CVE-2026-47102 | LiteLLM prior to 1.83.10 allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint. While the endpoint correctly restricts users to updating only their own account, it does not restrict which fields may be changed. A user who can reach this endpoint can set their role to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative access to LiteLLM including all users, teams, keys, models, and prompt history. Users with the org_admin role have legitimate access t
LiteLLM prior to 1.83.10 allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint. While the endpoint correctly restricts users to updating only their own account, it does not restrict which fields may be changed. A user who can reach this endpoint can set their role to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative access to LiteLLM including all users, teams, keys, models, and prompt history. Users with the org_admin role have legitimate access to this endpoint and can exploit this vulnerability without chaining any additional flaw.
- 🔗 www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/litellm-privilege-escalation-rce
- 🔗 gist.github.com/13ph03nix/9ec616e1fdc77b3673509c60206e827…
- 🔗 huntr.com/bounties/8e75edfb-ff05-4e63-bfca-2d93d03f…
- 🔗 github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.10-sta…
- 🔗 github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/25541
- 🔗 github.com/BerriAI/litellm/commit/e6f18ce75b111c9b93…
- 🔗 github.com/BerriAI/litellm/commit/128d32d2494b759c5d…
- 🔗 www.vulncheck.com/advisories/litellm-privilege-escalation-v…
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CVE-2026-47102 | LiteLLM prior to 1.83.10 allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint. While the endpoint correctly restricts users to updating only their own account, it does not restrict which fields may be changed. A user who can reach this endpoint can set their role to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative access to LiteLLM including all users, teams, keys, models, and prompt history. Users with the org_admin role have legitimate access t
LiteLLM prior to 1.83.10 allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint. While the endpoint correctly restricts users to updating only their own account, it does not restrict which fields may be changed. A user wh