CVE-2026-68433 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received. A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier message, c
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len
handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode
boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused
reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received.
A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the
second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier
message, causing an uninitialized memory read.
Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching
other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that
were actually read from the wire.
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/1307028f082756bf453e1889aee9983d…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6cbf6878f3a1503c872ba8f1e69a58e…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/72a35070fcefa229b1b031aa7482ad37…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/340e0386aa39da181015bee38f309018…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/d60de8253c85a02d0e6194b0735e7a56…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e7ebfaa0d14cf50e44041bfde38070d…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d934c934ec746d53fc7e4f532397926…
- 🔗 git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3c32939fa0e3ee9b883b9a0fd1972c5…
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CVE-2026-68433 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received. A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier message, c
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the s