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๐ก Newskategorie: Windows Tipps
๐ Quelle: windowsir.blogspot.com
I saw this tweet from Ankit recently, and as soon as I read through it, I thought I was watching "The Matrix" again. Instead of seeing the "blonde, brunette, redhead" that Cypher saw, I was seeing actionable detection opportunities and pivot points. How you choose to use them...detections in EDR telemetry or from a SIEM, threat hunts, or specifically flagging/alerting on entries in DFIR parsing...is up to you, but there are some interesting...and again, actionable...opportunities, nonetheless.
From the tweet itself...
%Draft% is environment variable leading to PowerShell
Environment variables are good...because someone has to set that variable using...wait for it...wย aย iย tย ย fย oย rย ย iย t...the 'set' command. This means that if the variable is set via the command line, the process can be detected.ย
Reads another registry value's base64 blob
Blobs are good...because they're usually of a particular value type (i.e., binary) and usually pretty big. I wrote the RegRipper sizes.pl plugin some time ago to address this exact issue, to find values of a certain size or larger.
If the blob isn't binary and is a base64-encoded string, there are a number of ways to detect strings that are base64 encoded.
What's not stated in the body of the tweet, but instead visible in one of the images is that the Run key value written for persistence has interesting data. First, the type is "REG_EXPAND_SZ", which may be a good detection opportunity. This may take some research to determine how prevalent it is in your environment, or in your customers environments, but Microsoft's documentation says that values within the Run key contain a "command line no longer than 260 characters". From this, we can assume that the value data are strings, and of type REG_SZ. For my own use, I've updated one of my RegRipper plugins to specifically look for instances where values in the Run key (HKLM or HKCU) are other than "REG_SZ" types.
Next, the command line itself has a number of unique items you can hunt on. Even if another attack changes the name of the key and value in which the data blob is stored, the command line still offers ample opportunities for detections.
If you don't have EDR telemetry available, try parsing theย Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core%4Operational Event Log, specifically event IDs 9707/9708. Or, if you're sending the data from that Windows Event Log to a SIEM, try searching on elements from within the command line.
Next, the command line itself has a number of unique items you can hunt on. Even if another attack changes the name of the key and value in which the data blob is stored, the command line still offers ample opportunities for detections.
If you don't have EDR telemetry available, try parsing theย Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core%4Operational Event Log, specifically event IDs 9707/9708. Or, if you're sending the data from that Windows Event Log to a SIEM, try searching on elements from within the command line.
The point of all this is that there is very often actionable info in open reporting, things that we can turn into detections via either EDR telemetry or SIEM searches, for threat hunting, or add to our automated DFIR parsing process as a means of retaining "corporate knowledge" and expanding the experience base of all analysts.
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