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What's Changed

• Changelog for v0.53.0-preview.0 by @gemini-cli-robot in #28507
• Changelog for v0.52.0 by @gemini-cli-robot in #28508
• chore(release): bump version to 0.54.0-nightly.20260722.gf743ab579 by @gemini-cli-robot in #28510
• fix(caretaker): sanitize and wrap issue title in untrusted_context by @chadd28 in #28352
• chore(caretaker): update vitest to v3.2.4 and add package-lock.json files by @chadd28 in #28409
• fix(core): rotate session ID on model fallback to prevent stateful API errors by @amelidev in #28469
• feat(caretaker-triage): post comment before auto-closing issues by @chadd28 in #28411
• fix(core): enforce HTTPS for GoogleCredentialsAuthProvider to prevent cleartext leakage by @amelidev in #28517
• fix(core): filter out thought parts from getHistoryTurns when context management is disabled by @DavidAPierce in #28509

Full Changelog: v0.52.0-nightly.20260723.g9681621c6...v0.54.0-nightly.20260726.g3818efbbf

What's Changed

• Changelog for v0.53.0-preview.0 by @gemini-cli-robot in #28507
• Changelog for v0.52.0 by @gemini-cli-robot in #28508
• chore(release): bump version to 0.54.0-nightly.20260722.gf743ab579 by @gemini-cli-robot in #28510
• fix(caretaker): sanitize and wrap issue title in untrusted_context by @chadd28 in #28352
• chore(caretaker): update vitest to v3.2.4 and add package-lock.json files by @chadd28 in #28409
• fix(core): rotate session ID on model fallback to prevent stateful API errors by @amelidev in #28469
• feat(caretaker-triage): post comment before auto-closing issues by @chadd28 in #28411
• fix(core): enforce HTTPS for GoogleCredentialsAuthProvider to prevent cleartext leakage by @amelidev in #28517
• fix(core): filter out thought parts from getHistoryTurns when context management is disabled by @DavidAPierce in #28509

Full Changelog: v0.52.0-nightly.20260723.g9681621c6...v0.54.0-nightly.20260726.g3818efbbf

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The issue is straightforward: when Node.js resolves modules, the runtime searches for packages in C:\node_modules as part of its default behavior. Since low-privileged Windows users can create this directory and plant malicious modules there, any Node.js application with missing or optional dependencies becomes vulnerable to privilege escalation.

This issue is not new. Concerned discussions about Node.js's module search path behavior date back to 2013 and 2014.

Node.js has explicitly stated that they consider this behavior intentional:

"Node.js trusts the file system."

They do not treat CWE-427 (Uncontrolled Search Path Element) as a vulnerability, pushing responsibility onto application developers.

As the case studies below demonstrate, this stance has dangerous consequences. Developers are largely unaware of this attack surface, and the result is a proliferation of exploitable applications. We will show examples in npm CLI and Discord, but there are likely many more applications that are impacted by this.

Root Cause

The root cause lies in the way Node.js performs module resolution. This is documented here. Although UNIX paths are used in the documentation provided by Node.js, the same logic is applied on Windows.

When a Node.js application calls require(‘bar’), the runtime searches for the module in the following order:

1. C:\Users\Administrator\projects\node_modules\bar.js
2. C:\Users\Administrator\node_modules\bar.js
3. C:\Users\node_modules\bar.js
4. C:\node_modules\bar.js <-- The problem

If the legitimate package is missing, whether due to optional dependencies, development packages removed in production, or installation failures, the resolution search will eventually reach the root of the drive. Any user can create C:\node_modules and place a malicious package there. Once the low-privileged user has populated C:\node_modules\bar.js, Node.js will load and execute it in the context of the current user. In the following case studies, we will provide evidence of how, despite properly following NPM’s guidelines, third-party dependencies end up triggering this vulnerability anytime you launch the application.

Case Studies: Real-World Manifestations

The Optional Dependency Pattern: npm supports optional dependencies to be specified in the project’s package.json file. The recommended pattern for checking for these dependencies is as follows:

This pattern silently catches errors when optional packages are missing, allowing execution to continue. So what’s the problem? On Windows, Node.js will search all the way up to C:\node_modules where an attacker may have planted a malicious replacement. This search behavior mirrors UNIX conventions where /node_modules at the filesystem root is typically only writable by root. Windows systems by default allow any user to create C:\node_modules. Once require is called, Node.js will traverse the search path and execute any matching module it finds.

Important things to note:

1. This pattern can be found in third party libraries deep in a dependency tree, as we will see in the following examples.
2. There is no runtime indication to either the developers or the end users that such a vulnerability exists without looking at the filesystem logs with Procmon.
3. The optional dependency pattern itself would not be dangerous if Node.js did not search for packages in C:\node_modules.

Let’s take a deeper look at both cases and see why this is so dangerous.

Case 1: npm CLI (ZDI-26-043 / ZDI-CAN-25430 / CVE-2026-0775).

Prior to version 11.2.0, npm CLI used a library called “promise-inflight”, which contained an optional dependency on a package called “bluebird”.

When Node.js is installed on the system, npm is included by default without the bluebird package. This vulnerability was introduced when bluebird was removed through a well-intentioned pull request (https://github.com/npm/cli/pull/1438/changes), demonstrating how easy it is for developers to unknowingly create this attack surface.

We can see Node’s package resolution logic at work in the screenshot below:

First, the application looks for the bluebird.js package in the Node.js installation directory. Node.js sequentially searches back to the system root until it finds the package. If an attacker has placed C:\node_modules\bluebird.js, the require call will find, read, and execute the malicious payload in the context of any user running npm on the system.

This vulnerability is especially dangerous because it is triggered when many npm * cli commands are used. Common development commands such as npm install, npm –l, and npm prune will all execute the malicious bluebird.jspackage.

