🎯 CVE-2026-64586 🇪🇺 EUVD
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CVE-2026-64586 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -> wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal

brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule
drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of()
and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free ->
wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending
or running during removal can outlive drvr.

Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work
callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe
brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset ->
brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for
the running work and deadlock.

Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through
brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is
marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls
brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing
and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes
the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming
path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in
the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail
path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in
sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the
firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq;
on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which
also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is
initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees
drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock;
resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe.

Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire
before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr
(bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate.

The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to
every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit),
SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the
debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending
bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the
scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released
those DMA buffers.

This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does
not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the
asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That
callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked
separately.

This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Klassifikation & Betroffenheit:
Linux Linux 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <4824e3bcc68f8d678b409039d1bb48c7b5ea73dcLinux patch: 5.10.266Linux patch: 6.18.44Linux 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945Linux 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <61127dd20920bf28460a1609aabb0dafa2f54facLinux 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683Linux patch: 6.1.184Linux 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 <177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985
Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') 🎯 Medium

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

🛡️ Empfohlene Mitigation: Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.
Vollständige Definition bei MITRE ➔
🩹 Patch verfügbar (OSV):
🩹 Kernel ≥ 5.10.266 🩹 Kernel ≥ 5.15.217 🩹 Kernel ≥ 6.1.184 🩹 Kernel ≥ 6.6.151 🩹 Kernel ≥ 6.12.103 🩹 Kernel ≥ 6.18.44
📚 Referenzen & Quellen:
Ausnutzungs-Zeitleiste:
CVSS-Vektor-Analyse: 8.8
AV · Angriffsvektor Benachbart
AC · Komplexität Gering
PR · Privilegien Keine
UI · Interaktion Keine
S · Scope Unverändert
C · Vertraulichkeit Hoch
I · Integrität Hoch
A · Verfügbarkeit Hoch
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Veröffentlicht:06.08.2026
Aktualisiert:23.08.2026 12:45
Assigner (CNA):Linux
EUVD-ID:EUVD-2026-53773
CWE-94: Code Injection ✓ Offizieller Patch / Advisory verfügbar
💡 Gegenmaßnahme: Kernel-Paket aktualisieren (apt upgrade linux-image / yum update kernel) und System neu starten.
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📊 Historien-Charts — Criticals-Trend · Vendors · EPSS-Verteilung
🔴 Criticals pro Monat (12 M) 2025-09: 80 2025-10: 317 2025-11: 257 2025-12: 426 2026-01: 431 2026-02: 417 2026-03: 649 2026-04: 574 2026-05: 683 2026-06: 941 2026-07: 1327 2026-08: 1828 2026-09: 1025 8.955 Criticals gesamt
🏢 Top-Vendor-Veröffentlichungen (6 M) Adobe Apple Google Linux Microsoft Oracle Corporation
● Adobe ● Apple ● Google ● Linux ● Microsoft ● Oracle
📈 EPSS-Verteilung (Messungen)
Tier2026-09-022026-09-20
≥90 %0489
≥50 %01477
≥10 %00
<10 %3000
Datenquellen & Methodik: Primärquelle ist die EUVD der ENISA (laufender Datenbank-Sync, alle 15 Minuten), abgeglichen mit dem CISA-KEV-Katalog und der NVD — Detail-Dossiers reichern fehlende Felder live per NVD an — mit Fallback auf CIRCL vulnerability-lookup (EU/Non-Profit, aggregiert CVE-, GitHub- und OSV-Advisories). Der CISA-KEV-Katalog (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, ~1.700 aktiv ausgenutzte Schwachstellen) wird bei jedem Sync vollständig neu geladen und kreuzreferenziert — filterbar über die KEV-Pille. CVSS 3.1 wird nach Ampel-Logik aus Verteidigersicht dekodiert; EPSS bezeichnet die 30-Tage-Exploit-Wahrscheinlichkeit (FIRST.org).
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Schwachstellen-Kategorie (CWE):
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EPSS 0.2%
CVE-2026-64586 🌐 Adjacent Network 🔓 Keine Authentifizierung nötig
Linux

CVE-2026-64586 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -> wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr throug

CWE-94: Code Injection ✓ Offizieller Patch / Advisory verfügbar
💡 Gegenmaßnahme: Kernel-Paket aktualisieren (apt upgrade linux-image / yum update kernel) und System neu starten.