CVE-2026-68196 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res); without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes hif_drv->ass
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header
wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as
ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res);
without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct
wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a
received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes
hif_drv->assoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be
validated before the driver accesses the fixed header.
For a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps.
For a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of
65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at
buffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data
(CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an
out-of-bounds read of res->status_code at offsets 2 and 3.
Reject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the
header or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure
on this path: the caller falls through to a
"conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS" check after the parser
returns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short
response be treated as a successful association.
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/d79b92417f33424ff23dad76716ed8f2…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/b81d0ea9e1daa215b3da68c1f4f6fb07…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d50acf5420de0c4da99c2d634731c9d…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/584c8954ad55f8b09b475be6db710fe4…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d410320e8ae5933e651660c9fadc1d3…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/e511e93abd6eeedcd5b3c55516241f41…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ccdf8c8de87a9580df37c3c1ec53ba8…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c4c97b60a5e978121d9ee8cb0ab3916…
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| Tier | 2026-08-29 | 2026-09-14 |
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CVE-2026-68196 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res); without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes hif_drv->ass
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*