Case 2: Discord (ZDI-26-040/ ZDI-CAN-27057 / CVE-2026-0776/ UNPATCHED)

On April 22, 2025, ZDI received a report for a similar vulnerability in Discord reported by T. Doğa Gelişli. Discord uses the ws WebSocket library, which contains an optional dependency on utf-8-validate for compatibility with older Node.js versions:

Discord does not ship with the utf-8-validate package. As a result, the following Procmon logs show the same behavior as Case 1. Anytime Discord is launched, the attacker controlled C:\node_modules\utf-8-validate.js is executed.

The ws library does support disabling this check via the WS_NO_UTF_8_VALIDATE environment variable, but this requires the consuming application (Discord) to set it explicitly. Here’s a quick video demonstrating the bug by popping the calc app when opening Discord:

Discord automatically opens on login by default, so in practice code execution happens immediately without any user interaction. Strangely, the Discord Security team made it clear to us in their responses that they do not consider local attack vectors as valid security issues.

The Bigger Picture

The cases above represent only a few of the applications affected by this pattern. During our investigation we found many other independent reports.  These issues in Mongo DB Compass and Mongo DB Shell are just two other examples.

Every Windows application built on Node.js with missing or optional dependencies is potentially vulnerable. This includes desktop applications that utilize Electron as well as popular web frameworks such as Next.js and React.

Each vendor has clearly stated that they will not treat these issues as vulnerabilities:

NPM’s response to our report:

“exploits that require local access to a machine are considered ineligible for npm CLI

Discord’s response to our report:

“We do not consider physical/local attacks as valid security issues”

Node.js, in the “Examples of non-vulnerabilities” section of their Security Policy:

“Node.js trusts the file system in the environment accessible to it. Therefore, it is not a vulnerability if it accesses/loads files from any path that is accessible to it.”

Conclusion

The vulnerability pattern described in this blog stems from a deliberate design decision by Node.js maintainers. While Node.js's position that “applications should trust their filesystem” may hold true on properly administered UNIX systems, it creates a systemic vulnerability on Windows where low-privileged users can write to C:\node_modules. Without a fix from Node.js, the burden silently falls on application developers.

Making matters worse, the vulnerable code may not live in the application code itself. The optional dependencies that trigger this behavior could come from third-party libraries buried in the dependency tree as we saw with both Discord and npm CLI.

We encourage security researchers to further review this issue and investigate other applications for this dangerous behavior. You can find us online at @bobbygould5 and @izobashi, and follow the team on Twitter, Mastodon, LinkedIn, or Bluesky for the latest in exploit techniques and security patches.

DISCLOSURE TIMELINES

NPM CLI:

2024-11-13 – ZDI submitted the report to the vendor

2024-11-13 – The vendor acknowledged the receipt of the report

2024-11-13 – The vendor communicated that the reported behavior was by design and they do not consider local attacks as valid security issues

2025-08-05 – ZDI encouraged the vendor to re-assess the issue

2025-12-18 – ZDI notified the vendor of the intention to publish the case as a 0-day advisory

DISCORD:

2025-07-08 – ZDI notified vendor

2025-09-11 – ZDI followed up with vendor

2025-09-15 – Vendor stated they do not consider local attacks as valid security issues

2025-12-01 – ZDI explained why we believe the issue is still valid

2025-12-10 – Vendor replied that the vulnerability is still out of scope 

2025-12-11 – ZDI informed vendor of intent to publish 0-day 

REFERENCES

https://nodejs.org/api/modules.html#loading-from-node_modules-folders

https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v10/configuring-npm/package-json#optionaldependencies

https://groups.google.com/g/nodejs/c/5BGr5dliUIk/m/abJEH3sPymcJ?pli=1

https://github.com/nodejs/node-v0.x-archive/issues/8830

https://bounty.github.com/ineligible.html#vulnerability_in_upstream_dependencies:~:text=eligible%20for%20rewards.-,Local%20access,-Vulnerabilities%20which%20require

https://github.com/nodejs/node/security/policy#examples-of-non-vulnerabilities

A double free vulnerability has been reported in the Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) service. The vulnerability is due to an error when processing fragments.

An unauthenticated, remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted packets to the target server. Successful exploitation could result in a crash of the IKEEXT service, or potentially arbitrary code execution.

The Vulnerability

Microsoft Windows is an operating system which includes both server and desktop components along with an easy-to-use GUI. All currently supported versions of Windows include Internet Key Exchange Protocol Extensions to support the Virtual Private Network (VPN) feature.

The VPN feature of Windows encrypts communication between hosts. ISAKMP is a negotiation protocol used by IPsec-enabled hosts to build a security association. It uses the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol in order to negotiate keys for encrypted communication. IKE has two versions: IKEv1 and IKEv2. IKE version 1 (IKEv1) and version 2 (IKEv2) messages have the following general format:

The type of payload is determined by the Next Payload header of the previous payload, or the Next Payload field in the header (in the case of the first payload).

IKEv2 supports message fragmentation as defined in RFC 7383. When IKEv2 messages exceed the path MTU, they may be split into multiple Encrypted Fragment payloads. Of interest to this report is the Encrypted Fragment (SKF) payload (type 0x35). The SKF payload format is defined as:

When an IKEv2 implementation receives fragments, it inserts each fragment into an ordered list and reassembles them once all fragments have been received. In the Windows implementation, the function IkeReinjectReassembledPacket() performs this reassembly.

A double-free vulnerability has been reported in the Windows IKE Extension library (ikeext.dll). The vulnerability is due to improper ownership handling of a heap-allocated blob pointer during IKEv2 fragment reassembly. During the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, a Security Realm Vendor ID payload causes IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId() to allocate a blob and store it in the MMSA (Main Mode Security Association) structure at offset 0x208. When a fragmented IKE_AUTH message is fully reassembled, IkeReinjectReassembledPacket copies MMSA fields at offsets 0x178 through 0x21F - including the blob pointer at 0x208 - into a local stack struct. This struct is then passed to IkeQueueRecvRequest, which shallow-copies it into a heap-allocated work item. While IkeQueueRecvRequest deep-copies the reassembly buffer at offset 0x10 in the struct, the Security Realm blob pointer at offset 0xC8 remains a shallow copy, aliasing the original at MMSA+0x208.

