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Punching Through NVIDIA NemoClaw's Sandbox to Hit Local vLLM on RTX 5090

Disclaimer: This is an experimental build, not a production setup. NemoClaw is early-stage (v0.0.7), the network hacks are volatile, and I'm documenting this because I couldn't find anyone else trying it. What Is…

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Disclaimer: This is an experimental build, not a production setup. NemoClaw is early-stage (v0.0.7), the network hacks are volatile, and I'm documenting this because I couldn't find anyone else trying it.







What Is NemoClaw?



NVIDIA NemoClaw (OpenShell) is a sandboxed execution environment for AI agents. It runs a k3s cluster inside Docker, creates isolated sandbox namespaces, and lets agents execute code in a locked-down container.



The default workflow: your agent talks to NVIDIA's cloud inference API. The sandbox allows outbound HTTPS to integrate.api.nvidia.com and blocks most other traffic.



But what if you have an RTX 5090 sitting right there on the host, running vLLM with Nemotron 9B? I wanted to see if I could route the sandbox's inference to my local GPU instead. Spoiler: it works, but the network isolation requires three separate workarounds.






The Network Topology






WSL2 Host
vLLM on 0.0.0.0:8000
Docker bridge: 172.18.0.1 (yours will differ)
|
openshell-cluster container (172.18.0.2)
k3s cluster
Pod main namespace (10.200.0.1)
|
Sandbox namespace (10.200.0.2) <-- you are here






The sandbox sits inside a network namespace, inside a pod, inside k3s, inside Docker. Three of these boundaries need explicit holes to let traffic through to the host.






Layer 1: Host iptables



Docker's DOCKER-USER chain blocks cross-bridge traffic by default. Replace br-xxx with your actual bridge interface name (ip addr to find it):




sudo iptables -I DOCKER-USER 1 \
-i br-<your-bridge> -p tcp --dport 8000 -j ACCEPT

sudo iptables -I FORWARD 1 \
-i br-<your-bridge> -o eth0 -p tcp --dport 8000 -j ACCEPT









Layer 2: Network Policy + TCP Relay



The sandbox only allows connections to endpoints in its policy file. Add local addresses:




nvidia_inference:
endpoints:
- { host: integrate.api.nvidia.com, port: 443 }
- { host: 10.200.0.1, port: 8000 }
- { host: 172.18.0.1, port: 8000 }






But the sandbox namespace (10.200.0.2) can't reach the Docker bridge (172.18.0.1) directly — different network namespaces. A Python TCP relay in the pod's main namespace bridges the gap:




# relay.py — runs in pod main namespace
server.bind(("10.200.0.1", 8000))
backend.connect(("172.18.0.1", 8000)) # -> host vLLM









Layer 3: Sandbox iptables Injection



The sandbox's own iptables OUTPUT chain has a blanket REJECT. Inject an ACCEPT via nsenter:




SANDBOX_PID=$(docker exec openshell-cluster-nemoclaw \
kubectl exec master-impala -n openshell -- \
cat /var/run/sandbox.pid)

docker exec openshell-cluster-nemoclaw \
kubectl exec master-impala -n openshell -- \
nsenter -t $SANDBOX_PID -n \
iptables -I OUTPUT 1 -d 10.200.0.1 -p tcp --dport 8000 -j ACCEPT









Bonus: Tool Call Gateway



Nemotron 9B outputs tool calls as <TOOLCALL>[...]</TOOLCALL> text. AI coding agents expect OpenAI-compatible structured tool_calls. A gateway between the agent and vLLM buffers SSE streams and translates the format. It also manages on-demand vLLM startup/shutdown to free VRAM when idle.






Does It Work?






# Inside the sandbox
~/ask "Explain PagedAttention in 3 sentences"
# -> hits local RTX 5090

opencode
# -> AI coding agent with tool execution, powered by local GPU






Yes. Zero cloud API calls. Code execution stays sandboxed (filesystem isolation is intact), but inference routes to the local GPU through the network holes we opened.






The Catch: Everything Is Volatile
































Component Survives restart?
Host iptables No
TCP relay No
Sandbox iptables No
Network policy Yes
Sandbox files No


Every restart means re-running the setup. A startup script is non-optional.






Takeaway



NemoClaw's provider system is pluggable — openshell provider create --type openai with a custom URL works fine at the API level. The challenge is purely network isolation: the sandbox blocks outbound traffic that isn't whitelisted, and bridging across namespace boundaries requires manual relay and iptables work.



As a proof of concept for running a sandboxed AI agent on local hardware, it works. As a daily workflow — you'll want a startup script.






Source: nemoclaw-docs — full setup scripts and relay code.

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