--- cve: "CVE-2026-46110" severity: "HIGH" cvss: 7.5 epss: "50%" vendor: "Linux" kev: false exploited: false published: "2026-05-28 10:16:26" tags: [cve, security, high] source: tsecurity.de CVE-Dossier exported: "2026-09-11T05:21:53+02:00" --- # CVE-2026-46110 > 7.5 HIGH ## Beschreibung In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer's physical address and a status flag ("OWN") indicating which side owns the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both "submissions" and "completions." In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called. This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own): - `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid) - `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated) - `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL) But because stmmac_rx() only checks OWN, it confuses `full`/`dirty`. In the past (see 'Fixes:'), there was a bug where the loop could cycle `cur_rx` all the way back to the first descriptor it dirtied, resulting in a NULL dereference when mistaken for `full`. The aforementioned commit resolved that *specific* failure by capping the loop's iteration limit at `dma_rx_size - 1`, but this is only a partial fix: if the previous stmmac_rx_refill() didn't complete, then there are leftover `dirty` descriptors that the loop might encounter without needing to cycle fully around. The current code therefore panics (see 'Closes:') when stmmac_rx_refill() is memory-starved long enough for `cur_rx` to catch up to `dirty_rx`. Fix this by explicitly checking, before advancing `cur_rx`, if the next entry is dirty; exit the loop if so. This prevents processing of the final, used descriptor until stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, but fully prevents the `cur_rx == dirty_rx` ambiguity as the previous bugfix intended: so remove the clamp as well. Since stmmac_rx_zc() is a copy-paste-and-tweak of stmmac_rx() and the code structure is identical, any fix to stmmac_rx() will also need a corresponding fix for stmmac_rx_zc(). Therefore, apply the same check there. In stmmac_rx() (not stmmac_rx_zc()), a related bug remains: after the MAC sets OWN=0 on the final descriptor, it will be unable to send any further DMA-complete IRQs until it's given more `empty` descriptors. Currently, the driver simply *hopes* that the next stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, risking an indefinite stall of the receive process if not. But this is not a regression, so it can be addressed in a future change. ## CVSS-Vektor ``` CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H ``` | Metrik | Wert | Bewertung | |---|---|---| | AV Angriffsvektor | Netzwerk | bad | | AC Komplexität | Gering | bad | | PR Privilegien | Keine | bad | | UI Interaktion | Keine | bad | | S Scope | Unverändert | good | | C Vertraulichkeit | Keine | good | | I Integrität | Keine | good | | A Verfügbarkeit | Hoch | bad | ## Patch verfügbar (OSV) - Kernel ≥ 6.1.176 - Kernel ≥ 6.6.140 - Kernel ≥ 6.12.88 - Kernel ≥ 7.0.7 ## Referenzen - - - - - - --- _Exportiert aus dem [tsecurity.de CVE-Dossier](https://tsecurity.de/cve?cve=CVE-2026-46110) · Datenquellen: EUVD (ENISA), NVD, OSV, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, Exploit-DB, BSI BITS_