When the thread pool processes the queued work item, IkeDestroyPacketContext checks the blob pointer at offset 0xC8 and calls WfpMemFree to release it (first free). The MMSA structure still holds the original pointer to the same allocation at offset 0x208. When the MMSA is subsequently cleaned up through IkeCleanupMMNegotiation, the SA reference count is decremented via IkeDerefMMSA, eventually triggering IkeFreeMMSA, which frees the blob pointer at MMSA offset 0x208 - the same allocation already freed by IkeDestroyPacketContext (second free).

A remote, unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted IKE_SA_INIT message followed by two or more Encrypted Fragment (SKF) payloads containing an invalid IKE_AUTH message to the target server. The fragment reassembly path will shallow-copy the blob pointers, and the subsequent MMSA cleanup will trigger the double free. Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution under the security context of the IKEEXT service (SYSTEM).

Source Code Walkthrough

The following code snippets were taken from IKEEXT.DLL file version 10.0.20348.2849 and decompiled with IDA Pro version 8.3. Comments added by TrendAI have been highlighted.

Detection Guidance

To detect an attack exploiting this vulnerability, the detection device must monitor and parse traffic on UDP ports 500 and 4500. The IKE general format, Payloads field, and the Encrypted Fragment (SKF) payload format can be seen above.

The detection device should monitor all incoming IKE traffic. Detection requires correlating two packets within the same IKE session: an IKE_SA_INIT request carrying the Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID, followed by a fragmented IKE_AUTH request. Neither packet alone is malicious; both must be observed in sequence from the same source.

IKE_SA_INIT

At byte offset 17 of the UDP payload, the device should check for the three-byte sequence 20 22 08, which corresponds to the IKEv2 version identifier (0x20), the IKE_SA_INIT exchange type (0x22), and the Initiator flag (0x08). The device should then scan the remainder of the packet for the 16-byte sequence 68 6a 8c bd fe 63 4b 40 51 46 fb 2b af 33 e9 e8, which is the Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID. If both conditions are met, the device should follow the guidance below.

IKE_AUTH

For subsequent packets from the same source, the device should check bytes at offset 16 through 23 of the UDP payload. At offset 16, the four-byte sequence 35 20 23 08 identifies an Encrypted Fragment payload (SKF, type 0x35), IKEv2 version (0x20), IKE_AUTH exchange type (0x23), and Initiator flag (0x08). If found, the detection device should inspect offset 20 and search for the four-byte sequence00 00 00 01. If found the traffic should be considered malicious; an attack exploiting this vulnerability is likely underway.

Notes
• All multi-byte values should be treated as big endian.
• When detecting traffic on port 4500, IKE packets are prepended by a 4-byte non-ESP marker (\x00\x00\x00\x00), shifting all IKE header content offsets by 4.

Conclusion

This vulnerability was patched by Microsoft in the April 2026 release cycle. They do note two mitigations that could prevent exploitation while the patch is being tested and deployed. 

·      Block inbound traffic on UDP ports 500 and 4500 for systems that do not use IKE.

·      For systems that require IKE, configure firewall rules to allow inbound traffic on UDP ports 500 and 4500 only from known peer addresses.

These mitigations may be removed once the security patch is applied. The only way to fully remediate the vulnerability is to apply the update from the vendor.

Special thanks to Richard Chen and Lucas Miller of the TrendAI Research team for providing such a thorough analysis of this vulnerability. For an overview of TrendAI Research services please visit https://go.trendmicro.com/tis/vulnerabilities.html.

The threat research team will be back with other great vulnerability analysis reports in the future. Until then, follow the team on Twitter, Mastodon, LinkedIn, or Bluesky for the latest in exploit techniques and security patches.

Adobe Patches for May 2026

For May, Adobe released 10 bulletins addressing 52 unique CVEs in Adobe Commerce, After Effects, Adobe Connect, Illustrator, Media Encoder, Premiere Pro, Substance 3D Painter, Substance 3D Sampler, Content Authenticity SDK, and the Adobe Substance 3D Designer. Here’s this month’s overview table:

The obvious priority this month is the patch for Commerce, with its 15 bugs and deployment priority of 2. The Connect fix should also rank up there since both of its CVEs are CVSS 9s. Beyond those, it’s a pretty typical month for Adobe, with most of the bugs either being cross-site scripting (XSS) or open-and-own code executions.

Microsoft Patches for May 2026

This month, Microsoft released a whopping 138 new CVEs in Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Azure, .NET and Visual Studio, Copilot Chat, Github Copilot, M365 Copilot, SQL Server, TCP/IP, and the Telnet Client – yes, the Telnet client. Two of these bugs were reported through the TrendAI ZDI program. 30 of these bugs are rated Critical, three are rated as Moderate, one is rated Low, and the rest are rated Important in severity.

This large volume of fixes follows the largest monthly release in Microsoft’s history and reflects the trend across the industry of a high number of submissions. While not all of these bugs were found by AI, it’s likely they had an AI-related component – even if it was just AI writing the submission. I should also point out the Pwn2Own Berlin occurs in just a few days, and it’s typical for vendors to patch as much as they can before the event.

None of the bugs patched by Microsoft this month are listed as publicly known or under active attack at the time of release, so we’ve got that going for us. Let’s take a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with a nasty-looking bug in DNS:

-    CVE-2026-41096 - Windows DNS Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This patch fixes a heap-based buffer overflow in the DNS Client triggered by a malicious DNS response. No authentication or user interaction needed, and since the DNS Client runs on virtually every Windows machine, the attack surface is enormous. An attacker with a position to influence DNS responses (MitM, rogue server) could achieve unauthenticated RCE across your enterprise.

-    CVE-2026-41089 - Windows Netlogon Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This update covers another CVSS 9.8 bug, which is a stack-based buffer overflow that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker execute code on a domain controller by sending a specially crafted network request — no credentials, no user interaction required. Yup – that makes it wormable. This is the highest-impact bug that requires immediate patching: a compromised domain controller is a compromised domain.

