USENIX Security '26 - Transparent Dictionaries from Polynomial Commitments
Hossein Hafezi, NYU; Alireza Shirzad, University of Pennsylvania; Benedikt Bünz and Joseph Bonneau, NYU
We present IRONDICT, a transparent dictionary construction based on polynomial commitment schemes. Transparent dictionaries enable an untrusted server to maintain a mutable dictionary and provably serve clients lookup queries. A major open challenge is supporting efficient auditing by lightweight clients. Previous solutions either incurred high server costs (limiting throughput) or high client lookup verification costs, hindering them from modern messaging key transparency deployments with billions of users. Our construction makes black-box use of a generic multilinear polynomial commitment scheme and inherits its security notions, i.e. binding and zero-knowledge. We implement our construction with the recent KZH scheme and find that a dictionary with 1 billion entries can be verified on a consumer-grade laptop in 35 milliseconds, a 300 -fold improvement over the state of the art. Our construction also offers 150000x smaller proofs ( 8 Kilobytes) and perfect privacy, with concretely efficient client and server costs. We also show fast-forwarding techniques based on incremental verifiable computation (IVC) and checkpoints to enable even faster client auditing.
View the full USENIX Security '26 program at https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions
Hossein Hafezi, NYU; Alireza Shirzad, University of Pennsylvania; Benedikt Bünz and Joseph Bonneau, NYU
We present IRONDICT, a transparent dictionary construction based on polynomial commitment schemes. Transparent dictionaries enable an untrusted server to maintain a mutable dictionary and provably serve clients lookup queries. A major open challenge is supporting efficient auditing by lightweight clients. Previous solutions either incurred high server costs (limiting throughput) or high client lookup verification costs, hindering them from modern messaging key transparency deployments with billions of users. Our construction makes black-box use of a generic multilinear polynomial commitment scheme and inherits its security notions, i.e. binding and zero-knowledge. We implement our construction with the recent KZH scheme and find that a dictionary with 1 billion entries can be verified on a consumer-grade laptop in 35 milliseconds, a 300 -fold improvement over the state of the art. Our construction also offers 150000x smaller proofs ( 8 Kilobytes) and perfect privacy, with concretely efficient client and server costs. We also show fast-forwarding techniques based on incremental verifiable computation (IVC) and checkpoints to enable even faster client auditing.
View the full USENIX Security '26 program at https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions