take steps to mitigate risks, it is ultimately the responsibility of OT device manufacturers to build products that are secure by design. The authoring organizations urge device manufacturers to take ownership of the security outcomes of their customers in line with the joint guide Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Secure by Design Software.

• Eliminate default credentials and require strong passwords. The use of default credentials is a top weakness threat actors exploit to gain access to systems.
• Mandate MFA for privileged users. Changes to engineering logic or configurations are safety-impacting events in critical infrastructure. MFA should be available for safety critical components at no additional cost.
• Practice secure by default principles. OT components were initially designed without public internet connectivity in mind. When internet connection becomes necessary, implementing additional security measures is essential to safeguard these systems. Manufacturers should recognize insecure states and promptly inform users so they can make informed risk decisions.
  • Include logging at no additional charge. Change and access control logs allow operators to track safety-impacting events in their critical infrastructure. These logs should be available for no cost and use open standard logging formats.
• Publish Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs). Vulnerabilities in underlying software libraries can affect a wide range of devices. Without an SBOM, it is nearly impossible for a critical infrastructure system owner to measure and mitigate the impact of a vulnerability on their existing systems. See CISA’s SBOM webpage for more information.

Additionally, see CISA’s Secure by Design Alert on how software manufacturers can shield web management interfaces from malicious cyber activity. By using secure by design tactics, software manufacturers can make their product lines secure “out of the box” without requiring customers to spend additional resources making configuration changes, purchasing tiered security software and logs, monitoring, and making routine updates.

For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage.

Validate Security Controls

In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring organizations recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring organizations recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how it performs against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To start:

1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 1 to Table 10).
2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
3. Test your technologies against the technique.
4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

The authoring organizations recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

Resources

Entities requiring additional support for implementing any of the mitigations in this advisory should contact their regional CISA Cybersecurity Advisor for assistance. Key resources organizations should reference include:

• CISA, EPA, NSA, FBI, ASD’s ACSC, Cyber Centre, BSI, NCSC-NL, and NCSC-NZ’s Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance for Owners and Operators offers best practices to assist organizations in identifying and prioritizing which assets should be secured and protected.
• CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA, DOE, USDA, FDA, MS-ISAC, Cyber Centre, and NCSC-UK’s guidance on Defending OT Operations Against Ongoing Pro-Russia Hacktivist Activity that can help organizations protect OT systems from pro-Russia hacktivist activity.
• NSA and CISA’s guidance on Control System Defense: Know the Opponent helps organizations defend OT and ICS assets against malicious cyber activity.
• CISA and EPA’s resource page on Water and Wastewater Cybersecurity to help organizations reduce risks posed by malicious cyber actors targeting water and wastewater systems.
  • For additional guidance, see CISA, EPA, and FBI’s fact sheet on Top Cyber Actions for Securing Water Systems.
• The Food and Ag-ISAC’s best practices on Food and Ag Cybersecurity: A Guide for Small & Medium Enterprises provides recommendations to help mitigate against cyber threats.
• DOE and National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners Cybersecurity Baselines for Electric Distribution Systems and Distributed Energy (DER) webpage provides resources for state public utility commissions and utilities, as well as DER operators and aggregators to help mitigate cybersecurity risks.

Additional resources that apply to this advisory include:

• EPA’s Cybersecurity for the Water Sector resource page provides organizations with guidance on implementing basic cyber hygiene practices.
• CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals enables critical infrastructure organizations to reduce the likelihood and impact of known risks and adversary techniques.
• CISA’s Require Strong Passwords webpage supports small and medium-sized businesses mitigating against malicious cyber activity that targets weak passwords.
• CISA, NSA, FBI, EPA, TSA, and international partners’ guidance Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products.
• DOE’s guidance on Cyber-Informed Engineering recommends considering cyber-enabled risks during the conception, design, and development phases when manufacturing physical systems.
• CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services help enable critical infrastructure organizations to reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to monitoring and mitigating attack vectors.
• CISA, NSA, FBI, and international partners’ guidance on Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Secure by Design Software urges software manufacturers to provide customers with products that are safer and more secure.
  • See more information in these Secure by Design Alerts: How Manufacturers Can Protect Customers by Eliminating Default Passwords and How Software Manufacturers Can Shield Web Management Interfaces From Malicious Cyber Activity.

Contact Information

U.S. organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA, FBI, and/or NSA:

• Contact CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at contact@cisa.dhs.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472) or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.
• For NSA cybersecurity guidance inquiries, contact CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov.

Australian organizations: Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.

Canadian organizations: Report incidents by emailing Cyber Centre at contact@cyber.gc.ca.

New Zealand organizations: Report cyber security incidents to incidents@ncsc.govt.nz or call 04 498 7654.

United Kingdom organizations: Report a significant cyber security incident: report.ncsc.gov.uk (monitored 24 hours) or, for urgent assistance, call 03000 200 973.

Disclaimer

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The authoring organizations do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI and co-sealers.

Acknowledgements

Schneider Electric, Nozomi Networks, Eversource Energy, Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Chevron, BP, and Dragos contributed to this advisory.

Version History

December 09, 2025: Initial version.

Appendix A: Targeting Methodologies for Pro-Russia Hacktivist Groups

For further information on targeting methodologies for pro-Russia hacktivist groups, see:

• CISA’s alert Unsophisticated Cyber Threat Actor(s) Targeting Operational Technology;
• The joint fact sheet Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology; and
• CISA’s Russia Cyber Threat webpage.

Appendix B: Additional Designators Used for Cited Groups

The cybersecurity industry and cyber actor groups often use various names to reference actor groups. While not exhaustive, the following are the most notable names used within the cybersecurity community to reference the groups in this advisory.

Note: Cybersecurity organizations have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this may not be a 1:1 correlation to the authoring organizations’ understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

• GRU military unit 74455
  • Sandworm Team
  • Voodoo Bear
  • Seashell Blizzard
  • APT44
• Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR)
  • CyberArmy of Russia
  • Народная CyberАрмия (НКА)
  • People’s CyberArmy of Russia (PCA)
  • Russian CyberArmy Team (RCAT)
• NoName057(16)
  • NoName057(16) Spain
  • NoName057(16) Italy
  • NoName057(16) France
• Z-Pentest
  • Z-Pentest Beograd
  • Z-Pentest Alliance
  • Z-Alliance

Introduction

Note: This advisory was originally published on April 7, 2026, to provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) related to ongoing cyber exploitation of internet-connected operational technology (OT) devices by Iranian-affiliated advanced persistent threat (APT) actors. The authoring agencies updated this advisory on July 22, 2026, to add new guidance on detecting malicious changes in reusable code modules leveraged within Rockwell Automation PLC programs. It also expands the manufacturer scope to include observed targeting of Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other branded/manufactured PLCs, emphasizing the importance of restricting direct internet access and providing best practice resources for secure deployment.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Energy (DOE), United States Cyber Command – Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) (hereafter referred to as the “authoring agencies”) are urgently warning U.S. organizations of ongoing cyber exploitation of internet-connected OT devices—including PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other manufactured PLCs—across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors. As a result of this activity, organizations from multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors experienced disruptions through malicious interactions with PLC project files¹ and the manipulation of data displayed on human machine interface (HMI) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) displays. In a few cases, this activity caused operational disruption and financial loss.

The authoring agencies assess a group of Iranian-affiliated APT actors is conducting this activity to cause disruptive effects within the United States. The group targeted devices spanning multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Services and Facilities (to include local municipalities), Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS), and Energy Sectors. The authoring agencies previously reported on similar activity targeting PLCs by CyberAv3ngers (aka Shahid Kaveh Group)—a cyber threat actor affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cyber Electronic Command (CEC).

Due to the widespread use of these PLCs, and the potential for additional targeting of other branded OT devices across critical infrastructure, the authoring agencies recommend U.S. organizations urgently review the TTPs and IOCs in this advisory for indications of current or historical activity on their networks, and apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the risk of compromise.

If owners and operators discover an affected internet-accessible device in their environment, additional technical measures may be necessary to evaluate the risk of compromise. Please engage your cyber incident response plans and contact the authoring agencies and applicable vendors through existing support channels available to customers and integrators (see Contact Information) to receive support, mitigation, and investigation assistance.

For more information on Iranian malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and the FBI’s Iran Threat and Iran Cyber Threat Overview webpages.

Download the PDF version of this report:

(New, July 22, 2026) For a downloadable copy of July 22, 2026 IOCs, see:

• AA26-097A STIX XML (XML, 29 KB)
• AA26-097A STIX JSON (JSON, 30 KB)

For a downloadable copy of historical April 7, 2026 IOCs, see:

Background Information

Similar Historical Activity Targeting Programmable Logic Controllers

During a similar campaign beginning in November 2023, the IRGC CEC-affiliated cyber threat actors known as "CyberAv3ngers” targeted U.S.-based PLCs and HMIs, causing disruptive effects. Private industry and open sources also refer to this group as Hydro Kitten, Storm-0784, APT Iran, Bauxite, Mr. Soul, Soldiers of Solomon, UNC5691, and the Shahid Kaveh Group. These attacks compromised at least 75 devices, targeting U.S.-based Unitronics PLC devices with an HMI used across multiple critical infrastructure sectors, including the WWS. APT actors developed and deployed custom ladder logic code to these devices, replacing the valid ladder logic with malicious code that continues to be observed to date.

For more information on this group’s activity, see the joint Cybersecurity Advisory IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities.

Ongoing Threat Actor Activity Against U.S.-Based Programmable Logic Controllers

The FBI observed Iranian-affiliated APT actors targeting internet-exposed PLCs with the intent to cause disruptions—including maliciously interacting with project files, and manipulating data displayed on HMI and SCADA displays—to U.S. critical infrastructure organizations. Iranian-affiliated APT targeting campaigns against U.S. critical infrastructure have recently escalated, likely in response to hostilities between Iran, and the United States and Israel.

(New, July 22, 2026) At one U.S. victim, the FBI observed the APT actors download a malicious project file to a targeted PLC using configuration software. Analysis indicated the project file retained ladder logic for downstream function but added logic that overrode specific instruction sets responsible for maintaining safe operating parameters in the victim’s environment.