-    CVE-2026-42898 - Microsoft Dynamics 365 On-Premises Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This bug rates a CVSS 9.9(!) and represents a code injection in Dynamics 365. It allows any authenticated user to execute code with a scope change, meaning exploitation can break out and affect resources beyond the vulnerable component itself. Scope changes are pretty rare, so if you’re running Dynamics 365 On-Prem, definitely test and deploy this patch quickly.

-    CVE-2026-40415 - Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This bug in the TCP/IP stack results from a use-after-free (UAF) and could allow a remote, unauthenticated threat actor to execute code without user interaction. That makes this another wormable bug. However, this one is much less likely to be exploited. The target needs to be under sustained low-memory (memory pressure) conditions, which is pretty rare. Still, no need to tempt fate here. Test and deploy this one quickly.

Here’s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for May 2026:

* Indicates this CVE had been released by a third party and is now being included in Microsoft releases.

† Indicates further administrative actions are required to fully address the vulnerability.

Looking at the other Critical-rated bugs in this month’s release, there are quite a few scary-looking bugs (including a CVSS 10!), but there’s no action for the end user as Microsoft has already mitigated these bugs and is just now documenting them. There’s also this month’s crop of Office bugs where the Preview Pane is an attack vector. However, the bug in Office for Android does not have the Preview Pane vector; it’s simple open and own. The bug in the WiFi driver needs a network adjacent attacker. The SharePoint bug requires authentication, but anyone with site privileges has the authentication needed. The bug in SSO Plugin for Jira & Confluence should really be called an authentication bypass, since it allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain access to a system.

Looking at the other code execution bugs, most are of the open and own variety as expected. The bug in Dynamic 365 (On Prem) requires high privileges. The Message Queueing bug requires an adjacent attacker. The bug in SQL Server requires authentication, but as usual, patching won’t be straightforward. Finally, there’s a bug in the kernel that leads to code execution. Most kernel bugs are privilege escalations, but this one could allow code execution if an attacker sends specially crafted NVMe over Fabrics (NVMe‑oF) response messages during the connection handshake process that contains an invalid header length value. Neat.

As usual, the vast majority of the Microsoft release fixes Elevation of Privilege (EoP) bugs. Also as usual, most simply lead to local attackers executing their code at SYSTEM-level privileges or administrative privileges, so there’s not much to add without further technical details about the bugs themselves. There are also a few bugs that just state the attacker could “gain ELEVATED privileges.” How obtuse. The bugs in Azure allow an attacker to access data otherwise hidden from them. The Edge bug allows threat actors to elevate to the privileges of the running application. The bug in Visual Studio allows attackers to get permissions associated with the MCP Server’s managed identity. Finally, there are a couple of sandbox escapes, too, which are always useful.

This month's update includes six Security Feature Bypass vulnerabilities. The most severe is in the Azure SDK for Java (CVSS 9.1). An attacker over the network can bypass the integrity protection provided by authentication tags on encrypted data, effectively manipulating encrypted input in a way that slips past integrity checks during decryption. Close behind is the bypass affecting the GitHub Copilot integration in Visual Studio Code (CWE-74). This one requires a user interaction, but it allows an attacker to circumvent the path validation safeguards that normally control which files Copilot is permitted to modify. The other Visual Studio Code bypass involves cross-site scripting, improper link resolution, and information exposure triggered when a user opens or views a maliciously crafted notebook. On the Windows networking side there are two bypasses. The first hits the Windows TCP/IP driver via an authentication bypass using an alternate channel. The other impacts the Windows Filtering Platform through improper access control, allowing a local, low-privileged attacker to bypass FQDN-based network security rules. Finally, there’s a Secure Boot bypass that, you guessed it, bypasses secure boot features.

Moving on to the Information Disclosure bugs fixed this month, we have 15 different CVEs. As usual, the majority of these simply result in info leaks consisting of unspecified memory contents or memory addresses. The bug in Power Automate could expose data marked “Sensitive” within Power Automate Desktop flows. One of the Word bugs could disclose NLTM hashes. The bug in Edge could disclose your cookies, which seems rude. The bug in Visual Studio could expose file path information. Finally, there’s a bug in Telnet for Windows 11 that leaks information being used by Telnet at the time. I didn’t even realize Windows 11 still had a telnet client.

The May release contains 10 spoofing bugs (plus the ones already addressed by Microsoft). The bug in Azure Machine Learning Notebooks vulnerability requires user interaction, but it could expose info through the Azure ML web interface to the attacker. There’s a cluster of fixes for Microsoft's mobile Office suite on Android. Excel, Word, and PowerPoint for Android all carry spoofing flaws rooted in improper access control. Two Copilot products are also affected by spoofing vulns. The M365 Copilot for Desktop has no details provided. The M365 Copilot for Android variant requires low privileges and producing only limited impact on confidentiality and integrity. Microsoft Teams for Android rounds out the mobile app spoofing bugs. Three Edge bugs close things out, all involving misrepresentation of information in the browser UI.

There are two Tampering bugs in this month’s release. The one in .NET Core allows threat actors to write files to an affected system. The other is in Outlook for iOS and manifests as a command injection bug.

There are eight DoS bugs in the May release, but as always, Microsoft provides little to no actionable information about the vulnerabilities. The most interesting from a practical standpoint are two TCP/IP bugs that allow a low-privilege Hyper-V guest to crash the host. Both are triggered from the adjacent network. On the broader network-exposure side, the ASP.NET Core bug is a straightforward infinite loop condition — an unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted request over the network and the server stops responding.

No new advisories are being released this month.

Looking Ahead

Assuming I survive Pwn2Own Berlin (which is looking iffy at the moment), I’ll return on June 9th on what will hopefully be a smaller release than this one. Until then, stay safe, happy patching, and may all your reboots be smooth and clean!

Adobe Patches for June 2026

For June, Adobe released 11 bulletins addressing 123 unique CVEs in Adobe Acrobat Reader, ColdFusion, Experience Manager, Experience Manager Forms, InDesign, InCopy, Substance 3D Sampler, Content Credentials SDK, Dreamweaver, Format Plugins, and Adobe Campaign Classic. A total of 11 of these CVEs were reported through the ZDI program.

