Summary
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security (CISA) partners have observed active exploitation of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server products. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable Exchange Servers, enabling the attacker to gain persistent system access, as well as access to files and mailboxes on the server and to credentials stored on that system. Successful exploitation may additionally enable the attacker to compromise trust and identity in a vulnerable network. Microsoft released out-of-band patches to address vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server. The vulnerabilities impact on-premises Microsoft Exchange Servers and are not known to impact Exchange Online or Microsoft 365 (formerly O365) cloud email services.
This Alert includes both tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and the indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with this malicious activity. To secure against this threat, CISA recommends organizations examine their systems for the TTPs and use the IOCs to detect any malicious activity. If an organization discovers exploitation activity, they should assume network identity compromise and follow incident response procedures. If an organization finds no activity, they should apply available patches immediately and implement the mitigations in this Alert.
allows an unauthenticated attacker to send arbitrary HTTP requests and authenticate as the Exchange Server. The vulnerability exploits the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) via a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This would also allow the attacker to gain access to mailboxes and read sensitive information.
It is possible for an attacker, once authenticated to the Exchange server, to gain access to the Active Directory environment and download the Active Directory Database.
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
The majority of the TTPs in this section are sourced from a to check your servers for any signs of a compromise.
Conduct Forensic Analysis
Should your organization see evidence of compromise, your incident response should begin with conducting forensic analysis to collect artifacts and perform triage. Please see the following list of recommendations on how to conduct forensic analysis using various tools.
Although the following free tools are not endorsed by the Federal Government, incident responders commonly use them to perform forensics.
While collecting artifacts to perform triage, use processes and tools that minimize the alteration of the data being collected and that minimize impact to the operating system itself.
Ideally, during data collection, store the data on removable/external media and, when possible, run the artifact collection tools from the same media.
Key artifacts for triage that should be collected:
- Memory
- All registry hives
- All windows event logs
- All web logs
Memory can be collected with a variety of open source tools (e.g., FTK Imager by AccessData, Ram Capture by Belkasoft).
Registry and Windows Event logs can be collected with a variety of open source tools as well (e.g., FTK_Imager, Kroll Artifact Parser And Extractor [KAPE]).
Web logs can also be collected with a variety of open source tools (e.g., FTK Imager).
Windows Artifact Collection Guide
Execute the following steps in order.
1) Download the latest FTK Imager from ]
1) Download KAPE from https://www.kroll.com/en/services/cyber-risk/investigate-and-respond/kroll-artifact-parser-extractor-kape.
2) Disable any antivirus or host protection mechanisms that prevent execution from removable media, or data loss prevention (DLP) mechanisms that restrict utilization of removable media.
- Enable antivirus and host protection once this process is completed.
3) Unzip Kape.zip and run gkape.exe as admin from your removable media
4) Target source should be the drive on which the OS resides, typically C:.
5) Target destination should be an external drive folder, not the same drive as the Target source. If available, use an external hard drive or flash drive.
- A KAPE execution with these parameters will typically produce output artifacts with a total size of 1-25 GB.
- If you are going to be running KAPE on different machines and want to save to the same drive, ensure the Target destination folder is unique for each execution of KAPE.
6) Uncheck Flush checkbox (it is checked natively).
7) Check Add %d and Add %m checkboxes.
8) Select ALL checkboxes to ensure KAPE will target all available data that it is capable of targeting. This takes some time; use the down arrow and space bar to move through the list quickly.
9) Check Process VSCs checkbox.
10) Select Zip radio button and add Base name TargetOutput.
11) Ensure Deduplicate checkbox is checked (it is checked natively).
- At the bottom you should now see a large Current command line, similar to:
- In the bottom right corner hit the Execute! Button.
- Screenshot below shows
gkape.exeduring execution, you will also see a command window execute. Note: KAPE usually takes less than 20 minutes to complete on a workstation; if it is taking significantly longer there may be an issue.

Figure 4: gkape.exe screenshot
Mitigations
CISA strongly recommends organizations read for more information on how to look for this malicious activity and apply critical patches as soon as possible.
If patching is not an immediate option, there are other mitigation options available. However, these options should only be used as a temporary solution, not a replacement for patching. CISA recommends limiting or blocking external access to internet-facing Exchange Servers via the following:
- Restrict untrusted connections to port 443, or set up a VPN to separate the Exchange Server from external access; note that this will not prevent an adversary from exploiting the vulnerability if the attacker is already in your network.
- Block external access to on-premise Exchange:
- Restrict external access to OWA URL:
/owa/. - Restrict external access to Exchange Admin Center (EAC) aka Exchange Control Panel (ECP):
url /ecp/.
- Restrict external access to OWA URL:
CISA would like to thank Microsoft and Volexity for their contributions to this alert.
RESOURCES
- Microsoft Advisory:
- Volexity Blog:
Revisions
- March 3, 2021: Initial Version
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