Since at least March 2026, the authoring agencies identified (through engagements with victim organizations) an Iranian-affiliated APT group disrupted the function of PLCs. Organizations across several U.S. critical infrastructure sectors (including Government Services and Facilities, WWS, and Energy Sectors) deployed these PLCs within a wide variety of industrial automation processes. Some of the victims experienced operational disruption and financial loss.

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK^® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 19. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for tables of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.

Initial Access

(Updated, July 22, 2026) The authoring agencies observed Iranian-affiliated APT actors using several foreign-based IP addresses to access internet-facing PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other manufactured PLCs [T0883]. The actors used leased, third-party hosted infrastructure and manufacturers’ PLC programming software to connect to misconfigured victim PLCs. Inbound malicious traffic has been observed targeting PLC devices on the following ports: 44818, 2222, 102, and 502, as well as targeting modems on port 22. Targeted devices include:

• Rockwell Automation: CompactLogix and Micro850 PLCs
• Schneider Electric: BMX P34/Modicon M340 PLCs
• Siemens: S7-1200 series PLCs

Command and Control

(Updated, July 22, 2026) The targeting of ports [T0885] associated with other OT vendors’ protocols suggests these actors are opportunistically targeting devices manufactured by companies other than Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, including Schneider Electric and Siemens. In one reported instance, the actors utilized Dropbear Secure Shell (SSH) software on victim modems to enable them to gain remote access through port 22 [T1219].

Exfiltration

(New, July 22, 2026) The authoring agencies observed Iranian-affiliated APT actors using configuration software—such as Rockwell Automation’s Studio 5000 Logix Designer, Schneider Electric’s EcoStruxure Control Expert, and Siemens’ Totally Integrated Automation (TIA) Portal—on leased, third-party hosted infrastructure to exfiltrate device project files from PLC devices to threat-actor-controlled infrastructure [T1041].

Impact

(Updated, July 22, 2026) After the actors extracted device project files, the FBI and CISA identified the modification and deletion of project file logic, to include Add-On Instructions (AOIs) and data manipulation on HMI and SCADA displays [T1565]. Additionally, the changes disabled critical shutdown and alarm logic, allowing systems to enter unsafe conditions without notifying operators of the anomalies.

Note: An AOI is analogous to a “Function Block” or “User Defined Function Block” used in other PLC vendor programs.

Indicators of Compromise

See Table 1 and Table 2 for recent IP addresses used by the Iranian-affiliated APT actors to communicate with PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, and Siemens in the United States.

Disclaimer: The FBI observed the threat actors using the IP addresses listed below in the specified time frames. This data is being provided for customers to query against logs for indications of historical targeting by the Iranian-affiliated APT actors. The authoring agencies recommend organizations investigate or vet these IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking.

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

See Table 3 to Table 6 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend organizations review historical TTPs for similar Iranian-affiliated cyber actor activity in IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Mitigations

The authoring agencies recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of the threat actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats and TTPs. Visit CISA’s CPGs webpage for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

Network Defenders

The cyber threat actors accessed PLCs manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other branded/manufactured PLCs to cause disruptions to victim systems. To safeguard against this threat and threats to other types of PLCs, the authoring agencies urge organizations to consider the following mitigations.

(Updated, July 22, 2026) In addition to contacting the authoring agencies, organizations and integrators operating PLCs from the manufacturers mentioned in this advisory should review the previously issued guidance to strengthen the security of their OT deployments:

• Rockwell Automation: Contact the Rockwell Automation Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) at PSIRT@rockwellautomation.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents related to Rockwell Automation products.
  
  • Refer to Rockwell Automation Security Advisory SD1771 for recommended PLC hardening measures and configuration guidance.
• Schneider Electric: Contact the Schneider Electric Corporate Product Cyber Emergency Response Team (CPCERT) at cpcert@se.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents related to Schneider Electric products.
  
  • Refer to Schneider Electric’s Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices and Cybersecurity User Guide for Modicon Controller Platform for guidance on securing and configuring PLCs.
• Siemens: Contact Siemens ProductCERT at productcert@siemens.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents and vulnerabilities related to Siemens products.
  
  • Refer to Siemens Security Bulletin 104599 for a list of security measures to harden PLCs and in-depth configuration guides.
  • Siemens users should review the Cybersecurity for Industry Operational Guidelines and implement defense-in-depth controls within their automation systems.

Immediate steps to prevent the attack:

• Disconnect the PLC from the public-facing internet [CPG 3.S]. Follow the joint guidance Secure connectivity principles for OT to safely allow remote access. Specifically, “remove inbound port exposure,” so the OT system is never directly exposed to the internet or external networks, and to ensure all access is mediated, monitored, and controlled. Do this through a secure gateway (jump host) that brokers the connection.
  
  • Ensure cellular modems, used for remote field connectivity and access, are secured with strong authentication and updated.
  • Enable logs for connected modems and regularly review for suspicious activity to detect intrusions and improve incident response speed.
  • (New, July 22, 2026) To mitigate unauthorized access to OT via cellular modems, organizations should consider implementing isolated architectures, such as private Access Point Name (APN), 5G Public Network Integrated Non-Public Network (PNI-NPN), cellular Software-Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN), Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA), or a site-to-site virtual private network (VPN).
• (New, July 22, 2026) Strictly control network access to PLC devices.
  
  • Configure firewall rules or access control list (ACL) security features on PLCs or programmable controllers to allow only authorized communications between expected control system devices. Block access from unauthorized or threat actor-controlled IP addresses, such as those associated with hosting providers.
• For controllers with a physical mode switch, place the physical mode switch into run position to prevent remote modification. Devices should only be in the program or remote position when updating or downloading software online and immediately switched back to the run position when complete. (See Rockwell Automation’s² System Security Design Guidelines for manufacturer’s instructions.)
  
  • (New, July 22, 2026) Prior to switching the device to run mode, review and validate project files, as changing modes will lock in the current project file downloaded to the device.
• For devices that allow software key switching, enable programming protection in PLC configuration software (S7 TIA Portal) to limit who can modify PLCs remotely. (See Siemens’ Cybersecurity for Industry Operational Guidelines for the manufacturer’s instructions.)

Follow-up steps to strengthen security posture:

• (New, July 22, 2026) Review project files running on PLCs for unauthorized changes. Use vendor-provided integrity checking tools and visually compare the running program to known good logic. Ensure reusable logic and input/output configurations are valid. For Rockwell Automation PLCs listed in the Customer Guidance to Disconnect Devices from the Internet, check the AOIs for any anomalous modifications.
  
  • If restoring from backups, verify the backup does not contain malicious logic before deployment.
  • Review logs and configurations on all connected devices, including modems, HMIs, and workstations, to assess potential lateral movement by threat actors. If it appears the actors connected to additional devices, reimage these devices to remove any potential malicious changes or access tools.
• (New, July 22, 2026) Ensure device passwords are changed from their default and are configured to use complex, unique combinations of letters, numbers, and symbols that are not easily guessable. Implementing robust password practices remains a critical security measure that can help prevent unauthorized access and strengthen the overall security posture of OT devices.
• (New, July 22, 2026) Take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation. Conduct comprehensive impact analysis and risk assessments prior to deploying defensive measures.
• Create and test strong backups of the logic and configurations of PLCs. Store backup files offline and secure the physical removal media to enable fast recovery.
• Implement multifactor authentication (MFA) [CPG 3.F] for access to the OT network from an external network.
• If remote access is required, implement a network proxy, gateway, firewall, and/or VPN in front of the PLC to control network access.
  
  • A VPN or gateway device can enable MFA for remote access even if the PLC does not support MFA. Implement security rules on these higher-level network security mechanisms to prevent the type of repeated and sustained login attempts seen during a brute force attack. When possible, implement a device control list for workstations sending messages or connecting to OT components.
  • Use the device control list to monitor for logon activity for unexpected or unusual access to devices from the internet.
• Keep PLC devices updated with the latest software patches issued by the manufacturer. Use established downtime windows to install patches. Known Exploited Vulnerabilities may need to be prioritized outside a downtime window.
• Configure external and internal firewalls to block traffic using common ports associated with network protocols that are unnecessary for the particular network segment.
• Disable any unused authentication methods, logic, or features, such as default authentication keys and passwords, as well as unused or needed services such as Teletype Network (Telnet), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Virtual Network Computing (VNC), and web services.
• Monitor asset management systems for device configuration changes, which can be used to understand expected parameter settings.
• Monitor the content of network traffic for the following:
  
  • Unusual logins to internet-connected devices or unexpected protocols to/from the internet. 
  • Functions of industrial control systems management protocols that change an asset’s operating mode or modify programs.
• (New, July 22, 2026) Ensure service providers are informed of active threats targeting internet-connected PLC devices. Owners and operators should communicate directly with service providers to address risks, especially when remote monitoring or maintenance is involved. Some service providers may rely on internet connectivity essential to monitor and maintain OT/ICS operations but may not be fully aware of active threats.

In addition, the authoring agencies recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques, as well as reduce the impact and risk of compromise by cyber threat actors:

• Reduce risk exposure. CISA offers a range of services at no cost, including scanning and testing, to help organizations reduce exposure to threats via mitigating attack vectors. CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services can help provide additional review of organizations’ internet-accessible assets. 

Device Manufacturers

Note: The following guidance is general in nature and not specific to any OT vendor. Some of the features, settings, and practices may already be offered by certain vendors. The inclusion of this guidance should not be interpreted as an assertion that vendors referenced do not offer such security features. Also, this advisory is not highlighting a new vulnerability in the identified products, but instead discusses opportunistic targeting. Device manufacturers can make opportunistic attacks more difficult at scale by encouraging more secure behavior by default and in operations, as discussed below. 

Although critical infrastructure organizations using PLC devices can take steps to mitigate the risks, it is ultimately the responsibility of the device manufacturer to build products secured by design and default. The authoring agencies urge device manufacturers to take ownership of their customers’ security outcomes by following the principles in the joint guide Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for OT Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products, primarily:

• Change the manufacturers’ default settings to prevent exposing administrative interfaces to the internet.
• Do not charge additional fees for basic security features needed to operate the product securely.
• Support MFA, including via phishing-resistant methods.

By using secure by design tactics, software manufacturers can make product lines secure “out of the box” without requiring customers to spend additional resources making configuration changes, purchasing tiered security software and logs, monitoring, and making routine updates.