Here’s this month’s overview table:

Obviously, the update for Campaign Classic should be on the top of your deployment list if you’re a user. A CVSS 10 is rare; two in the same bulletin is pretty much a unicorn. Adobe says there are no active attacks, but I would expect heavy research into creating one. The update for Coldfusion is also a Priority 1, but again, no known attacks is the wild. I suspect the Reader patch will also receive a lot of attention as malicious PDFs are common in ransomware attacks. The update for Experience Manager may be large, but it’s mostly just cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs.

Microsoft Patches for June 2026

This month, Microsoft released a new record 208 CVEs Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Azure, .NET and Visual Studio, Github Copilot, Defender, Exchange Server, Hyper-V, Secure Boot, and BitLocker. At least, that’s my count. Microsoft’s tools seem to be having some issues, as they initially included a CVE from 2020 in this release. Regardless, the count is over 200, and I counted several times.

One of these bugs came through the ZDI program, but bugs submitted during Pwn2Own Berlin remain unpatched. If you include the Chromium and other third-party bugs, the total CVE count for June comes to a staggering 571 CVEs. 38 of these cases are rated Critical while the rest are rated Important in severity.

I’ve been counting CVEs on Patch Tuesday since 2017, and this is by far the largest monthly release in that time. The previous record was 177 set last year. It is extraordinary that Microsoft can produce so many patches in a single month, but it does raise concerns. How many of these cases were found using AI tools? How many patches were generated using AI to assist in coding or testing? What quality issues may exist in these patches? And likely most importantly, is this the new normal? The last two months were also large releases. Should sysadmins adjust their processes for prioritization and patch deployment based on this new volume of updates? Unfortunately, Microsoft is not providing those answers right now. Hopefully that changes in the future. BTW – just a note – the current number of CVEs shipped by Microsoft this year exceeds the total number of CVEs shipped in all of 2018.

One of the bugs patched by Microsoft this month is listed as under active exploitation and three others are listed as publicly known at the time of release. Let’s take a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with the bug being exploited in the wild.

-   CVE-2026-41091 - Microsoft Defender Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Since Microsoft doesn’t provide info on how widespread exploitation is, we must read some tea leaves. For this patch, several different people were acknowledged, which indicates multiple parties say this is in the wild, meaning exploitation is likely significant. The good news is that most people won’t need to take action as Defender updates itself. However, if you don’t have this configured or are in an isolated environment, you’ll need to update to the latest version.

-    CVE-2026-45657 - Windows Kernel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This CVSS 9.8 bug allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute code at SYSTEM level without user interaction. Yup – this is wormable. The problem lies in the way the kernel handles TCP/IP. This was listed as “Exploitation Less Likely” by Microsoft, but rest assured that every researcher and bug shop on the planet is reversing this patch right now trying to create an exploit. Test and deploy this patch quickly.

-    CVE-2026-47291 - HTTP.sys Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Our second CVSS 9.8 bug of the month, this also allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute code on affected systems without user interaction. However, there is a caveat. Systems using the default MaxRequestBytes registry value used by the Windows HTTP stack are not affected by this bug. You can edit your registry settings if you need protection while you test and deploy the patch. The bulletin includes instructions and even a PowerShell script for doing this action. Microsoft lists this as “Exploitation more likely”, so I would definitely check your registry settings.

-    CVE-2026-44815 - DHCP Client Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Here’s another CVSS 9.8 that has an odd incongruity. Although the CVSS says no permissions are required for exploitation, the write-up states it must be an “authenticated” user. I would err on the side of caution here and believe the CVSS. If that’s correct, then we have another bug where a remote, unauthenticated attacker could execute code on affected systems without user interaction. And since the DHCP client is on every OS, it’s a juicy target. This is another one to test and deploy with haste.

-    CVE-2026-45585/CVE-2026-50507 - Windows BitLocker Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
If you’ve followed the ongoing saga of Nightmare Eclipse vs. MSRC, the bugs should look familiar. One is definitely a fix for “YellowKey”, while the other appears to be a fix for “GreenPlasma”. The researcher has promised a “bone shattering” drop on June 14, so let’s hope Microsoft is able to reach some understanding with the researcher before more 0-days are released. Also, there is a script provided by Microsoft as a mitigation, but the better strategy is to test and deploy the updates.

 Here’s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for June 2026:

* Indicates this CVE had been released by a third party and is now being included in Microsoft releases.

† Indicates further administrative actions are required to fully address the vulnerability.

Looking at the other Critical-rated bugs in this release, the scariest-looking one is actually nothing to concern yourself with at all. The CVSS 10 bug in Azure HorizonDB has already been addressed by Microsoft and is just being documented now. That’s also the case for five others. Of course, there wouldn’t be a release without Office bugs that have the Preview Pane as an attack vector. There are multiple in June. There’s a handful of bugs in the Remote Desktop Client, but these rely on connecting to a malicious RDP server. There are three patches for Hyper-V that allow for guest-to-host code execution. The bug in Active Directory requires authentication, but any authenticated user can hit it. For the Windows Directory Service vulnerability, it needs to be listening for TFTP. You have blocked that everywhere, right? The bug in Azure Network Adapter is somewhat unique as you need to update your Linux kernel to be protected. The bug in Azure Kubernetes allows an attacker to break out of a container and gain control of the AKS worker node. Finally, the bug in the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) seems unlikely, but if exploited, it could allow authenticated attackers to get code execution on affected systems.

Moving on to the other code execution bugs, there are the ubiquitous open-an-own bugs in Office components like Excel and Word. The code injection bug in Exchange Server looks troubling, but it requires a machine-in-the-middle (MiTM), so exploitation is unlikely. The bugs in SharePoint require authentication, but you should note that the patch applies to both SharePoint Server 2016 and SharePoint Enterprise Server 2016. The two bugs in UPnP are interesting. Both can lead to code execution by causing an error during the handling of specially crafted data, which could lead to a Use After Free (UAF) bug. The bugs in RDP Client all require connecting to a malicious RDP server, but it’s not clear why some are rated Critical and some are rated Important. The NTFS vulnerability requires a user to mount a virtual hard drive on an affected system. The last RCE bug this month is in Azure Stack Edge and requires the attacker to send a specially crafted file upload request that includes a manipulated file name or path, leading to code execution.

