CVE-2026-68255 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer
virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the
device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid
array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension
count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size
together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent
kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds
read / info leak).
Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array.
Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f506a85a905b080cadc029a1651a310…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fc2a017c5d597937e0c28b9a9669844…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/2757e6e803092cf0aeaf4b735e16b5d3…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/35be0e2c6862abcd5e5f5445261f1fd9…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/375c1934ef0196d3b6d3a1eae3232bef…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e1a53892ba7f8a3e1da6bfc53c83ae7…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/64bedd2758eccbc74d39f7006a7ec16f…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/65ce911f341ad8ff0c08922eff5bb6db…
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CVE-2026-68255 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never again