For more information on common misconfigurations and guidance on reducing their prevalence, see joint advisory NSA and CISA Red and Blue Teams Share Top Ten Cybersecurity Misconfigurations. For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage and joint guide.

Validate Security Controls

In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 3 to Table 6).
2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
3. Test your technologies against the technique.
4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

The authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

Resources

• Authoring Agencies: IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities
• CISA: Bulletproof Defense: Mitigating Risks From Bulletproof Hosting Providers
• EPA: Cybersecurity for the Water Sector
• CISA: Water and Wastewater Cybersecurity
• CISA: Exploitation of Unitronics PLCs used in Water and Wastewater Systems
• CISA: Iran Threat Overview and Advisories
• FBI: The Iran Threat and Cyber Threat Overview: Iran
• CISA, MITRE: Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
• CISA: Decider Tool
• CISA: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0
• CISA: No-Cost Cybersecurity Services and Tools
• CISA: Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for OT Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products
• NSA, CISA: NSA and CISA Red and Blue Teams Share Top Ten Cybersecurity Misconfigurations
• CISA: Secure by Design
• FBI, CISA: Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology
• United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre: Secure connectivity principles for operational technology

Contact Information

U.S. organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA, the FBI, and/or NSA:

• Contact CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at contact@cisa.dhs.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). File a claim with FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) or contact your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: 
  • Date, time, and location of the incident;
  • Type of activity;
  • Number of people affected;
  • Type of equipment used for the activity; and
  • Name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.
• For NSA cybersecurity guidance inquiries, contact CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov.
• Entities required to report incidents to DOE should follow established reporting requirements, as appropriate. For other energy sector inquiries, contact EnergySRMA@hq.doe.gov.
• Contact the Rockwell Automation PSIRT for questions regarding their guidance or for reporting cyber incidents related to Rockwell Automation products at PSIRT@rockwellautomation.com.
• Contact the Schneider Electric CPCERT at cpcert@se.com for questions regarding this guidance, or to report cyber incidents related to Schneider Electric products.
• Contact Siemens ProductCERT for up-to-date information about the security of Siemens products or to report cybersecurity vulnerabilities at productcert@siemens.com. For support with increasing the security of installed Siemens PLCs, contact Siemens Industrial Cybersecurity Services at services.automation@siemens.com. See Siemens ProductCERT and Siemens CERT for more information.

Disclaimer

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and the authoring agencies do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA and the authoring agencies.

Version History

April 7, 2026: Initial version.

July 22, 2026: Update includes new guidance on detecting malicious activity, expanded scope of observed targeting, and best practices for secure PLCs deployment.

Notes

¹Project file refers to the software file that contains ladder logic and configuration settings. On Rockwell Automation devices, it is referred to as an .ACD file.

² See CompactLogix 5370 Controllers (Chapter 5: “Select the Operating Mode of the Controller”) for more information on functions available for the switch.

Executive summary

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 cyber actors continue to exploit poorly configured and vulnerable networking devices worldwide, opportunistically compromising multiple critical infrastructure sector networks. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) builds on FBI’s Russian Government Cyber Actors Targeting Networking Devices, Critical Infrastructure Public Service Announcement of the decade-plus FSB Center 16 cyber activity by providing additional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to enable defenders to more fully understand and counter the threat. [1] 

This CSA is being released by the following authoring and co-sealing agencies: 

• United States National Security Agency (NSA)
• United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
• United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
• Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
• Communications Security Establishment Canada’s (CSE’s) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre)
• New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
• United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
• Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)¹ 
• Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS)² 
• Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS)³ 
• Estonian Information System Authority (RIA)⁴
• Finnish Defence Intelligence (FDI)⁵
• Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO)⁶
• French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI)⁷
• Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE)⁸ 
• Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI)⁹
• The Military Counterintelligence Service of Poland (SKW)¹⁰ 
• Sweden National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-SE)¹¹ 

The authoring and co-sealing agencies strongly urge device owners and network defenders to take mitigation and remediation actions against Russian government-sponsored exploitation of vulnerable routers.

Download the PDF version of this report:

• Improve Router Hygiene to Protect Against Russian State-Sponsored Targeting (PDF, 816KB)

Cybersecurity industry tracking 

The cybersecurity industry provides overlapping cyber threat intelligence, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and mitigation recommendations related to this activity. Although not all encompassing, the following list contains the most notable threat group names commonly used within the cybersecurity community related to this activity: 

• Berserk Bear 
• Energetic Bear
• Crouching Yeti 
• Dragonfly
• Ghost Blizzard
• Static Tundra

Note: Cybersecurity companies have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this list may not provide a 1:1 correlation to the authoring agencies’ understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

Targeting details

Critical infrastructure sectors most at risk from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 cyber actors’ targeting include:

• Communications,
• Defense Industrial Base,
• Energy,
• Financial Services,
• Government Services and Facilities, especially organizations at the state and local level, and
• Healthcare and Public Health.

Technical details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise¹² framework, version 19. See Appendix A for tables of the activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This advisory also uses MITRE DEFEND^TM version 1.4.0.

The Russian FSB Center 16 cyber actors primarily use scanning to identify poorly configured networking devices, primarily routers, for exploitation. The actors scan for Internet IP ranges with active Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agents that accept common or default community strings for authentication [T1595.001, T1595.002]. These scans, run via proxies, consist of SNMP Set-Requests from a spoofed IP address [T1027] containing Object Identifiers (OIDs) that instruct the SNMP agent on poorly configured networking devices to [T1569, T1602.001, T1090]:

• Copy its configuration to a file, often called “config.bkp” or “output.txt” [T1003, T1602.002].
• Transfer the file, typically using Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), to an actor-controlled leased virtual private server (VPS) or compromised FTP server [T1583.003, T1090, T1071, T1048].

While SNMP scanning is the primary method the actors use to discover and exploit poorly configured networking devices, they occasionally exploit common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) in Cisco devices, Cisco’s Smart Install (SMI) functionality, and web portals to manage network devices. The actors previously exploited at least the following CVEs [T1584.008, T1588.005, T1190, T1068]: 

• CVE-2018-0171
• CVE-2008-4128¹³

Many of these TTPs overlap with activity by other malicious cyber actors, such as Salt Typhoon. Even though this CSA focuses on Russian FSB Center 16 cyber activity, the mitigations below should detect and counter these and similar TTPs used by other actors.

Mitigation actions

The authoring agencies highly recommend network defenders implement the following mitigations to harden networks against this exploitation:

• Disable Cisco Smart Install on all devices [D3-ACH]. [2]
• Use SNMPv3 with “authPriv” configured to the most modern encryption standard that is supported by the device instead of SNMPv1 or SNMPv2 [D3-ACH]. [3]
  • Disable SNMPv1 and SNMPv2. These are legacy protocols and should no longer be needed on current devices. If they are necessary, change all community strings from defaults and only allow read-only community strings rather than read-write access.
  • SNMPv3 adds strong authentication and data encryption that are unavailable in SNMPv1 and v2. SNMPv3 replaces clear text shared passwords, known as community strings, with more securely encoded parameters, and authenticates and encrypts data [D3-MAN, D3-MENCR].
• Use strong, unique passwords for local accounts on network devices and configure credentials to be stored securely to prevent reuse of compromised passwords [D3-CH].
  • Cisco devices protect passwords in the configuration file using different hashing types. Use hashing type 8 for user credentials. Avoid using hashing type 0, 4, and 7 as they are insecure or store passwords in plaintext in the configuration file. [4]
  • Monitor for unusual credentials that do not conform to standard organizational naming conventions [D3-PM]. 
  •  Monitor for and alert on logins using local accounts. Local accounts should only be used in emergency situations when accounts supported by centralized authentication servers are unavailable. Centralized authentication to network devices should support multi-factor authentication where feasible. [3]
• Monitor and restrict access to SNMP OIDs using a Management Information Base (MIB) allow list [D3-ACH]. [5] Reference the vendor-specific MIB for the network devices and monitor OIDs for indications of reconnaissance or misconfiguration in logs or intrusion detection systems (IDS). IDS rules should be written for inbound SNMP Set-Requests that contain OIDs targeting sensitive device data [D3-PM].
  
  • Example OIDs include:
    • 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1 (Cisco Config Copy)
    • 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5 (Config Copy Server Address, value for this OID is where the configuration file is being sent to) 
• Restrict management protocols [D3-NTF].
  • Use Access Control Lists (ACLs) to only allow management protocols, such as SNMP, from management devices, preferably on an out-of-band network. [3]
  • On edge firewalls and devices deny all external communications on the following ports unless mission critical, with strict monitoring if blocking is not feasible:
    • User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port 69 (TFTP) 
    • Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 4786 (SMI)
    • UDP ports 161 and 162 (SNMP)
    • TCP/UDP ports 10161 and 10162 (SNMPv3)
• Update network device software and firmware images, especially to patch known vulnerabilities, and upgrade end-of-life devices to supported ones. 
  
  • Use an attack surface management service to identify and secure Internet-facing systems with weak configurations and known vulnerabilities [D3-NVA].
    • U.S.-based federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and U.S. critical infrastructure organiztions should consider signing up for CISA’s no-cost Cyber Hygiene services.
    • U.S. Defense Industrial Base organizations should consider signing up for NSA’s DIB Cybersecurity Services.