There are more than 60 Elevation of Privilege (EoP) bugs in this month’s release, and as usual, most simply lead to local attackers executing their code at SYSTEM-level privileges or administrative privileges, so there’s not much to add without further technical details about the bugs themselves. A notable exception is in Exchange Server, where a user on Outlook Web Access (OWA) could gain access to other mailboxes. The bug in Visual Studio Code could allow attackers to gain permissions associated with the MCP Server’s managed identity. The bugs in Windows SDK and Windows UI Automation Manager could let attacker go from low integrity up to medium integrity code execution. The bug in Bluetooth just allows “elevated” privileges without really describing what elevated might be.

Moving on to the more than 20 security feature bypass (SFB) bugs in the June release, there are a total of 10 that impact Secure Boot. All carry scope change (S:C) in the CVSS, meaning successful exploitation affects security boundaries beyond the vulnerable component itself — specifically the ability to load untrusted code at boot, bypass Virtual Secure Mode, and undermine boot integrity guarantees. CVE-2026-45654 explicitly calls out VSM exposure. The bulk of these are credited to Alon Leviev (STORM), which is notable given his prior BootKitty/BlackLotus-adjacent research. The bugs in the Windows Boot Manager have a similar impact as the Secure Boot bugs. The UEFI Secure Boot vulnerabilities go a layer deeper. They require either local admin or physical access but could allow for the running of untrusted code even before the OS loads. Rootkits anyone? The four bugs in BitLocker all require physical access but could yield encrypted data if exploited. The bug in Windows Administration Protection allows attackers to bypass the feature that prevents standard-user apps from performing admin-level actions. The bug in Visual Studio Copilot Chat could be the most interesting non-boot bug here as it allows authentication impersonation. Mark of the Web (MotW) and Excel vulns could bypass user warnings. Lastly, the bug in PC Manager bypasses expected user controls.

Turning our attention to the mass of spoofing bugs in the release, we instantly see 18 impacting SharePoint Server. Fortunately, these are simply cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs. It’s the Exchange bugs we should really watch for. One is an XSS that an attacker can exploit by convincing an Exchange administrator to open a malicious link or message, which then runs code in the admin's web session. That's a meaningful privilege escalation path. Another is listed as an SSRF-based attack, but no other details are available. The last is a lower-impact XSS with limited confidentiality/integrity loss. The bug in Bing Search (remember Bing?) is a classic search result spoofing. The bug in Azure Stack Edge is interesting as it could allow access to resources outside the vulnerable component's security boundary. The bug in Office for Android requires user interaction. The Office Project Server bug is an authenticated XSS with low impact. The final spoofing bug is in Azure Attestation but has already been addressed. You should still verify you are protected by following the instructions in the write-up from Microsoft.

There are 30 different information disclosure bugs in this release, and fortunately, the vast majority of these simply result in info leaks consisting of unspecified memory contents or memory addresses. The two bugs in Visual Studio require user interaction and could “disclose information over a network.” How obtuse. The bug in GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code could disclose discloses a sign-in access token for a user's work account. That's a meaningful credential exposure, not just random memory. That leaves the two bugs in Exchange Server. One could allow an authenticated user to gain information about which network services that the Exchange server can reach. The other sounds much like the spoofing bug in OWA as it allows attackers to see information in mailboxes they should not have access to.

I’ve never been a fan of the “tampering” category, as it could mean so many different things. For example, the bug in .NET simply says it could allow an unauthorized attacker to perform tampering locally. Similarly, the bug in Visual Studio says the same, expect here the tampering occurs over a network. Microsoft doesn’t even bother with a CWE for the tampering bug in the DHCP Server, so your guess is as good as mine.

There are seven DoS bugs in the June release, and as usual, Microsoft provides little to no actionable information about the vulnerabilities. The most interesting is the bug in HTTP.sys, which is listed as publicly known. This is an uncontrolled resource consumption, rated "Exploitation More Likely," and publicly disclosed. Since, HTTP.sys sits at the core of IIS and Windows web services, a network-accessible DoS here can take down any Windows server running HTTP-based services. Based on the Acknowledgement, it looks like this bug may have been found using AI. There are no real details for the other bugs, but based simply on the impact, I would focus on the Kerberos and TCP/IP bugs if you had to prioritize.

No new advisories are being released this month.

Looking Ahead

The next Patch Tuesday will be on July 14 and will be the last one before Black Hat/DEFCON. It’s usually a big release, so strap in and hang on. I’ll be back then to give you my full thoughts. Until then, stay safe, happy patching, and may all your reboots be smooth and clean!

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the HTTP Protocol Stack for Microsoft Internet Information Services implemented in HTTP.sys. The vulnerability is due to invalid validating incoming HTTP requests.

A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted HTTP packets to the target system. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can result in a denial-of-service condition, or, in the worst case, code execution with kernel privileges.

The Vulnerability

HTTP.sys is the kernel-mode HTTP protocol driver in Microsoft Windows. It provides HTTP request parsing, response caching, and SSL/TLS termination for Internet Information Services (IIS) and other applications that register URL prefixes. The driver listens on configured TCP ports (commonly 80 for HTTP and 443 for HTTPS) and processes inbound HTTP/1.x and HTTP/2 requests at the kernel level.

When operating over HTTPS, HTTP.sys delegates TLS processing to the Windows Secure Channel (SChannel) provider. Inbound TCP data is decrypted on a per-record basis: each TLS record constitutes an independent unit of encryption and is decrypted separately by SChannel before being delivered to HTTP.sys as a distinct plaintext buffer. A single TLS 1.3 application data record has the following structure:

The decrypted payload of each TLS record is delivered independently to the HTTP parser via

UlHttpBufferReceiveEvent(), regardless of how many TLS records the underlying TCP connection coalesces into a single TCP segment. This behavior is distinct from plaintext HTTP connections, where the Windows TCP stack coalesces multiple segments into a single receive indication before the data reaches HTTP.sys.

