Steven Sinofsky was right: It wasn't enough for Microsoft to just port Windows to Arm, the mobile chip architecture behind Android and Apple's iPhone and Android. For this new platform to succeed, Microsoft would have to aggressively remove legacy code, develop a modern apps platform, invent versatile new form factors, and attract developers and customers to something new that offered a bridge to the PC past. And it would have to happen in just three years.
In the end, Sinofsky and the software and hardware teams he oversaw were thwarted by a combination of factors. The most problematic, perhaps, came from within. Windows RT was undermined from its inception when the Microsoft Office team, then distracted by making versions of its apps for Apple's iPad, refused to fully support the new app platform, called Metro. It was immediately clear that this decision would send a message to Microsoft's customers and, as important, to developers: If Microsoft didn't support this new platform fully, why should they?
And so he did the only thing he could do: He compromised. Instead of being an entirely new system that could take advantage of the rich capabilities of its Windows foundation but on more reliable and efficient devices, RT was instead a confusing version of the traditional Windows 8 product for PCs that only ran on Arm devices and couldn't even run Windows desktop apps. It looked identical to Windows 8. But it wasn't he same.
Consumers, businesses, and developers would predictably reject it entirely. But RT's defeat wasn't solely on the Office team. RT was also undermined by the shifting dynamics in personal computing, in which the PC, somewhat ironically, was no longer the most personal device people used. It was undermined by Intel's anticompetitive business practices. It was undermined by hubris, as the Windows team, consumed by its success with Windows 7 and, before that, the Office ribbon, was convinced it could hit another home run. And it was undermined by time. Three years simply wasn't long enough to orchestrate this many changes.
But it was also undermined by apathy and fatigue. As customers embraced smartphones for personal, entertainment, and casual tasks, they conversely dug in their heels with the PC, a tool that was increasingly just for work. They were no longer interested in innovation or change, but simply wanted familiar tools to keep working. Sinofsky's teams--Windows and Surface, the latter of which pioneered hybrid tablet PC devices that transformed between different usage "postures"--wanted to "reimagine Windows from the chipset to the experience" to better position Windows against mobile platforms. Microsoft's customers and partners were far less interested in this shift. The world had changed, was changing in real time as Microsoft moved from Windows 7 to Windows 8 and RT.
When Windows 8 and RT arrived in late 2012, they were met by a stone wall of resistance and even disdain. Sinofsky and the ...
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