Resources

United States:

• Russia Threat Overview and Advisories
• Network Infrastructure Security Guide

Canada:

• Routers cyber security best practices (ITSAP.80.019)
• Security considerations for edge devices (ITSM.80.101)
• Guidance on securely configuring network protocols (ITSP.40.062)
• Baseline security requirements for network security zones (ITSP.80.022)
• Top 10 IT security actions to protect Internet-connected networks and information (ITSM.10.089)

Works cited

[1] FBI. Russian Government Cyber Actors Targeting Networking Devices, Critical Infrastructure. Alert Number: I-082025-PSA. 2025. https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2025/PSA250820

[2] NSA. Cisco Smart Install Protocol Misuse. 2017. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/16/2002157833/-1/-1/0/CSA-CISCO-SMART-INSTALL-PROTOCOL-MISUSE.PDF

[3] NSA. Network Infrastructure Security Guide. 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/15/2003018261/-1/-1/0/CTR_NSA_NETWORK_INFRASTRUCTURE_SECURITY_GUIDE_20220615.PDF

[4] NSA. Cybersecurity Information Sheet Cisco Password Types: Best Practices. 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/17/2002940795/-1/-1/0/CSI_CISCO_PASSWORD_TYPES_BEST_PRACTICES_20220217.PDF

[5] NSA. Cybersecurity Information Sheet: Reducing the Risk of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Abuse. 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jul/09/2003959459/-1/-1/0/CSI_REDUCING_RISK_OF_SNMP_ABUSE.PDF

Footnotes

¹  Národní úřad pro kybernetickou a informační bezpečnost

²  Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste

³ Välisluureamet

⁴ Riigi Infosüsteem Amet

⁵ Sotilastiedustelu

⁶ Suojelupoliisi

⁷ Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information

⁸ Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Esterna

⁹ Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna

¹⁰ Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego

¹¹ Nationellt Cybersäkerhetscenter

¹² MITRE and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE DEFEND is a trademark of the MITRE Corporation.

¹³ CVE-2008-4128 only affects end-of-life Cisco devices.

Disclaimer of Endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring agencies’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

Contact

United States organizations

• National Security Agency (NSA)
  • Cybersecurity Report Feedback: CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov 
  • Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DIB_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov 
  • Media Inquiries / Press Desk: NSA Media Relations: 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov
• Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
  •  U.S. organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System, its 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870), or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment user for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. 
• United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)  
  • Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DC3.DCISE@us.af.mil 
  • Defense Industrial Base mandatory cyber incident reporting as required by 10 U.S. Code Sections 391 and 393 and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.204-7012 is submitted at https://dibnet.dod.mil.
  •  Media Inquiries / Press Desk: DC3.Information@us.af.mil

Australian organizations

• Australian Signals Directorate
  • Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.

Canadian organizations

• The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), part of the Communications Security Establishment, encourages Canadian organizations to report cyber incidents and to strengthen the security of their networking devices. 
  • Report an incident or suspicious activity to the Cyber Centre by email at contact@cyber.gc.ca, online via the reporting tool Report a cyber incident - Canadian Centre for Cyber Security or by phone at 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788).

New Zealand organizations

• New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ): info@ncsc.govt.nz

United Kingdom organizations

• Report significant cyber security incidents to ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored 24/7)

Estonia organizations

• Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS): info@valisluureamet.ee

Finnish organizations

• Finnish Security and Intelligence Service: supo.fi/en/contact

French organizations

• French organizations are encouraged to report suspicious activity or incident related information found in this advisory by contacting ANSSI/CERT-FR at: cert-fr@ssi.gouv.fr or by phone at: 3218 or +33 9 70 83 32 18.

Italian Organizations

• Italian External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE): 
  • Visit https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/ 
• Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI): 
  • Visit https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/ 

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques

See Table 1 through Table 10 for all the threat actor tactics and techniques referenced in this advisory.

Appendix B: MITRE D3FEND countermeasures

See Table 11 for a mapping of several of the cybersecurity countermeasures mentioned in this advisory.

Milliarden Nutzer haben Metas neues KI-Bildmodell auf dem Smartphone, ohne es zu wissen. Wir haben Muse Image in der Instagram-Story getestet und zeigen euch hier, wie ihr eure Daten schützen könnt.

UL Solutions entwickelt derzeit einen neuen 3DMark-Test für aktuelle und kommende High-End-Grafikkarten. Der Benchmark setzt vollständig auf Pathtracing und soll neben nativer UHD-Auflösung auch KI-Upscaling und Frame Generation mehrerer Hersteller unterstützen.

Facebook-Konzern Meta hat mit Muse Image einen eigenen KI-Bildgenerator vorgestellt. Die Software kann nicht nur Bilder erzeugen und bearbeiten, sondern auch auf öffentliche Instagram-Inhalte zugreifen. UPDATE (13. Juli 2026): Meta hat seine KI-Funktion Muse Image nach massiver Kritiker wieder offline genommen. Das Unternehmen teilte laut der Nachrichtenagentur Reuters mit: „Wir haben Rückmeldungen erhalten, dass diese […]

Der Beitrag Muse Image: Instagram-Bilder mit neuer Meta-KI bearbeiten erschien zuerst auf BASIC thinking. Folge uns auch auf Google News und Flipboard oder abonniere unseren Newsletter UPDATE.

Add Laguna XS 2, XS 2.1, and S 2.1 support to the MLX model and create paths.

Read the source config to apply one quantization policy across dense and routed MoE layers. Keep the tied output head and router at source precision, quantize supported attention and expert projections, selectively promote sensitive expert down projections, and emit per-tensor metadata for mixed quantization blobs.

Correct dense expert loading, BF16 source-layout handling, expert global-scale shapes and dtypes, routing-score scaling, and mixed-precision expert dispatch. Gate/up and down projections select quantized or dense execution independently so promoted BF16 down projections do not force quantized gate/up weights through the dense fallback.

Optimize the forward pass with compatible gate/up fusion, sorted standard GatherMM and GatherQMM operations for larger prefills, model-local mlx.Compile closures for elementwise MoE work, and cache-backed 512-token prefill chunks. This keeps the implementation on maintained MLX operations without custom kernels.

Add focused tests for Laguna configuration variants, quantization policy and metadata, dense and routed expert loading, mixed-precision dispatch, compiled-versus-eager parity, fused projections, routing, and prefill chunking.

• review comments and S 2.1 performance fixes

Address renderer/parser selection and mixed-precision expert quantization review feedback.

Keep Laguna weights resident on Metal to prevent repeated paging of its large, sparsely accessed expert buffers. Scope this policy to Laguna GPU execution.

Remove obsolete 512-token prefill chunking now that the runner's 2048-token path is faster.

• review comments addressed

• fix create

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Dieser Beitrag Warum KI-Projekte oft scheitern: Incentives statt Modelle im Fokus erschien als erstes auf IT BOLTWISE x Artificial Intelligence.

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Zimbra Phishing Campaign Uses CVE-2025-66376

LAUNDRY BEAR Targets Email and Sensitive Data

Ulej and Flowerbed Support Email Data Exfiltration

Organizations Urged to Patch Vulnerable Zimbra Systems

Können Geräte keine Verbindung zum WLAN herstellen oder läuft die Datenübertragung plötzlich lediglich noch im Schneckentempo, ist die Ursache oftmals schwer zu bestimmen. Der Fehler kann an veralteten oder beschädigten Treibern liegen, an einem überlasteten oder falsch konfigurierten Router, an Störsignalen durch benachbarte Funknetze oder daran, dass der Client zu weit vom Router entfernt ist.

Um sich einen Überblick über den WLAN-Status zu verschaffen und damit diese Probleme zu lösen, bringt Windows ein spezielles Tool mit: Es liefert Ihnen in Sekundenschnelle eine Übersicht zu Ihrem Netzwerk. Hierzu benötigen Sie die Kommandozeile oder Powershell: Starten Sie das gewünschte Eingabeprogramm, indem Sie in der Taskleiste in das Suchfeld Eingabeaufforderung oder Power shell eingeben.

Achten Sie darauf, dass der Treffer markiert ist und klicken Sie dann auf der rechten Seite auf „Als Administrator ausführen“. In der Eingabeaufforderung tippen Sie den Befehl netsh wlan show wlanreport ein und bestätigen mit Enter. Windows erzeugt nun den WLAN-Bericht und speichert ihn in der Datei „wlan-report-latest.html“ in dem Ordner „C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WlanReport“.

Foundry

Am besten markieren Sie diesen Pfad direkt in der Eingabeaufforderung mit der Maus und übernehmen ihn mit Strg-C in die Zwischenablage. Öffnen Sie danach das Suchfeld in der Taskleiste, kopieren Sie den Pfad mit Strg-V hinein und bestätigen Sie mittels Enter. Windows ruft nun Ihren Standardbrowser auf und lädt die HTML-Datei des Berichts. Falls das nicht funktioniert, steuern Sie den Ordner über den Explorer an.

Allerdings ist das Verzeichnis in den Standardeinstellungen versteckt – Sie müssen es zunächst über die Einstellungen des Explorers sichtbar machen. Klicken Sie anschließend doppelt auf die HTML-Datei, um sie im Browser zu öffnen. Im Bericht sehen Sie ganz oben eine Übersicht der WLAN-Ereignisse der letzten 48 Stunden. Sie können über einzelne Verbindungen mit der Maus fahren, um Details einzusehen.

Die Ereignisse sind mit farbigen Punkten und Buchstaben gekennzeichnet: Ein schwarzes X auf rotem Grund steht beispielsweise für einen Fehler, N zeigt an, dass die Verbindung zu einem WLAN unterbrochen wurde. Weiter unten finden Sie bei „Report Info“ das Datum, an dem der Bericht erzeugt wurde, sowie die Berichtsdauer.

Foundry

Darunter folgt die „General System Info“, die Details zur Hardware, zum Bios und zur Windows-Version verrät. Diese Daten können beispielsweise bei Kompatibilitätsproblemen helfen. Der Abschnitt „User Info“ nennt einige grundlegende Benutzerdaten:

Darunter finden Sie bei „Network Adapters“ die installierten Netzwerkadapter, und zwar sowohl den oder die Hardwareadapter sowie Softwareadapter, beispielsweise für eine VPN-Verbindung oder für Bluetooth und virtuelle Adapter. Bei „Script Output“ beginnt die Anzeige der Ausgabebildschirme von einigen Troubleshooting-Tools in Windows.

So liefert der Befehl ipconfig /all zum Beispiel Angaben zur aktuellen Netzwerkkonfiguration sämtlicher Adapter. Das Kommando netsh wlan show all ermittelt Daten zu den installierten Netzwerktreibern, Details zu Ihrem WLAN und den in der Vergangenheit genutzten Access Points.

Foundry

Darüber hinaus führt Windows für den Bericht den Befehl certutil aus, der Ihnen weitere Einzelheiten über die verschiedenen WLAN-Profile präsentiert. Weiter unten folgt im Bereich „Summary“ ein Überblick über die erfolgreichen und die gescheiterten WLAN-Verbindungen. Dort nennt der Bericht auch die Gründe, warum beispielsweise der Kontakt zu einem WLAN verlorengegangen ist.