The HTTP parser maintains a per-request state object that includes a dynamically grown buffer reference array. The capacity field stores the current number of allocated slots in the buffer reference array. The count field stores the number of slots currently in use. The ref_array_ptr field points to the dynamically allocated array of 8-byte buffer reference entries.

An integer overflow vulnerability exists in HTTP.sys. The vulnerability is due to insufficient bounds checking when growing a buffer reference array during HTTP/1.x header parsing. When HTTP.sys receives data for an HTTP/1.x request, it allocates a UL_REQUEST_BUFFER structure for each receive indication and tracks these buffers in the per-request reference array described above. The count field records the number of active buffer references, and the capacity field records the total number of allocated slots.

As the HTTP parser (UlpParseNextRequest()) processes header lines, it calls an inline buffer reference routine each time a new receive buffer is consumed. When count reaches capacity, the routine grows the array by reallocating it with five additional slots. The new allocation size is computed as 0x28 + capacity * 8, the contents of the existing array are copied via memmove using count * 8 as the copy length, and capacity is incremented by 5 as a 16-bit unsigned integer addition. No overflow check is performed on this addition.

After 13,107 growth events, capacity reaches 0xFFFB. The next growth adds 5, producing 0x10000, which truncates to 0x0000 in the 16-bit field. On the subsequent buffer reference addition, count (which is now 65,536 or greater) exceeds the zero capacity, triggering another growth. The allocation size computation 0x28 + 0 * 8 produces a 40-byte allocation, but the memmove copies count * 8 bytes (approximately 524,256 bytes) from the old buffer into the 40-byte allocation. This results in a kernel pool heap buffer overflow of over 500 kilobytes.

Each buffer reference corresponds to one receive buffer delivered to the HTTP parser. For plaintext HTTP connections, the Windows TCP stack coalesces received segments into large indications, and UlpMergeBuffers() further combines buffers within HTTP.sys. Over TLS connections, each TLS record is decrypted independently by SChannel and delivered as a separate buffer through UlHttpBufferReceiveEvent() into UlpCopyIndicatedData(). If each TLS record contains exactly one complete header line (terminated by CRLF), the HTTP parser fully consumes the buffer without setting the partial-parse flag, causing UlpAdjustBuffers() to advance to the next buffer via its non-merge path. This creates a 1:1 correspondence between TLS records sent and buffer references accumulated.

To trigger the overflow, an attacker crafts an HTTP request in which each header line is encapsulated in a separate TLS application data record. Given a minimum header line size of approximately 4 bytes and a required count of 65,536 buffer references, the total request size comes to roughly 262,144 bytes. The MaxRequestBytes registry value (at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\HTTP\Parameters) must be configured to a value of at least 262,144 bytes for the server to accept a request of this size. The default value of 16,384 bytes limits the request to approximately 4000 header lines, which is insufficient to trigger the overflow. As a mitigation, keeping MaxRequestBytes at or below 65,535 bytes represents the most conservative configuration to prevent this attack.

A remote unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted HTTP/1.x request over a TLS connection to an affected server. Successful exploitation results in unexpected system termination due to a memory access exception in the context of the kernel. Under specific memory layout conditions, exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the kernel.

Notes:

• The vulnerability is only reachable through HTTP/1.x header parsing over TLS connections. HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 use different parser paths that do not interact with the buffer reference array.

• Body data parsing (Content-Length or chunked transfer encoding) does not add entries to the buffer reference array. Only header parsing triggers buffer reference growth.

• At a sending rate of 10 milliseconds per TLS record, the overflow requires approximately 11 minutes to trigger.

Source Code Walkthrough

The following code snippet was taken from HTTP.sys version 10.0.26100.7705. Comments added by TrendAI Research have been highlighted.

In UlpParseNextRequest():

Detection Guidance

To detect an attack exploiting this vulnerability, the detection device must monitor and parse traffic on the TCP port 443.

The traffic on the affected port(s) is TLS-encrypted. The detection device must be able to decrypt the TLS traffic before applying the following detection method. The detection device should monitor for HTTPS connections.

An HTTP/1.x request [1] consists of a request line followed by zero or more header field lines, each terminated by CRLF. The following grammar defines the relevant structure:

Decrypted traffic inspection:

After decrypting the TLS session, the detection device must parse the HTTP/1.x request headers. The detection device must count the number of distinct header field lines present in a single HTTP request. If the number of header field lines in a single request exceeds 1,000, the traffic should be considered suspicious; an attack exploiting this vulnerability is likely underway.

Encrypted traffic heuristics:

Where decryption is not available, the detection device should inspect the pattern of TLS application data records within the encrypted session. If each TLS application data record contains a single short payload and the total number of such records on a single connection exceeds 1,000, the traffic should be considered suspicious; an attack exploiting this vulnerability is likely underway.

Notes:

• The preferred detection method (header line count) requires the ability to decrypt TLS traffic, for example through TLS inspection, a decrypting proxy, or possession of the server's private key. This method directly observes the attack indicator and produces low false-positive and false-negative rates.

• The TLS record heuristic operates on encrypted traffic and does not require decryption. This method is more prone to false positives (legitimate applications that send many small TLS records, such as interactive streaming sessions, may trigger the heuristic) and to false negatives (the threshold is based on observable record sizes rather than the actual header count that determines exploitability). Where possible, decrypted traffic inspection should be preferred.

• The attack requires approximately 11 minutes of sustained connection to accumulate sufficient header lines. Connection duration monitoring may serve as a supplementary detection heuristic.

Conclusion

This vulnerability was patched by Microsoft in the June 2026 release cycle. They note several mitigations that include editing the registry to ensure unpatched systems are not vulnerable to exploitation. However, the best method to ensure this bug has been fully remediated is to test and deploy the vendor-supplied patch.

Special thanks to Yazhi Wang and Jonathan Lein of the TrendAI Research team for providing such a thorough analysis of this vulnerability. For an overview of TrendAI Research services, please visit https://go.trendmicro.com/tis/vulnerabilities.html.

