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📊 Historien-Charts — Criticals-Trend · Vendors · EPSS-Verteilung
| Tier | CVEs | Anteil | Δ 7 T |
|---|---|---|---|
| ≥90 % | 795 | 0,2 % | +8 |
| ≥50 % | 3.561 | 0,9 % | +3 |
| ≥10 % | 13.177 | 3,2 % | +12 |
| <10 % | 397.837 | 95,8 % | +1.738 |
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CVE-2026-121587 | Coolify before 4.1.1 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate application names across all teams via manual GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Gitea webhooks. Attackers can send a repository name of % or empty with a common branch like main, exploiting unescaped LIKE wildcards to receive every matching application name before signature verification.
Coolify before 4.1.1 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate application names across all teams via manual GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and Gitea webhooks. Attackers can send a reposi
CVE-2026-118504 | The web interface blocks issue and pull request changes on archived repositories, but several issue routes of the REST API did not check whether the repository is archived. A user allowed to change issues of an archived repository could use the API to edit, close or delete issues, change labels and deadlines, add or delete tracked time and stopwatches, add reactions, change issue blocks, and pin issues, altering data that archiving is meant to freeze. Gitea
The web interface blocks issue and pull request changes on archived repositories, but several issue routes of the REST API did not check whether the repository is archived. A user allowed to change issues of an archived repository could use
CVE-2026-116474 | The `GITEA_TOKEN` of a Gitea Actions job authenticates as the `gitea-actions` system user, and the `/api/v1/user` email and GPG key endpoints accepted that user, so a job could register an email address and a GPG key on it; without required email confirmation (the default) the address is stored as activated. Commit verification treats a key without a real owner as the instance signing key, so any user who can run a workflow job could make commits signed with
The `GITEA_TOKEN` of a Gitea Actions job authenticates as the `gitea-actions` system user, and the `/api/v1/user` email and GPG key endpoints accepted that user, so a job could register an email address and a GPG key on it; without required
CVE-2026-113429 | Legacy (v1 to v3) Actions artifact uploads stored the request's `Content-Encoding` header unchecked in the column that is served as the artifact's `Content-Type` on download, and a value starting with `video/` or `audio/` also removed the sandboxing Content-Security-Policy. A user who can run an Actions job could upload an artifact that a browser renders as HTML on the Gitea origin when the direct artifact download URL is opened, and the URL is reachable ano
Legacy (v1 to v3) Actions artifact uploads stored the request's `Content-Encoding` header unchecked in the column that is served as the artifact's `Content-Type` on download, and a value starting with `video/` or `audio/` also removed the s
CVE-2026-112887 | Gitea Actions task tokens authenticate to the REST API as a shared system user with a negative ID, which repository, organization, project and key filters treated as having no owner restriction, and the token carried no API scope to restrict user-scoped routes. A user who can run a workflow could use the job's token with `GET /api/v1/user/repos` to list every repository on the instance, including private repositories of other users and organizations, with th
Gitea Actions task tokens authenticate to the REST API as a shared system user with a negative ID, which repository, organization, project and key filters treated as having no owner restriction, and the token carried no API scope to restric
CVE-2026-118386 | Workflows triggered by a pull request review were read from the commit named in the review's `commit_id`, while the fork restrictions were decided by the reviewed pull request, and the commit was not checked to belong to that pull request. A user with read access to a repository could place a commit of their own in it, through a fork pull request or an AGit push, and submit a review naming that commit on a pull request whose head branch is in the same reposi
Workflows triggered by a pull request review were read from the commit named in the review's `commit_id`, while the fork restrictions were decided by the reviewed pull request, and the commit was not checked to belong to that pull request.