Diese Informationen sind oft besonders hilfreich, wenn es um die Fehlersuche im Netzwerk geht. Ganz am Schluss des Berichts steht der Abschnitt „Wireless Sessions“: Dort sind den WLAN-Adaptern unter anderem Informationen zur Verbindungsmethode und der SSID des WLAN zugeordnet. Des Weiteren stehen an dieser Stelle die Event-IDs und Beschreibungen der Ereignisse beim Aufbau der Verbindung.

Auch daraus lassen sich Schlussfolgerungen für die Lösung von Verbindungsproblemen ziehen.

Lesetipp: Die besten Tools für WLAN & Heimnetz

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Summary

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker with network access to achieve remote code execution.

The following versions of Johnson Controls C-CURE 9000 and Victor application server are affected:

• C-CURE 9000 and victor <=v2.90_v3.0 
• victor Web <=v7.1 

Background

• Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Critical Manufacturing
• Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
• Company Headquarters Location: Ireland

Vulnerabilities

Acknowledgments

• Harrison Neal reported these vulnerabilities to CISA

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.

Refer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.

Refer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.

Revision History

• Initial Release Date: 2026-07-23

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

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Der Nvidia GeForce Hotfix-Treiber 610.82 behebt Fehler in zwei Spielen: Halo: Combat Evolved läuft auf RTX-50-Grafikkarten nun stabiler und Path of Exile 2 sollte bei langen Spielsessions unter DirectX 12 keine Aussetzer mehr zeigen. Ein Problem mit Battlefield 6 besteht jedoch weiterhin.

Apple arbeitet offenbar an einer der umfangreichsten Mac-Produktoffensiven der vergangenen Jahre. Ein neuer Bericht zeichnet eine detaillierte Roadmap bis mindestens 2028. Geplant sind zahlreiche neue ... Weiterlesen ...

Der Beitrag Hardware-Bericht: Diese Macs plant Apple für die kommenden Jahre erschien zuerst auf Apfelpage.

On July 22, 2026, Check Point published a security advisory for multiple vulnerabilities affecting Security Management, Multi-Domain Management, and firewall products. The most urgent of these is CVE-2026-16232, an authentication bypass in the SmartConsole login process classified as improper authentication (CWE-287). CVE-2026-16232 has been assigned a critical CVSS score of 9.1. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to obtain an application login token and authenticate to the management server with full administrative privileges, enabling modification of security policies and configurations.

Check Point has confirmed that CVE-2026-16232 is being actively exploited in the wild, affecting what the vendor describes as a small number of customers. Remote exploitation requires network access to the Management Server IP address in environments that do not restrict Trusted Clients. On the same day as the advisory, CVE-2026-16232 was added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) list of known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV), with a remediation due date of July 25, 2026, giving organizations only three days to respond.

The advisory addresses three vulnerabilities in total:

Compromise of a Security Management Server is particularly consequential because it sits at the top of the trust hierarchy. An attacker with administrative access can modify security policies across managed gateways, alter administrator permissions, manipulate VPN configurations, and potentially disable or tamper with logging and monitoring. According to Check Point's advisory, the vulnerabilities were discovered during a routine internal review, with subsequent analysis revealing that CVE-2026-16232 had been exploited prior to the availability of a patch.

Check Point network security products have been targeted by multiple in-the-wild vulnerabilities over the past two years. In June 2026, CVE-2026-50751, a critical authentication bypass in Check Point Remote Access VPN, was exploited in the wild and added to the CISA KEV. In May 2024, CVE-2024-24919, a high-severity information disclosure vulnerability in Check Point Quantum Security Gateways, was also exploited in the wild. Organizations running affected Check Point management products should apply the available hotfixes on an emergency basis.

Mitigation guidance

Check Point released Jumbo Hotfixes on July 22, 2026, to remediate CVE-2026-16232, CVE-2026-62144, and CVE-2026-62145. Organizations running affected versions of Security Management or Multi-Domain Management should install the latest Jumbo Hotfix on an emergency basis, without waiting for a regular patch cycle to occur.

The following versions are affected by CVE-2026-16232:

• R82.10: fixed in Jumbo Hotfix Take 36 and later

• R82: fixed in Jumbo Hotfix Take 118 and later

• R81.20: fixed in Jumbo Hotfix Take 158 and later

• R81.10, R81, R80.30, R80.20, R80.10, R80, and R77.30: no fix specified

CVE-2026-62144 and CVE-2026-62145 affect the same release families (R81.10, R81.20, R82, R82.10) per the vendor advisory, with older versions also impacted.

Smart-1 Cloud customers are already protected according to Check Point. For on-premises deployments where the hotfix cannot be applied immediately, Check Point recommends the following steps to reduce exposure:

• Restrict Trusted Clients (GUI clients) to trusted IP addresses or subnets

• Protect Management access with a firewall and restrict access to trusted IP addresses

• Verify that implied rules for control connections are enabled

These mitigations reduce the attack surface, but they do not address the underlying vulnerability. Installing the Jumbo Hotfix remains the priority.

Rapid7 strongly recommends investigating for signs of compromise even after applying the hotfix, particularly in environments where the Management Server has been accessible from the internet. Organizations should review administrator, SmartConsole, API, and application token activity, and search logs for the published indicators of compromise listed below.

For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to the vendor advisory.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-16232, CVE-2026-62144, CVE-2026-62145 with authenticated vulnerability checks expected to be available in the 24 July content release.

Indicators of compromise

Check Point has published the following IP addresses associated with observed exploitation of CVE-2026-16232:

• 151.241.99[.]207

• 151.241.99[.]233

• 158.62.198[.]182

• 192.142.10[.]99

• 139.28.37[.]250

• 194.213.18[.]137

Per the vendor, the presence of these indicators should prompt investigation, but the absence of these addresses does not confirm that an environment was unaffected.

Updates

• July 23, 2026: Initial publication.

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National Diplomatic Academy Data Breach Remained Active for Nearly 10 Months 

Thousands Impacted in South Korea Foreign Ministry Data Breach 

What Information was Exposed? 

• User IDs 
• Names 
• Email addresses 
• Encrypted passwords 

July 2026 Critical Patch Update Covers Hundreds of Oracle Products 

Hundreds of Vulnerabilities Can Be Exploited Remotely 

• E-Business Suite: 410 vulnerabilities 
• Fusion Middleware: 355 vulnerabilities 
• Communications: 168 vulnerabilities 
• PeopleSoft: 84 vulnerabilities 

AI-Driven Vulnerability Discovery Appears to Have Played a Major Role 

Organizations Urged to Apply the Oracle Security Patch Promptly 

OpenAI and Hugging Face are investigating an AI security incident involving an AI agent that compromised infrastructure while models were being evaluated for advanced cyber capabilities. The incident was detected and contained after the models identified and chained vulnerabilities across OpenAI’s research environment and Hugging Face’s production infrastructure.

Hugging Face disclosed the incident last week, while OpenAI has now shared preliminary findings from its investigation. According to OpenAI, the activity involved a combination of models, including GPT 5.6 Sol and a more capable pre-release model, with reduced cyber refusals for evaluation purposes. The models were being tested against a benchmark designed to measure advanced cyber capabilities.

OpenAI described the incident as unprecedented and said it is continuing its investigation alongside Hugging Face. The company said the findings are being shared to help defenders understand what occurred and assess the capabilities of increasingly advanced AI models.

OpenAI and Hugging Face Investigate AI Security Incident

The incident took place during an internal evaluation designed to test models against advanced exploitation scenarios involving complex attack paths. OpenAI said the evaluation was conducted without production classifiers that normally prevent models from pursuing high-risk cyber activity.

The testing environment was designed to be highly isolated, with network access limited to package installation through an internally hosted third-party software system that functions as a proxy and cache for package registries.

Despite these restrictions, the models spent substantial inference compute attempting to obtain open Internet access. During this process, they identified and exploited a zero-day vulnerability in the package registry cache proxy. OpenAI said the vulnerability has since been responsibly disclosed to the vendor.

The models then carried out privilege escalation and lateral movement within the research testing environment until they reached a node with Internet access.

Models Chained Vulnerabilities Across Infrastructure

After obtaining Internet access, the models inferred that Hugging Face could host models, datasets and solutions related to the ExploitGym evaluation. The models then searched for ways to obtain secret information that could help them bypass the evaluation.

In one example described by OpenAI, the models chained multiple attack vectors, including stolen credentials and zero-day vulnerabilities, to identify a remote code execution path on Hugging Face servers.

OpenAI's security team detected the anomalous activity internally. Hugging Face's security team and agents also detected and stopped the activity on its infrastructure. The company had already begun containment and forensic reconstruction using its own open-source models when the two organizations connected.

Both companies are continuing to investigate the incident and its impact.

OpenAI Strengthens Security Controls After Incident

As part of its response, OpenAI said it is implementing stricter infrastructure configuration controls while identified vulnerabilities are patched. The company acknowledged that these measures could come at the cost of research velocity and said its Safety and Security Committee is being briefed on the controls and their impact.

OpenAI is also working with Hugging Face on the forensic investigation and has responsibly disclosed the identified zero-day vulnerability in the internally hosted third-party software.

The company has also brought Hugging Face into its trusted access program and is supporting its teams in using AI model capabilities to strengthen defenses.

OpenAI said it is improving protections around future training and evaluations, including stronger safeguards for model alignment, cybersecurity and monitoring during internal testing. The company noted that deployment safeguards were intentionally disabled during this evaluation because the goal was to measure cyber vulnerabilities.

AI Cyber Capabilities Raise New Security Concerns

OpenAI said the incident demonstrates the need for AI security and safety measures to keep pace with rapidly advancing model capabilities. The company is strengthening containment, monitoring, access controls and evaluation practices used during model development.

The incident also highlights how advanced models can potentially discover and exploit novel attack paths in real-world systems without access to source code. OpenAI said increasingly capable models should also be used defensively to help security teams identify weaknesses, understand vulnerability chains and accelerate remediation.

Hugging Face CEO Clem Delangue said the incident demonstrates the importance of collaboration in addressing AI safety and security challenges. Both organizations said they will continue investigating the incident and share additional findings and best practices as the work progresses.

Der Beitrag Neuer iMac soll mit diesen Upgrades noch 2026 erscheinen erschien zuerst auf appgefahren.de.

The post Cursor Releases Cursor Router: A Request-Level Classifier Delivering Frontier Coding Quality at 30–50% Lower Cost appeared first on MarkTechPost.

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Fixed

• Clearer log when the transport can't reach reachable bridges. If a bridged connect fails after the reachability scan found bridges reachable but the transport could not connect to any of them, the log now names the likely cause: a firewall or security tool blocking OnionHop's transport helper (lyrebird / webtunnel-client), or bridges that are dead at the protocol layer. Previously this appeared only as an unexplained wall of "general SOCKS server failure" (#74).

Downloads

Fixed

• Transport helpers now run from a stable path, so firewalls can allow them (#74). On macOS and Linux, the bridge transport helpers (lyrebird / webtunnel-client) ran from the system temp directory. Per-app firewalls like Little Snitch identify a process by its executable path, so a helper in a periodically-purged temp folder never got a durable allow rule and could be silently denied without ever prompting - every bridge then failed with "general SOCKS server failure" even with an "allow all" rule for OnionHop itself. The helpers now run from a stable per-user location (~/Library/Caches/onionhop-pt on macOS, ~/.cache/onionhop-pt on Linux), so the firewall can prompt once and remember the answer, the same way it does for Tor Browser's bundled lyrebird. The stale-transport cleanup at connect time now also covers helpers running from that directory.

Downloads

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Wo du uns folgen kannst: Facebook, Reddit, Google News, X, Threads

Wo du uns folgen kannst: Facebook, Reddit, Google News, X, Threads

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The post Security Advisory – Action Required – July 2026 Security Update appeared first on IT Security News.

As part of Check Point’s Frontier AI Readiness Program, we are releasing a jumbo hotfix with security and hardening fixes for our firewall and management products. This update includes a number of security hardening improvements and fixes, the most significant of which are outlined below. During a routine BLAST review, we discovered a few vulnerabilities. Following a thorough analysis, we identified one of those in the wild, affecting a handful of customers. This only affects a very specific configuration — when Management is exposed directly to the internet without IP restrictions. We’ve already notified the affected customers. This is exactly […]

The post Security Advisory – Action Required – July 2026 Security Update appeared first on Check Point Blog.

Microsoft arbeitet kontinuierlich daran, Windows 11 einen modernen Look zu verpassen. Dazu hat das Unternehmen nun alte Elemente ersetzt, die noch aus der Ära von Windows 95 stammen, wie die Seite Windows Latest berichtet.

Der bekannte Leaker PhantomOfEarth hat demnach einige Neuerungen in den kürzlich veröffentlichten Preview-Builds entdeckt. Darunter ein neuer Eigenschaften-Dialog des Datei-Explorers, dessen zugrunde liegender Code sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten kaum verändert haben soll.

Microsoft hat bereits bestätigt, dass alle veralteten Dialogfelder durch moderne Versionen ersetzt werden sollen. Einige davon stammen aus Zeiten von Windows 8, andere reichen sogar bis Windows 95 zurück. Die neuen Versionen sollen vollständig auf WinUI 3, Microsofts aktuellem Framework für die Benutzeroberfläche von Windows 11, basieren.

Was bedeutet das also für Windows 11? Microsoft plant offensichtlich, einige klassische Elemente aus Windows zu entfernen und mit neuen, modernen Inhalten zu ersetzen. Das dürfte die Optik von Windows 11 deutlich beeinflussen und dafür sorgen, dass weniger “Altlasten” durchscheinen.

Leider stößt Microsoft aber bei diesem Vorhaben immer wieder auf ein Hindernis, das es selbst erschaffen hat: Da Windows 11 ein Legacy-Betriebssystem ist und größtenteils aus altem Code besteht, der nie ersetzt wurde (sondern lediglich aufpoliert), ist es deutlich schwerer, das Ganze zu modernisieren. Zumindest nicht, ohne die Performance oder Teile des Nutzererlebnisses zu gefährden.

Die Modernisierung eines kleinen Teils von Windows, wie eben des Eigenschaften-Dialogfelds, kann etwa dazu führen, dass Anwendungen von Drittanbietern nicht mehr richtig funktionieren. Das können Antivirenprogramme oder andere Anwendungen wie 7-Zip, Dropbox, Codec-Pakete und so weiter sein.

Es ist also eine mühsame Aufgabe, alte Teile von Windows mit neuen Elementen zu ersetzen. Die Vorteile von modernen Elementen, die komplett auf WinUI 3 basieren, überwiegen aber. Denn sie können schneller starten und verursachen weniger Probleme, sofern sie ordentlich implementiert werden.

Übrigens: Sollten Sie Windows 11 Home im Einsatz haben, dann entgehen Ihnen die vielen Vorteile der Pro-Version, die wir Ihnen hier vorstellen. Im PC-WELT Software-Shop ist das Windows-11-Upgrade für günstige 59,99 Euro statt 145 Euro erhältlich.

Nicht die einzige Neuerung

Auch der Windows-Ausführungsdialog soll einen modernen Ersatz bekommen. Dieser soll sich nicht nur optisch verändern, sondern auch neue Funktionen bieten. Laut kann man den modernen Ausführungsdialog bereits unter Einstellungen > Erweiterte Einstellungen aktivieren und ausprobieren.

Danach können Sie den Ausführen-Dialog über die Tastenkombination Win+R öffnen, was etwas schneller vonstatten gehen soll. Er soll außerdem zum Kontext passende Vorschläge und einen Schnellzugriff auf das Home-Verzeichnis bieten.

Windows 11 Preview: Das bringen die nächsten Updates an Neuerungen

Gleich drei neue faltbare Smartphones anstelle von üblicherweise zwei gab es zum Galaxy Unpacked von Samsung in London zu sehen: Fold 8 Ultra, Fold 8 und Flip 8. Für das größte Interesse unter den Gästen sorgte das Fold 8, Samsung neuer Falter im kleineren Buchformat. Im ersten Hands-on überzeugte der neue Formfaktor auf Anhieb.

Die chinesischen Autohersteller können weit mehr als nur günstig sein, das untermaueren BYD, Geely und Co. mindestens einmal im Jahr mit einer neuen Entwicklung. Diesmal…

Dieser Artikel Geely knackt Verbrauch von 8 kWh: Neuer Elektroantrieb fordert von BYD bis Mercedes alle heraus erschien zuerst auf SmartDroid.de.

Tags: #Softwareentwicklung | #Vibe Coding

In einem intensiv geführten Finale in New Jersey inklusive Verlängerung konnte sich Spanien als neuer Weltmeister krönen, damit ist die Fußballweltmeisterschaft in den USA offiziell ... Weiterlesen ...

Der Beitrag Apple Sports App ist in Version 4.2 erschienen: das ist neu erschien zuerst auf Apfelpage.

The post Critical ASUS Router Flaw Lets Remote MITM Attackers Execute Arbitrary Commands appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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Smartphones werden heutzutage oft nicht deshalb ausgemustert, weil ihre Hardware versagt. Häufig ist es der fehlende Software-Support, der Nutzer zum Neukauf zwingt: Nach wenigen Jahren gibt es keine großen Android-Updates mehr, Sicherheitslücken bleiben offen und neue Apps setzen irgendwann eine aktuellere Systemversion voraus.

Dabei steckt in vielen älteren Geräten noch genug Leistung für den Alltag. Alternative Betriebssysteme (Custom-ROMs) bieten hier einen Ausweg: Sie verlängern die Lebensdauer von Smartphones, liefern Sicherheitsupdates und machen Schluss mit überladenen Hersteller-Oberflächen. Dank neuer Webinstaller im Browser ist dieser Einstieg heute einfacher als je zuvor – allerdings ist die Community aktuell in zwei Welten geteilt.

Während das besonders sichere GrapheneOS das brandneue Android 17 ausschließlich auf (ältere) Google-Pixel-Handys bringt, versorgt das flexiblere LineageOS weit über 100 Modelle anderer Hersteller mit dem ausgereiften Android 16. Die aktuelle Version LineageOS 23 bringt das Google-System auf Geräte, die offiziell längst keine Updates mehr erhalten. An der Nachfolge-Version LineageOS 24 (auf Basis von Android 17) feilt das Team bereits im Hintergrund – ein fester Veröffentlichungstermin steht community-typisch allerdings noch nicht fest.

LineageOS: Android 16 ohne Herstellerballast

LineageOS

LineageOS ist ein alternatives Android-Betriebssystem, das auf dem offenen Android-Quellcode (AOSP) basiert und in der aktuellen Version LineageOS 23 auf Android 16 setzt. Entwickelt wird es nicht von einem Hersteller, sondern von einer internationalen Community. Das Ziel: Smartphones länger aktuell halten und Nutzern mehr Kontrolle über ihre Geräte geben.

Entstanden ist LineageOS 2016 als Nachfolger des bekannten Custom-ROMs CyanogenMod. Seitdem hat sich das Projekt zu einer der wichtigsten Android-Alternativen entwickelt. Unterstützt werden zahlreiche Smartphones verschiedener Hersteller – darunter Modelle von Samsung, Xiaomi, Motorola, Sony, OnePlus und Google.

Der große Vorteil gegenüber der Original-Software vieler Hersteller: LineageOS kommt ohne zusätzliche Apps, Werbung oder unnötige Dienste. Nutzer entscheiden selbst, welche Bestandteile sie installieren möchten. Wer Google-Dienste benötigt, kann ein passendes Paket nachrüsten. Wer möglichst wenig Daten mit Google teilen möchte, kann das System auch weitgehend ohne Google verwenden.

Zu den wichtigsten Vorteilen gehören:

• aktuelle Android-Versionen auch für ältere Geräte
• regelmäßige Sicherheitsupdates
• weniger vorinstallierte Hersteller-Apps
• mehr Datenschutz und Kontrolle
• zahlreiche Anpassungsmöglichkeiten

Damit eignet sich LineageOS besonders für Nutzer, die ihr Smartphone länger verwenden möchten, statt ein technisch noch gutes Gerät wegen fehlender Updates auszutauschen.