The threat research team will be back with other great vulnerability analysis reports in the future. Until then, follow the team on Twitter, Mastodon, LinkedIn, or Bluesky for the latest in exploit techniques and security patches.

Adobe Patches for July 2026

Adobe has now moved to a bimonthly release schedule, which means they will be releasing patches on the second and fourth Tuesdays of the month. I’ll continue to cover the second Tuesday release here and update this blog should the fourth Tuesday release contain anything significant. I think this is a smart way to break up a monster release into something a bit more manageable. Apple has said they are taking a similar approach. We’ll see if other vendors follow their lead.

For the first part of the July release, Adobe released 12 bulletins addressing 88 unique CVEs in Adobe ColdFusion, Commerce, After Effects, Animate, Audition, Bridge, Creative Cloud Desktop Application, Experience Manager, Illustrator, Media Encoder, Premiere Pro, and the Content Credentials SDK.

Here’s this month’s overview table:

While nothing is under active exploit, I would prioritize the Cold Fusion and Commerce patches first. The patch for Cold Fusion even clocks in with a CVSS 9.9 bug. Beyond that, most of these updates are pretty straightforward. If you’re using these products, patch them. However, you can use you regular patch cadence here.

Microsoft Patches for July 2026

Here it is. The Mother of All Releases. To call this record-breaking is an understatement. How to count this mess is anyone’s guess, but I see new Microsoft 621 CVEs for the month of July. Some of these are in online services where no user action is required. They also list about 480 bugs in Chromium and Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) that I won’t cover here. Here’s how I put this in context. I looked at the last 20 years of Microsoft releases. The CVE count year-to-date exceeds all other years’ totals.

The products covered this month are also astonishing. There are patches for Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Azure, .NET and Visual Studio, Github Copilot, Defender, Exchange Server, Hyper-V, Ages of Empire II, and Minecraft Server (really!). That phrase “Windows components” does some pretty heavy lifting here, too, as just about everything you’ve ever heard of is getting patched. All told, there are 63 rated Critical, six rated Moderate, one rated Low, with the rest rated Important in severity. Eight of these bugs were submitted through the ZDI program (more on that later). Two CVEs are listed as under active exploit while one other is listed as publicly known.

So how do we eat this elephant? One byte at a time (pun intended). Let’s start by looking a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with the bugs being exploited in the wild.

-    CVE-2026-56155 - Active Directory Federation Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This is one of several AD FS being patched this month, but it’s the only one being actively exploited. It stems from insufficient access-control granularity and does require local access and low privileges to start, but AD FS is exactly the kind of identity infrastructure attackers love to pivot through once they're in. It can also be paired with an RCE as we often see in ransomware. Test and deploy this patch quickly.

-    CVE-2026-56164 - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
The other bug being exploited in the wild this month is a modest CVSS 5.3 – but it shows why Moderate severity bugs still matter. It's a missing-authentication flaw, meaning an unauthenticated attacker can hit it over the network with no user interaction required. When something this reachable is being actively abused, patch it now and worry about the score later.

-    CVE-2026-57092 - Microsoft Windows VMSwitch Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This patch rates the highest CVSS score for the month: a solid 9.9. It’s a use-after-free that lets a low-privileged attacker escalate to full host compromise across a VM boundary. We saw something like this demonstrated at Pwn2Own Berlin on ESXi, but it clearly isn’t alone. If you’re using VMSwitch in your Hyper-V deployments (and you likely are), test and deploy this one quickly.

-    CVE-2026-50522/58644 - Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This matching pair of CVSS 9.8 bugs results from the deserialization-of-untrusted-data and are reachable without authentication or user interaction. CVE-2026-50522 was demonstrated during Pwn2Own Berlin, so it’s odd to see Microsoft list it as “Exploit Maturity Unknown” since we literally handed them a working exploit. Just another reason to do your own risk assessment and not rely 100% on the vendor. If you have any Internet accessible SharePoint servers, test and deploy this patch quickly.

-    CVE-2026-56190 - Remote Desktop Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
This patch covers an unauthenticated, network-reachable, no user interaction required bug. The root cause is a classic one: use of uninitialized resource (CWE-908), meaning specially crafted RDP traffic can interact with memory that was never properly initialized, letting an attacker corrupt memory and potentially steer code execution. RDP Servers are a common target, so audit your systems to see which are internet accessible and start from there.

-    CVE-2026-55008 - Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability
Ignore the title here and treat this like the XSS bug it is. The vulnerability is listed as a CVSS 9.6 since it’s a stored cross-site scripting flaw in Outlook Web Access, with a scope-changed impact that lets it break out of the web app context entirely. An attacker sends a specially crafted email, and if the victim simply opens it in OWA, arbitrary JavaScript executes in their browser session — no attachment needed, no macro warning, just viewing the message does it. If you’re using OWA, test and deploy this one quickly.

-    CVE-2026-50518 - Windows DHCP Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are a couple of these DHCP RCE patches in this release, but the other has caveats while this one does not. Both are heap-based buffer overflows scoring CVSS 9.8, both unauthenticated and network-reachable. If you're running DHCP Server role on anything Internet-adjacent (you're not, right?), these move to the top of the list.

-    CVE-2026-56188 - Windows Server Network driver Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Another Critical-rated bug, this one is caused by a race condition. It’s always fun to see a TOCTOU bug rated this high, since race conditions are notoriously finicky to exploit reliably. While it may prove tricky to exploit, this bug could allow an attacker to execute privileged code over the network without user interaction. Don’t let the race condition lull you to sleep on a wormable bug.

-    CVE-2026-55010 - Minecraft Bedrock Dedicated Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
File this in the “why not” category. This bug is a heap-based buffer overflow in Minecraft Bedrock Dedicated Server, also CVSS 9.8 and also unauthenticated RCE. Yes, your kid’s Minecraft server (it is your kid’s server, right?) is exposed to the same class of bug as your DHCP infrastructure. Patch it anyway.

Here’s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for July 2026: