CVE-2026-112377 | CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 fails to bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection, allowing attackers to relay valid Evidence from a genuine attester. Attackers holding an extracted attested TLS private key can forward the relying party's nonce to a genuine attester and replay its Evidence to impersonate the attested workload and intercept data.
CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 fails to bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection, allowing attackers to relay valid Evidence from a genuine attester. Attackers holding an extracted attested TLS private key can forward the relying party's nonce to a genuine attester and replay its Evidence to impersonate the attested workload and intercept data.
- 🔗 github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc/pull/58
- 🔗 github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc/tree/5b6…
- 🔗 github.com/ionut-arm/mbedtls/blob/f4ac7593826a506fc5…
- 🔗 datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-intra-handshake-fail/
- 🔗 github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fai…
- 🔗 github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc
- 🔗 www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ccc-attestation-sig-attested-t…
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CVE-2026-112377 | CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 fails to bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection, allowing attackers to relay valid Evidence from a genuine attester. Attackers holding an extracted attested TLS private key can forward the relying party's nonce to a genuine attester and replay its Evidence to impersonate the attested workload and intercept data.
CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 fails to bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection, allowing attackers to relay valid Evidence from a genuine attester. Attackers holding an extracted attested TLS priv