--- cve: "CVE-2024-26960" severity: "HIGH" cvss: 7.0 epss: "18%" vendor: "Linux" kev: false exploited: false published: "2024-05-01 06:15:12" tags: [cve, security, high] source: tsecurity.de CVE-Dossier exported: "2026-09-08T07:42:31+02:00" --- # CVE-2024-26960 > 7.0 HIGH ## Beschreibung In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff() There was previously a theoretical window where swapoff() could run and teardown a swap_info_struct while a call to free_swap_and_cache() was running in another thread. This could cause, amongst other bad possibilities, swap_page_trans_huge_swapped() (called by free_swap_and_cache()) to access the freed memory for swap_map. This is a theoretical problem and I haven't been able to provoke it from a test case. But there has been agreement based on code review that this is possible (see link below). Fix it by using get_swap_device()/put_swap_device(), which will stall swapoff(). There was an extra check in _swap_info_get() to confirm that the swap entry was not free. This isn't present in get_swap_device() because it doesn't make sense in general due to the race between getting the reference and swapoff. So I've added an equivalent check directly in free_swap_and_cache(). Details of how to provoke one possible issue (thanks to David Hildenbrand for deriving this): --8try_to_unuse() will stop as soon as soon as si->inuse_pages==0. So the question is: could someone reclaim the folio and turn si->inuse_pages==0, before we completed swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(). Imagine the following: 2 MiB folio in the swapcache. Only 2 subpages are still references by swap entries. Process 1 still references subpage 0 via swap entry. Process 2 still references subpage 1 via swap entry. Process 1 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE [then, preempted in the hypervisor etc.] Process 2 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE Process 2 goes ahead, passes swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(), and calls __try_to_reclaim_swap(). __try_to_reclaim_swap()->folio_free_swap()->delete_from_swap_cache()-> put_swap_folio()->free_swap_slot()->swapcache_free_entries()-> swap_entry_free()->swap_range_free()-> ... WRITE_ONCE(si->inuse_pages, si->inuse_pages - nr_entries); What stops swapoff to succeed after process 2 reclaimed the swap cache but before process1 finished its call to swap_page_trans_huge_swapped()? --8 ## CVSS-Vektor ``` CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H ``` | Metrik | Wert | Bewertung | |---|---|---| | AV Angriffsvektor | Lokal | good | | AC Komplexität | Hoch | good | | PR Privilegien | Gering | warn | | UI Interaktion | Keine | bad | | S Scope | Unverändert | good | | C Vertraulichkeit | Hoch | bad | | I Integrität | Hoch | bad | | A Verfügbarkeit | Hoch | bad | ## Patch verfügbar (OSV) - Kernel ≥ 5.10.215 - Kernel ≥ 5.15.154 - Kernel ≥ 6.1.84 - Kernel ≥ 6.6.24 - Kernel ≥ 6.7.12 - Kernel ≥ 6.8.3 ## Referenzen - - - - - - - - - --- _Exportiert aus dem [tsecurity.de CVE-Dossier](https://tsecurity.de/cve?cve=CVE-2024-26960) · Datenquellen: EUVD (ENISA), NVD, OSV, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, Exploit-DB, BSI BITS_