Cross-posted from for the latency budget this implies.
Opportunity 3: JIT-via-Hook Liquidity
V3 JIT (just-in-time) liquidity required searchers to wrap a swap with mint and burn in the same block. V4 hooks let a pool internalize JIT — the hook itself adds and removes liquidity around incoming swaps, capturing the LP fees.
For an external searcher, this changes the strategy:
- Pools with internal JIT hooks are harder to JIT-attack — the hook already takes the LP fee. Don't waste gas competing.
- Pools without internal JIT still allow classic V3-style JIT, but you must check the hook flags first (
hasPermission(BEFORE_ADD_LIQUIDITY_FLAG)) to know whether your mint will trigger extra callbacks.
The on-chain check is one storage read. Skip pools where internal JIT is active and focus capital on the half of the market without it. See for the calculation framework.
What FRB Agent Supports
for the full risk model.
Further Reading
- . Discuss MEV strategy with the team at ai-frb.com.
↗ Original-Artikel auf dev.to lesenVollständiger Original-BerichtAusführliche Details, Code-Beispiele & Hersteller-Stellungnahme auf dev.to.
Uniswap V4 Hooks MEV 2026: Searcher Opportunities and Risks
- ▸ What Hooks Actually Change
- ▸ Opportunity 1: Custom-Curve Arbitrage
- ▸ Opportunity 2: Dynamic Fee Races
- ▸ Opportunity 3: JIT-via-Hook Liquidity
- ▸ Risk 1: Hook Reentrancy Traps
- ▸ Risk 2: Asymmetric Gas Costs
- ▸ Risk 3: Simulation Drift
- ▸ How V4 Hooks Compare With V3 MEV
- ▸ Hook-Aware Bundling Pattern
- ▸ What FRB Agent Supports
- ▸ Realistic Returns On V4 Hook Arb
- ▸ Further Reading
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