Moderne Android-Versionen bringen neue Funktionen auf alte Handys

Egal ob Sie mit dem aktuellen LineageOS 23 auf Android 16 setzen oder als Pixel-Nutzer via GrapheneOS bereits Android 17 nutzen (worauf LineageOS 24 künftig ebenfalls aufbauen wird): Der Wechsel von einem älteren Android verspricht viel mehr als nur eine neue Versionsnummer. Die aktuellen Generationen bringen zahlreiche Verbesserungen bei Sicherheit, Bedienung und Effizienz auf ausgemusterte Geräte.

Gerade ältere Smartphones profitieren von optimierten Hintergrundprozessen und einem schlankeren System. Das kann sich positiv auf die Geschwindigkeit und den Energieverbrauch auswirken – insbesondere bei Geräten, deren Original-Software mit den Jahren immer umfangreicher geworden ist.

Außerdem erhalten Nutzer aktuelle Sicherheitsmechanismen und die neuesten Android-Sicherheitspatches. LineageOS integriert diese regelmäßig in seine Builds und versucht, Verbesserungen auch auf ältere unterstützte Versionen zurückzuführen.

LineageOS

Die Entwickler haben außerdem die hauseigene Update-App überarbeitet. Sie orientiert sich nun stärker an Googles aktueller Designsprache und zeigt vor einem Update die enthaltene Sicherheitsstufe des Android Security Bulletin an. Dadurch sehen Nutzer transparenter, welche Schutzmaßnahmen mit dem jeweiligen Update installiert werden. Zudem werden System-Updates ab sofort standardmäßig gestreamt. Das schont den oft knappen Speicherplatz älterer Geräte und beschleunigt den Installationsprozess.

Unterstützte Geräte: Nicht jedes Smartphone eignet sich

Der wichtigste Schritt vor der Installation lautet: Prüfen Sie, ob Ihr Smartphone überhaupt unterstützt wird. Nicht jedes Android-Gerät lässt sich mit LineageOS betreiben.

Die offizielle Geräteliste finden Sie im LineageOS-Wiki. Dort sind alle kompatiblen Modelle inklusive Installationsanleitung, Downloads und gerätespezifischen Hinweisen aufgeführt.

LineageOS

Achten Sie unbedingt auf die genaue Modellbezeichnung. Ein Samsung Galaxy S20 ist beispielsweise nicht automatisch mit jeder Variante der Baureihe kompatibel. Hersteller verkaufen häufig mehrere Versionen eines Smartphones mit unterschiedlichen Prozessoren oder Modems.

Unterstützt wird derzeit eine große Auswahl älterer Geräte. Besonders interessant sind dabei natürlich Smartphones, die technisch noch leistungsfähig sind, aber vom Hersteller keine Updates mehr bekommen.

Hinweis zum künftigen Upgrade: Wer jetzt auf LineageOS 23 (Android 16) setzt, muss bei der späteren Veröffentlichung von LineageOS 24 (Android 17) keine Angst vor einem Datenverlust haben. Der Wechsel auf eine neue Hauptversion gelingt in der Regel ohne Werksreset: Statt über den automatischen Updater spielt man das neue Betriebssystem-Image dafür einmalig manuell über die Recovery-Umgebung des Smartphones ein (per sogenanntem ADB-Sideload) – Ihre installierten Apps, Fotos und Einstellungen bleiben dabei erhalten.

Vor der Installation: Diese Punkte sollten Sie beachten

Ein Custom-ROM ist kein gewöhnliches App-Update. Die Installation verändert die komplette Systemsoftware des Smartphones. Deshalb sollten Sie sich anhand der folgenden Checkliste gründlich vorbereiten:

• Vollständige Datensicherung: Sichern Sie Fotos, Videos, Kontakte, Dokumente und wichtige App-Daten. Beim anschließenden Entsperren des Bootloaders wird der interne Speicher in der Regel komplett gelöscht.
• Zwei-Faktor-Authentisierung (2FA): Denken Sie an Ihre Kontosicherheit. Wer Authenticator-Apps verwendet, muss die Wiederherstellungscodes sichern oder die Konten vorab auf ein anderes Gerät übertragen.
• Bootloader entsperren: Damit fremde Software überhaupt starten kann, muss diese herstellerseitige Sicherheitsbarriere geöffnet werden. Der genaue Ablauf unterscheidet sich dabei je nach Smartphone-Modell.
• Garantie & Risiken abwägen: Das Entsperren kann Auswirkungen auf die Herstellergarantie oder spezielle Sicherheitsfunktionen haben. Bei älteren Geräten kann man das in der Praxis oft vernachlässigen – trotzdem ist es besser, sich vorab zu informieren.

LineageOS installieren: Der Webinstaller macht es einfacher

Die Installation eines Custom-ROMs bestand lange aus mehreren komplizierten Schritten: Android-Plattform-Tools auf dem Computer installieren, kryptische Befehle über die Kommandozeile eingeben, Dateien manuell übertragen und anschließend Recovery sowie System installieren. Mit den neuen, browserbasierten Lineage Flash Tools hat das Team diesen Prozess deutlich vereinfacht.

Wichtig zu wissen: Das Tool startet nicht automatisch beim Geräte-Download und nimmt Ihnen das Herunterladen der Dateien nicht ab. Stattdessen lädt man das passende Betriebssystem-Image wie gewohnt manuell herunter. Die Lineage Flash Tools dienen dann als komfortabler Ersatz für die von manchen Nutzern gefürchtete PC-Kommandozeile: Sie rufen die Web-Oberfläche des Tools im Browser auf, verbinden Ihr Smartphone per Mausklick via WebUSB (unterstützt von Chrome oder Edge) und können die Installationsdateien direkt über das Browser-Fenster auf das Handy hochladen.

LineageOS

Das neue Flash-Tool unterstützt verschiedene Verfahren wie Fastboot und ADB sowie bei bestimmten Geräten auch Samsungs Odin-Protokoll. Dadurch sinkt die Einstiegshürde deutlich. Weil das Team die Funktion schrittweise ausrollt und gerätespezifische Besonderheiten bestehen, ersetzt der Webinstaller jedoch nicht den kompletten Weg: Das vorherige, manuelle Entsperren des Bootloaders bleibt oft weiterhin Pflicht.

Ganz ohne Vorbereitung geht es aber weiterhin nicht. LineageOS unterstützt sehr viele unterschiedliche Geräte, und jedes Modell besitzt eigene Besonderheiten. Deshalb bleiben die offiziellen Anleitungen für individuelle Geräte im LineageOS-Wiki weiterhin Pflichtlektüre.

Dort erfahren Sie unter anderem:

• welche Dateien für Ihr Smartphone benötigt werden
• wie der Bootloader entsperrt wird
• welche Recovery-Umgebung verwendet wird
• ob zusätzliche Pakete notwendig sind

Wer die Anleitung Schritt für Schritt befolgt, kommt in der Regel zuverlässig ans Ziel. Fehlerhafte Dateien oder falsche Schritte können jedoch dazu führen, dass das Gerät nicht mehr startet – ein sogenannter Soft-Brick.

Praxis-Tipps für die Browser-Installation:

• Lokales ADB beenden: Falls Sie bereits die klassischen Android-Entwicklertools auf Ihrem PC installiert haben, müssen Sie vor der Nutzung des Webtools den Befehl adb kill-server in Ihrer Kommandozeile ausführen, um Konflikte zu vermeiden.
• USB-Verbindungsfehler lösen: Der Flash-Vorgang erfordert eine hohe Datendurchsatzrate. Sollte der Webinstaller abbrechen oder die Verbindung zum Gerät verlieren, verzichten Sie auf USB-Hubs, Verlängerungskabel oder Adapter. Schließen Sie das Smartphone direkt an den PC an und testen Sie im Zweifel ein anderes USB-Kabel oder einen anderen USB-Port.
• Hilfe bei Problemen: Sollte es dennoch haken, bietet die Community offizielle Anlaufstellen für Support auf Reddit, Discord oder im IRC-Channel (#LineageOS auf Libera.Chat).

Google-Dienste oder maximale Freiheit?

Nach der Installation läuft LineageOS zunächst ohne Google-Dienste. Wer den Play Store, Gmail oder Google Maps weiter nutzen möchte, kann zusätzliche Google-Pakete installieren. Eine häufig verwendete Lösung ist MindTheGapps, das speziell für LineageOS angepasst wurde.

Alternativ können Nutzer auf datenschutzfreundlichere Lösungen wie MicroG setzen oder komplett auf Google verzichten und Apps über alternative Quellen beziehen.

Welche Variante sinnvoll ist, hängt vom eigenen Nutzungsverhalten ab. Für viele Anwender ist die Kombination aus LineageOS und Google-Diensten der einfachste Weg, während Datenschutz-Fans einen anderen Weg wählen können.

GrapheneOS: Die Speziallösung für Pixel-Nutzer (Android 17)

Neben LineageOS gibt es mit GrapheneOS eine weitere bekannte Android-Alternative. Der Ansatz ist allerdings ein anderer: Während LineageOS möglichst viele Geräte unterstützt, konzentriert sich GrapheneOS ausschließlich auf Google-Pixel-Smartphones.

Der Grund dafür sind die speziellen Sicherheitsfunktionen der Pixel-Hardware. GrapheneOS nutzt unter anderem den abgesicherten Bootvorgang und hardwarebasierte Schutzmechanismen, die auf anderen Geräten nicht in gleicher Form verfügbar sind.

Das System richtet sich vor allem an Nutzer mit besonders hohen Datenschutzanforderungen. Google-Dienste sind nicht fest integriert, können aber über eine isolierte Umgebung (Sandboxed Google Play) trotzdem verwendet werden.

Auch GrapheneOS setzt schnell auf neue Android-Versionen und hat Android 17 bereits als Basis integriert. Aufgrund eines anfänglichen Android-17-Bugs beim manuellen Sideloading über das Recovery-Menü sollten Nutzer hier beim Umstieg oder Update jedoch unbedingt auf den offiziellen Webinstaller oder automatische OTA-Updates setzen. Für den normalen Smartphone-Alltag abseits der Pixel-Welt bleibt LineageOS jedoch die deutlich breiter aufgestellte Lösung, auch wenn es bisher noch auf Android 16 basiert.

Fazit: Ein zweites Leben für ältere Smartphones

Das Ende des Hersteller-Supports bedeutet nicht automatisch das Ende eines Smartphones. Wer ein technisch noch gutes Gerät besitzt, kann mit LineageOS oft mehrere zusätzliche Jahre herausholen.

Die Kombination aus aktueller Android-Version, Sicherheitsupdates und weniger Herstellerballast macht Custom-ROMs heute attraktiver denn je. Gleichzeitig nimmt der neue Webinstaller LineageOS einen Teil seiner früheren Komplexität.

Ganz ohne technisches Interesse geht es zwar weiterhin nicht. Wer sich aber etwas Zeit nimmt und die offiziellen Anleitungen sorgfältig befolgt, bekommt ein modernes Android-System – und verlängert die Lebensdauer seines Smartphones deutlich.

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Die neue Firefox-Version 153 für Windows, macOS, Linux und Android bringt einige Verbesserungen bei der Benutzung wie etwa HDR-Videowiedergabe, abgeschottete Tab-Umgebungen, und QR-Code-Erzeugung zur Link-Weitergabe. Die Entwickler haben mehr als 60 Sicherheitslücken gestopft. Updates gibt es auch für die ESR-Versionen.

Im Sicherheitsbericht für Firefox 153 nennt Mozilla mehr als 63 beseitigte Sicherheitslücken, von denen 60 durch externe Sicherheitsforscher entdeckt und gemeldet wurden, drei davon durch OpenAI Codex Security. Mozilla stuft 17 dieser Schwachstellen als hohes Risiko ein. Bei vier dieser Lücken drohen Ausbrüche aus der Browser-Sandbox.

▶Die neuesten Sicherheits-Updates

Weitere 35 Schwachstellen sind als mittleres Risiko ausgewiesen, der Rest als geringes Risiko. Die drei letzten Einträge im Sicherheitsbericht fassen eine nicht angegebene Zahl intern gefundener, als hohes Risiko eingestufter Sicherheitslücken zusammen, die aus Programmierfehlern bei der Speicherverwaltung resultieren. Die Lücken sind danach gruppiert, welche Programme und Programmversionen betroffen sind.

Was ist neu in Firefox 153?

Für Windows-Nutzer bietet Firefox 153 die Wiedergabe von HDR-Videos (High Dynamic Range). Voraussetzung ist, dass der HDR-Modus in den Windows Bildschirmeinstellungen aktiviert ist. Notebook-Displays, die lediglich „HDR Video-Streaming“ bieten, werden derzeit nicht unterstützt, ebenso wie Smartphone-Videos im Hochkant-Format.

Mit dem integrierten PDF-Betrachter und -Editor können Sie nun mehrere PDF-Dateien zusammenführen, indem Sie sie in die PDF-Sidebar ziehen. Auch können Sie jetzt Bilder als neue Seiten in PDF-Dokumente einfügen.

Wenn Sie einen Link weitergeben wollen, etwa auch an Ihr eigenes Smartphone, ohne einen Web-Dienst (wie Firefox Sync) zu benutzen, können Sie mit Firefox 153 einen QR-Code erstellen. Firefox hebt nun das Symbol für die Standort-Freigabe in roter Farbe hervor, wenn eine Website Zugriff auf Ihren Standort hat.

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Das mit Firefox 149 eingeführte und in Firefox integrierte Gratis-VPN bietet weiterhin eine vorübergehend (bis Ende August) auf 28 Länder erweiterte Auswahl virtueller Standorte mit uneingeschränktem Datenvolumen. Das kostenlose VPN ist derzeit für Firefox-Nutzer in den USA, Kanada, Großbritannien, Frankreich und Deutschland verfügbar.

Tipp: Unabhängig davon, dass Sie Ihren Browser stets aktuell halten, sollten Sie die Sicherheit Ihres PCs zusätzlich mit geeigneter Antivirus-Software verbessern. Gute Antivirus-Lösungen stellen wir in „Die besten Antivirus-Programme 2025 im Test: So schützen Sie Ihren Windows-PC“ vor. Falls Sie großen Wert auf anonymes Surfen legen, sind wiederum gute VPN-Programme einen Blick wert.

Weitere Browser-Updates

Neben Firefox 153.0 sind auch die ESR-Ausgaben 140.13.0 und 115.38.0 erhältlich. Letztere gibt es allerdings nur für Windows 7 & 8.1 sowie macOS 10.12 bis 10.14. In den ESR-Versionen haben Mozillas Entwickler diejenigen der oben genannten Schwachstellen behoben, die schon im teils gut abgehangenen Code dieser Browser-Generationen stecken. Das sind in Firefox 140.13 mindestens 32 und in Firefox 115.38 immerhin noch wenigstens 14 geschlossene Sicherheitslücken. Darunter sind zwei als kritisch eingestufte Schwachstellen, die bereits in Firefox 152.0.6 beseitigt wurden. Firefox 153 ist außerdem die Basis für die nächste ESR-Generation. Das bedeutet, Firefox ESR 140 wird im Oktober durch Firefox ESR 153 abgelöst.

Gnadenfrist für Windows 7 & 8 erneut verlängert

Firefox ESR 115 wird vorerst bis März 2027 (v115.52) weiter mit Sicherheits-Updates gepflegt. Wenn Sie Firefox 115 unter Windows 7, 8.1 oder macOS 10.12 bis 10.14 einsetzen, erhalten Sie zumindest für den Browser weiterhin aktuelle Sicherheits-Updates. Rechtzeitig vor Ablauf dieser Gnadenfrist wird Mozilla die Situation neu bewerten und dann entscheiden, ob es eine weitere Verlängerung gibt.

Updates für Tor Browser und Thunderbird

Der neueste Tor Browser 15.0.19 basiert auf Firefox ESR 140.13. Das ansonsten von Mozilla unabhängige Tor-Projekt und die Nutzer des Tor Browsers profitieren so von den in Firefox gestopften Sicherheitslücken. Tor Browser 15.0.9 bringt die Erweiterung NoScript 13.6.31 mit. Das Tor Projekt hostet NoScript für seinen Browser inzwischen selbst. Erkennbar ist das daran, dass diese NoScript-Version den Suffix „.1984“ (aktuell also 13.6.31.1984) trägt – George Orwell lässt grüßen. Ansonsten ist sie identisch mit der Version auf AMO (addons.mozilla.org). Einen Tor Browser für ältere Systeme gibt es nicht mehr. Auch Mozillas Mailer Thunderbird 153.0 und 140.13.0esr sind verfügbar. Darin haben die Entwickler ebenfalls Dutzende Sicherheitslücken beseitigt, die das Mail-Programm vorwiegend von Firefox geerbt hat.

Bis zur Veröffentlichung der nächsten Hauptversion Firefox 154 am 18. August plant Mozilla wöchentliche Updates zur Fehlerbehebung und um weitere Schwachstellen zu beseitigen. Nach Firefox 154 wechselt Mozilla, wie auch Google Chrome und Microsoft Edge, auf einen zweiwöchentlichen Turnus für neue Hauptversionen. Firefox 155 soll demnach bereits am 1. September erscheinen.

Besitzer einer Fritzbox 7510 steht ab sofort FritzOS 8.26 bereit. Das neue Wartungsupdate behebt einen Fehler, der unter bestimmten Bedingungen die Geschwindigkeit von DSL-Anschlüssen erheblich reduzieren konnte. Darauf weisen die offiziellen Versionshinweise von Fritz sowie mehrere Medienberichte, etwa von Winfuture, hin.

Wer eine Fritzbox 7510 nutzt, sollte daher prüfen, ob die neue Firmware bereits zur Installation angeboten wird. Das Update enthält zwar keine neuen Funktionen, beseitigt aber ein Problem, das die Internetverbindung im Alltag spürbar beeinträchtigen konnte.

Fehler begrenzte DSL-Anschlüsse auf 10 MBit/s

In bestimmten technischen Konstellationen kam es vor, dass DSL-Verbindungen unabhängig vom gebuchten Tarif auf maximal 10 MBit/s begrenzt wurden. Nutzer bemerkten dies möglicherweise durch ungewöhnlich langsame Downloads, längere Ladezeiten oder Probleme beim Streaming und Online-Gaming.

Mit FritzOS 8.26 soll dieser Fehler nun behoben sein. Die offiziellen Änderungen fallen überschaubar aus:

• Behebung eines Fehlers, der DSL-Verbindungen unter bestimmten Bedingungen auf 10 MBit/s begrenzen konnte
• Verbesserungen der Systemstabilität

Bislang nur für die Fritzbox 7510

Aktuell wird FritzOS 8.26 für die Fritzbox 7510 bereitgestellt. Dabei handelt es sich um ein DSL-Einstiegsmodell mit Unterstützung für Supervectoring-Anschlüsse mit bis zu 300 MBit/s.

Erfahrungsgemäß veröffentlicht Fritz neue Wartungsupdates jedoch häufig zunächst für einzelne Modelle, bevor weitere Router folgen. Ob und wann andere Fritzboxen ebenfalls FritzOS 8.26 erhalten, ist derzeit noch nicht bekannt.

Unabhängig davon empfiehlt es sich grundsätzlich, regelmäßig nach neuen Firmware-Versionen zu suchen. Updates schließen nicht nur Fehler, sondern verbessern häufig auch die Stabilität und Sicherheit des Heimnetzes.

So prüfen Sie, ob das Update verfügbar ist

Die Aktualisierung lässt sich direkt über die Benutzeroberfläche der Fritzbox installieren. Öffnen Sie dazu in Ihrem Browser die Adresse „fritz.box“ und wechseln Sie anschließend zu System > Update. Dort können Sie manuell nach einer neuen Firmware suchen.

Wer automatische Updates aktiviert hat, muss in der Regel nichts unternehmen. In diesem Fall lädt und installiert die Fritzbox neue Versionen selbstständig, häufig außerhalb der üblichen Nutzungszeiten.

Für Besitzer einer Fritzbox 7510 dürfte die Installation von FritzOS 8.26 insbesondere dann interessant sein, wenn die Internetgeschwindigkeit zuletzt unerwartet niedrig ausgefallen ist.

Weitere Beiträge zum Thema:

• Fritzbox-Router im Vergleich: Welches ist das beste Modell?
• Fritzbox absichern: So sind Sie optimal geschützt
• Test: Fritzbox 7590 AX – neuer High-End-Router mit Wi-Fi 6

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